Posted on Feb 19, 2023
What is the "Win-Loss" ratio of OPFOR against Rotational Units at the CTCs (JRTC, NTC, etc.)?
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I heard the other day that "Geronimo" at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) remains UNDEFEATED. Is this true? If not, what is their "Win-Loss" ratio against rotational units?
What is the Opposing Force (OPFOR) "Win-Loss" ratio against rotational units at the other Combat Training Centers (i.e. National Training Center, Joint Multinational Readiness Center)?
In other words, how often did the OPFOR succeed in preventing the Rotational Unit from achieving their assigned Mission, Task, and Purpose?
(Be advised: not interested in "Learning is Winning," "Homefield Advantages," "Winning is not the purpose of the CTC rotation," "OPFOR Cheats," etc... Just need the win-loss ratio of OPFOR against Rotational Units.)
What is the Opposing Force (OPFOR) "Win-Loss" ratio against rotational units at the other Combat Training Centers (i.e. National Training Center, Joint Multinational Readiness Center)?
In other words, how often did the OPFOR succeed in preventing the Rotational Unit from achieving their assigned Mission, Task, and Purpose?
(Be advised: not interested in "Learning is Winning," "Homefield Advantages," "Winning is not the purpose of the CTC rotation," "OPFOR Cheats," etc... Just need the win-loss ratio of OPFOR against Rotational Units.)
OPFOR
Edited 3 y ago
Posted 3 y ago
Responses: 10
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The NTC OPFOR definition of a win was at least 1 MRB on the OBJ at change of mission in the 90s. Not sure what that looks like now.
The NTC Leadership was always sensitive to NOT publish this data.
The NTC Leadership was always sensitive to NOT publish this data.
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LTC Jason Mackay
SPC Gary C. 177th Support Battalion, the Maintenance Troop RSS when they reflagged. 94-98
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Having served as the CSM over training in Europe, including the JMRC and participated in multiple senior leaders conference regarding all aspects of the training centers and their operations. I never saw any official statistics. The OPFOR had their own gage for discerning a win but that was an internal thing.
The only thing I would recommend is that you contact the Ops SGM for each center and ask.
Although you said you didn’t want to hear it; the OC’s frequently inject stressors on the unit in session, such as taking out key leaders, disabling a vehicle for poor maintenance checks etc., providing intel to the OPFOR in order to see where the unit needs more depth. So, the OPFOR can never truly claim a win, the only winner is the unit.
When we deployed our OPFOR to Afghanistan they had all of the same issues and struggles that regular tactical unit had during a rotation.
Good luck in your search.
The only thing I would recommend is that you contact the Ops SGM for each center and ask.
Although you said you didn’t want to hear it; the OC’s frequently inject stressors on the unit in session, such as taking out key leaders, disabling a vehicle for poor maintenance checks etc., providing intel to the OPFOR in order to see where the unit needs more depth. So, the OPFOR can never truly claim a win, the only winner is the unit.
When we deployed our OPFOR to Afghanistan they had all of the same issues and struggles that regular tactical unit had during a rotation.
Good luck in your search.
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I know you said this isn't what you are interested in, but I have to ask what you define as winning?
I have done three rotations through JRTC and two through NTC. I have done countless rotations through "lesser" training exercises on both red and blue teams. And I can tell you that each and every time, the mission focus and purpose was at least a little bit different.
The couple times I was on the red team, I had one where our ROE were to be as sneaky and underhanded as possible. Lie, cheat, steal, deceive, wear "civilian" clothing, create insider threats, you name it. Our goal was to help the unit identify as many security holes as we could. And we did. We "won" because we achieved our mission which was unit readiness. They won because they identified the holes and fixed them. We also killed more of them than they did of us. But they killed ALL of us. So who "won?"
My other ROE was to be very conventional. Always uniformed, standard weapons, no civilian targets, etc. To fight like the US fights. We managed to do some damage, including taking out two mission critical resources. But they held their ground and ultimately took the objective, even if they took heavier than projected casualties. So we killed more than we should have, including mission critical assets. But they o
ultimately took the objective. So again, who "won?"
