The United States needs a democratic civ-mil fusion for the future of our country – and the world

The strategic competition between the United States and China is entering a new phase. On each side, steps are being taken to increase their relative competitive advantage – the outcome of which will determine whether the United States or China sets the rules, norms, values for the world in the second half of the 21st century and into the 22nd century.

Those are the stakes. But are we ready for this long-term competition?

The Biden Administration describes this decade as a “decisive decade” both in terms of this strategic competition with China as well as the future standing and role of the United States in the world. You can see this in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy:

- “From the earliest days of my Presidency, I have argued that our world is at an
inflection point. How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented
opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and
prosperity of the American people for generations to come.”

- “The 2022 National Security Strategy outlines how my Administration will seize
this decisive decade to advance America’s vital interests [and] position the
United States to outmaneuver our geopolitical competitors…”

- “President Biden has stated that we are living in a “decisive decade,” one
stamped by dramatic changes in geopolitics, technology, economics, and our
environment.”

- “The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the
PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-
Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and
authoritarian preferences.”

What’s interesting is these statements could have also been made by the Trump Administration – and they were in Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy:

- “The United States will respond to the growing political, economic, and military
competitions we face around the world. China and Russia challenge American
power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and
prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to
grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their
societies and expand their influence.”

- “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of
long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy
classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia
want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto
authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”

- “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is not the primary concern in
U.S. national security.”

When the Biden Administration and the Trump Administration are saying the same thing, that, my friends, is a consensus. And this consensus in the United States is particularly notable because it coincides with an important, yet not often discussed, reshuffling of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership.

Approximately one-year ago, in October 2022, the leadership of the CCP came together in Beijing for its quinquennial congress. During that meeting, we not only saw Xi Jinping further extend his grip on power over the CCP – to include by gaining a third term. We also saw another important strategic shift within the CCP leadership – one that has been under-reported.

During this quinquennial congress, many of the senior level positions in the CCP did not go to Chinese leaders with the traditional career tracks – provincial level leaders or mid-tier CCP leaders striving to attain senior levels of power. Rather, what we saw were many of the CCP’s senior level positions going to a new group of political leaders – leaders with deep experience at the intersection of the military and civil sectors of China.

What does this signal? Among many things, it suggests a renewed focus by Xi on his strategic vision for a military-civil fusion – the purpose of which is the break down the barriers between the Chinese government, government-controlled universities, state-controlled business, and China’s innovative sector – all geared towards what the US State Department describes as “the CCP’s strategy to develop the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a ‘world class military’ by 2049.”

While China’s mil-civ fusion (MCF) concept has a long history that goes back to the 1980s. What is different now is that Xi’s renewed focus and strategic prioritization of MCF reflects a sense of urgency among China’s leadership – particularly Xi.

Xi may well believe that the state-controlled party, the CCP, and the industrial sector can be further “fused” and, thereby, enable the country to make more significant leaps in China’s military and economic advancements to, in Xi’s own words, make “China central on the world stage,” as reported in the Financial Times.

According to the same report in the Financial Times, as of June of this year, more than one-third of CCP leadership has background and experience in STEM, and some of this new leadership in the CCP, includes:

 Zhang Guoqing – former CEO of a weapons maker
 Liu Guozhong – an ordinance engineer
 Li Ganjie – a nuclear engineer
 Ma Xingrui – an aerospace technology expert
 Yuan Jiajun – a rocket scientist

These new type of CCP leaders will have significant power in the party – from overseeing senior party appointments to managing key tech and innovation hubs within China.

While China has been challenged for decades to effectively and fully implement MCF as a national strategy (one would think given the authoritarian nature of China’s political leadership, it should have been easy) and the suspicion that some of these new appointments also advantage Xi because while these new leaders have tech and innovation chops, they also lack the political base to threaten Xi’s grip on power down the road; the question remains what does this renewed focus on MCF mean for the United States in its long-term, strategic competition with China?

For me, it means we need our own democratic version of civ-mil fusion. If this can be achieved in the United States – in which the value proposition is so strong and so well-articulated for the government, universities, and the private sector to constructively work together – then I am confident that China will not be able to overtake the United States as the leader in the world.

But how do we do it? It starts with real-world problems.

There is a model for national – and even international partner and allied civ-mil fusion. It is Hacking for Defense (H4D).

H4D is an innovation and entrepreneurship program that convenes the government, universities, and the private sector around critical public problems – from national security to natural disasters, energy to the environment. But in addition to the convening aspect of H4D and the constructive problem-solving nature of this national program, the most unique feature is how it gets these various stakeholder groups to work together on real-world problems – not conceptual problems, not theoretical problems, not dreamed up problems. Real problems with people who actually experience the pain point of the problem on a daily basis.

This feature of H4D is critical because it turns what are usually civ-mil partnerships when using abstract and theoretical problems into civ-mil fusion because the problems are being worked on and solved by the civilian and military sectors together.

Problems, as H4D founder Pete Newell says, are “the currency” in this civ-mil fusion marketplace. Moreover, this version of civ-mil fusion – unlike China – is democratic in nature because the government, universities, and the private sector are not being forced to work together as is the case in an authoritarian model. Rather, these sectors and stakeholders in the civilian and military sectors are incentivized to work together because what ties the relationships together is a strong value proposition for each.

The problems – not organizational equities – become the centerpiece of the engagement in the H4D model, thereby, making the “fused work” on the problems between the government, universities, and the private sector constructive in nature.

The H4D model for civ-mil fusion in the United States and our partnered and allied nations leaves me with hope.

Hope for our future, as Americans and Western society, to maintain our leadership position in the world – but not through the failed way we have been currently operating as a fragmented country with diametrically opposing views of the future of the country.

But instead as a “fused” country where we can come together around a common mission.



Alex Gallo is the author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security,
foreign policy, politics, and society. Alex also serves as the Executive Director of the Common
Mission Project, a 501c3, that delivers an innovation and entrepreneurship program, Hacking
for Defense®, which brings together the government, universities, and the private sector to solve the strategic challenges. He is also a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute, an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and a US Army Veteran. Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloCMP.

Source: https://www.ft.com/content/6f388e4b-9c4e-4ca3-8040-49962f1e155d