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I was promoted to Colonel and I question the necessity. I was not selected to command and neither were 60% or more of my peers. If a Colonel is not going to command, why not keep them a Lieutenant Colonel and save all those millions of dollars. Maybe pay Sergeants more. Are we so concerned over rank that we promote people because they work for a General? Is it time to take officers down a rank?
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Personnel
COL
Posted 9 y ago
Responses: 28
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A disclaimer...I am not complaining about the command selection system here. I know everyone who was selected to command and they are amazing officers. This is about a perception that the Army is so rank heavy that it must promote lieutenant colonels that it is not going to put into command positions (thus shutting them out of continued promotion chances). Either we are too rank heavy (from the 4 star level on down to about...major) and it has a trickle down effect or we are promoting officers for the sake of maintaining them (throwing them a bone to keep them in for as long as possible). It just seems to me that the military could use the money spent on Colonels who are not going to be competitive any longer towards a better purpose. Imagine the money which could be spent on pay raises for enlisted by taking all the non-competitive LTC's out of the promotion mix.
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LTC Stephen C.
Congratulations, COL (Join to see)! I'm most happy for you! Everything you say makes perfect sense, and I don't take issue with any of it.
However, who knows, maybe you'll eventually get that O-6 command, and bingo, you're an O-7!
Regardless, I'd keep this argument on the down low at least until you retire! :)
However, who knows, maybe you'll eventually get that O-6 command, and bingo, you're an O-7!
Regardless, I'd keep this argument on the down low at least until you retire! :)
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COL (Join to see)
LTC Stephen C., thanks. I've never kept anything on the DL. That's probably one reason I did not get picked up. I speak to power. It gets me in hot water some times.
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"Too Many" would be quite a discussion in other services around the world. We are more top heavy than Commonwealth services but far less top heavy as say Cambodia where a two star has, wait for it, maybe 700 people. So if you get away from billets with say 4-5 Battalions of O-5's in charge that you run, there's not much out there other than specialty and staff stuff. So some of it is having a body count of O-6 slots that creates some promotion opportunity and enough of a pool to select a decent star from. I'm staff corps, so my commands were much smaller on body count but high end on contracting, environment, etc. The question then gets to how much, how complex, and AOR. Do you have enough horsepower to make it happen with the trigger puller side? Do you have the cajones to buck up against a stupid Flag that wants to give you mission without force protection? Some of it is having enough rank to protect your people from head case Alpha Hotels. So the current formula mix seems to work but there hasn't been much of a decent analysis to evaluate changing the structure. I will say, the Commonwealth services tend to have lower ranks with more responsibility, but then I've seen their relative compensation package compared with the other folk at home. Different culture, different story.
It did feel strange being in Australia and rating an aide/driver. They made me use them because that's how it's done there. Turned out the aide/driver took very good care of me and I was able to get vastly more done in a work day given the pace of the large scale multinational work being done.
It did feel strange being in Australia and rating an aide/driver. They made me use them because that's how it's done there. Turned out the aide/driver took very good care of me and I was able to get vastly more done in a work day given the pace of the large scale multinational work being done.
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COL (Join to see)
CAPT Kevin B., interesting perspective. I do believe we have to have Colonels to get Generals...but I don't think we need half of what we have. If we cut the promotion rate to Colonel by 50%, we'd still have a 10% overage in "non-select" Colonels. Assuming that the 50% you select for promotion are the TOP half, you still have the same population we are selecting for GO...without the bloat of Colonels. If we had a military based on the Prussian General Staff ideals, then having this many Colonels might make sense. There, it's not Command that distinguishes the officer, but membership in the General Staff.
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Sir, I fully agree with you, specifically at a one star or two star command. Why do we need a Full Bird Colonel, for each one of General Staff Sections (G-Shops)? I have been a G4 and J4 NCOIC, and see no good reason for the requirement of an O-6 OIC. A Light Colonel or better yet, a Major would be more then sufficient.
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COL (Join to see)
LTC John Weisner - I agree that the Army is top heavy in those positions. The thing is...they are mostly staff positions and not command positions. Why not make those positions COL positions for those colonels who didn't make it to GO. Still post BDE CMD, but didn't make that 1% cut line. NDAA17 is going to take some of the 4 star generals off the plate. Hopefully that trickles down to the rest of the Army.
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COL William Oseles
Since most enlisted will never be First Sergeants shall we keep them privates instead? Think of all the money that would be saved.
