Posted on Jul 8, 2015
Is the concept of Vertical Envelopment still viable?
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The most recent publication from CSI (Combat Studies Institute) "When Failure Thrives," studies the historical evidence surrounding the concept and practice of vertical envelopment (airborne operations). Is this once inovative military practice obsolete in the current operating environment?
http://usacac.army.mil/node/936
http://usacac.army.mil/node/936
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 6
Still viable with small teams and HALO. Drop a division static line in broad daylight? You've sentenced most of them to death or injury.
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COL (Join to see)
Concur. Small specialized teams to do operations is one thing. The concept of vertical envelopment (large scale airborne operations), may have seen its best days (and that's a stretch considering the track record laid out here) in WWII. The piece also states that when it was successful after WWII, it was unecessary. Conventional troops would have been quite capable of doing the job. Of course this piece could be entirely wrong and one sided as well.
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Sir,
Wasn't the Airborne concept developed before our widespread use of helicopters?
As such, during that era, it would have been the "best" way to get large quantities of troops inland quickly. But once you add in helicopters and the ability to do expeditionary airfield or ship to shore landings, the need for parachutes is significantly reduced?
Less training, less risk, more control, smaller footprint (on landing).
I'm not saying that Airborne ops aren't a great tool, but it seems like technology gave us a "better" option, and that option is getting better and faster every year. We can land half a platoon (24-32 troops) using an Osprey.
Wasn't the Airborne concept developed before our widespread use of helicopters?
As such, during that era, it would have been the "best" way to get large quantities of troops inland quickly. But once you add in helicopters and the ability to do expeditionary airfield or ship to shore landings, the need for parachutes is significantly reduced?
Less training, less risk, more control, smaller footprint (on landing).
I'm not saying that Airborne ops aren't a great tool, but it seems like technology gave us a "better" option, and that option is getting better and faster every year. We can land half a platoon (24-32 troops) using an Osprey.
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COL (Join to see)
Obviously, large scale ship to shore landings were prevalent at the time of the inovation of vertical envelopment, so I will address the air assault or air movement piece. It's a different set of risks. In my opinion, Air Assault operations are inherently less of a tactical risk. I won't get into operational risk because there are too many factors that can bear on a larger operation. A tactical mission can fail and the operation can still succeed. The ability to make contact with a smaller element through air assualt versus the mass acheived from a large scale airborne operation allows the situation to develop versus throwing all your eggs out of one plane so to speak. You also have the ability to retreive your troops during an air mobile operation which you do not have during an airborne operation. While the risk to the airframes are different, I think modern air defense systems negate this risk factor to little difference between the two. Even then, I think I'd rather be in an agile helicopter low to the ground than a slow moving mass of C130's or C141's subject to everything an enemy can throw at them. Take a gander at the case study and see what you think.
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Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS
The study was a hair verbose (not that I'm not), but it seemed to align with your comments and my initial assessment.
One thing of huge note, was the focus on "prestige." The idea of having an elite status is great, but (and I'm trying to phrase this correctly) there must be a functional need for it. The document highlights more of a "lack of need" than a need, which in turn questions whether this particular skill set should be used for that elite status.
One thing of huge note, was the focus on "prestige." The idea of having an elite status is great, but (and I'm trying to phrase this correctly) there must be a functional need for it. The document highlights more of a "lack of need" than a need, which in turn questions whether this particular skill set should be used for that elite status.
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COL (Join to see)
It is verbose, but it's an intellectual piece by the "Combat Studies Institute" at Fort Leavenworth. Can't expect something half done there. I concur that there is little time spent on identifying possible needs. That being said, there can always be a reason to keep something "just in case." The prestige and heritage argument is one that we see and live up to throughout the Army. When it comes time to cut capability, no one wants to see the unit they commanded die off. There is an especially strong kinship in the Airborne community as well as places like Fort Hood. We tend to defend those units we have served in and the community in which we have fought. It's natural. This piece points out the logical problems with that.
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Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS
COL (Join to see) Concur on all points. But I don't think units have to "die" when they can "evolve." Cavalry used to be horses. When was the last time someone actually rode a horse in a combat capacity? What will Cavalry be in 50 years?
Marines used to be Shipboard protectors, now we have a very defined "Littoral" mission. I'm a huge proponent of the evolving model.
It's just a case of how "Airborne Units" can evolve.
Marines used to be Shipboard protectors, now we have a very defined "Littoral" mission. I'm a huge proponent of the evolving model.
It's just a case of how "Airborne Units" can evolve.
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There is a bit of a problem with the idea of hanging in the air under a canopy with people with automatic weapons under you ...
That being said .. if you can deliver a platoon of blood-thirsty airborne troopers into someplace the enemy least suspects in the dead of night .. then you have something!
That being said .. if you can deliver a platoon of blood-thirsty airborne troopers into someplace the enemy least suspects in the dead of night .. then you have something!
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COL (Join to see)
Unless you are surrounded and summarily anhiliated, which happend to the Russians not once...not twice...but three times in WWII. More airborne operations have been failures or pyrhic victories than have been successes (at least according to this study). When they were successes, they were unecessary (against a weakened foe which would not have stood up to a conventional attack).
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SPC Jan Allbright, M.Sc., R.S.
Welllllll ... they are not supposed to know we are coming!
The U.S. Army Airborne ops at Normandy didn't quite go off as planned as well, but it did have the Germans in a "Look! A Squirrel" mode for a few.
The U.S. Army Airborne ops at Normandy didn't quite go off as planned as well, but it did have the Germans in a "Look! A Squirrel" mode for a few.
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COL (Join to see)
I will concede your point. The problem today is that it would be extremely difficult to surprise a peer competitor with a Division size airborne operation. Nigh impossible. With lack of surprise comes preparation and the possibility of being killed to death rather quickly on arrival.
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SPC Jan Allbright, M.Sc., R.S.
And I concede yours as well. A Division sized assault would be doomed.
However small units should still work. but in a special ops capability.
However small units should still work. but in a special ops capability.
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