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1790 – Warriors of the Miami tribe under Chief Little Turtle defeat United States troops under General Josiah Harmar at the site of present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana, in the Northwest Indian War.
The Harmar Campaign was an attempt by the United States to subdue Native Americans in the Northwest Territory in the Autumn of 1790. It was led by General Josiah Harmar and was part of the Northwest Indian War. The campaign featured a series of battles that were all overwhelming victories for the Native Americans, and the losses are sometimes referred to as Harmar’s Defeat.
On 19 October, near modern Churubusco, Indiana, Harmar sent out a scouting party under Colonel Hardin, consisting of 180 militia, a troop of cavalry under Major James Fontaine, and 30 regulars under Captain John Armstrong. It was to estimate the strength of the Indians and attack the village of Chief Le Gris. The party came within a few miles of Kekionga, where they encountered an Indian on horseback, who fled along a minor trail leading away from the village. Hardin ordered his force to pursue, but sent Major Fontaine's cavalry back to bring up a company that had been left behind. The Indian was a decoy, and led Hardin into a swampy lowland by the Eel River, where he could neither pursue nor easily retreat.
Indians led by Little Turtle attacked Hardin's force from three sides. Most of the militia fled, warning Major Fontaine's cavalry to get out.
The regulars stood their ground with some of the militia. Only 8 of the 30 regulars survived. 40 militia were killed, and 12 Americans had been wounded. Captain Armstrong hid in the marsh and escaped with his life. He blamed Hardin and the militia for the defeat, and claimed that only about 100 Indians had been involved. This was the approximate number of warriors available from Kekionga and Le Gris' Village. The battle is also sometimes referred to as Hardin's Defeat.
On 20 October, General Harmar arrived at the camp outside Kekionga. He sent a detachment of 300 men under Ensign Phillip Hartshorn northward to scout for Indian movements. Eight miles above Kekionga, Hartshorn was ambushed by a large Indian force, which killed him and 19 of his men. Instead of advancing immediately to attack the Indians, Harmar pulled back several miles south of Kekionga. He did not even have a burial detail to bury the twenty dead. Morale by now had plummeted, and the men were enraged at the cowardice of their commander. Hardin then demanded that he be allowed to attack the Indians with 400 men, or at the very least, bury their fallen comrades.
On the night of 21 October, Colonel Hardin advanced with 300 militia and 60 regulars of the First American Regiment, under regimental commander Major John P. Wyllys. At dawn on 22 October, they found about 1,000 Indians encamped at Kekionga. Hardin immediately sent to Harmar requesting reinforcements. When the courier told Harmar (who was rumored to have been drunk) about the size of the enemy force, he became visibly shaken. He ordered his 800-900 remaining men into a hollow defensive square and refused to come to Hardin's aid, leaving him alone to face an enemy more than twice his number. Colonel Hardin, expecting reinforcements at any time, divided his command into four groups under Major Wyllys, Major Hall, Major Fontaine, and Major McMullen. He planned to flank the Indians on all sides.
The Indians at Kekionga, who were led by Little Turtle, attacked first, however. Little Turtle sent small parties to fire on the militia and retreat. The militia gave chase in many instances, until the regulars were left isolated. Little Turtle then attacked Major Wyllys's detachment, with results as devastating as Heller's Corner. Major Fontaine, meanwhile, led a cavalry charge into a wooded area and was ambushed. Soon the Shawnee and Miami attacked Hardin from three sides. Still expecting reinforcements from Harmar, Hardin's men put up a valiant defense, holding the Indians at bay for over three hours before finally falling back to join the rest of the army.
The battle came to be known as the Battle of the Pumpkin Fields because the steam from the scalped skulls reminded the Indians of squash steaming in the autumn air. 180 men were either killed or wounded. The army forces reported 129 men killed in action (14 officers, including Major Wyllys and Major Fontaine, and 115 enlisted men) and 94 wounded (including 50 of the Regulars). Estimates of Indian casualties range from 120 to 150 total.
After such high casualties from these engagements, General Harmar determined that he could not attack. The approaching winter further threatened his command, as militia deserted and horses starved. The retreating force reached Fort Washington on 3 November 1790.
It was the worst defeat of U.S. forces by Indians up to that time, and was later surpassed only by St. Clair's Defeat and the Battle of the Little Bighorn. It established Little Turtle as an Indian hero, and encouraged the Indians in the Northwest Territory to resist the United States. Indians attacked settlements all across the Northwest Territory, including the January 1791 Big Bottom massacre and Siege of Dunlap's Station.