Go back to Propay since they do not need the rank.
Go back to Propay since they do not need the rank.
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MSG (Join to see)
COL William Oseles you’re right, too many chiefs and not enough indians, getting promoted just for the sake of keeping the club going.
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Sir, I certainly agree with you. Every time I go to a BDE or higher Training Conference, or even an exercise (WAREX, CSTX, etc.), there is sooooo much brass walking around it's mind boggling. There are times, where I wonder if when the powers that be promote an Officer, a position for them is an afterthought.
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COL (Join to see)
In some instances it is. We have a TTHS account in the Army. That's "Training, Transfer, Holding and Students." We maintain an overage of people so we can train them or hold them. It's a large amount. As far as all those in positions...I think there are too many Colonels. At this point, I think I'm one of them.
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Taking a step further back ... I do not see this as a "Col vs LtCol" (LTC) issue. Our entire rank structure is predicated on up or out. Other nations (UK) have allowances in their system for making careers without having to promote. Not all of that works out as planned, but invariably you will wind up with folks that are more proficient in their duties. I was fortunate enough to have two company command tours, the first in Somalia 94-95. About the time I was finally getting to really understand everything (leadership, tactics, duty) I had orders. Luckily I had another shot later in life too, which is rare now as leaders roll through 0-3 so much faster.
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COL (Join to see)
Col Neil Schuehle, I spent some time at the Fuhrungs Akademie in Germany. They called us "temporary soldiers." They serve until they are 60 if they are in for a career. I like that system. Nothing wrong with being a 60 year old major.
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COL Dan Fuhr
The idea of having an allowance for careerists who don't have to be promoted is pretty intriguing. I think there would have to be a selective retention program like that in the National Guard to cull the few who are not performing. However, promotions could still be competitive. Solving the Army's problems one beer at a time here!
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Sir I agree with you there are way to many Generals in our army right now. I also question why we need to have so many staff officers at that rank. There should not be much staff time when you pass Colonel, Generals and Colonels should spend most of there time in command. Our army has become way to top heavy we have removed a great number from the enlisted ranks and have not done so for the top. I have asked this question for a long time.
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COL (Join to see)
SSG (Join to see), concur. I haven't even touched on the enlisted side. Big Army is trying to figure out what to do with ROAD SGM's right now. If you make SGM and don't become a CSM, you can ride to 30, taking up a position for someone who could get promoted and has potential to be a CSM. Huge backlog of SGM's just waiting on the clock. There needs to be a change on the enlisted side as well.
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SSG (Join to see)
COL (Join to see) - You have that at a lot of ranks soldiers get to a point and stop trying and just take up a slot. It is a problem that I think should be fixed from the top down.
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COL (Join to see) I agree with you for the most part. And I would concur with your thoughts on this and a number of other commenters. Consider the following tables, who these individuals were and the positions that they held at various times throughout their military careers. For those of you not familiar with what I am alluding to, please familiarize yourselves with the individuals duty biographies for the inter-war years.
George C. Marshall
Second lieutenant, United States Army: February 2, 1902
First lieutenant, United States Army: March 7, 1907
Captain, United States Army: July 1, 1916
Major, National Army: August 5, 1917
Lieutenant colonel, National Army: January 5, 1918
Colonel, National Army: August 27, 1918
Captain, Regular Army (reverted to permanent rank): June 30, 1920
Major, Regular Army : July 1, 1920
Lieutenant colonel, Regular Army: August 21, 1923
Colonel, Regular Army: September 1, 1933
Brigadier general, Regular Army: October 1, 1936
Major general, Regular Army: September 1, 1939
General, Regular Army, for service as Army Chief of Staff: September 1, 1939
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 16, 1944
General of the Army rank made permanent in the Regular Army: April 11, 1946
Douglas MacArthur
Second Lieutenant, Engineers, Regular Army: June 11, 1903
First Lieutenant, Engineers, Regular Army: April 23, 1904
Captain, Engineers, Regular Army: February 27, 1911
