reality-check-for-the-administrative-state

In Chevron, the Court directed lower courts to give agencies great leeway in administering broadly worded statutes. When a statute—say, a provision of the Clean Air Act—is not clear but ambiguous, then the courts should generally defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. Following the federal courts’ micromanagement of federal agencies—especially agencies’ deregulatory efforts in the 1970s and 1980s—Chevron was originally defended as a way to ensure that judges didn’t supplant presidential administrations’ policy judgments. Chevron was intended to elevate both expertise and political accountability in presidential administration, simplify judicial review, and reinforce Congress’s central role in American government. In hindsight, it fell far short in all of these objectives, and may well have undermined them. The problem with this approach is that the Constitution vests legislative power in our Congress—not in administrative agencies staffed by unelected bureaucrats. The Loper Bright Enterprises and Relentless cases give the Supreme Court an opportunity to make that point clear. It’s also a chance to return lawmaking to leaders that voters can hold accountable (Townhall Review).