Posted on Jun 13, 2015
Why can't our Iraqis or Afghans fight like their Iraqis or Afghans?
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I have been re-reading several books that I first read as a Lieutenant and Captain. Most deal with the Korean and Vietnam wars. Now with several deployments since I last read them, I have a different perspective. One thing that stands out is how in most cases, the side we supported failed to perform on the battlefield (as a rule and I know there have been exceptions). In Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it is the same ethnic people fighting against each other. And usually the ones we have supported have had superior training and equipment. So why have our "allies" failed so often?
http://www.unprecedentedmediocrity.com/marvin-the-arvn-and-the-iraqi-army/
http://www.unprecedentedmediocrity.com/marvin-the-arvn-and-the-iraqi-army/
Posted in these groups: 
Leadership
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan
ISIS
Leadership Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan ISIS
Posted 9 y ago
Responses: 38
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Something I noticed in the difference between my first and second deployments was that on the first one I worked with Iraqi National Guard and the second one is worked with Iraqi Army.
Working with the ING, these guys fought to protect their home. The fight was local and it was their clan or tribe they were protecting
protecting. The IA were pulled from all over the country and assigned where they were needed. They were from a different province than the one they served in, so it was only a job.
I blame it on the tribalism that's present throughout Iraq. In America, we are all Americans and we fight for America. In Iraq, there are clans. The survival of a different clan doesn't affect the clan. I think this is why the Sons of Iraq program and the Iraqi National Guard worked so well, and why our attempts to set up the Iraq Army in a system that mirrored ours did not.
Working with the ING, these guys fought to protect their home. The fight was local and it was their clan or tribe they were protecting
protecting. The IA were pulled from all over the country and assigned where they were needed. They were from a different province than the one they served in, so it was only a job.
I blame it on the tribalism that's present throughout Iraq. In America, we are all Americans and we fight for America. In Iraq, there are clans. The survival of a different clan doesn't affect the clan. I think this is why the Sons of Iraq program and the Iraqi National Guard worked so well, and why our attempts to set up the Iraq Army in a system that mirrored ours did not.
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SFC (Join to see)
It's easy for us to forget that we were once very tribal nation at the state level. We had separate currencies between states and didn't identify as Americans for a very long time.
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SGT (Join to see)
I was about to post a comment along similar lines. I think you're right on point.
When we're nation-building, we seem to care way too much about maintaining good relations with corrupt central governments. And, historically, maybe that's a bad model. The United States didn't have a strong national army for quite some time. It relied upon locally-raised regiments for much of the first half of our nation's history.
I understand that there's always tension. The president of the central government usually doesn't want to brook challenges to his authority from local powers. However, these presidents are corrupt as hell. They lose all legitimacy with the common people. And, they start reaching out to our enemies as soon as we leave because they haven't built anything that can stand up against an outside power.
Sometimes, I think we need to IMPOSE federalism upon these governments and equip and train local militias. The Sons of Liberty in Iraq was one of our first success stories there. And, we keep opposing an autonomous Kurdistan because Turkey and Iraq don't like that idea. But, they've been one of the strongest allies we've had in that area.
If a unitary central government can't deliver, it's time to look at federal models of government.
When we're nation-building, we seem to care way too much about maintaining good relations with corrupt central governments. And, historically, maybe that's a bad model. The United States didn't have a strong national army for quite some time. It relied upon locally-raised regiments for much of the first half of our nation's history.
I understand that there's always tension. The president of the central government usually doesn't want to brook challenges to his authority from local powers. However, these presidents are corrupt as hell. They lose all legitimacy with the common people. And, they start reaching out to our enemies as soon as we leave because they haven't built anything that can stand up against an outside power.
Sometimes, I think we need to IMPOSE federalism upon these governments and equip and train local militias. The Sons of Liberty in Iraq was one of our first success stories there. And, we keep opposing an autonomous Kurdistan because Turkey and Iraq don't like that idea. But, they've been one of the strongest allies we've had in that area.
If a unitary central government can't deliver, it's time to look at federal models of government.
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LTC Michael Hrycak
I worked with a division level (Department) staff of the DBE (Department of Border Enforcement) as Staff/Maneuver Officer in a Border Transition Team. My counterpart was a former Iraqi Army Brigadier General. He was a Warrior, as were others on the staff because they all fought for Iraq against the Iranians for about six and a half years, almost always outnumbered 5-7 to 1, and they performed well. We saw the tribal influence in the Iraqi priorities, and they will fight to the death for their tribe, but they are definitely more ambivalent about the general populace of Iraq. The federal model of government may be the solution. Good call.
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SSG Jesus Sijalbo
There are more pride and rewards to be held when your fighting for the way you live and where your raised.
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Could it be because we shoulder the main load of fighting and they are happy to let us do so?
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- Each case (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan) has similarities and differences and therefore its own unique reasons for why our allies "failed". My own quick thoughts.
- Korea. South Korea did not fail. The US failed to support South Korea to the extent that the Soviets supported North Korea. The US also allowed the Soviets and North Koreans to believe that South Korea was outside of our "sphere of influence". In spite of all this, South Korea and its supporters/allies were able to at least keep South Korea independent and South Korea has flourished since then.
- Vietnam. Where to begin? The US got involved when we did not have and arguably should not have gotten involved. Once we got involved, LBJ never went "all in". The US supported corrupt individuals and a corrupt government. Simply stated, the North Vietnamese were willing to stay longer, commit more resources, and be as brutal as necessary to win.