A court martial in 1791 cleared Harmar of any wrongdoing during the campaign.
President Washington was furious at the news of the defeat, and lamented "my mind... is prepared for the worst; that is, for expence without honor or profit. The news persuaded Congress to raise a second regiment of Regular soldiers for six months, but it later reduced the soldiers' pay. The First Regiment was soon reduced to 299 soldiers, while the new Second Regiment recruited only half of their authorized number. When Governor St. Clair led a similar expedition the next year, he had to call out the militia to meet the required manpower. His campaign would end in the worst defeat by Indians the Army ever received
1972 – Operation Linebacker I, the bombing of North Vietnam with B-52 bombers, ended. The U.S. ended all tactical air sorties into North Vietnam above the 20th parallel and brought to a close Linebacker I operations. This “gesture of good will” in terminating the bombing above the 20th parallel was designed to help promote the peace negotiations being held in Paris. US tactical air sorties during Linebacker I operations helped to stem the flow of supplies into NVN, thereby, limiting the operating capabilities of North Vietnam’s invading army. During the five and one-half month period of Linebacker I, the Navy contributed more than 60 percent of the total sorties in North Vietnam, with 60 percent of this effort in the “panhandle”, two large regions between Hanoi and the DMZ. Tactical air operations were most intense during the July-September quarter with 12,865 naval sorties flown. Most attack sorties in North Vietnam fell into two classes–armed reconnaissance and strike. The former was usually directed against targets of opportunity with three main areas proscribed–near Hanoi, Haiphong and the Chinese border. Strike operations were preplanned and usually directed at fixed targets. Most types of fixed targets, not associated with armed reconnaissance, required approval by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to attack. Principal Navy aircraft were the A-7 and A-6, which accounted for roughly 60 and 15 percent of the Navy’s attack sorties, respectively. About 25 percent of the Navy’s effort was at night. Carriers participating in the initial May-June operations from Yankee Station were Constellation, Coral Sea, Hancock, Kitty Hawk, Midway and Saratoga.
http://thisdayinusmilhist.wordpress.com/2004/10/22/october-22/
The Harmar Campaign was an attempt by the United States to subdue Native Americans in the Northwest Territory in the Autumn of 1790. It was led by General Josiah Harmar and was part of the Northwest Indian War. The campaign featured a series of battles that were all overwhelming victories for the Native Americans, and the losses are sometimes referred to as Harmar’s Defeat.
On 19 October, near modern Churubusco, Indiana, Harmar sent out a scouting party under Colonel Hardin, consisting of 180 militia, a troop of cavalry under Major James Fontaine, and 30 regulars under Captain John Armstrong. It was to estimate the strength of the Indians and attack the village of Chief Le Gris. The party came within a few miles of Kekionga, where they encountered an Indian on horseback, who fled along a minor trail leading away from the village. Hardin ordered his force to pursue, but sent Major Fontaine's cavalry back to bring up a company that had been left behind. The Indian was a decoy, and led Hardin into a swampy lowland by the Eel River, where he could neither pursue nor easily retreat.
Indians led by Little Turtle attacked Hardin's force from three sides. Most of the militia fled, warning Major Fontaine's cavalry to get out.
The regulars stood their ground with some of the militia. Only 8 of the 30 regulars survived. 40 militia were killed, and 12 Americans had been wounded. Captain Armstrong hid in the marsh and escaped with his life. He blamed Hardin and the militia for the defeat, and claimed that only about 100 Indians had been involved. This was the approximate number of warriors available from Kekionga and Le Gris' Village. The battle is also sometimes referred to as Hardin's Defeat.
On 20 October, General Harmar arrived at the camp outside Kekionga. He sent a detachment of 300 men under Ensign Phillip Hartshorn northward to scout for Indian movements. Eight miles above Kekionga, Hartshorn was ambushed by a large Indian force, which killed him and 19 of his men. Instead of advancing immediately to attack the Indians, Harmar pulled back several miles south of Kekionga. He did not even have a burial detail to bury the twenty dead. Morale by now had plummeted, and the men were enraged at the cowardice of their commander. Hardin then demanded that he be allowed to attack the Indians with 400 men, or at the very least, bury their fallen comrades.
