The Army wants its own 'Space Force.' They shouldn’t be allowed to have it. - Breaking Defense

SFC Kelly Fuerhoff This op-ed posted in opposition.

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/08/the-army-has-a-vital-role-in-space-and-it-continues-to-grow/

(3 of 3) The Army's announced expansion of SMDC -- one of SIX (6) Service Component "Space Commands" -- is specifically spelled out in an article referenced in this sophomoric OPED (see link). This link also contains a link to the PDF of the US Army's official policy statement. And, one may gather from the angry rant posted by these two Senior Resident Fellows for Space Studies at the Mitchell Institute that they didn't bother to "study" either the Article or the Statement much beyond the headlines.

First, the Army "...will integrate friendly joint and coalition space capabilities and interdict adversary space capabilities IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCE COMMANDERS." [EMPHASIS ADDED]. Ergo, the Army is interested in leveraging its own, other Service Components', and other space capabilities TOGETHER to support Army Ground Force Commanders. This implies support to Operational and Tactical-level formations. They also seek to ensure Operational and Tactical interdiction of adversary space capabilities that threaten Army Ground Force Commanders. So, what does the nascent USSF promise to ensure the specific support needs of the Army Ground Force Commanders are met? Or should the Army wash its hands of ALL space-related operations and pray that Space Force has their back

Second, the Army is relying on Army Space Professionals to "...increase understanding and integration of friendly joint and coalition space capabiliies into [Army] Operations and Activities." Moreover, these ARMY Professionals will do all this "at echelon" -- i.e. from Headquarters, Department of the Army, all the way down to the Company-level. Is USSF planning on deploying Space Teams and Detachments in every Army unit across the globe? Would these Space Teams and Detachments even understand the wants and needs of the Army Commanders they support?

Third, Army space integration involves integration in support of Army Warfighting Functions. Which of the following will the USSF step in and "spoon feed" to the Army "at echelon?" How many "guardians" will a Tank Battalion Commander have to fit inside his tactical command post or Rifle Company Commander have tagging along in his formation in order to do these functions for them, and how often will they have these "guardians" around to train with:
- Positioning
- Navigation
- Timing
- Deep Sensing
- Beyond Line-of-Sight Communications
- Force Tracking
- Environmental Monitoring
- Space Domain Awareness
- Geospatial Information

Fourth, and similarly, Army space interdiction involves a variety of capabilities needed at the operational and tactical level. How does USSF plan to cater to these needs for a Operational Detachment A operating behind enemy lines?
- Protect from Observation & Targeting by Counter-Satellite Communications
- Counter-surveillance & Reconnaissance
- Navigation Warfare Operations

The Army's Official Policy Statement stipulates that fighting at echelon in and through space means employing a myriad of systems dedicated to Army-specific needs. These include tactical terminals to leverage multi-orbit satellite communications & access space-enabled tactical intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance platforms, in order to fusing data from multiple space-based platforms tailored to enable targetable intelligence to Army fires and effects, movement and maneuver. That doesn't sound like the Army is going to launch it's own satellites superfilous to the USSF. Rather, it sounds as if the Army seeks to develop Army systems to plug into and leverage assets that rightfully belong to USSF.

The Statement goes on to elaborate other Army-specific platforms that interdict adversary space systems that threaten Army formations (e.g. think USMC F/A-18s providing CAS and Battlefield Air Interdiction as part of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) while USN F/A-18s fly combat air patrols over the Carrier Task Force and the MAGTF), and serve to provide additional resiliency to the Joint Force in theater.

The Statement also points to a need to develop and deploy expeditionary, scalable, and mobile Army space formations empowered by flexible ARMY command relationships to move along side of and keep pace with ground combat formations and integrate these formations with (not REPLACE) USSF and USSPACECOM managed assets. An analog to this would be the USMC's Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) which provides teams to Marine and Army Brigades and Battalions to coordinate close air support and naval gunfire. It wouldn't make sense if the US Navy and Air Force insisted on Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams AND Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) if Marines can fuse all those functions into a Marine-centric team that can access US Navy, Marine, and Airforce support assets and translate the fires and effects they provide to the needs of the ground pounders they support.