Major, Engineers, Regular Army: December 11, 1915
Colonel, Infantry, National Army: August 5, 1917
Brigadier General, National Army: June 26, 1918
Brigadier General, Regular Army: January 20, 1920
Major General, Regular Army: January 17, 1925
General for temporary service as Army Chief of Staff: November 21, 1930
Reverted to Major General, Regular Army: October 1, 1935
General, Retired list: December 31, 1937
Recalled to active service as Major General, Regular Army: July 26, 1941
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: July 27, 1941
General, Army of the United States: December 18, 1941
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 18, 1944
General of the Army, Regular Army: March 23, 1946
George S. Patton
Cadet, United States Military Academy, July 1, 1905
Second Lieutenant, Regular Army, June 11, 1909
First Lieutenant, Regular Army, May 23, 1916
Captain, Regular Army, May 15, 1917
Major, Temporary, January 26, 1918
Lieutenant Colonel, National Army, April 3, 1918 (March 20, 1918)
Colonel, National Army, October 17, 1918
Captain, Regular Army, June 30, 1920
Major, Regular Army, July 1, 1920
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army, March 1, 1934
Colonel, Regular Army, July 24, 1938
Brigadier General, Army of the United States, October 2, 1940
Major General, Army of the United States, April 4, 1941
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States, March 12, 1943
Brigadier General, Regular Army (bypassed), August 16, 1944 (September 1, 1943)
Major General, Regular Army, August 16, 1944 (September 2, 1943)
Lieutenant General, Regular Army, December 4, 1944
General, Army of the United States, April 14, 1945
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Cadet, United States Military Academy: June 14, 1911
Second Lieutenant, Regular Army: June 12, 1915
First Lieutenant, Regular Army: July 1, 1916
Captain, Regular Army: May 15, 1917
Major, National Army: June 17, 1918
Lieutenant Colonel, National Army: October 20, 1918
Captain, Regular Army: June 30, 1920 (Reverted to permanent rank.)
Major, Regular Army: July 2, 1920
Captain, Regular Army: November 4, 1922 (Discharged as major and appointed as captain due to reduction of Army.)
Major, Regular Army: August 26, 1924
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army: July 1, 1936
Colonel, Army of the United States: March 6, 1941
Brigadier General, Army of the United States: September 29, 1941
Major General, Army of the United States: March 27, 1942
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: July 7, 1942
General, Army of the United States: February 11, 1943
Brigadier General, Regular Army: August 30, 1943
Major General, Regular Army: August 30, 1943
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 20, 1944
General of the Army, Regular Army: April 11, 1946
Omar Bradley
Cadet, United States Military Academy: August 1, 1911
Second Lieutenant, United States Army: June 12, 1915
First Lieutenant, United States Army: July 1, 1916
Captain, United States Army: May 15, 1917
Temporary Major, National Army: June 17, 1918 to January 22, 1920
Major, National Army: July 1, 1920
Captain, Regular Army (reverted to permanent rank*): November 4, 1922 (Discharged as Major and appointed Captain November 4, 1922; acts June 30, 1922 and September 14, 1922)
Major, Regular Army: June 25, 1924
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army: July 26, 1936
Brigadier General, Army of the United States: February 24, 1941
Major General, Army of the United States: February 15, 1942
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: June 2, 1943
Colonel, Regular Army: October 1, 1943**
Brigadier General, Regular Army: September 1, 1943**
Major General, Regular Army: September 8, 1944
General, Army of the United States: March 12, 1945
General, Regular Army: January 31, 1949
General of the Army, Regular Army: September 22, 1950
Note** – Bradley's effective date for permanent brigadier general in the Regular Army is earlier than his effective date of promotion for permanent colonel. While serving as a temporary lieutenant general in early 1943, Bradley was notified that he would be promoted to permanent colonel with an effective date of October 1, 1943. At the time, promotions to permanent brigadier and major general had been withheld for more than two years, except for Delos C. Emmons, Henry H. Arnold, and Dwight Eisenhower. President Franklin D. Roosevelt lifted the moratorium after Bradley was notified that he would be promoted to colonel, but before the October 1 effective date.
In determining whom to promote after the lifting of Roosevelt's moratorium, Marshall consulted with Eisenhower, and they agreed to promote Bradley and several others. Marshall and Eisenhower then arranged the effective dates of promotion to brigadier general based on where they wanted each of the individuals selected to rank in terms of seniority. Bradley's date of rank for permanent brigadier general was then set as September 1, 1943—even though this was before his October 1, 1943 effective date for promotion to colonel—based on where Eisenhower and Marshall wanted Bradley to fall in terms of seniority as a brigadier general.
