Transition to an "Operational Reserve"

Another aspect to look at that hasn't been addressed is the time away from your civilian employment. While government officials, USAR leaders, and the like will tell you that you have things to help you like ESGR but in the long run, if you are continually seeking time off to go fulfill Army Reserve missions, that costs your employer time and money and it will reflect eventually. The only way to offset that would be to offer employees some type of tax credit for higher active reservists. Otherwise, the reservist will have to choose a further career in their part-time Army job? Or committing to one that actually pays the mortgage. Eventually the Reserves will have a hard time meeting retention goals (not like it already doesn't have that problem).

If you can remember back to 2001 there were still some AC leaders at reserve units. It was horrible. Hence why they created AGR in the first place. The few I knew had no idea what balancing was and considered the entire structure toxic. AC positions in RC slots is a horrible idea that has tried and failed miserably.

In terms of Operational Reserves for the most part the entirety of the operations are key groups that are not available to the AC. Civil Affairs, Theater Engineer Commands, Contracting. It is just too expensive to mobilize reserve units when there are active units at ARFORGEN III siting at home.

If you want healthcare check out Tricare reserve select. (not an option for Federal Civilian Employees) $205.62 a month per family seems like a screaming deal to me.

In terms of VA Home loan you need to qualify there is no difference that I'm aware of between a Reserve and AC loan, it's a veteran loan which qualifies as 90 days on active duty or 6 years in the reserves. http://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/purchaseco_eligibility.asp

The reserve retirement is significantly better than the AC payout if you consider the hours put into it. The only benefit to the AC retirement is the collection date, with the reserve the more points you score the bigger your payout. Seems like a square deal to me.

Obvious solution to your gripes is put in an AGR packet.

It briefs well; however the vehicle that will most likely be used is the statutory authority under 10 USC 12304B (SECDEF Authority to augment active forces for pre-planed missions).

First, the authority is limited to missions ISO combatant commanders. Army commands, such as FORSCOM, TRADOC, and AMC, as well as all of the DRU's would have trouble accessing RC forces for Force Generation or other support missions. A Unified Legislative and Budget (ULB) proposal is under consideration, but will not likely go to Congress until Fiscal Year 2017. Also, note that this is for pre-planned missions, meaning that it must go through a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process, as part of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System. Bottom Line: must be planned for planning about 2 years in advance. Combatant commanders have grown accustomed to requesting tailored force packages, where changes can occur to requested force packages just prior to the year of execution to meet the realities on the ground. So the statute doesn't necessarily match reality.

Second, 10 USC 12304B is not defined as a contingency authority under 10 USC 101(a)(13), which means that the benefits that RC Soldiers have grown accustomed to while deployed will not be there. Early eligibility for Tricare is one such benefit and has been used as a vehicle to fix Soldier medical readiness, as well as provide peace of mind as part of family readiness. Several other "nice to haves" are not included, such as Veterans job training assistance and the Post 9-11 G.I. Bill. In some nuanced situations, certain RC Soldiers are not entitled to USERRA protections that they would have in any other status, to include 32 USC 502(f) in support of Defense Support to Civilian Agencies (DSCA) (Civil Disturbance, Disaster Relief). Some Unified Legislative and Budget (ULB) proposals have been submitted to DoD, but they do not encompass what is wrong with this authority.

Third, although operational reserve sounds appealing, resources need to be provided that are not OCO. The Army in total has become dependent on OCO money, and while it has been extended. RC units will have limited resources to train and validate prior to a deployment. In a fiscally constrained environment, an operational reserve may be hard to execute when competing with the AC for dollars.

Computers- will our computers at the reserve centers ever work?

Unlikely, G6 pushes updates on a weekly basis. The computers should be left on and plugged into the network to receive these updates. Hopefully your supply sergeant or S6 personnel do not have laptops sitting in a supply cage off the network. It isn't fun to sit down to a laptop and find it has Vista.

Just today, we lost some functionality with Java which interferes with some amount of work. Fortunately, DTS and iPerms is working. Majority of those computers that are on the net will still need those updates. Every time I come to drill, I take nearly two hours to update three computers to ensure that they are operational for the drill while waiting for the help desk to assist with getting computers out of quarentene.

Don't get me started about the network.

I came on board in 1989 and trust me, the "Great American White Lie" of "one weekend a month and 2 weeks a year" was in full swing back then too. Even pre 9/11, you couldn't do too much in the NG w/o ample time in "For the Flag" pay status. Though I loathe the term, "that's the way it is", it is essentially just that.

For me the issue was that the AGRs were so busy meeting the regs and keeping the books - to include making sure us Traditional Guardsmen (M-Days) were getting paid, that the M-Day Os & SNCOs had to be involved in planning and prep otherwise our drills wouldn't get off the ground. If the requirement has increased so much then they need to increase AGR strength.

That being said, State HQs or Joint Forces HQ as ours is known, need to spread the AGR wealth down to the operational units. My Old Bde, its Bn HQ and 3 line companies - all multiply deployed units - had 20 AGRs total among them while the non-deployable HQ had 3 times that.

