Posted on Jan 20, 2021
How could someone make a 8 yr reserve obligation enlistment that does not qualify as a veteran for veteran purposes?
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I ask that question in lieu of the Constitution Preamble which we all swore an Oath to Defend
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
I ask this question because after 5 years assigned to 2 different Navy Active Duty Guided Missile Frigates and the injuries and illness associated with a job like a BM, and my medically failed Navy Army Transfer off the same ships half way through my enlistment, and my honorable discharge after those 8 years I was not instantly awarded a homeless housing voucher at the VA. Instead I had to wait nearly 4 years for the local VA Oakland regional center Denials stating I did not have enough active duty time in continuation 2 years minimum to qualify. I was literally homeless and without income and in a older guys house who kept me off the street if only he could like get in my pants because I was to scared to defend or be homeless again living in my car,(that got impounded). I was telling the va that these were my living conditions, and there was a police report eventually. But still they denied me even a homeless housing voucher, No waiver. The BVA by a stroke of luck granted me support. But that is after a 8 year enlistment. and nearly decade battle with chronic homelessness. Now I am in a VA apartment alone wondering what happened.
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
I ask this question because after 5 years assigned to 2 different Navy Active Duty Guided Missile Frigates and the injuries and illness associated with a job like a BM, and my medically failed Navy Army Transfer off the same ships half way through my enlistment, and my honorable discharge after those 8 years I was not instantly awarded a homeless housing voucher at the VA. Instead I had to wait nearly 4 years for the local VA Oakland regional center Denials stating I did not have enough active duty time in continuation 2 years minimum to qualify. I was literally homeless and without income and in a older guys house who kept me off the street if only he could like get in my pants because I was to scared to defend or be homeless again living in my car,(that got impounded). I was telling the va that these were my living conditions, and there was a police report eventually. But still they denied me even a homeless housing voucher, No waiver. The BVA by a stroke of luck granted me support. But that is after a 8 year enlistment. and nearly decade battle with chronic homelessness. Now I am in a VA apartment alone wondering what happened.
Posted in these groups: 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 3
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My battle to get a VA Homeless Housing Voucher is done and complete. I share information just so possibly others might not have to go through this again.
I am not sure who to share this following excerpts with at the va but if you want to give me suggestions let me know.
Peace
---------
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
“interrelated factors of maintenance” Who ever created this “test” to give a young non prior service reserve enlisted to fill an active dut billet on a ship, gave no consideration to the “interrelated factors of maintenance” of his, my life from 18-23 years of age assigned to these ships. Factors such as thousands of hour stressing over manuals at home alone about a ship and duty to your own country with poverty compensation, no health care insurance, no leadership checking in and monitoring you, no health care professionals monitoring you, never be considered a veteran for veteran purposes even with an honorable discharge, right in the middle of America. You had those factors whie you basically were given the task to be an active duty sailor in qualification and ability and readiness and exposure to the same elements monthly. It gets to the point that no one I think ever considered this and no on on the ship monitored it my development. The young guys in the reserves and national guard should be monitored for these “interrelated factors”.
There were times in the ship yard, based on orders, where I would be doing life altering things very stressful on the body and mind with no health insurance to check in after duty sent home, right next to as DOD civilian and active duty sailor who both had full time health insurance. I mean it was a one way ticket to the streets and homelessness, that did happen.
I am not sure who to share this following excerpts with at the va but if you want to give me suggestions let me know.
Peace
---------
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
“interrelated factors of maintenance” Who ever created this “test” to give a young non prior service reserve enlisted to fill an active dut billet on a ship, gave no consideration to the “interrelated factors of maintenance” of his, my life from 18-23 years of age assigned to these ships. Factors such as thousands of hour stressing over manuals at home alone about a ship and duty to your own country with poverty compensation, no health care insurance, no leadership checking in and monitoring you, no health care professionals monitoring you, never be considered a veteran for veteran purposes even with an honorable discharge, right in the middle of America. You had those factors whie you basically were given the task to be an active duty sailor in qualification and ability and readiness and exposure to the same elements monthly. It gets to the point that no one I think ever considered this and no on on the ship monitored it my development. The young guys in the reserves and national guard should be monitored for these “interrelated factors”.
There were times in the ship yard, based on orders, where I would be doing life altering things very stressful on the body and mind with no health insurance to check in after duty sent home, right next to as DOD civilian and active duty sailor who both had full time health insurance. I mean it was a one way ticket to the streets and homelessness, that did happen.
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A lot of soldiers in the guard feel that it's wrong the VA doesn't recognize them as veterans until the retire from the guard if they don't have federal active duty time. I think there is the legal distinction and then there's the working definition of what a veteran is. Personally, I think that guard members should be recognized legally as veterans. Yes, we serve part time, but we receive part time benefits. However, in addition to the two days of training each month and two weeks in the summer, we still have to keep up on our SSD, going to NCOES, additional training from time to time, and physical fitness. One thing reservists have to do that active duty doesn't is juggle employment and military service, and we often have a difficult time with employment issues. I know there are laws on the books, but proving a law was broken is another matter. I just think if a soldier honorably serves, in whatever capacity, they are a veteran and that should be recognized.
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That's a good question but I don't know if anyone here can accurately provide an answer. We lack the information, perspective and context that happened over those 4 years to provide the answer you need/want. If you have documented proof of 5 years on an AD Frigate I don't know how you would fail to have the minimum 2 years. My only thoughts to that is possibly it needed to be consecutive and not cumulative but I don't know what all the eligibility criteria is and what documentation is on hand. That could possibly answer the question but again I don't know. I would recommend going to patient advocacy at your VA and get all the cards on the table to figure out where things were snagged in the process.
