Did the consolidation of EOD units in garrision affect the way individual units operate?

1stSgt (Join to see) - Ok. Again, the question is regarding GARRISON.

However, many EOD units don't have enough manning for their AO. Also, if you gave your EOD support crap, some would give you crap back.

SGT (Join to see) , got it. Your definition of garrison is different than mine. For me and most Marines, garrison is the rear, as in FOB, Kuwait or Camp Pendleton. Out on a range, we did not bother calling EOD until after we were done. We would stake it off, search the surrounding area and then call in the grid to range control and then leave. I believe we were operating on different frequencies, my friend. Semper Fidelis.

1stSgt (Join to see) - I've been saying that from the beginning. Maybe instead of saying "not talking about combat AO" I should've simply said stateside. All of this had little to do with my question.

SGT (Join to see) - Concur

You mean the effects it had on just the EOD units? Not big picture for all units?

It's a pretty vague question, probably could have used a description in my opinion.

SSG Bethany Viglietta - Yes, mostly just toward EOD units. Those who haven't worked extenisively with EOD are less likely to realize the changes that SFC (Join to see) mentioned, I think.

Typically in the garrison environment the only time a unit interacts with an EOD technician outside of training is during range operations and they have a problem. So anyone with large ordnance items like rocket pods on a helicopter or a field artillery unit training at the range would interact when they had a malfunctioning piece of ordnance, but they have to go through range control, and range control would call EOD, not the unit directly. The incident would also have to go through Quasas. So outside of that type of incident a normal unit would not interact with operational EOD in garrison. With the alignment, the Army had a big interest in the BCTs and subordinate units training with the EOD teams that they would be deploying with, but when they trained with those EOD teams, the EOD teams were hardly ACTUALLY trained with, it became a situation like NTC or JRTC, a unit would call for EOD, but the EOD incident would be abridged or quickened or otherwise undermined by the training O/Cs to get the unit moving again, because once the first 5 minutes of a deployed EOD incident are over, the major unit role in it is being stationary and pulling security for a good 30 minutes(with the exception of the on scene commander and the TOC). During training events a major unit calls this a waste of time, so interacting with EOD turns out to be overlooked during these events, and the unit doesn't get the full experience of working with EOD, and it causes problems when they actually get an incident while deployed.

To all of you reading who are not EOD, if i were to pass on any knowledge or advice when it comes to working with and being supported by EOD it would be this: Get ready to meet a lot of demands for a small enabler that doesn't answer to you. I know this sounds kind of pretentious, but trust me, it is this way for reasons, and those reasons are all past history of working with major units. EOD teams have a lot of requirements that we have to meet in order to work on a base, the basic ones are a space that is not trafficked or available to other people. It needs to be close to our response vehicle, which also should not be int he mix of a bunch other vehicles and people (though this one is a bit flexible). We need power and connectivity, we can provide our own at times, but we need it in this modern war. These requirements are made out of explosive safety concerns and information security concerns. We need privacy, and we will not share our initial reports with you, we will provide all the debriefings you want, but the hard reports MUST go through our channels. This one was the result of supported units misinterpreting or over extrapolating things that EOD techs say and submitting their own reports with our pictures, and higher commands now have two completely different reports with the same pictures (this happened A LOT around 07-09, and the higher command trusted EOD as the experts, and supported units just looked stupid, this rule of not sharing info is in place to protect the supported unit, not EOD). There are a few more, but these are the big ones, and if a unit can't provide them to EOD, then that unit will lose EOD on their base. They will not lose EOD support, but they will lose that close access to EOD that they had before.

The realignment of forces was a knee-jerk reaction to the sudden and overwhelming need for Brigade Combat Teams to have immediate access to EOD resources. The simplest solution it seemed (at the time) was to move all the outlying units, which were where they were to provide faster response to CONUS-based missions, including response and VIPS, to major divisional posts and align each company with a BCT, allowing interaction prior to deployment with the assigned BCT. It sounded terrific on paper, but now you not only grow MTOE from 18 (which we rarely filled) to 44-man modular companies, but move those units to where they are right next to each other and fighting for response. With more people come more missions we can support, which is why, even though there are more than double the number of active EOD Techs than there were when I came in, we are still stretched devastatingly thin. Couple that with the enormous amount of Techs back from 15 years of war who are just now getting around to addressing nagging medical issues and, per capita, we are worked harder now than prior to OEF/OIF. One of the major shortcomings that has changed the way we operate is that with all the units being so close to Battalion or Group and under so much scrutiny, we are no longer able to obtain training/equipment/opportunities outside the realm of big, proper Army... One example is that when I was in San Diego, every month we'd do a 'bomb-squad breakfast' where we'd get together with Marine Techs, the Navy guys, FBI, ATF, and local law enforcement from San Diego, Orange County, and LA and do a brunch and discuss latest happenings. Back then each company was more free to conduct their own engagements and operate independently. Trying to do that on a post with 4 companies makes for WAY too full a venue, plus as soon as someone does something nice, BN and GP typically want a Powerpoint and AAR submitted so they have situational awareness of what the companies are doing. It's a larger version of being fragged out from a Company while deployed... it's nicer away from the flag pole, even though it does tend to keep the units more honest.