Posted on Oct 22, 2015
How do you feel about the promotion of this Admiral who punished suspected whistle-blowers?
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The Navy is poised to promote the admiral in charge of its elite SEAL teams and other commando units even though Pentagon investigators determined that he illegally retaliated against staff members who he mistakenly suspected were whistleblowers.
Rear Adm. Brian L. Losey was investigated five times by the Defense Department’s inspector general after subordinates complained that he had wrongly fired, demoted or punished them during a vengeful but fruitless hunt for the person who had anonymously reported him for a minor travel-policy infraction, according to documents obtained by The Washington Post.
After conducting separate, years-long investigations that involved more than 100 witnesses and 300,000 pages of e-mails, the inspector general upheld complaints from three of the five staff members. In each of those cases, it recommended that the Navy take action against Losey for violating whistleblower-protection laws, the documents show.
The Navy, however, dismissed the findings this month and decided not to discipline Losey, a preeminent figure in the military’s secretive Special Operations forces who once commanded SEAL Team 6, the clandestine unit known for killing terrorist targets such as Osama bin Laden. He now leads the Naval Special Warfare Command and has served in Afghanistan, Iraq, Panama, Bosnia, Somalia and other conflict zones.
Senior Navy leaders reviewed the inspector general’s investigations but “concluded that none of the allegations rose to the level of misconduct on Admiral Losey’s part,” Rear Adm. Dawn Cutler, the Navy’s chief spokeswoman, said in a statement. She added that “no further action is contemplated.”
Losey did not respond to requests for comment placed through the Navy. Documents show that he vigorously contested the complaints, asserting that the staff members were poor performers and that he had acted within his authority as a commander.
The decision clears the way for Losey to pin on a higher rank as a two-star admiral. He was selected for the promotion in 2011, but it was put on hold for four years as the inquiries unfolded.
Critics say the previously undisclosed investigations into one of the Navy’s top SEALs underscore the weakness of the military’s whistleblower-protection law and how rarely violators are punished.
Under the law, commanders or senior civilian officials are prohibited from taking punitive action against anyone who has reported wrongdoing in the armed forces to the inspector general or members of Congress.
In comparison with other federal employees, whistleblowers working in the military or national security agencies must meet a higher burden of proof to win their cases. The odds are stacked against those who seek redress.
Of the 1,196 whistleblower cases closed by the Defense Department during the 12 months ending March 31, only 3 percent were upheld by investigators, records show.
“There’s no teeth,” said Mandy Smithberger, a military reform analyst at the Project on Government Oversight, a nonpartisan Washington advocacy group. She called the military’s whistleblower law “a trap, because people think they have protection, but they don’t. It’s sad.”
The complaints against Losey also illustrate the Pentagon’s long-standing reluctance to discipline top brass for wrongdoing and how the military typically conceals misconduct investigations from public view. The armed forces rarely disclose the existence of such cases except in response to public-records requests, which usually take months to process.
The only public reference to the Losey case is buried in a 134-page semiannual report that the Defense Department inspector general submitted to Congress in June. Without identifying Losey by name, a single paragraph noted that a rear admiral had retaliated against people he thought were whistleblowers and that corrective action was “pending.”
The inspector general’s office declined to comment for this article. It has not responded to a request filed by The Post in August to release the Losey investigative reports under the Freedom of Information Act.
The Post obtained redacted copies of the reports from sources upset with the Navy’s decision not to take action against Losey.
Most of the staff members who filed complaints against Losey declined to comment for the record, saying they were concerned they could face further retaliation for speaking out.
An exception was Fredrick D. Jones, a retired Army Special Forces colonel who served as Losey’s civilian chief of staff before he was demoted. He questioned how the military could repeatedly ignore the outcome of the investigations.
“The lack of action demonstrates the Whistleblower Reprisal Protection Act’s ineffectiveness in protecting victims, and highlights the lack of accountability for those individuals who have broken the law,” he said in an e-mail to The Post.
‘Cut the head off this snake’
The turmoil began in July 2011, three weeks after Losey took charge of the military’s Special Operations Command for Africa, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany.
Someone filed an anonymous complaint with the inspector general alleging that Losey had improperly sought a government-paid plane ticket for his adult daughter when his family relocated to Germany.
In fact, Losey had paid for the plane ticket himself, and the complaint was soon dismissed. But enraged by what he saw as an act of disloyalty, the admiral became determined to find out who had reported him, according to the inspector general reports.