Bradley's and the other promotions to brigadier general on which Marshall and Eisenhower had conferred were not acted on until mid-October 1943 because Congress had to approve a waiver for those generals, including Bradley, who did not yet have 28 years of service. As a result, his October 1, 1943 date for promotion to permanent colonel was allowed to remain in effect. When Congress acted in mid-October to approve Bradley's time in service waiver and promotion to permanent brigadier general, his effective date for brigadier general was backdated to September 1, 1943. The September 1, 1943 date for permanent brigadier general enabled Bradley to line up with his peers where Marshall and Eisenhower intended for purposes of seniority.
The effective postdated (and then backdated) date of rank for Bradley's promotion to permanent brigadier general—September 1, 1943—thus came before the effective postdated date of rank for his promotion to colonel—October 1, 1943
George C. Marshall
Second lieutenant, United States Army: February 2, 1902
First lieutenant, United States Army: March 7, 1907
Captain, United States Army: July 1, 1916
Major, National Army: August 5, 1917
Lieutenant colonel, National Army: January 5, 1918
Colonel, National Army: August 27, 1918
Captain, Regular Army (reverted to permanent rank): June 30, 1920
Major, Regular Army : July 1, 1920
Lieutenant colonel, Regular Army: August 21, 1923
Colonel, Regular Army: September 1, 1933
Brigadier general, Regular Army: October 1, 1936
Major general, Regular Army: September 1, 1939
General, Regular Army, for service as Army Chief of Staff: September 1, 1939
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 16, 1944
General of the Army rank made permanent in the Regular Army: April 11, 1946
Douglas MacArthur
Second Lieutenant, Engineers, Regular Army: June 11, 1903
First Lieutenant, Engineers, Regular Army: April 23, 1904
Captain, Engineers, Regular Army: February 27, 1911
Major, Engineers, Regular Army: December 11, 1915
Colonel, Infantry, National Army: August 5, 1917
Brigadier General, National Army: June 26, 1918
Brigadier General, Regular Army: January 20, 1920
Major General, Regular Army: January 17, 1925
General for temporary service as Army Chief of Staff: November 21, 1930
Reverted to Major General, Regular Army: October 1, 1935
General, Retired list: December 31, 1937
Recalled to active service as Major General, Regular Army: July 26, 1941
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: July 27, 1941
General, Army of the United States: December 18, 1941
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 18, 1944
General of the Army, Regular Army: March 23, 1946
George S. Patton
Cadet, United States Military Academy, July 1, 1905
Second Lieutenant, Regular Army, June 11, 1909
First Lieutenant, Regular Army, May 23, 1916
Captain, Regular Army, May 15, 1917
Major, Temporary, January 26, 1918
Lieutenant Colonel, National Army, April 3, 1918 (March 20, 1918)
Colonel, National Army, October 17, 1918
Captain, Regular Army, June 30, 1920
Major, Regular Army, July 1, 1920
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army, March 1, 1934
Colonel, Regular Army, July 24, 1938
Brigadier General, Army of the United States, October 2, 1940
Major General, Army of the United States, April 4, 1941
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States, March 12, 1943
Brigadier General, Regular Army (bypassed), August 16, 1944 (September 1, 1943)
Major General, Regular Army, August 16, 1944 (September 2, 1943)
Lieutenant General, Regular Army, December 4, 1944
General, Army of the United States, April 14, 1945
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Cadet, United States Military Academy: June 14, 1911
Second Lieutenant, Regular Army: June 12, 1915
First Lieutenant, Regular Army: July 1, 1916
Captain, Regular Army: May 15, 1917
Major, National Army: June 17, 1918
Lieutenant Colonel, National Army: October 20, 1918
Captain, Regular Army: June 30, 1920 (Reverted to permanent rank.)
Major, Regular Army: July 2, 1920
Captain, Regular Army: November 4, 1922 (Discharged as major and appointed as captain due to reduction of Army.)