I have done three rotations through JRTC and two through NTC. I have done countless rotations through "lesser" training exercises on both red and blue teams. And I can tell you that each and every time, the mission focus and purpose was at least a little bit different.
The couple times I was on the red team, I had one where our ROE were to be as sneaky and underhanded as possible. Lie, cheat, steal, deceive, wear "civilian" clothing, create insider threats, you name it. Our goal was to help the unit identify as many security holes as we could. And we did. We "won" because we achieved our mission which was unit readiness. They won because they identified the holes and fixed them. We also killed more of them than they did of us. But they killed ALL of us. So who "won?"
My other ROE was to be very conventional. Always uniformed, standard weapons, no civilian targets, etc. To fight like the US fights. We managed to do some damage, including taking out two mission critical resources. But they held their ground and ultimately took the objective, even if they took heavier than projected casualties. So we killed more than we should have, including mission critical assets. But they o
ultimately took the objective. So again, who "won?"
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LTC John Wilson
That is a decent request. Win = Defeat of the BLUEFOR, I.E. prevention of them achieving their objectives for a given operation (Mission, Task, Purpose); Loss = Failure to prevent BLUEFOR achieving their objectives for a given operation (Mission, Task, Purpose).
Using your example for the purposes of illustrating what I am looking for: You "won" as an OPFOR each time you were able to exploit the unit's security beyond what would be considered an appropriate level, and they "lost." If the task was "Secure" -- i.e. "A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being
damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action." Then if you damaged or destroyed that thing being "secured" as the OPFOR, then you "won," REGARDLESS of what the Unit LEARNED from the encounter.
The enemy will ALWAYS "lie, cheat, steal, deceive, wear "civilian" clothing, create insider threats, you name it.." If the unit fails to anticipate the enemy and is unable to carry out their mission, task, and purpose, then they have LOST.
Using your example for the purposes of illustrating what I am looking for: You "won" as an OPFOR each time you were able to exploit the unit's security beyond what would be considered an appropriate level, and they "lost." If the task was "Secure" -- i.e. "A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being
damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action." Then if you damaged or destroyed that thing being "secured" as the OPFOR, then you "won," REGARDLESS of what the Unit LEARNED from the encounter.
The enemy will ALWAYS "lie, cheat, steal, deceive, wear "civilian" clothing, create insider threats, you name it.." If the unit fails to anticipate the enemy and is unable to carry out their mission, task, and purpose, then they have LOST.
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SFC Casey O'Mally
LTC John Wilson In that case, sir, I would say that my unit has "won" every rotation we have gone through. We took every objective we were supposed to take. Usually with higher losses than we would like, but we took the objectives.
In the defense phase (on those rotations we had one) we held our objective. We almost always had at least one breach, but the breach was secured and the objective was held.
And the times on was on OPFOR our assigned mission was NEVER to win. It was to test, probe, identify weaknesses, etc. We were never intended to actually seize objectives, nor were we expected to actually hold the ones we started with. We were always expected to either die or flee, the question was how many we could take with us. But by the "How many did you kill?" metric, OPFOR won more often than not.
And I think this highlights a big problem with the recent COIN fight. Insurgents could care less about holding ground. They care about body counts. If they can take out 20 of us while they slowly give up the valley, they think they won. Meanwhile we claim victory because we hold the valley. And they flee to the next valley over, and cost us another 20 to take that one. Eventually, we can't actually HOLD all the valleys - we don't have enough manpower. So by the time we have cleared out the 5th valley or the tenth or the fifteenth, they are back to the first one.
And we BOTH think we are winning the entire time.
In the defense phase (on those rotations we had one) we held our objective. We almost always had at least one breach, but the breach was secured and the objective was held.