Several staff members testified that Losey drew up a list of suspects and made it known there would be consequences. One unidentified witness said Losey vowed to “find out who did it” and would “cut the head off this snake and we’ll end this.”
Losey’s mood soured even more a few weeks later. Another anonymous tipster filed an inspector-general complaint, alleging that the admiral had created a “toxic” atmosphere at headquarters.
As a result, Losey became convinced that there was “a conspiracy to undermine his command,” according to the inspector general’s findings in the whistleblower cases.
One witness testified that Losey told his staff to send a message to any malcontents: “If you continue to undermine my authority as a commander, I’m going to bury each one of them. I’m going to come after them, and I’m going to [make] it very unpleasant.”
About the same time, Losey began cracking down on people whom he saw as potentially disloyal, according to the inspector general.
He fired an officer who had been on his list of suspects, alleging that he had committed a handful of minor transgressions, such as using the admiral’s autopen without permission to sign routine paperwork.
He got rid of Jones, his chief of staff, who was stripped of his title and moved into a basement office, and then moved again to an even more remote outpost at a military airfield.
Later, Losey ordered an investigation into whether civilian staff members on his enemies list had committed timekeeping and attendance-sheet errors that affected their pay, according to the inspector general reports.
At least three staff members faced discipline as a result, although their punishment for the timekeeping irregularities was ultimately overturned. Some staffers also received poor performance reviews, which affected their compensation and careers.
The actions sent a chill through the command. Other staff members said it was clear Losey was targeting people he suspected of being snitches.
“I don’t understand why Brian did what he did. He went hard over stupid on it,” said a senior military official who knew Losey well and served at the time with the U.S. Africa Command, the parent command for Losey’s group.
“He was concerned about disloyalty. But as I had another commander tell me, loyalty goes both ways,” said the military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the confidentiality of the investigations.
In the end, it turned out that Losey had the wrong people on his list of suspects.
Investigators determined that none of the people he retaliated against had filed the original complaint about his daughter’s plane ticket.
A tough commander
Losey sharply disputed the inspector general’s findings even before it completed the first of the five investigations in August 2013. In one letter, his attorney accused the inspector general of “investigative improprieties” and being “fatally tainted by bias.”
In testimony, Losey denied retaliating against anyone. He said he was just a tough and demanding commander who didn’t hesitate to hold subordinates accountable for mediocre work. He also questioned the credibility of several witnesses.
The inspector general disagreed with Losey’s objections and concluded that he had committed reprisals in three of the cases. Under the law, however, the inspector general lacked the authority to do much about it. The only step the office could take was to recommend that the Navy take “appropriate action” against Losey.
As he fought to keep his job, Losey received the backing of some key military leaders.
In 2013, Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, the four-star commander of Africa Command, sought out the Navy’s top uniformed officer at the time, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, to voice support for Losey’s candidacy for a plum new assignment: leader of the Navy’s Special Warfare Command.
“I was very supportive of that and highly complimentary,” Ham, who has since retired from the Army, said in an interview. “I knew there were allegations out there, and I thought it was important for Admiral Greenert to hear from me.”
Ham said he was aware of the inspector-general investigations but was not privy to details of the cases, which remained confidential at that stage. He said he had the impression that civilian staff members were unhappy with Losey’s aggressive style and the admiral’s desire to ramp up the command’s operations.
“I think that was at the core of why some of the civilian employees were disgruntled,” Ham said.
Losey, he added, “is a very direct guy. There’s not a lot of nuance with him, and I think that might have caused some of the friction.”
Losey won the Special Warfare Command assignment shortly afterward.
The inspector general took two more years to wrap up its cases against Losey. Despite the findings that Losey had violated whistleblower-protection laws, the Navy’s leadership concluded that he had acted within his duties and responsibilities as a commander, a senior Navy official familiar with the case said.
The official said the Navy issued Losey a formal letter of counseling this month, advising him to be thoughtful and careful when handling such matters in the future but finding no wrongdoing on his part.
Meanwhile, the inspector general also recommended that the armed forces take action against two colonels who served as senior aides to Losey. Investigators determined that they had punished suspected whistleblowers, effectively acting on behalf of the admiral.
One of the aides, Air Force Col. Richard Samuels, now assigned as an instructor at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, denied retaliating against anyone. “No, I did no such thing,” he said in a brief phone interview. “I would have known if I was firing people and so forth.”