So, unless and until the US Space Force -- or Senior Resident Fellows for Space Studies at the Mitchell Institute -- can come up with a reasonable plan to replace the desired functions of the US Army and the demonstrated zeal to execute that plan, then both the USSF, and Senior Resident Fellows for Space Studies at the Mitchell Institute should probably keep their opinions to themselves and focus on launching a viable Service Component.

Last and worse of all, Charles Galbreath's and Jennifer Reeves' claim that the "Army wants its own 'space force'" without expressly demonstrating which of the clearly stated Army goals and capabilities duplicates or replaces (rather than augmenting or leveraging) USSF's core Strategic National or Strategic Theater roles and how amounts to open libel. They should issue a retraction and an apology.



https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/army-moves-to-expand-space-control-planning-interdiction-capabilities/

(2 of 3) As stipulated previously in (1 of 3), the OPED you linked amounts to little more than service rivalry squawking because the authors' (who apparently represent the interests of USSF) beloved baby Service Component is fighting for resources. The OPED piece fallaciously obfuscates the US Army's plans for US Army Space & Missile Defense Command. Here are a few examples.

The OPED incorrectly states:

"Jointness means combatant commands apportion unique capabilities from each of the services to best meet the requirements of a specific operation. It does not mean every service gets an equal share of the action regardless of real-world circumstances, and it does not mean each service replicates the functions of the others within its own ranks. To this end, the Air Force does not operate ships, and the Navy does not have tanks. The entire point of this alignment is to effectively and efficiently focus training, organization, and equipping in specific zones of excellence. That’s why Congress created the Space Force in 2019."

First, Combatant Commands "apportion" NOTHING to the Services aside from operational roles within their Joint Operational Control. It is the SERVICE COMPONENTS that apportion RESOURCES to the CCMDs.

Second, the authors state that "...it does not mean each service replicates the functions of the others within its own ranks. To this end, the Air Force does not operate ships, and the Navy does not have tanks." This is per se Bullshit! In any given geographical CCMD, the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps operate aircraft. In some cases, these Service Components operate almost IDENTICAL aircraft or aircraft with IDENTICAL functions (e.g. BOTH the USN & USMC operate F/A-18s, and the USMC and US Army operate attack, lift, and cargo rotary wing assets). Even the USMC operated M1-series heavy tanks (until their recent divestment of these) and still operates LAVs that are very similar to the US Army's STRYKERs. ALL of the Service Components to one degree or another replicate functions of their sister services within any given joint operation. Sure, an Army maintenance unit can fix Marine equipment or the Air Force can fly Close Air Support missions for the Army, but history proves and missions demand some redundancies within each of the services operating under the operational authority of a CCDR, this includes some Space-related functions.

Third, I agree... we should have service-specific "...alignment...to effectively and efficiently focus training, organization, and equipping in specific zones of excellence." This does NOT mean that the over Services should unconditionally surrender their Space-related, Service-Specific functions, personnel, equipment, or budget.

Why? The Army has been burned before. As part of the 1948 Key West Agreement, the Air Force PROMISED to provide dedicated Close Air Support (CAS) if the Army surrendered fixed-wing aircraft. The Air Force never intended to keep that promise and have been kicking and screaming to ignore their part of the bargain ever since. The USAF squawked over (and eventually killed) the US Army's development of the OV-1 Mohawk, which provided a critical and successful CAS/Forward Observation platform in Vietnam. The only reason the USAF agreed to develop the A-10 was to kill the US Army's AH-56 Cheyenne Advanced Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS) program. And after the Cheyenne died, the Air Force has been trying to kill the A-10 ever since -- despite its battle-proven record and the obvious need.

Apart from crying like toddlers about the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) plans to "...increase its space personnel and space control capabilities...," the authors fail to list any of the Army's initiatives, specifically; they fail to explain WHY the USSF, alone, should cater to the Army's specific service requirements behind these initiatives; and they offer no USSF-unique solution as a substitute. If the USSF wants the US Army to unilaterally divest itself of its Space-related, Service-Specific functions, personnel, equipment, or budget, then it is incumbent upon the authors to make this case substantively (apart from waving around the 2019 NDAA). Otherwise, the authors and the USSF may go and pound sand.

And why pick on the US Army SMDC exclusively? As stated previously, the joint staff and ALL of the other Service Components field their own "Space Commands." Where are the OPEDs demanding these Space-related, Service-Specific functions, personnel, equipment, or budget be folded into USSF?