- Iraq. One can argue whether the US should have invaded in 2003 or not but two big reasons for strategic failure include: did not plan for Phase IV operations (what happens after we "win" and we pulled out completely in 2011 (can not have influence if one does not have a presence). On the Iraqi side, one can not get Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds together if one establishes a Shia dominated government. Lack of will and corruption are two big reasons as well.
- Afghanistan. Hard to convince an Afghani to stay in the fight for the long haul if they are not convinced that the US is in it for the long haul. I have never understood the currently thinking / requirement of an "exit plan" when all of our success stories (Japan, Germany, South Korea) involved US forces staying up to the present time.
- Korea. South Korea did not fail. The US failed to support South Korea to the extent that the Soviets supported North Korea. The US also allowed the Soviets and North Koreans to believe that South Korea was outside of our "sphere of influence". In spite of all this, South Korea and its supporters/allies were able to at least keep South Korea independent and South Korea has flourished since then.
- Vietnam. Where to begin? The US got involved when we did not have and arguably should not have gotten involved. Once we got involved, LBJ never went "all in". The US supported corrupt individuals and a corrupt government. Simply stated, the North Vietnamese were willing to stay longer, commit more resources, and be as brutal as necessary to win.
- Iraq. One can argue whether the US should have invaded in 2003 or not but two big reasons for strategic failure include: did not plan for Phase IV operations (what happens after we "win" and we pulled out completely in 2011 (can not have influence if one does not have a presence). On the Iraqi side, one can not get Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds together if one establishes a Shia dominated government. Lack of will and corruption are two big reasons as well.
- Afghanistan. Hard to convince an Afghani to stay in the fight for the long haul if they are not convinced that the US is in it for the long haul. I have never understood the currently thinking / requirement of an "exit plan" when all of our success stories (Japan, Germany, South Korea) involved US forces staying up to the present time.
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Capt Seid Waddell
COL Jason Smallfield, PMP, CFM, well stated, sir. And I would add that we made as great a change to Japanese society as would have been required to turn Iraq around. Germany also had a culture change with our occupation, but it was not as extreme as the change in Japanese culture.
But the vision and determination to see the mission through was very different on our part than anything that we have seen since.
But the vision and determination to see the mission through was very different on our part than anything that we have seen since.
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Lt Col Stephen Petzold
Both good points. In our rush to not be called occupiers we turned much over to the Afghans and Iraqis as far as setting things up and picking who would be in charge. And in these places there is a very firmly established culture of corruption. The military leaders are picked based on their political connections and use their positions to fleece their troops, and anyone else that they can, and when faced with battle, flee with their money and leave the troops behind. There is also no high paying civilian position awaiting their senior military leaders when they retire (nor a pension), so at least in the Afghan case, there is no desire to ever leave the positions. This means they have zero desire to professionally develop the Jr officers and NCOs under them, because then these folks could become a threat to the senior's position. All of this leads to very unmotivated troops and we are seeing the effects on the battlefield. There were/are some very good and motivated Jr military leaders but they tend to not be politically connected and thus are never given the higher level positions. Because we gave up any veto authority over military personnel we had few ways to get rid of the corrupt Sr leaders. Although we do not agree with the motivation of ISIS, it is fair to say that they are highly motivated in their cause. So our unmotivated local troops are fighting a highly motivated enemy and we have seen where that leads from the previous conflicts mentioned above.
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1LT William Clardy
Capt Seid Waddell, we had inherently greater authority in Japanese eyes than we ever had in Iraq -- and not because we won the war.
After Admiral Perry's fleet sailed unstoppably into Tokyo, the Japanese put an extraordinary effort into learning how we had achieved such technical superiority, and that research continued well past the end of World War II. It was a major part of the reason that Japanese industry adopted leading-edge American manufacturing ideas and turned them into reality with much more vigor than we did. In some ways, it could be said that they worshiped our industrial prowess so much that the student far surpassed the master.
After Admiral Perry's fleet sailed unstoppably into Tokyo, the Japanese put an extraordinary effort into learning how we had achieved such technical superiority, and that research continued well past the end of World War II. It was a major part of the reason that Japanese industry adopted leading-edge American manufacturing ideas and turned them into reality with much more vigor than we did. In some ways, it could be said that they worshiped our industrial prowess so much that the student far surpassed the master.
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Capt Seid Waddell
1LT William Clardy, it also helped that the Japanese industry had been bombed flat and it was a matter of survival to accept our help and instructions to put their country back together again.
I recall as a young boy having a tin truck that was made in Japan - if you looked underneath it you could still see the Coors label. They were making anything possible to earn a living out of whatever materials that fell to hand - including G.I.'s discarded beer cans.
The problem we had in Iraq was a lack of staying power as a nation; we had the situation stabilized and then walked away and let it deteriorate again. As a comparison I would note that we STILL have troops in both Japan and Germany after 70 years, and they are BOTH success stories.
I recall as a young boy having a tin truck that was made in Japan - if you looked underneath it you could still see the Coors label. They were making anything possible to earn a living out of whatever materials that fell to hand - including G.I.'s discarded beer cans.
The problem we had in Iraq was a lack of staying power as a nation; we had the situation stabilized and then walked away and let it deteriorate again. As a comparison I would note that we STILL have troops in both Japan and Germany after 70 years, and they are BOTH success stories.
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