The Bay of Pigs 60th Anniversary—And The Media-Democrat Cover-up Continues

While this happened before I was born in Cuba... so much of my Cuban personal narrative is defined by this history bending event...

I have read just as many books with the opposite viewpoint. since we cannot go back and read JFK's mind, I guess each will look at it based on their political ideology.
Personally, I believe JFK could have been one of very best Presidents had he lived. Not nominating hm for sainthood, but I think he was a pretty good American.

Throughout February and March, Kennedy continued to meet regularly with advisers regarding the deployment of the exile army. As early as February 8, 1961, several high-level State Department officials voiced their concerns regarding the plan. On March 31, Under Secretary Chester Bowles identified some of his concerns. He feared foremost, that the covert action violated “the fundamental obligations we assumed. . .in establishing the Organization of American States.” The act prohibited the United States (or any state) to “intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” Bowles worried that any United States interference would be received poorly in the international community. Furthermore, if the plan failed, and Bowles believed there was a high likelihood that it would strengthen Castro and his control over the island consolidated. Microsoft Word - Introduction & HS.doc (umbc.edu)

The CIA task force leadership in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the US military. The candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect and not after his inauguration. The believed, the “original concept is now seen to be unachievable (with a force of 1,400 men) in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. (and the) second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

In March 1961, Kennedy rejected the CIA's war plan called Trinidad for an amphibious/airborne assault on Cuba and instead he approved a quiet invasion landing at night in which there would be "no basis for American military intervention." On approving the new plan for the April 15, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy reemphasized that he would not intervene by introducing US troops, even if the exile brigade faced defeat on the beachhead.

Prior to the invasion, Kennedy had ask Secretary of State Dean Acheson, how many men were invading and how many men Castro could field against them. Acheson said, “Perhaps 1,500 invaders and 25,000 opponents.”

CIA Director Allen Dulles and Bissell never expected an uprising by the people of Cuba against Castro when Brigade 2506 landed. They and the Joint Chiefs lied to Kennedy about this. They expected the invaders would establish and secure a beachhead. Than the CIA and Joints Chiefs cry to Kennedy for the US Navy and Marines floating nearby to come to the Brigade’s aid. They hoped Kennedy would be forced by public opinion to use American Marines and the Navy. Further, on the first day of the invasion, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations had sent the US aircraft carrier USS Essex and helicopter landing ship USS Boxer close to Cuban shore, in violation of Kennedy’s order to keep US ships 50 miles away.

Kennedy had repeatedly told CIA Deputy Director, Dick Bissell in the lead up to the Bay of Pigs that he reserved the right to abort the operation at any time. Yet Bissell advised the anti-Castro Cubans Brigade commanders to “mutiny against their US advisers and proceed with the invasion.” Encouraging a mutiny is the US federal crime of subversion.

"The country’s military and intelligence chiefs had clearly believed they could sandbag the young, untested Kennedy into joining the battle. But he had stunned them by refusing to escalate the fighting." (Source: JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters by James W. Douglass)


Rodolfo Walsh Prensa Latina, a journalist the official state news agency of Cuba, got his hands on an encrypted CIA telex. After deciphering the message, he passed this information about the planned Bay of Pigs invasion to Castro. (The Shock Doctrine, p. 97) http://thewildgeese.irish/profiles/blogs/rodolfo-walsh-defender-of-a-free-press

The CIA had information indicating that the Soviet Union knew the date of the planned invasion and did not inform Kennedy. Radio Moscow actually broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961 predicting the invasion and said, "a plot hatched by the CIA criminals" will occur within a week. The invasion took place four days later. According to British minister David Ormsby-Gore, a British intelligence estimates stated that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion. This estimate was given to the CIA. http://laura-knight-jadczyk.blogspot.com/2006/11/john-f-kennedy-and-pigs-of-war.html

The CIA had information indicating that the Soviet Union knew the date of the planned invasion and did not inform Kennedy. Radio Moscow actually broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961 predicting the invasion and said, "a plot hatched by the CIA criminals" will occur within a week. The invasion took place four days later. According to British minister David Ormsby-Gore, a British intelligence estimates stated that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion. This estimate was given to the CIA. http://laura-knight-jadczyk.blogspot.com/2006/11/john-f-kennedy-and-pigs-of-war.html

Kennedy allowed unmarked US Navy fighter jets to provide limited air cover to escort the B-26s flight to Cuba. But under the control of the CIA these B-26s arrived on the scene an hour before Navy jets who took their orders from the Navy. In the heat of the battle at the Bay of Pigs, one of the transport boats fired 75mm recoilless rifles and .50-caliber machine guns on aircraft their own B-26s, striking some of them. According to CIA officer Grayston Lynch, “We couldn’t tell them from Castro planes,” “We ended up shooting at two or three of them.”

As a result of poor logistics planning the soldiers on the beach ran out of ammunition. All their ammo was in one ship which got sunk by a T-33. According to Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy's special counsel, adviser, the CIA then cancelled a convoy bringing more ammunition. They did so without consulting the President.

The IG’s report concluded the operation was characterized by bad planning, poor staffing, faulty intelligence and assumptions, and “a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious”,..and the “plausible denial was a pathetic illusion.” On page 149 of Volume III, from the minutes of the CIA Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our [CIA] original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned. Our second concept (1,500- 3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed.”
(Source: The “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations” was written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian.)

The above Taylor Commission report remained classified until 1998. (Source: Crime So Immense, Texas Observer, May 26, 2000)
Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations, Volume III, page 149 written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer, who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB355/