And the times on was on OPFOR our assigned mission was NEVER to win. It was to test, probe, identify weaknesses, etc. We were never intended to actually seize objectives, nor were we expected to actually hold the ones we started with. We were always expected to either die or flee, the question was how many we could take with us. But by the "How many did you kill?" metric, OPFOR won more often than not.
And I think this highlights a big problem with the recent COIN fight. Insurgents could care less about holding ground. They care about body counts. If they can take out 20 of us while they slowly give up the valley, they think they won. Meanwhile we claim victory because we hold the valley. And they flee to the next valley over, and cost us another 20 to take that one. Eventually, we can't actually HOLD all the valleys - we don't have enough manpower. So by the time we have cleared out the 5th valley or the tenth or the fifteenth, they are back to the first one.
And we BOTH think we are winning the entire time.
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If someone was actually keeping score I wouldn't be surprised to find that the OPFOR is "undefeated".
The reason why it seems like it's impossible to "win" at a Training Center is because it is literally designed for you to not "win" at a Training Center.
The Army isn't shelling out $25 million+ per rotation just to see if you can win a stand up fight against a near peer. And it would tell you next to nothing if that's what it was about; you beat a near peer unit in a clinical, canned scenario.
Unfortunately, that's just a de facto expectation of your unit.
And the real thing is way too ambiguous and fluid to test with a canned scenario.
And because the real thing is way to ambiguous to teach and train with just some doctrine and a canned scenario, the rotation needs to be designed to test every possible limit of that command and staff to be an effective training and assessment tool.
The "OPFOR" isn't just the kid in the box wearing MILES (that may or may not be turned on). The "OPFOR" includes every OC/T hanging out in your TOC.
And unlike you, where all you have is what you brought into the "box", the OC/Ts are not limited to that. Any inject they throw at you doesn't need to be any more real than the one or two sentences that touched on it in the Road to War scenario.
The purpose of the rotation is to find the breaking point of each of your WfFs, use injects to get you to those breaking points, then allow you to learn how to fix those breaking points and find a way to remain functional and effective.
And the only way to overwhelm your WfFs like that is to "lose" the battle...
And the troops stuck in the box get the benefit of improving their TTPs, and some OC/T led AARs and development.
This of course is only my opinion, based on five rotations, reading their CALL products, and working with folks that did three years at a Training Center.
The reason why it seems like it's impossible to "win" at a Training Center is because it is literally designed for you to not "win" at a Training Center.
The Army isn't shelling out $25 million+ per rotation just to see if you can win a stand up fight against a near peer. And it would tell you next to nothing if that's what it was about; you beat a near peer unit in a clinical, canned scenario.
Unfortunately, that's just a de facto expectation of your unit.
And the real thing is way too ambiguous and fluid to test with a canned scenario.
And because the real thing is way to ambiguous to teach and train with just some doctrine and a canned scenario, the rotation needs to be designed to test every possible limit of that command and staff to be an effective training and assessment tool.
The "OPFOR" isn't just the kid in the box wearing MILES (that may or may not be turned on). The "OPFOR" includes every OC/T hanging out in your TOC.
And unlike you, where all you have is what you brought into the "box", the OC/Ts are not limited to that. Any inject they throw at you doesn't need to be any more real than the one or two sentences that touched on it in the Road to War scenario.
The purpose of the rotation is to find the breaking point of each of your WfFs, use injects to get you to those breaking points, then allow you to learn how to fix those breaking points and find a way to remain functional and effective.
And the only way to overwhelm your WfFs like that is to "lose" the battle...
And the troops stuck in the box get the benefit of improving their TTPs, and some OC/T led AARs and development.
This of course is only my opinion, based on five rotations, reading their CALL products, and working with folks that did three years at a Training Center.
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I know this is not what you want, but to me everyone who goes to JRTC, NTC, etc comes back a winner. The clear objective is not to win or loose, but learn where the weaknesses are and how to better fight as a unit. So in this respect, every unit going there comes back the winner.
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LTC John Wilson
Indeed... Learning is "Winning," but I am more interest in Win-Loss rates as it pertains to our ability to plan and adapt effectively against an thinking opposing force, not how well we demonstrate our ability to check the blocks on a Training and Evaluation Outline or log our Sustains and Improves in an After Action Review.