Major, Regular Army: August 26, 1924
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army: July 1, 1936
Colonel, Army of the United States: March 6, 1941
Brigadier General, Army of the United States: September 29, 1941
Major General, Army of the United States: March 27, 1942
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: July 7, 1942
General, Army of the United States: February 11, 1943
Brigadier General, Regular Army: August 30, 1943
Major General, Regular Army: August 30, 1943
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 20, 1944
General of the Army, Regular Army: April 11, 1946
Omar Bradley
Cadet, United States Military Academy: August 1, 1911
Second Lieutenant, United States Army: June 12, 1915
First Lieutenant, United States Army: July 1, 1916
Captain, United States Army: May 15, 1917
Temporary Major, National Army: June 17, 1918 to January 22, 1920
Major, National Army: July 1, 1920
Captain, Regular Army (reverted to permanent rank*): November 4, 1922 (Discharged as Major and appointed Captain November 4, 1922; acts June 30, 1922 and September 14, 1922)
Major, Regular Army: June 25, 1924
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army: July 26, 1936
Brigadier General, Army of the United States: February 24, 1941
Major General, Army of the United States: February 15, 1942
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: June 2, 1943
Colonel, Regular Army: October 1, 1943**
Brigadier General, Regular Army: September 1, 1943**
Major General, Regular Army: September 8, 1944
General, Army of the United States: March 12, 1945
General, Regular Army: January 31, 1949
General of the Army, Regular Army: September 22, 1950
Note** – Bradley's effective date for permanent brigadier general in the Regular Army is earlier than his effective date of promotion for permanent colonel. While serving as a temporary lieutenant general in early 1943, Bradley was notified that he would be promoted to permanent colonel with an effective date of October 1, 1943. At the time, promotions to permanent brigadier and major general had been withheld for more than two years, except for Delos C. Emmons, Henry H. Arnold, and Dwight Eisenhower. President Franklin D. Roosevelt lifted the moratorium after Bradley was notified that he would be promoted to colonel, but before the October 1 effective date.
In determining whom to promote after the lifting of Roosevelt's moratorium, Marshall consulted with Eisenhower, and they agreed to promote Bradley and several others. Marshall and Eisenhower then arranged the effective dates of promotion to brigadier general based on where they wanted each of the individuals selected to rank in terms of seniority. Bradley's date of rank for permanent brigadier general was then set as September 1, 1943—even though this was before his October 1, 1943 effective date for promotion to colonel—based on where Eisenhower and Marshall wanted Bradley to fall in terms of seniority as a brigadier general.
Bradley's and the other promotions to brigadier general on which Marshall and Eisenhower had conferred were not acted on until mid-October 1943 because Congress had to approve a waiver for those generals, including Bradley, who did not yet have 28 years of service. As a result, his October 1, 1943 date for promotion to permanent colonel was allowed to remain in effect. When Congress acted in mid-October to approve Bradley's time in service waiver and promotion to permanent brigadier general, his effective date for brigadier general was backdated to September 1, 1943. The September 1, 1943 date for permanent brigadier general enabled Bradley to line up with his peers where Marshall and Eisenhower intended for purposes of seniority.
The effective postdated (and then backdated) date of rank for Bradley's promotion to permanent brigadier general—September 1, 1943—thus came before the effective postdated date of rank for his promotion to colonel—October 1, 1943
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LtCol William Bentley
Fascinating careers, bypassing some grades, adjusting seniority in rank within grades, discharging or reduction in grades, temporary appointments to higher grades reverting to permanent grades, then the "5-star" issues: temporary vs. permanent, who, and when in seniority.
FDR was a Navy man, and his personal Chief of Staff was a retire-recalled 4-star Admiral Leahy who never commanded any forces in WWII, and yet was present and helped guide FDR's decision making process in conferences, meetings, and behind the scenes for the entirety of the war.
FDR liked him so much, he was the very first O-11...5-star "Admiral of the Fleet of the United States."
And Leahy then assisted in determining who else was going to get a fifth star and in what order to ensure seniority issues were handled...specifically the "MacArthur question" where his outrageous seniority as either a permanent O-8 Major General, or appointed Regular Army O-10 4-star General, put him always at odds with the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall who was many years his junior in seniority...but by statute and custom the Chief of Staff of the Army outranked all other officers of the Army for the duration of their appointment as CoS. Same for Navy, because Admiral King was CNO, thus outranked ADM Leahy until the 5th star came along and Leahy was the very first, Marshall, then King, MacArthur, Nimitz, Eisenhower, Halsey, Arnold (first in the Army, then transferred to USAF as the only 5-star to serve in two Services), and finally Bradley to address the "MacArthur question" again as the Korean War beckoned and Bradley as a 4-star Army Chief of Staff was severely outranked by the Shogun MacArthur who huddled with his hand-picked staff as America's Proconsul in the Imperial Roman manner and directed the Japanese Emperor's recovery and rehabilitation in the eyes of his country...