On the night of 21 October, Colonel Hardin advanced with 300 militia and 60 regulars of the First American Regiment, under regimental commander Major John P. Wyllys. At dawn on 22 October, they found about 1,000 Indians encamped at Kekionga. Hardin immediately sent to Harmar requesting reinforcements. When the courier told Harmar (who was rumored to have been drunk) about the size of the enemy force, he became visibly shaken. He ordered his 800-900 remaining men into a hollow defensive square and refused to come to Hardin's aid, leaving him alone to face an enemy more than twice his number. Colonel Hardin, expecting reinforcements at any time, divided his command into four groups under Major Wyllys, Major Hall, Major Fontaine, and Major McMullen. He planned to flank the Indians on all sides.
The Indians at Kekionga, who were led by Little Turtle, attacked first, however. Little Turtle sent small parties to fire on the militia and retreat. The militia gave chase in many instances, until the regulars were left isolated. Little Turtle then attacked Major Wyllys's detachment, with results as devastating as Heller's Corner. Major Fontaine, meanwhile, led a cavalry charge into a wooded area and was ambushed. Soon the Shawnee and Miami attacked Hardin from three sides. Still expecting reinforcements from Harmar, Hardin's men put up a valiant defense, holding the Indians at bay for over three hours before finally falling back to join the rest of the army.
The battle came to be known as the Battle of the Pumpkin Fields because the steam from the scalped skulls reminded the Indians of squash steaming in the autumn air. 180 men were either killed or wounded. The army forces reported 129 men killed in action (14 officers, including Major Wyllys and Major Fontaine, and 115 enlisted men) and 94 wounded (including 50 of the Regulars). Estimates of Indian casualties range from 120 to 150 total.
After such high casualties from these engagements, General Harmar determined that he could not attack. The approaching winter further threatened his command, as militia deserted and horses starved. The retreating force reached Fort Washington on 3 November 1790.
It was the worst defeat of U.S. forces by Indians up to that time, and was later surpassed only by St. Clair's Defeat and the Battle of the Little Bighorn. It established Little Turtle as an Indian hero, and encouraged the Indians in the Northwest Territory to resist the United States. Indians attacked settlements all across the Northwest Territory, including the January 1791 Big Bottom massacre and Siege of Dunlap's Station.
A court martial in 1791 cleared Harmar of any wrongdoing during the campaign.
President Washington was furious at the news of the defeat, and lamented "my mind... is prepared for the worst; that is, for expence without honor or profit. The news persuaded Congress to raise a second regiment of Regular soldiers for six months, but it later reduced the soldiers' pay. The First Regiment was soon reduced to 299 soldiers, while the new Second Regiment recruited only half of their authorized number. When Governor St. Clair led a similar expedition the next year, he had to call out the militia to meet the required manpower. His campaign would end in the worst defeat by Indians the Army ever received
1972 – Operation Linebacker I, the bombing of North Vietnam with B-52 bombers, ended. The U.S. ended all tactical air sorties into North Vietnam above the 20th parallel and brought to a close Linebacker I operations. This “gesture of good will” in terminating the bombing above the 20th parallel was designed to help promote the peace negotiations being held in Paris. US tactical air sorties during Linebacker I operations helped to stem the flow of supplies into NVN, thereby, limiting the operating capabilities of North Vietnam’s invading army. During the five and one-half month period of Linebacker I, the Navy contributed more than 60 percent of the total sorties in North Vietnam, with 60 percent of this effort in the “panhandle”, two large regions between Hanoi and the DMZ. Tactical air operations were most intense during the July-September quarter with 12,865 naval sorties flown. Most attack sorties in North Vietnam fell into two classes–armed reconnaissance and strike. The former was usually directed against targets of opportunity with three main areas proscribed–near Hanoi, Haiphong and the Chinese border. Strike operations were preplanned and usually directed at fixed targets. Most types of fixed targets, not associated with armed reconnaissance, required approval by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to attack. Principal Navy aircraft were the A-7 and A-6, which accounted for roughly 60 and 15 percent of the Navy’s attack sorties, respectively. About 25 percent of the Navy’s effort was at night. Carriers participating in the initial May-June operations from Yankee Station were Constellation, Coral Sea, Hancock, Kitty Hawk, Midway and Saratoga.
http://thisdayinusmilhist.wordpress.com/2004/10/22/october-22/
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