Insights for Marine (and Beyond) Force Design from the Russo-Ukrainian War - War on the Rocks

Six focus areas of article: optionality, traditional air power, loitering munitions, social media and associated IT, ground mobility, logistics

MSgt Steve Sweeney it's the "...in line with political guidance..." that bothers me.

..."Of note, Sen. Jim Webb and a group of prominent retired Marine Corps general officers have come to the definitive conclusion that Force Design 2030 is wrong for the Marine Corps and the nation, despite unfolding developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War. While their various commentaries emphasize different ways in which Gen. David Berger — the current commandant — is mistaken, one thing they share is a failure to offer any alternatives beyond a nostalgic status quo that does not reflect the lessons unfolding on the battlefield of Ukraine or analysis of the China challenge. They demonstrate no solid understanding of current threats, contemporary technologies, or the economic and budgetary constraints that active-duty leaders must contend with today.

Failing to evolve means losing the next war and precious lives with it. That is a cause worth pursuing regardless of any amount of criticism change will receive. Certainly, George C. Marshall did not defer to the views of the cavalry veterans of the 1898 Battle of Omdurman when he was building the force that won World War II, nor should current serving leaders defer to the judgments of veterans of wars 50 years past. The opinions of these veterans deserve a respectful hearing, but in the end, it is down to current leaders to make decisions for the future force in line with political guidance, which has been consistent, in the case of the Marine Corps, across administrations."...