Does the Navy have a harder time employing doctors as opposed the Air Force?

I am reviewing a 1990 DOD Manpower Requirement Report that is 4 years before I would join in 1994, to get a good idea of the era, at the draw down end of the Cold War as they called it, that discusses Navy difficulties hiring doctors, on ships for example where it hits the fan, but under the same exact budget, plenty of money, an amazing amount of money to hire approximately 300,000 civilian federal employees, possibly even secretaries and admin and Doctors to fully analyze the stress load on land in a secure building! But a real Doctor on a Ship well?? under this TOTAL FORCE policy of Civilian Active Duty and Reserve. I mean when you are 18 you are not even contemplating this.


Here is the Report Excerpts of interest.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR FY 1990

E. Key Manpower Issues
1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth
It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing
an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries.


The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health
care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a
national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the
correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken
significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength
in FY 1989 and beyond:


C. Civilian Component
Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of
the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not
require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,
ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical
support; and operates and maintains military installations. They
contribute directly to the..readiness of the armed forces. Civilian
strength is projectod-V6'decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent)
between FY ljS9-•nd FY 1990.



C. Civilian Manpower
1. General
Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall
resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our
fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial
activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E,
printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the
readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation
and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in
supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance
facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support
in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development,
and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on
readiness.


Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people
needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to
procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenerio.
These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as
depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well
as associated equipment and supply support.






I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.

To supplement the active component units some reserve
component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate
call up for limited periods.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civilian
personnel, contract resources, and host nation support. Mlanpower requirements
are developed based on the forces required to execute our military
strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by
fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the
event of war,


THE TOTAL FORCE.

The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force
Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to

national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components,
civilian workforce, and retired military, host nation. support, and DoD
Contractors.-,





1. Navy Total Force
A Total Force Advocate flag officer billet within the Plans,
Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component
manpower and units in the Navy. With analytical support from the Center
for Naval Analyses, potential changes in Total Force composition are
evaluated to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger
share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped
to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.
By the mid-199Ots, the US Naval Reserve (measured in manpower,
ships, and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful naval
force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active
Navy, this Total Force will ensure that the United States will prevail in
k any conflict at sea.


However, past decisions to assign significant combat and combat
support capabilities to the Naval Reserve were not supported by the
Congress when authorizing Naval Reserve end strength growth


Further, despite several years of requests for legislative authority for
incentives for hard-to-man units to help attract the quality and skill
mix needed to man the programmed growth in the Naval Reserve, such
authority was not granted.

Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve
frigates and other important units.











II. Significant Program Highlights
A. Active Component Military Manpower
1. General
Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and
retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as
hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy
continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel
whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose
talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical
skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their
families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the
modern Navy.



B. Reserve Component Military Manpower
The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to
describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions that simultaneously
provide direct assistance to active duty units in performing their
missions.


(1) General. A major component of Navy's growth toward
the goal of 600 ships is occurring in the Naval Reserve, now well underway
in the most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy
endeavors to use limited resources with optimum efficiency, while remaining
prepared to respond rapidly to crises, accomplish heavy training
requirements, and maintain Fleet readiness.

Mobilization Forces Category "A"
In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will
increase by two ships to a total of 27 with the addition of two frigates
and one mine countermeasure ship and the loss of one destroyer.



5. TAR End Strength Shortfall
In the 1986 Report to the Congress on Navy's Total Force,
Navy addressed SECNAV's policy to man FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships with
approximately a 30%/70% active/TAR crew mix. Between FY 1987 and FY
1989, programmed TAR growth has been reduced by 4,987 because of Congressional
actions. One thousand of these billets were originally programmed
for Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.

The assignment of additional MPN assets to ensure proper manning of NRF ships places an
even greater demand on the constrained active duty manpower.

The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was inaugurated
in FY 1984, to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel
mobilization requirements (E-3 and below).











(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-6 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1988 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below and junior
officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program is meeting
some of these junior enlisted mobilization requirements.


So after reading this and having the ability for critical analysis having lived it I asked a few questions.



I talked to one of my Marine Buddies officer type Vietnam Era, who said the Navy has special reasons like working conditions of a ship, being away from a family on continuous deployments, unlike the Air Force. Why did I have to fight and wait years because I had to prove that my spine and nerve problem may possibly be connected to the ship in deck?






It seems service members should be afforded equal opportunity to an actual doctor, especially lets say in an operational unit like a Navy Ship. I can speak for my experience there was no doctor on the guided missile frigate. My Navy Army Transfer at MEPS when finally reviewed in a safe place by real DOD Doctors, was disqualified at MEPS to get off the ship, for spine and musculoskeletal and psych permanent profile. My actual medical records on the ship for any of these conditions are a big. zero. It was either you were dead or fit for duty keep pumping and dumping. I was younger then so I could hit some pain thresholds, just basically blank out, I suppose in deck. But when you go the Va and work in deck and have no documentation of a spine injury on the ship, and only a a permanent profile for spine and musculoskeletal at MEPS denying your transfer off the ship, they deny your claim time and time again as it was not actually documented on the ship, where no doctors are.
You end up not knowing how to take care of yourself because no one assisted you then, and you eventually limp and can't walk in society as it became degenerative. But I will say this teeter machine, and a good diet, and no surgery, can be your partial cure. If you are not dead keep on fighting.