A Maxwell Air Force Base spokesman, Lt. Col. Dave Huxsoll, said officials “are in the process of determining what, if any, appropriate administrative action will be taken” against Samuels.
The other senior aide, Army Col. Michael Franck, has since retired from the military.
In a statement, the Army said it reviewed the inspector general’s findings but “elected not to take action.” Franck did not respond to e-mails seeking comment.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/powerful-admiral-punishes-suspected-whistleblowers-still-gets-promotion/2015/10/21/8a9e757e-7342-11e5-8248-98e0f5a2e830_story.html
At first glance it does appear that the Admiral is punishing whistleblowers, but at least in my opinion after reading the article he appears to have valid reasons for punishing those he suspected.
What is the community's thoughts?
Rear Adm. Brian L. Losey was investigated five times by the Defense Department’s inspector general after subordinates complained that he had wrongly fired, demoted or punished them during a vengeful but fruitless hunt for the person who had anonymously reported him for a minor travel-policy infraction, according to documents obtained by The Washington Post.
After conducting separate, years-long investigations that involved more than 100 witnesses and 300,000 pages of e-mails, the inspector general upheld complaints from three of the five staff members. In each of those cases, it recommended that the Navy take action against Losey for violating whistleblower-protection laws, the documents show.
The Navy, however, dismissed the findings this month and decided not to discipline Losey, a preeminent figure in the military’s secretive Special Operations forces who once commanded SEAL Team 6, the clandestine unit known for killing terrorist targets such as Osama bin Laden. He now leads the Naval Special Warfare Command and has served in Afghanistan, Iraq, Panama, Bosnia, Somalia and other conflict zones.
Senior Navy leaders reviewed the inspector general’s investigations but “concluded that none of the allegations rose to the level of misconduct on Admiral Losey’s part,” Rear Adm. Dawn Cutler, the Navy’s chief spokeswoman, said in a statement. She added that “no further action is contemplated.”
Losey did not respond to requests for comment placed through the Navy. Documents show that he vigorously contested the complaints, asserting that the staff members were poor performers and that he had acted within his authority as a commander.
The decision clears the way for Losey to pin on a higher rank as a two-star admiral. He was selected for the promotion in 2011, but it was put on hold for four years as the inquiries unfolded.
Critics say the previously undisclosed investigations into one of the Navy’s top SEALs underscore the weakness of the military’s whistleblower-protection law and how rarely violators are punished.
Under the law, commanders or senior civilian officials are prohibited from taking punitive action against anyone who has reported wrongdoing in the armed forces to the inspector general or members of Congress.
In comparison with other federal employees, whistleblowers working in the military or national security agencies must meet a higher burden of proof to win their cases. The odds are stacked against those who seek redress.
Of the 1,196 whistleblower cases closed by the Defense Department during the 12 months ending March 31, only 3 percent were upheld by investigators, records show.
“There’s no teeth,” said Mandy Smithberger, a military reform analyst at the Project on Government Oversight, a nonpartisan Washington advocacy group. She called the military’s whistleblower law “a trap, because people think they have protection, but they don’t. It’s sad.”
The complaints against Losey also illustrate the Pentagon’s long-standing reluctance to discipline top brass for wrongdoing and how the military typically conceals misconduct investigations from public view. The armed forces rarely disclose the existence of such cases except in response to public-records requests, which usually take months to process.
The only public reference to the Losey case is buried in a 134-page semiannual report that the Defense Department inspector general submitted to Congress in June. Without identifying Losey by name, a single paragraph noted that a rear admiral had retaliated against people he thought were whistleblowers and that corrective action was “pending.”
The inspector general’s office declined to comment for this article. It has not responded to a request filed by The Post in August to release the Losey investigative reports under the Freedom of Information Act.
The Post obtained redacted copies of the reports from sources upset with the Navy’s decision not to take action against Losey.
Most of the staff members who filed complaints against Losey declined to comment for the record, saying they were concerned they could face further retaliation for speaking out.
An exception was Fredrick D. Jones, a retired Army Special Forces colonel who served as Losey’s civilian chief of staff before he was demoted. He questioned how the military could repeatedly ignore the outcome of the investigations.
“The lack of action demonstrates the Whistleblower Reprisal Protection Act’s ineffectiveness in protecting victims, and highlights the lack of accountability for those individuals who have broken the law,” he said in an e-mail to The Post.
