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Without using Google,Wiki, or any other search engine...using only what you know the second you read the question -- Give your opinion why Marines, trained in Amphibious landing, were not used at Normandy on D-Day.
Let's keep this civil, because this is a topic that could easily go awry.
Thoughts?
Opinions?
Facts?
Insider information?
Let's keep this civil, because this is a topic that could easily go awry.
Thoughts?
Opinions?
Facts?
Insider information?
Posted in these groups: 
D-Day
D-Day
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 133
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Why Marines not at Normandy (from a related 36 EN BDE LPD a few years ago).
- BLUF: It makes more strategic sense to mass a service (Marines vs Army) in a theater of operation as opposed to giving each theater a slice of each service. It therefore made more sense to mass Marines in the Pacific Theater of Operation (PTO) and mass the Army in the European Theater of Operation (ETO) based upon the below.
- There were seven major amphibious operations in the WWII ETO whereas there were about 40 major (Regimental size or larger) amphibious operations in the PTO. US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Army & Marine Corps, Pacific Theater and US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Mediterranean & European Theaters by Gordon Rottman
- PTO amphib operations were generally smaller. All of the islands in the Pacific add up to a land mass about the size of Ohio (42,000 mi2). The AO covered 9600 miles, 13 time zones with maps/intel of beaches that were not well charted and were lightly opposed. Their purpose was to secure small islands and were generally conducted during the day. ETO amphib operations, meanwhile, were generally larger in scale and their purpose was to secure lodgements and seaports. They were generally conducted at night on beaches that were well charted and heavily opposed.
- Marines rely upon Navy logistics within about 40 miles from a coastline and beyond that they rely upon Army logistics. Based upon the data above, using Marines in the PTO generally meant they did not have to transition from Navy to Army support.
- There are four basic defenses against an amphibious attack: preemptive (hit force at base), shoreline, mobile, and combination. Each has a different focus, advantages, and disadvantages. At the Water’s Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault by Theodore L. Gatchel.
- Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare by LTC Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC
- BLUF: It makes more strategic sense to mass a service (Marines vs Army) in a theater of operation as opposed to giving each theater a slice of each service. It therefore made more sense to mass Marines in the Pacific Theater of Operation (PTO) and mass the Army in the European Theater of Operation (ETO) based upon the below.
- There were seven major amphibious operations in the WWII ETO whereas there were about 40 major (Regimental size or larger) amphibious operations in the PTO. US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Army & Marine Corps, Pacific Theater and US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Mediterranean & European Theaters by Gordon Rottman
- PTO amphib operations were generally smaller. All of the islands in the Pacific add up to a land mass about the size of Ohio (42,000 mi2). The AO covered 9600 miles, 13 time zones with maps/intel of beaches that were not well charted and were lightly opposed. Their purpose was to secure small islands and were generally conducted during the day. ETO amphib operations, meanwhile, were generally larger in scale and their purpose was to secure lodgements and seaports. They were generally conducted at night on beaches that were well charted and heavily opposed.
- Marines rely upon Navy logistics within about 40 miles from a coastline and beyond that they rely upon Army logistics. Based upon the data above, using Marines in the PTO generally meant they did not have to transition from Navy to Army support.
- There are four basic defenses against an amphibious attack: preemptive (hit force at base), shoreline, mobile, and combination. Each has a different focus, advantages, and disadvantages. At the Water’s Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault by Theodore L. Gatchel.
- Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare by LTC Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC
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Col Robert Santucci
Good discussion. It would be better to discuss in person over a single malt scotch, but I guess my point was I think the Marines could have been used at least in the amphibious planning stage to identify some of these concepts. Close air support on fixed open beach defenses along an easily identifiable line of defense on the beach bluffs would have been easy to plan and fairly simple to coordinate - the Marines used CAS in dense forest jungles where exact positions were not easy to identify. The Army conducted several practice amphibious landing on beaches in England leading up to the 6 June Assault and it would given the Army Air Corps and platoon commanders a chance to integrate these concepts. Personally, don't think it would have even been a plan to have the Marines fight all the way to Germany, especially since they didn't have the armored or artillery force levels needed to support such an advance. However, in the ETO the Army was continually short of infantry which caused Eisenhower to use the 101st and 82nd airborne as infantry in several campaigns - Hurtgen Forest and The Bulge come to mind, so maybe a Marine division would have come in handy in France in WWII as it did in WWI at Belleau Wood. The practice of using Marines for the initial amphibious assault and then backfilling with heavier Army units wasn't a new concept either, it was essentially done at Guadalcanal.
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1LT William Clardy
Col Robert Santucci, while your points make sense tactically, they fail logistically.
There is a limit to available real estate in England, so positioning Marine aviation assets where they could provide more effective and responsive CAS than AAF units would have been problematic -- any forward-positioned airfield hosting a Marine squadron would mean that an AAF or RAF squadron would have to fly farther to accomplish its missions.