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PO3 Aaron Hassay
SSGT,
Thanks for the response. Here are reports about the program the ship and my exact enlistment as associated with the ffg. The VA would not take note of any of these reports. The VA homeless voucher would of been really helpful instantly approved instead of denied. I was part timed over 5 years. For what I understand the Navy stopped doing this.
“In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
Structure.”
<<This Reports explains both the beginning and end of the NRF and the SAM Enlistment.>>
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213071.pdf
SLEEP PROBLEMS, HEALTH SYMPTOMS, AND TENSION/ANXIETY AND FATIGUE DURING VARTINE CRUISING IN A MODERATELY HIGH
HEAT/HUMIDITY NAVAL XMVIRONNENT
Naval Health Research Center.
Approach
A cross-sectional sample of officers' and enlisted personnel aboard nine
U.S. .Navy combatant ships vas surveyed. Shiptypes included tvo Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs), five Minesweepers (MSOs), one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG),
and one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SUSTAINED SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS ON
U. S.NAVY PERSONNEL
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
<< Navy War College XO Report NRF FFG >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE’S SURFACE ASSETS?
LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
(( These 1975 and 1976 DOD Reports discuss the end of the draft and the new need for junior enlisted reserve recruiting, and the “test’ to underman active ships and fill billets with a reserve enlisted. Mind you the SAM enlistment has not yet been created. At this moment Navy Reservist are prior active duty))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs. Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
Thanks for the response. Here are reports about the program the ship and my exact enlistment as associated with the ffg. The VA would not take note of any of these reports. The VA homeless voucher would of been really helpful instantly approved instead of denied. I was part timed over 5 years. For what I understand the Navy stopped doing this.
“In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
Structure.”
<<This Reports explains both the beginning and end of the NRF and the SAM Enlistment.>>
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213071.pdf
SLEEP PROBLEMS, HEALTH SYMPTOMS, AND TENSION/ANXIETY AND FATIGUE DURING VARTINE CRUISING IN A MODERATELY HIGH
HEAT/HUMIDITY NAVAL XMVIRONNENT
Naval Health Research Center.
Approach
A cross-sectional sample of officers' and enlisted personnel aboard nine
U.S. .Navy combatant ships vas surveyed. Shiptypes included tvo Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs), five Minesweepers (MSOs), one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG),
and one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SUSTAINED SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS ON
U. S.NAVY PERSONNEL
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
<< Navy War College XO Report NRF FFG >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE’S SURFACE ASSETS?
LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
(( These 1975 and 1976 DOD Reports discuss the end of the draft and the new need for junior enlisted reserve recruiting, and the “test’ to underman active ships and fill billets with a reserve enlisted. Mind you the SAM enlistment has not yet been created. At this moment Navy Reservist are prior active duty))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs. Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
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SSgt Christophe Murphy
PO3 Aaron Hassay - Ok, if I understand this correctly you were a reservist and the eligibility requirements of the voucher program required two years of active service? I would still recommend working with patient advocacy so they could potentially use your experience to improve the process.
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PO3 Aaron Hassay
SSgt Christophe Murphy - thanks for the feedback-
I pulled some reports about these ships I served on in the previous response. Here is a more short form version.
My battle to get a VA Homeless Housing Voucher is done and complete. I share information just so possibly others might not have to go through this again.
I am not sure who to share this following excerpts with at the va but if you want to give me suggestions let me know.
Peace
---------
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
“interrelated factors of maintenance” Who ever created this “test” to give a young non prior service reserve enlisted to fill an active dut billet on a ship, gave no consideration to the “interrelated factors of maintenance” of his, my life from 18-23 years of age assigned to these ships. Factors such as thousands of hour stressing over manuals at home alone about a ship and duty to your own country with poverty compensation, no health care insurance, no leadership checking in and monitoring you, no health care professionals monitoring you, never be considered a veteran for veteran purposes even with an honorable discharge, right in the middle of America. You had those factors whie you basically were given the task to be an active duty sailor in qualification and ability and readiness and exposure to the same elements monthly. It gets to the point that no one I think ever considered this and no on on the ship monitored it my development. The young guys in the reserves and national guard should be monitored for these “interrelated factors”.
There were times in the ship yard, based on orders, where I would be doing life altering things very stressful on the body and mind with no health insurance to check in after duty sent home, right next to as DOD civilian and active duty sailor who both had full time health insurance. I mean it was a one way ticket to the streets and homelessness, that did happen.
I pulled some reports about these ships I served on in the previous response. Here is a more short form version.
My battle to get a VA Homeless Housing Voucher is done and complete. I share information just so possibly others might not have to go through this again.
I am not sure who to share this following excerpts with at the va but if you want to give me suggestions let me know.
Peace
---------
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
“interrelated factors of maintenance” Who ever created this “test” to give a young non prior service reserve enlisted to fill an active dut billet on a ship, gave no consideration to the “interrelated factors of maintenance” of his, my life from 18-23 years of age assigned to these ships. Factors such as thousands of hour stressing over manuals at home alone about a ship and duty to your own country with poverty compensation, no health care insurance, no leadership checking in and monitoring you, no health care professionals monitoring you, never be considered a veteran for veteran purposes even with an honorable discharge, right in the middle of America. You had those factors whie you basically were given the task to be an active duty sailor in qualification and ability and readiness and exposure to the same elements monthly. It gets to the point that no one I think ever considered this and no on on the ship monitored it my development. The young guys in the reserves and national guard should be monitored for these “interrelated factors”.
There were times in the ship yard, based on orders, where I would be doing life altering things very stressful on the body and mind with no health insurance to check in after duty sent home, right next to as DOD civilian and active duty sailor who both had full time health insurance. I mean it was a one way ticket to the streets and homelessness, that did happen.
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