‘Cut the head off this snake’
The turmoil began in July 2011, three weeks after Losey took charge of the military’s Special Operations Command for Africa, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany.
Someone filed an anonymous complaint with the inspector general alleging that Losey had improperly sought a government-paid plane ticket for his adult daughter when his family relocated to Germany.
In fact, Losey had paid for the plane ticket himself, and the complaint was soon dismissed. But enraged by what he saw as an act of disloyalty, the admiral became determined to find out who had reported him, according to the inspector general reports.
Several staff members testified that Losey drew up a list of suspects and made it known there would be consequences. One unidentified witness said Losey vowed to “find out who did it” and would “cut the head off this snake and we’ll end this.”
Losey’s mood soured even more a few weeks later. Another anonymous tipster filed an inspector-general complaint, alleging that the admiral had created a “toxic” atmosphere at headquarters.
As a result, Losey became convinced that there was “a conspiracy to undermine his command,” according to the inspector general’s findings in the whistleblower cases.
One witness testified that Losey told his staff to send a message to any malcontents: “If you continue to undermine my authority as a commander, I’m going to bury each one of them. I’m going to come after them, and I’m going to [make] it very unpleasant.”
About the same time, Losey began cracking down on people whom he saw as potentially disloyal, according to the inspector general.
He fired an officer who had been on his list of suspects, alleging that he had committed a handful of minor transgressions, such as using the admiral’s autopen without permission to sign routine paperwork.
He got rid of Jones, his chief of staff, who was stripped of his title and moved into a basement office, and then moved again to an even more remote outpost at a military airfield.
Later, Losey ordered an investigation into whether civilian staff members on his enemies list had committed timekeeping and attendance-sheet errors that affected their pay, according to the inspector general reports.
At least three staff members faced discipline as a result, although their punishment for the timekeeping irregularities was ultimately overturned. Some staffers also received poor performance reviews, which affected their compensation and careers.
The actions sent a chill through the command. Other staff members said it was clear Losey was targeting people he suspected of being snitches.
“I don’t understand why Brian did what he did. He went hard over stupid on it,” said a senior military official who knew Losey well and served at the time with the U.S. Africa Command, the parent command for Losey’s group.
“He was concerned about disloyalty. But as I had another commander tell me, loyalty goes both ways,” said the military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the confidentiality of the investigations.
In the end, it turned out that Losey had the wrong people on his list of suspects.
Investigators determined that none of the people he retaliated against had filed the original complaint about his daughter’s plane ticket.
A tough commander
Losey sharply disputed the inspector general’s findings even before it completed the first of the five investigations in August 2013. In one letter, his attorney accused the inspector general of “investigative improprieties” and being “fatally tainted by bias.”
In testimony, Losey denied retaliating against anyone. He said he was just a tough and demanding commander who didn’t hesitate to hold subordinates accountable for mediocre work. He also questioned the credibility of several witnesses.
The inspector general disagreed with Losey’s objections and concluded that he had committed reprisals in three of the cases. Under the law, however, the inspector general lacked the authority to do much about it. The only step the office could take was to recommend that the Navy take “appropriate action” against Losey.
As he fought to keep his job, Losey received the backing of some key military leaders.
In 2013, Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, the four-star commander of Africa Command, sought out the Navy’s top uniformed officer at the time, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, to voice support for Losey’s candidacy for a plum new assignment: leader of the Navy’s Special Warfare Command.
“I was very supportive of that and highly complimentary,” Ham, who has since retired from the Army, said in an interview. “I knew there were allegations out there, and I thought it was important for Admiral Greenert to hear from me.”
Ham said he was aware of the inspector-general investigations but was not privy to details of the cases, which remained confidential at that stage. He said he had the impression that civilian staff members were unhappy with Losey’s aggressive style and the admiral’s desire to ramp up the command’s operations.
“I think that was at the core of why some of the civilian employees were disgruntled,” Ham said.
Losey, he added, “is a very direct guy. There’s not a lot of nuance with him, and I think that might have caused some of the friction.”
Losey won the Special Warfare Command assignment shortly afterward.
The inspector general took two more years to wrap up its cases against Losey. Despite the findings that Losey had violated whistleblower-protection laws, the Navy’s leadership concluded that he had acted within his duties and responsibilities as a commander, a senior Navy official familiar with the case said.