Likewise, any Marine assets (men and equipment) used for Operation Overlord would be assets unavailable for operations in the Pacific. How many landings in the Pacific would have had to be shorted Amtracks in order to stage a significant number in support of Overlord? If we presume a 12-month build-up period and then optimistically tack on another 3 months for redeploying those assets to support amphibious operations in the Pacific, how much would that have hindered operations in the PTO?
Fundamentally, wouldn't it be likely that any reduction in casualties by using Marines at Normandy would have been offset by an increase in casualties as our forces island-hopped their way towards Japan?
There is a limit to available real estate in England, so positioning Marine aviation assets where they could provide more effective and responsive CAS than AAF units would have been problematic -- any forward-positioned airfield hosting a Marine squadron would mean that an AAF or RAF squadron would have to fly farther to accomplish its missions.
Likewise, any Marine assets (men and equipment) used for Operation Overlord would be assets unavailable for operations in the Pacific. How many landings in the Pacific would have had to be shorted Amtracks in order to stage a significant number in support of Overlord? If we presume a 12-month build-up period and then optimistically tack on another 3 months for redeploying those assets to support amphibious operations in the Pacific, how much would that have hindered operations in the PTO?
Fundamentally, wouldn't it be likely that any reduction in casualties by using Marines at Normandy would have been offset by an increase in casualties as our forces island-hopped their way towards Japan?
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Col Robert Santucci
Lt Clardy,
Thanks for engaging, comments are always welcome. My intent is not to argue the Marines should have been used or that the Army didn’t did a good job. My intent is to propose some options that may have been considered if a Marine had been on the amphibious planning staff for Overload. That being said, I was a Marine aviator, a graduate of both Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff. My wife is British, and her 98 year old father was an RAF pilot in WWII. Over the past 30+ years I have had the rare opportunity to discuss tactics with RAF and Luftwaffe pilots alike, including the legendary German Ace Adolf Galland who I got to meet in 1986. England had 787 active airfields in World War II, many of them used by the AAF and built by the Seebees. One of those was RAF Upottery, an old abandoned field, rebuild by US Navy Seabees in like 30 days to house the C-47 Airlift Corps. It was from here that the 101st Airborne took off for Normandy. Finding room for three squadrons (54 aircraft) of F4U Corsairs (what I would propose for Omaha Beach) would not have been hard at all. Even if an airfield was not available, then any open field that Marsden Matting could be thrown down would have worked. . The Seabees were experts in building Marsden Matting airfields, building them in 24 hours on Pacific Island atolls the last three years. Lastly, by 1944 the USN had 25 aircraft carriers and if they could spare the USS Wasp to carry RAF Spitfires to Malta twice, they probably would have been amenable to using a carrier to support the greatest amphibious assault in history. However I personally don’t think a carrier would have been required. Logistically Corsairs used the same fuel and .50 caliber ammunition the AAF used but the Corps has always carried it’s own logistics supply train into battle. In addition to 500lb bombs, the Corsairs carried rockets, napalm as well as different types of armor piercing and variable fuse bombs for use on bunkers or ships – not sure if those were different than what the AAF used. The most important part is the AAF did not utilize CAS at Normandy – by that I mean calling in airstrikes on enemy positions with friendly troops in close proximity. By 1944 the Marines were pretty darn good at it, using it in much harder jungle terrain than an easily identifiable beach defense position. They used radio, colored panels, white phosphorous and colored smoke to mark both friendly and enemy positions. It’s why to this day the Army has a huge fleet of Apache helicopters to provide for their troops what the Air Force really believes is their fourth most important mission - CAS. Let’s not forget that the plan for Overlord was for AAF bombers to crater the beach to help provide cover for the invasion force and bomb the German positions and that didn’t happen. As for the use of Amtracks, I was not proposing that the entire invasion force be carried to the beach in them. My suggestion would have been to use Amtracks for the first wave. The 116th Regiment of the 29th Infantry Division hit Omaha with around 3000 men in the first wave - that’s 150 Amtracks, add another 50 as spares. The landings at Saipan in the Pacific happened at the same time, but was on a much smaller scale and of course the Japanese never liked to oppose the actual landings after their defeat at Tarawa preferring to suck the Marines into the interior island defenses.
