Posted on May 9, 2015
Building an Insurgency and Fighting an Insurgency, does this change your perspective?
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Just rattling some readings I have done which may help you understand insurgencies. Please forgive me if my memory is off.
1. Mao Zedong, a revolutionary who ruled China, wrote down his steps to insurgency which is pretty universal for insurgencies: (please give me literary license because my memory sucks).
a. An elite in society will start the insurgency.
b. The leader will recruit cadre.
c. Cadre will recruit foot soldiers through ideology or by violence.
d. They will provide services to communities.
e. The insurgents will use asymmetric warfare against the government.
f . The insurgency will grow to a size to slug it out with government forces.
The British military used a doctrine of minimalism to fight insurgents that is quite counter to the U.S. doctrine.
The British often conducted counterinsurgency operations with Regiments which were half the size of Brigades. These Regiments had close understanding of the AO due to ability to conducted protracted operations, which gave them the opportunity to understand the terrain and build important ties with the indigenous society fighting the insurgents. This is quite unlike U.S. approach of using Divisions and Corps. They strived to use minimal force necessary to achieve victory.
The mission for local security was conducted by local police with requisite assistance from the regiment. Funds were minimal, therefore, not much was destroyed to be fixed later, which simplified and reduced the need for Civil Affairs and nation building.
One of the principles of counterinsurgency is technology is not the be all, end all. The British soldiers in unison fought like the insurgents. They conducted ambushes and tracked the insurgents to their safe havens capture or kill them regardless of the austerity of the terrain.
Our war paradigm for success is creating a democratic government, training, and equipping the military. Then we say goodbye and leave.
1. Mao Zedong, a revolutionary who ruled China, wrote down his steps to insurgency which is pretty universal for insurgencies: (please give me literary license because my memory sucks).
a. An elite in society will start the insurgency.
b. The leader will recruit cadre.
c. Cadre will recruit foot soldiers through ideology or by violence.
d. They will provide services to communities.
e. The insurgents will use asymmetric warfare against the government.
f . The insurgency will grow to a size to slug it out with government forces.
The British military used a doctrine of minimalism to fight insurgents that is quite counter to the U.S. doctrine.
The British often conducted counterinsurgency operations with Regiments which were half the size of Brigades. These Regiments had close understanding of the AO due to ability to conducted protracted operations, which gave them the opportunity to understand the terrain and build important ties with the indigenous society fighting the insurgents. This is quite unlike U.S. approach of using Divisions and Corps. They strived to use minimal force necessary to achieve victory.
The mission for local security was conducted by local police with requisite assistance from the regiment. Funds were minimal, therefore, not much was destroyed to be fixed later, which simplified and reduced the need for Civil Affairs and nation building.
One of the principles of counterinsurgency is technology is not the be all, end all. The British soldiers in unison fought like the insurgents. They conducted ambushes and tracked the insurgents to their safe havens capture or kill them regardless of the austerity of the terrain.
Our war paradigm for success is creating a democratic government, training, and equipping the military. Then we say goodbye and leave.
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 4
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I conducted large amounts of research in this area for my graduate thesis on failed states. When it comes to the US strategy in general (whether large-scale wars, small wars, or COIN) the legacy of World War II still overshadows everything we do. As most people know the USMC wrote the book on small wars and counter-insurgency (the Small Wars Manual) but it was last published/updated in 1940 and was largely forgotten after WWII. The Marines even implemented much of this in the jungles of Central America and the Caribbean. After WWII the necessity to be able to conduct a large-scale land war in Europe further decreased the desire to rebuild our COIN capabilities. So after 60 years the US Army, and the military in general, have decided that large formations (divisions, corps) are essential and, again what we did after WWII, that we can install a democracy and leave and just like Japan and Germany it will flourish. The truth is much different however and the US Army in particular is just waiting for the next large-scale operations instead of getting in the game that is being played.
So, no, my perspective is the same as it has been since I went to Afghanistan in 2003. A small force properly trained and implemented is the most effective COIN tool we have.
So, no, my perspective is the same as it has been since I went to Afghanistan in 2003. A small force properly trained and implemented is the most effective COIN tool we have.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
I think Desert Storm tricked us into believing we need large armies to defeat the enemy, and everything would be nice and neat.
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SGT James Elphick
MAJ Ken Landgren I think you are right, ODS reinforced the paradigm, even the opening phases of OIF as well.
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No, this does not change my perspective of insurgency or counter insurgency. What does change my viewpoint is the process of ...and envisioning how our enemies market their battle solutions, such as branding power, placements of their guerilla strategies and tactics ... as these methods are old as humanity and yet effective in a techno-age.
Unleash the Japanese military from their constitutional constraints and then observe our enemies behavior.
Unleash the Japanese military from their constitutional constraints and then observe our enemies behavior.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
Being able to conduct small unit operations was a very large part of the successes the VC had in Vietnam. While they tie up larger units chasing ghosts the larger units that are chasing these ghosts will often become demoralized by their enemy. Other countries throughout history have also used small unit tactics to defeat larger armies.
Large unit tactics are designed to close with and destroy the enemy. Small unit tactics are designed to attack and melt into the surrounding communities appearing as indigenous peoples and often friendly forces, hence their successes.
Once, or if, the US military adapts a more comprehensive small unit tactical doctrine our practices in waging war should, at worst, or will, at best, engage the hostile forces with better success at destroying them and ending conflicts sooner. This is just my opinion.
Being able to conduct small unit operations was a very large part of the successes the VC had in Vietnam. While they tie up larger units chasing ghosts the larger units that are chasing these ghosts will often become demoralized by their enemy. Other countries throughout history have also used small unit tactics to defeat larger armies.
Large unit tactics are designed to close with and destroy the enemy. Small unit tactics are designed to attack and melt into the surrounding communities appearing as indigenous peoples and often friendly forces, hence their successes.
Once, or if, the US military adapts a more comprehensive small unit tactical doctrine our practices in waging war should, at worst, or will, at best, engage the hostile forces with better success at destroying them and ending conflicts sooner. This is just my opinion.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
The British said fight like the insurgents. Go to jungle and ambush, go to their homes and kill them.
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SSG Mike Angelo
Our military will be challenged in going forward with the idea of "more comprehensive" training....Just read the Army times blotter for UCMJ actions and bad conduct discharges...We are in a different phase of internal cultural and climate changing within our ranks...lets get a grip on it before expanding to the "comprehensive" idea.
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