The official said the Navy issued Losey a formal letter of counseling this month, advising him to be thoughtful and careful when handling such matters in the future but finding no wrongdoing on his part.
Meanwhile, the inspector general also recommended that the armed forces take action against two colonels who served as senior aides to Losey. Investigators determined that they had punished suspected whistleblowers, effectively acting on behalf of the admiral.
One of the aides, Air Force Col. Richard Samuels, now assigned as an instructor at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, denied retaliating against anyone. “No, I did no such thing,” he said in a brief phone interview. “I would have known if I was firing people and so forth.”
A Maxwell Air Force Base spokesman, Lt. Col. Dave Huxsoll, said officials “are in the process of determining what, if any, appropriate administrative action will be taken” against Samuels.
The other senior aide, Army Col. Michael Franck, has since retired from the military.
In a statement, the Army said it reviewed the inspector general’s findings but “elected not to take action.” Franck did not respond to e-mails seeking comment.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/powerful-admiral-punishes-suspected-whistleblowers-still-gets-promotion/2015/10/21/8a9e757e-7342-11e5-8248-98e0f5a2e830_story.html
At first glance it does appear that the Admiral is punishing whistleblowers, but at least in my opinion after reading the article he appears to have valid reasons for punishing those he suspected.
What is the community's thoughts?
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[Disclaimer, I saw a post of the article on Facebook last night, but that is the extent of my knowledge of the incidents in question. If verified facts come out that are different from my current assumptions, I am open to changing my mind.]
OK, time for my unpopular post of the month!
I think it points out a common misperception of the role of the IG. The IG doesn't administer military justice or overrule the chain of command. The IG is a special staff section/function that exists to help the COMMAND ensure the proper functioning of the command (mostly) by looking into allegations of impropriety. The IG conducts (or requests that the command conducts) investigation into allegations of wrongdoing. It then forwards the results of that investigation, with its recommendations, to the chain of command. The article clearly states as much, though it buries it.
The chain of command then decides what, if any, action is warranted. In this case, per the linked article, the chain of command “concluded that none of the allegations rose to the level of misconduct on Admiral Losey’s part....” That was a determination for the chain of command to take. It could also have decided to hold a court martial, administer NJP, or take other administrative actions. It declined to do so in this case.
Per regulation, he was not promoted in 2011, when scheduled, because of the ongoing investigations. Now that the investigations are completed and the chain of command has taken final action, he is due his promotion. (and if he was a SSG, everyone here would be arguing that he should also get back pay an TIG for the next promotion...)
The convening authority has made a determination, and the matter is closed. I don't really know what a "formal letter of counseling" is in the Navy, but I'm thinking that it is one step above a counseling statement, and WAY below a LOR.
I have seen convening authorities go after people who were "cleared" (the IG can't clear anyone, that is not its role) by the IG, and not follow recommendations to prosecute. That's the way it works. Unless we don't actually believe in military justice, or the chain of command, that is.
As for the merits, I see holes based on a critical reading of the article.
Having not read any of the IG reports (as nobody here, nor the author(s) of the article - by their own admission - has either), I am not willing to hang the man because of one-sided allegations by those unhappy with the outcomes. That said, I do think it's telling that - according to the author(s) of the article, the sequence of events started with a FALSE report of impropriety on the part of the
Admiral (specifically, that he sought to have the gov pay for a plane ticket for his daughter).
The fact that there were FIVE investigations over 4 years tells me that there wasn't a lot there, but there was a determination on some quarters to find something.... I could be wrong, and he could be toxic as hell, and really clever/nimble, but I doubt it. I think his lawyer's letter about the IG ""investigative improprieties” and being “fatally tainted by bias.”" is probable pretty close to the mark. I know of at least 2 cases where an investigation showing a "clean bill" resulted in an order to "try harder." (what? unlawful command influence, you say? Prove it.) I find the Admiral's claims that he was simply a aggressive & strict leader (and the subtext that this pissed a lot of people off) to be more credible. Aggressive & strict are not inappropriate or "toxic", even if it pisses some people off.
At the end of the day, I am going to go with the assumption that the chain of command that not only had access to the IO's formal report but also an understanding of the totality of the circumstances (and, yes, I have also seen the IG come to completely incorrect conclusions on at least one situation where I knew all the players and had personal knowledge of what transpired) acted in the best interests of the Navy in the outcome.
