Reservists - what is your philosophy on measuring readiness? Are we mired down in metrics?

Interesting thread. As a Brigade Commander, having lived this as a Battalion Commander as well, I have a couple of thoughts:

- as a Battalion Commander, my Ops SGM was highly upset over the amount of effort we spent on Readiness Metrics. I thought about it, and my response was I agree in principle...EXCEPT that every single Readiness Metric we focused on was really nothing more than a Soldier Care issue. APFT, Ht/Wt, Evals, DMOSQ, Security Clearance...show me one readiness metric that isn't something that is really First-Line Leader Soldier Care and I'll debate the merits of tracking it based on unit mission.

- which brings us to point number two: I was taught years ago to be careful what you measure, it's exactly what you'll get. If people are only judged based on metrics, all other life will stop except to achieve those metrics...by hook or by crook.

- also related to my first point is that each of these readiness metrics is not only a First-Line Leader issue, but an Individual Soldier Condition of Employment. Most of these measured areas are required by regulation for the Soldier to remain in the service in good standing (i.e. not be flagged). I shouldn't have to tell my boss that 30% of my unit hasn't passed a PT test in a year; they aren't supposed to be in my formation.

- finally, I would suggest because of the points listed below, you shouldn't be spending a preponderance of your time chasing these. If the culture of your unit is similar to mine of "doing the right things and doing things right," to include taking care of individual Soldier readiness, you should be managing the exceptions. Yes, I spend some time asking why is SSG Snuffy's NCOER sitting in his Senior Rater's inbox, but I don't spend a weekly hour-long call, or even such a meeting at BA, chasing metrics. Why? Because my subordinate leaders know it's important, and have bought into the belief that it is the best way to take care of their Soldiers.

No doubt: BAs should be spent on collective training; making sure the unit is ready to deploy and perform its war-time mission. But to not pay attention to if the Individual Soldier, and their Chain of Command, are doing their job to ensure individual readiness, is not good leadership.

The metrics versus training readiness question is an excellent one, especially as we transition from an Army at War to an Army Preparing for Contingencies.

Let me start with some history. Prior to 9-11, metrics were not as important as they are today, and training alone was the gold standard for evaluating units. Commanders conducted training events, and rated their units based upon the performance, especially if granted the opportunity to attend one of the training centers (NTC, JRTC, CMTC, BCTP). Those units that deployed to Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo were able to judge readiness based on those experiences. Unfortunately, the majority of these evaluations were subjective ones, from our USRs, and those were often inflated. Many leaders would write in their USR reports statements to the effect that "although only 50% of my unit is DMOSQ, those who are perform at such a high level that we can accomplish 80% of our wartime mission." If you don't have the trained people, you can't do the full mission.

Once we began calling up units for Afghanistan and expecially Iraq, however, the Army found that the number of Army Reserve troops we could actually deploy for combat was as low as 50% of the assigned strength of our units. Medical profiles caused many of them, but some were due to lack of MOSQ, family care plans, physical fitness - factors that sound familiar from your current metrics, right? The Army Reserve wasn't truly tested by Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, or the other "recent" actions, because our numbers required for deployment were so small that we could cobble together the necessary fully-qualified troops from a number of units to accomplish the mission and make it happen. Iraq in particular broke the bank when it came to getting enough folks downrange who were mission ready. Our recent history tells us that unless we pay attention to these metrics, we won't have a truly ready force.

The second factor has to do with resourcing. As we all know, the Army and the Army Reserve face enormous resource and money restraints with sequestration and the general post-conflict draw-down. When our military leaders meet with the elected officials in Washington, D.C., and tell Congress that they need $100 million to keep 200,000 Army Reserve Soldiers ready for war, those congressmen and women have our readiness stats handy. How do you answer a Senator who replies, "Well General, you say you need $100 million for 200,000 troops. But only 50% are medically qualified for war. How about we give you $50 million and you can have all of your medically qualified troops trained at peak performance?" Metrics are important for resourcing as well.

The problem is that when all your time is focused on metrics, when do you do training? What if we are medically qualified but we don't know our engineering, medical, signal, MP, quartermaster, civil affairs, or PSYOP job? This is the job of leaders. Whereas our top Army Reserve leadership have to focus on Readiness as their command guidance, we as leaders below have to add the Training piece. Both are vital.

The take-away is that leaders must balance both Readiness and Training. Division, Command, and Brigade Commanders must measure Training as well, through exercises. And we have excellent resources in the Army Reserve - request evaluation from the Training Divisions, who are tasked to provide this sort of objective feedback. By combining our Operational Reserve units with the Training units, both improve their ability to do their combat missions. Ask the Training Divisions to conduct FTXes, and provide collective training feedback.

@Eric Rahman - Not just "Yes" but "Hell Yes!"

We are obsessed with whether someone is medically cleared (even though all of this would be done in a mobilization process, the time is planned in for it), legal readiness (same thing here - time is provided for any necessary preparation of wills, powers of attorney, etc...). What we ignore is such "minor issues" as weapon familiarity, knowledge about the area(s) of the world likely to be mobilized for action in, and training on the systems actually likely to be used on deployment.