Posted on Nov 30, 2015
How can the US Air Force increase combat capability across multiple weapon systems using operations reconnaissance?
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http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/bookinfo.asp?bid=573
This paper uses nontraditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR), now known in tactics, techniques and procedures as operations reconnaissance, as a case study to increase combat capability across multiple weapon systems within the Air Force. NTISR demonstrates how one capability can flex to bridge gaps across several doctrinal functions and mission sets. It also provides an argument for the development of future technologies within extant fiscal constraints, revealing a requirement to shift the acquisition weight of effort away from traditional niche assets to those that support true multirole capabilities.
This paper uses nontraditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR), now known in tactics, techniques and procedures as operations reconnaissance, as a case study to increase combat capability across multiple weapon systems within the Air Force. NTISR demonstrates how one capability can flex to bridge gaps across several doctrinal functions and mission sets. It also provides an argument for the development of future technologies within extant fiscal constraints, revealing a requirement to shift the acquisition weight of effort away from traditional niche assets to those that support true multirole capabilities.
Posted 9 y ago
Responses: 5
The paper makes some strong and valid points regarding the need to make better use of OPSRECCE assets. I think we (the AF) have been forced many times to turn niche assets into multi-role assets (the author's own B-1 being used for CAS in Afghanistan comes to mind)...so the movement from niche to multi-role is not new. A couple points: There is a newer version of AFTTP 3-3.AOC (31 Jan 2014) but it still offers no update on how to best interleave OPSRECCE prioritization (historically via the ISRD creating the JIPCL) with the strike prioritization (via CPD creating the JIPTL) for the JFACC. Though the author makes a good case for the XCAS model, particularly for relatively permissive environments, he doesn't mention 5th gen aircraft, their superior OPSRECCE capabilities and how as these platforms become a larger portion of the force, that will make the need for a new combined process even greater. I'm not sure an XCAS model will serve us in kicking down the door of a near-peer competitor.
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