Can't add anything more than you've already said! I transferred to the IRR to actually have more control over my career; rather than sitting at drill for 2 days a month listening to people tell deployment stories. Don't need to hear them, been there, done that. No training, no updated equipment, my last 2 TPU units had no vehicles. It wasn't what I expected after 8 years of active duty.

Do not expect an expansion in benefits and pay but expect the contrary. Despite the fact that the majority of those in the active component have never served in the RC, everyone in the RC have served on active duty. As a result, AC leaders and decision makers have no reference point for the actual commitment demanded of the RC and believe 2 days pay for 8 hours is excessive. The strategic reserve was one weekend per month and 2 weeks per year (all paid), plus NCOES/OES (all paid). The Operational Reserves requires one weekend per month (or whatever combination of days to reach 48 UTAs) and 2 weeks per year (paid), monthly staff calls, plus calls to soldiers to coordinate training, plus distance learning, plus staying in touch with emails and phone calls (all unpaid). Due to the limitation in the number of retirement points per year, most exceed this limit. This, in addition to possible deployments/rotations to backfill AC units.

I've seen the best and the worse of the National Guard and Reserves, but I can tell you that times have changed and we are asking more of our citizen soldiers in todays' operational tempo than every before. I don't see that changing in the near future. I agree with a lot of what you are saying and the many shortfalls that you have identified, but I don't know if they will all get addressed. The citizen soldier has definitely made a difference in the last 14 years of war that we have been engaged in. With the all volunteer military and the citizen soldiers getting deployed hometown support has been at it’s highest. Also, we have lost a lot of great citizen soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many times I have asked if there are political figures that can get access to RallyPoint to see these discussions and what their military constituents are talking about. If we want to be heard we need to get these discussions in front of the right Government Officials that can make a difference! We can talk about it all day long, but our government needs to hear what we think!

Good luck!

Current and former Chiefs of the Army Reserve, LTG Talley and LTG(R) Stultz, respectively, would say that you're already *in* an operational reserve -- not that we're transitioning to one. You can find LTG Stultz's testimony on this topic a number of times during his tenure as CAR, as far back as 2009.

The concept of an operational reserve is to provide a predictable deployment cycle for Reserve Forces through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle -- meaning that units will go through a 4-5 year training cycle that accounts for build up, individual and collective skill development, capstone training, and in the final year, either deployment for a contingency (if we're at war) or a major exercise or security cooperation mission.

The strategic reserve concept comes from the idea that the Reserve Components are only brought out in case of extreme duress -- something that the Abrams Doctrine was meant to overcome quickly. Because we didn't go to war for so long after Vietnam for any real length (Reagan's little wars notwithstanding), it was incredibly painful and expensive to retrain and develop the RC into a fighting force for the GWOT.

There are limitations to the operational reserve concept:
1) it's unit based, not individual based; when individuals move, most don't know to move to a unit that's on the same ARFORGEN cycle, and so people can get mobilized/deployed more or less often;
2) our personnel "faces" do not match our unit "spaces" and so we must cross-level personnel (especially at senior NCO and mid-grade officer) to make whole units; this is true even when we reach maximum end strength;
3) some of our units have greater "spin": they are low density & high demand, such as Civil Affairs, Movement Control, EOD, etc. The 1:5 ratio doesn't exist for these units.
4) unless you're deploying for combat, exercises and security cooperation missions rarely require an entire unit -- which means that extra scrutiny *should* go into selecting who is sent on these missions ... not the Soldiers who are simply available, but the ones who will truly shine. Of course, good impressions engender additional opportunities, and then more work, right? And so if we haven't done an outstanding job in training our bench, we'll be tapping into the same pool of people.

Regarding your statement about our "social contract" being thrown out -- this argument holds no water. Every person in the Army Reserve has had an opportunity to begin or continue their term of service within the last 15 years. If they didn't realize that the gig involved more than one weekend a month and "summer camp" (as my old SFCs used to call it when I was a new PL) ... then they're really probably past all hope for assistance.

Recommend you reconsider the benefits inherent in your Reserve service. It sounds like you might have/be getting a case of the F*its. I understand, and have had them.
a) Keep pressing on -- all that stuff you're doing? You can multi-task much better than your civilian and AC counterparts and are getting experiences you may not have access to in your primary career. I've leveraged those for promotions in my civilian jobs.

b) TSP matching? AC doesn't get it. Health care? RC Tricare & Dental is a steal. VA Home Loans? No difference AC/RC.

c) Be careful what you ask for -- the AC has no desire for the RC. We fall in the realm of "it's just too hard." If you gripe too much, you just add to it -- and don't worry, you can go back to one weekend a month, two weeks a year. It will actually be harder, because you won't have any funding -- no LIK, no travel reimbursement, no bullets, no toilet paper. But all the expectations will be there. And then. Then you'll have retention problems.

The operational reserve is part of the solution -- cash is a very small carrot. Most of the folks who have joined the Reserve today, joined because they want to serve and deploy -- not because they just wanted the college money. They didn't join blindly. Not going anywhere is a retention problem. Routine, predictable utilization is viewed as a readiness multiplier.