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LTC John Wilson, I understand your question, but your constraints make answering difficult like others have indicated in their response. Your best answer will have to come from the folks who run the exercises.
Every OPFOR has the capacity to say they are "undefeated". The point of these exercises is not to have the training unit show up, do a couple of missions, and "succeed". It is to stress the command systems, planning, execution, and evaluate the adaptability of units. Individual units may "win" their portion, but did BDE and DIV "win"?
Sure, if an unprepared unit shows up, they are going to get rolled up pretty easily. But for trained and ready units, OPFOR scales the challenge. They have the answers to the test. The OPFOR is not operating in the blind.
Every OPFOR has the capacity to say they are "undefeated". The point of these exercises is not to have the training unit show up, do a couple of missions, and "succeed". It is to stress the command systems, planning, execution, and evaluate the adaptability of units. Individual units may "win" their portion, but did BDE and DIV "win"?
Sure, if an unprepared unit shows up, they are going to get rolled up pretty easily. But for trained and ready units, OPFOR scales the challenge. They have the answers to the test. The OPFOR is not operating in the blind.
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SGM Jeff Mccloud
LTC John Wilson - There is no substitute for victory in combat.
Victory in training teaches you far less than failing and breaking everything possible in training.
Victory in training teaches you far less than failing and breaking everything possible in training.
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LTC John Wilson
True, SGM Jeff Mccloud, but what if we are conditioning the institution to lose because we are more focused on logging the Sustains and Improves?
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SGM Jeff Mccloud
LTC John Wilson - I haven't seen any evidence in the last 33 years to support that.
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I honestly haven't really heard of this. At the infantry School we had plenty of LPD from JRTC. From what I understand they are more concerned about stressing your systems. The better you are at fighting the harder they become. They will push as far as a system collapse. From what I heard lately there has been a huge disconnect from the BDE command intent and the implementation at the platoon level. The inability of mission command to unify for their mission objectives at the ground level left a lot of room for error. In theory, even if the platoons won their fights they would be out of line with their sequencing and cause the battalion to lose. They would win the battle and lose the war. In my 20 years I have never heard of a unit that "won" JRTC or NTC. I have been there 3 times so far and we took a beating.
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CPT Lawrence Cable
When I went there as an Engineer Augmentee for the Bad Guys, the rotational unit, 1st Cavalry, didn't look good. The last mission was so bad that their Commander requested a redo.
That should be expected, the OPFOR has the advantage of being familiar with the terrain, a long history of fighting battles over that terrain, and they repeat it multiple times a year.
That should be expected, the OPFOR has the advantage of being familiar with the terrain, a long history of fighting battles over that terrain, and they repeat it multiple times a year.
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LTC John Wilson
CPT Lawrence Cable - As long as we avoid having to defend our own national territory, EVERY enemy we are likely to face will have the "home field advantage." As expressed in my initial question, I am not interested in the fact that the OPFOR play in the box all the time. I am more interest in Win-Loss rates as it pertains to our ability to plan and adapt effectively against an thinking opposing force...ESPECIALLY when they possess a "Home Field Advantage."
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LTC John Wilson
CPT Cable, you are beginning to scratch the surface of why I asked the question.
To your point: "From what I heard lately there has been a huge disconnect from the BDE command intent and the implementation at the platoon level. The inability of mission command to unify for their mission objectives at the ground level left a lot of room for error. In theory, even if the platoons won their fights they would be out of line with their sequencing and cause the battalion to lose. They would win the battle and lose the war."
EVERY enemy will seek to stress and break our systems, to exploit any weakness or advantage they may take. That is why the OPFOR program was developed. To replicate real warfare.
Our ability -- or INABILITY -- to EFFECTIVELY plan, synchronize, and adapt against a thinking OPFOR is i(I believe) indicative of flaws in our Doctrine than in our training. Developing an overall win-loss rate helps to confirm or deny systemic flaws.