FDR was a Navy man, and his personal Chief of Staff was a retire-recalled 4-star Admiral Leahy who never commanded any forces in WWII, and yet was present and helped guide FDR's decision making process in conferences, meetings, and behind the scenes for the entirety of the war.
FDR liked him so much, he was the very first O-11...5-star "Admiral of the Fleet of the United States."
And Leahy then assisted in determining who else was going to get a fifth star and in what order to ensure seniority issues were handled...specifically the "MacArthur question" where his outrageous seniority as either a permanent O-8 Major General, or appointed Regular Army O-10 4-star General, put him always at odds with the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall who was many years his junior in seniority...but by statute and custom the Chief of Staff of the Army outranked all other officers of the Army for the duration of their appointment as CoS. Same for Navy, because Admiral King was CNO, thus outranked ADM Leahy until the 5th star came along and Leahy was the very first, Marshall, then King, MacArthur, Nimitz, Eisenhower, Halsey, Arnold (first in the Army, then transferred to USAF as the only 5-star to serve in two Services), and finally Bradley to address the "MacArthur question" again as the Korean War beckoned and Bradley as a 4-star Army Chief of Staff was severely outranked by the Shogun MacArthur who huddled with his hand-picked staff as America's Proconsul in the Imperial Roman manner and directed the Japanese Emperor's recovery and rehabilitation in the eyes of his country...
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SSG Robert Webster
LtCol William Bentley - And let us not forget MacArthur was also a Field Marshall of the Philippine Army.
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COL (Join to see)
SSG Robert Webster; those were some different times of course, but the career paths of these gentlemen are something to behold. We won't see that kind of progression system again due to DOPMA...unless it is repealed or replaced when we have a significant military crisis. These gentlemen benefitted from an aging and incapable corps of general officers when war came around. Those that couldn't fight and win were sidelined to staff jobs and those who could make it happen were promoted quickly in temporary ranks. It would take a war of epic proportions to require that kind of system again.
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COL (Join to see) I am not currently privy to the numbers; didn't the U.S. Army of WW II manage many more Soldiers with a much lower ratio of General Officers per 1000 Soldiers?
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CPT (Join to see)
CSM, are you suggesting that the true purpose is to maintain the capability to massively scale up as needed for a global war against larger powers? That is the first defense here that really makes sense to me. We have a history of short-sightedness from a policy perspective that this addresses. It is much easier to train quality company level leaders than higher in a short period of time.
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COL (Join to see)
CSM Charles Hayden Passed 7/29/2025 - Spot on. That Army was built for combat and not for administration to be sure. You had 1 stars running brigades, 2 stars running divisions, 3 stars running corps, and 4 stars running armies. It's almost as if it makes sense. There were very few general officers sitting on staffs in comparison to what we have today. We also had significantly fewer "special projects" for generals to oversee. There are a boat load of special programs and commands that are stood up to take charge of an enterprise system...and they never go away.
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1LT William Clardy
Have you read the Green Books, COL (Join to see)? If you haven't, you should -- they will give you a much greater insight into the overall war effort. They will also provide a much greater awareness of just how much effort went into supporting the fight compared to the actual fighting forces (e.g., divisional troops only accounted for about 1.2 million soldiers, out of a total Army of 8.5 million)(although, to be fair, that 8.5 million included the Army air forces).
But to address your point about the Army in World War 2 being "built for combat and not administration", let me offer a modestly abridged version of the Chief of Military History's Foreword to "Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943":
"The present volume, and its successor, depict a massive achievement: the performance by the Army of the task of effecting the orderly assembly, movement, and delivery of great masses of men and matériel throughout the world to meet not only American requirements but also those of the other nations fighting the Axis...
"Logistical tasks account in large measure for the enormous administrative machinery that the Army developed in the course of the war. Its development, though not a complete surprise, exceeded all anticipations. The demand for service troops seemed insatiable and required repeated revisions of the troop basis. With this went a 'proliferation of overhead' in the form of complex controls and higher headquarters that ate up officers needed for the training and leading of fighting troops, drew into the service a multitude of specialists, and confused the chain of command. The trend ran counter to the traditional American belief that the overriding mission of the Army is to fight, a conviction so deep that some commanders, like General McNair, fought to keep the Army lean and simple. In World War II they lost this fight.
"Those who fear that administration is supplanting combat as the primary mission of the Army will find much to ponder in this book and its companion volumes."