At the end of the day, I am not going to assume that a one-sided attack piece quoting those who are unhappy with the outcome telling me that they are unhappy with the outcome invalidates it.
For every individual accused of something who doesn't get convicted, there are at least a dozen people thinking "he did it."
OK, time for my unpopular post of the month!
I think it points out a common misperception of the role of the IG. The IG doesn't administer military justice or overrule the chain of command. The IG is a special staff section/function that exists to help the COMMAND ensure the proper functioning of the command (mostly) by looking into allegations of impropriety. The IG conducts (or requests that the command conducts) investigation into allegations of wrongdoing. It then forwards the results of that investigation, with its recommendations, to the chain of command. The article clearly states as much, though it buries it.
The chain of command then decides what, if any, action is warranted. In this case, per the linked article, the chain of command “concluded that none of the allegations rose to the level of misconduct on Admiral Losey’s part....” That was a determination for the chain of command to take. It could also have decided to hold a court martial, administer NJP, or take other administrative actions. It declined to do so in this case.
Per regulation, he was not promoted in 2011, when scheduled, because of the ongoing investigations. Now that the investigations are completed and the chain of command has taken final action, he is due his promotion. (and if he was a SSG, everyone here would be arguing that he should also get back pay an TIG for the next promotion...)
The convening authority has made a determination, and the matter is closed. I don't really know what a "formal letter of counseling" is in the Navy, but I'm thinking that it is one step above a counseling statement, and WAY below a LOR.
I have seen convening authorities go after people who were "cleared" (the IG can't clear anyone, that is not its role) by the IG, and not follow recommendations to prosecute. That's the way it works. Unless we don't actually believe in military justice, or the chain of command, that is.
As for the merits, I see holes based on a critical reading of the article.
Having not read any of the IG reports (as nobody here, nor the author(s) of the article - by their own admission - has either), I am not willing to hang the man because of one-sided allegations by those unhappy with the outcomes. That said, I do think it's telling that - according to the author(s) of the article, the sequence of events started with a FALSE report of impropriety on the part of the
Admiral (specifically, that he sought to have the gov pay for a plane ticket for his daughter).
The fact that there were FIVE investigations over 4 years tells me that there wasn't a lot there, but there was a determination on some quarters to find something.... I could be wrong, and he could be toxic as hell, and really clever/nimble, but I doubt it. I think his lawyer's letter about the IG ""investigative improprieties” and being “fatally tainted by bias.”" is probable pretty close to the mark. I know of at least 2 cases where an investigation showing a "clean bill" resulted in an order to "try harder." (what? unlawful command influence, you say? Prove it.) I find the Admiral's claims that he was simply a aggressive & strict leader (and the subtext that this pissed a lot of people off) to be more credible. Aggressive & strict are not inappropriate or "toxic", even if it pisses some people off.
At the end of the day, I am going to go with the assumption that the chain of command that not only had access to the IO's formal report but also an understanding of the totality of the circumstances (and, yes, I have also seen the IG come to completely incorrect conclusions on at least one situation where I knew all the players and had personal knowledge of what transpired) acted in the best interests of the Navy in the outcome.
At the end of the day, I am not going to assume that a one-sided attack piece quoting those who are unhappy with the outcome telling me that they are unhappy with the outcome invalidates it.
For every individual accused of something who doesn't get convicted, there are at least a dozen people thinking "he did it."
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MAJ (Join to see)
Sir, great response. On the other hand, if these allegations had been against a more junior officer or NCO or enlisted......would the chain of command's reaction have been different? Most of us seem to think so----as demonstrated, say, by the Navy's habit of firing most of the people it puts in charge of its ships. If this were a major or below in the Army, there's no way adverse action (ie, the flag on the file that prohibits favorable personal action during the investigation) would not have led to involuntary separation. At a minimum. So, while your points on IG are spot on, the perception here is of double standards. If this admiral allowed two Navy captains to retaliate, and these two captains were reprimanded (not by the admiral, mind you).....the Navy's actions here are difficult to understand. Yes, IG is powerless. Yes, the decision is made by the chain of command. But chains of command make mistakes, no?
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COL Vincent Stoneking
MAJ (Join to see) - Chains of command make mistakes, yes. All the time. I started out with the disclaimer that I would change my mind if the facts warranted it.