To your point: "From what I heard lately there has been a huge disconnect from the BDE command intent and the implementation at the platoon level. The inability of mission command to unify for their mission objectives at the ground level left a lot of room for error. In theory, even if the platoons won their fights they would be out of line with their sequencing and cause the battalion to lose. They would win the battle and lose the war."
EVERY enemy will seek to stress and break our systems, to exploit any weakness or advantage they may take. That is why the OPFOR program was developed. To replicate real warfare.
Our ability -- or INABILITY -- to EFFECTIVELY plan, synchronize, and adapt against a thinking OPFOR is i(I believe) indicative of flaws in our Doctrine than in our training. Developing an overall win-loss rate helps to confirm or deny systemic flaws.
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CPT Lawrence Cable
LTC John Wilson - Let me make a comment or two that is only the opinion of Cpt. Cable.
I'm a Cold War Warrior, so I came up in an era where we realistically expected to fight a near peer opponent that significantly out numbered us, the number 83,000 Warsaw Pact tanks across the wire comes to mind (and I had a single shot Dragon (enlisted)). Units trained for that scenario a lot outside of NTC. Even Guard units had a least one war game outside of their AT periods with their Round Out Division or Guard Division. We were still doing Reforger in Europe, so there were a lot of Big Army War training at the time. IMO, the performance of the US Army/Military during Desert Storm showed that the training we had done made the difference.
Then the Russians went home and we started declaring war on a bunch of goat herders.
I'm not denigrating the dedication or ability of the soldiers that fought those twenty plus years, but the focus went from Heavy Divisions to what in reality ended up in SOCOM. Brigade Combat Team may make sense in a world of intervening in second and third world conflicts, but it certainly has some weak points if we are looking at a continent wide war and I don't see us having trained up the present leadership to the level it was before the fall of the Soviets.
I was always of the opinion that units in the box were supposed to fail to drive home the point that the Soviets weren't a pushover.
I'm a Cold War Warrior, so I came up in an era where we realistically expected to fight a near peer opponent that significantly out numbered us, the number 83,000 Warsaw Pact tanks across the wire comes to mind (and I had a single shot Dragon (enlisted)). Units trained for that scenario a lot outside of NTC. Even Guard units had a least one war game outside of their AT periods with their Round Out Division or Guard Division. We were still doing Reforger in Europe, so there were a lot of Big Army War training at the time. IMO, the performance of the US Army/Military during Desert Storm showed that the training we had done made the difference.
Then the Russians went home and we started declaring war on a bunch of goat herders.
I'm not denigrating the dedication or ability of the soldiers that fought those twenty plus years, but the focus went from Heavy Divisions to what in reality ended up in SOCOM. Brigade Combat Team may make sense in a world of intervening in second and third world conflicts, but it certainly has some weak points if we are looking at a continent wide war and I don't see us having trained up the present leadership to the level it was before the fall of the Soviets.
I was always of the opinion that units in the box were supposed to fail to drive home the point that the Soviets weren't a pushover.
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I am dating myself here, but I have heard that OPFOR has a fair share of losing if the unit is well trained and prepared. THat was back in the 1990's. I also saw OPFOR not do so well against NG SEB units when the Guard Unit was in the defensive position (think that was 1999 or 2000). As for currently, I don't know.
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I cannot give a win/loss ratio, and not sure they would give it up if asked, but.......
I do know for a fact that if you manage to get the upper hand on them, they will halt the exercise, and tell you how you are violating a rule or just accuse you of cheating.
Never mind the fact they were cheating or "using the situation to their advantage".
Publicly I was scolded, privately I was told that was some "ooooha shit I pulled back there".
I do know for a fact that if you manage to get the upper hand on them, they will halt the exercise, and tell you how you are violating a rule or just accuse you of cheating.
Never mind the fact they were cheating or "using the situation to their advantage".
Publicly I was scolded, privately I was told that was some "ooooha shit I pulled back there".
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