Those interested can access the full series at
http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usaww2.html
(the book I quoted from is in the War Department collection)
But to address your point about the Army in World War 2 being "built for combat and not administration", let me offer a modestly abridged version of the Chief of Military History's Foreword to "Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943":
"The present volume, and its successor, depict a massive achievement: the performance by the Army of the task of effecting the orderly assembly, movement, and delivery of great masses of men and matériel throughout the world to meet not only American requirements but also those of the other nations fighting the Axis...
"Logistical tasks account in large measure for the enormous administrative machinery that the Army developed in the course of the war. Its development, though not a complete surprise, exceeded all anticipations. The demand for service troops seemed insatiable and required repeated revisions of the troop basis. With this went a 'proliferation of overhead' in the form of complex controls and higher headquarters that ate up officers needed for the training and leading of fighting troops, drew into the service a multitude of specialists, and confused the chain of command. The trend ran counter to the traditional American belief that the overriding mission of the Army is to fight, a conviction so deep that some commanders, like General McNair, fought to keep the Army lean and simple. In World War II they lost this fight.
"Those who fear that administration is supplanting combat as the primary mission of the Army will find much to ponder in this book and its companion volumes."
Those interested can access the full series at
http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usaww2.html
(the book I quoted from is in the War Department collection)
U.S. Army in World War II Series - U.S. Army Center of Military History
All of the titles in the U.S. Army in World War II series (the Army's official history of World War II - commonly referred to as the "Green Books") are listed in the following sections.
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Well the way I've always seen it, someone isn't going to get promoted unless someone higher has either gotten promoted themselves or has dropped their paperwork to get out. Now I can't speak obviously for your specific situation, but maybe there are some generals that just dropped their retirement packages so the military is responding by swelling the Colonel rank in preparation for the current Colonels to get selected for General.
That is literally the only input I can provide. Yes we could potentially save millions of dollars, but typically from what I've seen, people don't get promoted unless someone moves up or gets out. So who knows, maybe you can expect orders for your own Command very soon.
That is literally the only input I can provide. Yes we could potentially save millions of dollars, but typically from what I've seen, people don't get promoted unless someone moves up or gets out. So who knows, maybe you can expect orders for your own Command very soon.
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COL (Join to see)
You're not too far off, though the bureaucracy and administration that forecasts the requirements are what drives promotions. It's only in the National Guard where you will see the system you are talking about. There, it is necessary for a position to open up requiring a higher rank for one to get promoted. You can be "promotable" for a long time before that happens. In the Active Component, there are requirements forecasted for all ranks. If the military is growing in the next 10 years for example, the system will determine that we need more of every rank or specific ones. That drives how many get promoted...whether there are jobs available yet or not. Same thing if we downsize. While those jobs may exist now, an estimate is made on how many we need to cut and we do it before it is necessary to help in the long term.
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COL (Join to see)
Cpl Justin Goolsby, as far as command goes, the Army has selected me as an "alternate." That means if someone turns down command, I can get that one...as long as I am higher on the list than the other hundred or so other alternates. There's a chance, but it's a small one.
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I am with you 100% Sir, we are very top heavy. I understand rank is needed to deal with certain situations, but I believe that is something we have created. Why not empower/ force lower grade officers to make the same decisions? I only served at the BN Staff level so I don't have a whole lot of experience. Having been an NCO and Senior NCO at Plt Company and Battalion level it always amazed me to see the amount of pretty shiny metal when ever I was obligated to go to staff events at Battalion and Brigade levels. I avoided any echelon higher than Brigade.
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COL (Join to see)
MSG Steve Wiersgalla, The amount of brass at the BN and BDE level is necessary to perform staff functions properly at the tactical level. There's only one COL and 6 LTC's in a BDE (if the BDE XO or S3 aren't LTC's). Hop up to division and it looks like someone dropped a bag of oak leaf clusters off the back of a truck. Continue up that chain and it gets heavier. That's the level I'm talking about. General staffs need to be thinned. I am hopeful that congress moves forward with the words in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 which lowers the ranks for some commands. This should cause a trickle down effect of reducing the overhead costs of the Army. I could do my job 30 days ago as a LTC, and I can do it now. No difference. Since I am likely not going to get a Command, I won't be getting the necessary experience to justify Colonel's rank...beyond just giving me more money for doing the same thing I could already do.
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