However, the mob is almost never right. The crowd is usually wrong. Keep in mind, we have a few paragraphs of one side of the story and people are ready to ride him out on the rail.
I don't know (nor does anyone else) what the results would have been if the same facts had adhered to an Major. Simply because we don't know WHAT the facts were. You have been around long enough to know the value of the truism that "first reports are always wrong."
I have personal knowledge of (as in went to the belated promotion party) one active duty MAJ who just made LTC after being delayed since 2012 due to multiple IG investigations. That's not quite as long as the flag in this story, but close. I personally gave one SPC an Article 15 in order to foreclose an court martial by higher. As mentioned in my initial post, I am aware of times that the IG came back with the wrong answer - and was acted on, and others with the wrong answer and ignored. Anecdote, not data, true. But they are counterpoints to your perceptions that I have first hand knowledge of.
Keep in mind, that only two types of of military justice stories make the news - juniors who get railroaded and seniors who get over. (again, unusual stories are what qualify as news in the first place) And generally only one side of that story. This does lead to a perception of double standards. However, it has little to do with reality.
Always beware of blanket statements and news reports.
However, the mob is almost never right. The crowd is usually wrong. Keep in mind, we have a few paragraphs of one side of the story and people are ready to ride him out on the rail.
I don't know (nor does anyone else) what the results would have been if the same facts had adhered to an Major. Simply because we don't know WHAT the facts were. You have been around long enough to know the value of the truism that "first reports are always wrong."
I have personal knowledge of (as in went to the belated promotion party) one active duty MAJ who just made LTC after being delayed since 2012 due to multiple IG investigations. That's not quite as long as the flag in this story, but close. I personally gave one SPC an Article 15 in order to foreclose an court martial by higher. As mentioned in my initial post, I am aware of times that the IG came back with the wrong answer - and was acted on, and others with the wrong answer and ignored. Anecdote, not data, true. But they are counterpoints to your perceptions that I have first hand knowledge of.
Keep in mind, that only two types of of military justice stories make the news - juniors who get railroaded and seniors who get over. (again, unusual stories are what qualify as news in the first place) And generally only one side of that story. This does lead to a perception of double standards. However, it has little to do with reality.
Always beware of blanket statements and news reports.
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COL Vincent Stoneking
And it is worth noting, that the people the Navy puts in charge of its ships are generally O6. As you point out, the Navy seems very content to fire them.
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PO1 John Miller
COL Vincent Stoneking
Great points on the IG and I agree 100% with you. With that said (and as you said none of us have read the IG reports) if allegations of misconduct are proven true and being swept under the rug, that makes me wonder just how politically connected the Admiral is.
I have personally seen senior enlisted found guilty of DUI and no action taken other than 2 weeks restriction to the base. No loss of rank or pay as one would expect for E6 and below. I don't know about you, but in situations like that it seems like E6 and below are being held to a different higher standard than our leadership.
Great points on the IG and I agree 100% with you. With that said (and as you said none of us have read the IG reports) if allegations of misconduct are proven true and being swept under the rug, that makes me wonder just how politically connected the Admiral is.
I have personally seen senior enlisted found guilty of DUI and no action taken other than 2 weeks restriction to the base. No loss of rank or pay as one would expect for E6 and below. I don't know about you, but in situations like that it seems like E6 and below are being held to a different higher standard than our leadership.
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PO1 John Miller
SSgt (Join to see)
Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Ted Branch has had his security clearance suspended for nearly 2 years and still hasn't been exonerated or brought up on charges.
Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Ted Branch has had his security clearance suspended for nearly 2 years and still hasn't been exonerated or brought up on charges.
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SGT Jeremiah B.
"New"?! Surely you jest. Senior leadership getting away with flagrant abuses of power while being protected by the very system they're harming is as old as history.
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PO1 John Miller
SGT Jeremiah B.
But at the same time I'm sure you've seen the stories in Military Times/Navy Times about Captains, XO's, and Command Master Chiefs getting relieved from their positions for similar issues?
But at the same time I'm sure you've seen the stories in Military Times/Navy Times about Captains, XO's, and Command Master Chiefs getting relieved from their positions for similar issues?
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(Join to see)
SCPO Joshua I - My comment was in regard to the previous post - WWWDA. I read the article and reserve comment in the face of missing information, rather than draw conclusions based on a peremptory reading.
No need for the down vote, sweet pea :D
No need for the down vote, sweet pea :D
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