Thanks for engaging, comments are always welcome. My intent is not to argue the Marines should have been used or that the Army didn’t did a good job. My intent is to propose some options that may have been considered if a Marine had been on the amphibious planning staff for Overload. That being said, I was a Marine aviator, a graduate of both Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff. My wife is British, and her 98 year old father was an RAF pilot in WWII. Over the past 30+ years I have had the rare opportunity to discuss tactics with RAF and Luftwaffe pilots alike, including the legendary German Ace Adolf Galland who I got to meet in 1986. England had 787 active airfields in World War II, many of them used by the AAF and built by the Seebees. One of those was RAF Upottery, an old abandoned field, rebuild by US Navy Seabees in like 30 days to house the C-47 Airlift Corps. It was from here that the 101st Airborne took off for Normandy. Finding room for three squadrons (54 aircraft) of F4U Corsairs (what I would propose for Omaha Beach) would not have been hard at all. Even if an airfield was not available, then any open field that Marsden Matting could be thrown down would have worked. . The Seabees were experts in building Marsden Matting airfields, building them in 24 hours on Pacific Island atolls the last three years. Lastly, by 1944 the USN had 25 aircraft carriers and if they could spare the USS Wasp to carry RAF Spitfires to Malta twice, they probably would have been amenable to using a carrier to support the greatest amphibious assault in history. However I personally don’t think a carrier would have been required. Logistically Corsairs used the same fuel and .50 caliber ammunition the AAF used but the Corps has always carried it’s own logistics supply train into battle. In addition to 500lb bombs, the Corsairs carried rockets, napalm as well as different types of armor piercing and variable fuse bombs for use on bunkers or ships – not sure if those were different than what the AAF used. The most important part is the AAF did not utilize CAS at Normandy – by that I mean calling in airstrikes on enemy positions with friendly troops in close proximity. By 1944 the Marines were pretty darn good at it, using it in much harder jungle terrain than an easily identifiable beach defense position. They used radio, colored panels, white phosphorous and colored smoke to mark both friendly and enemy positions. It’s why to this day the Army has a huge fleet of Apache helicopters to provide for their troops what the Air Force really believes is their fourth most important mission - CAS. Let’s not forget that the plan for Overlord was for AAF bombers to crater the beach to help provide cover for the invasion force and bomb the German positions and that didn’t happen. As for the use of Amtracks, I was not proposing that the entire invasion force be carried to the beach in them. My suggestion would have been to use Amtracks for the first wave. The 116th Regiment of the 29th Infantry Division hit Omaha with around 3000 men in the first wave - that’s 150 Amtracks, add another 50 as spares. The landings at Saipan in the Pacific happened at the same time, but was on a much smaller scale and of course the Japanese never liked to oppose the actual landings after their defeat at Tarawa preferring to suck the Marines into the interior island defenses.
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SPC (Join to see)
Your answer makes a lot of sense, Col Robert Santucci. In the European front amphibious landings were used what? Twice? Italy and Normandy? Versus the Pacific front where they were used in pretty much every operation. The common sense thing to do, I think, would be to devote the branch with the most training on amphibious landings to the front where amphibious landings would be used most heavily. While I can't say for sure (without cheating and using Google) how many amphibious landings were used in the ETO, the number definitely doesn't compare to the number used in the PTO.
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We couldn't come fight the Battle of Normandy because we were too busy fighting the Pacific War.
Most of the comments here have given fair and valid reasons.
The Corps was heavily engaged beginning 7 Dec 1941 in the Pacific. By the Normandy landings in 1944 the Navy/Marine Corps team (with undeniable help from the Army especially in the Philippines) had been heavily at war for years with (strategically) minor battles beginning in 41 and the real campaign opening with Guadalcanal in 42. Truly, despite all the politics involved, the Corps could only operationally afford advisory detachments to the ETO, which were provided and mostly ignored. (The Army preferred "surprise" in the landings to the Marine doctrine of "shoot them with naval guns for a few days or weeks, then land." Arguments on both sides are very interesting.)
Most of the comments here have given fair and valid reasons.
The Corps was heavily engaged beginning 7 Dec 1941 in the Pacific. By the Normandy landings in 1944 the Navy/Marine Corps team (with undeniable help from the Army especially in the Philippines) had been heavily at war for years with (strategically) minor battles beginning in 41 and the real campaign opening with Guadalcanal in 42. Truly, despite all the politics involved, the Corps could only operationally afford advisory detachments to the ETO, which were provided and mostly ignored. (The Army preferred "surprise" in the landings to the Marine doctrine of "shoot them with naval guns for a few days or weeks, then land." Arguments on both sides are very interesting.)
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Cpl Phil Hsueh
The reasons behind the panzer reserves being held were two-fold, during the initial part of the invasion they weren't released because they were under the direct operational control of Hitler and he was napping at the time of the invasion and nobody on the staff dared wake Hitler up. Then after he woke up he still wouldn't authorize their release because he was convinced that Normandy was just a feint and that the real attack would still be in the Pas de Calais region.
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Because using both the Army and Marines against the Germans would have been far to cruel and against the Geneva Convention.
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SFC Mark Merino
Capt Richard I P. Geneva is that place where Marine bayonets are made I believe....lol
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