Will some Navy leadership help perform a MISHAP investigation to improve safety and health efforts?

Will some Navy leadership help perform a MISHAP investigation to improve safety and health efforts? I think there are things to learn.

<I am using this Navy Post Graduate School MISHAP definition>

https://nps.edu/web/safety/mishap-reporting

Mishap investigation, reporting and record keeping are critical elements to the Navy’s safety and health efforts. Determining the cause and identifying problem areas can help us better understand how to correct hazardous working conditions. The process can assist us in preventing and/or eliminate future reoccurrences, as well as educating us on the lessons learned.

What is a Mishap and Near-Miss?
A Mishap is defined as any unplanned event that results in personal injury or property damage. There are different reporting proceedures for Mishaps depending on where it happened and if you are a Civilian or Military. The details can be found below on this page.




REPORT (1)



https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994


Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY1994

Naval Reserve Manpower Requirements
(Strength in Thousands)

SAM (0.9)
OSAM II (0.0)

The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service
accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet
its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down
to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and
skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program, Sea and Air
Mariner II (SAM II), was developed specifically to place individuals
serving two years on Initial Active Duty Training, onboard FFT 1052
class ships. With the cancelation of the FFT program, the SAM II
program draws down in FY 1994.


<<<<Here are excerpts from the reports>>>>



“In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
Structure.”

The following is a direct quote from the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman:
"The Naval Reserve today is entering a new phase that is
truly historic. After years of postwar talk about the integration of the Naval Reserve as a part of the total force, we
are now four years into the process of making this a reality in
every way. More and more we're seeing the Naval Reserve help carry the load and take on the responsibilities the President has
given to the Navy all around the world."
“However, when the Secretary of the Navy made the decision to attain NAMMOS and was briefed that the majority of the requirements were EI-E4 and that the veteran's pool could not provide sufficient numbers, he approved the SEA/AIR MARINER PROGRAM (SAM) at the start-up rate of 10,000 per year to provide the necessary people.”

“Though we would have a younger force which would meet NAMMOS requirements, that force would be less experienced, require more training, cost more, have a higher projected turnover rate and leave fewer vacancies for returning active duty veterans. The BAA asked the question Is this what we want?"


“Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations”

“Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity.”

“training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force”

“systemic weakness in the training and administration”

“training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties”



“these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control”

“ cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF”

“dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report”

To quote from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
We found areas of active and reserve forces that, if eliminated, better integrate the Total Force and preserve robust combat capabilities at lower cost. One such example is the parallel headquarters structures in the active and reserve components... In the Navy, there is a Commander, Naval Reserve Force; A Commander, Naval Air Reserve; and a Commander, Naval Surface Reserve, each
with a headquarters staff duplicating the functions of
one another and of the Active Navy component."



“Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists.”

“Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.”









<<This Reports explains both the beginning and end of the NRF and the SAM Enlistment.>>

https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx

Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix




U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.

To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66

<<Here is the Military Law USCode for the SAM Enlistment, a 8 Yr MSO>>


10 USC 511(d)

“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.


<< SAM enlistment for $4000 to fund an entire 4 year degree. I thought it was something similar to ROTC except I would go to bootcamp first >>

https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS

4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shopinstruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a non degree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.



<< 1997 summits are being held to discuss a reservist and healthcare and va status. I had already been assigned to a ship for 3 years, with no health care access or va support >>



https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41152

American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Nov. 24, 1997

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said Nov. 18 the summit will address the full spectrum of health care issues, entitlements and legislative policies affecting the readiness of reserve components in the post-Cold War world.

In Phase I, slated for late November in Washington, summit participants will evaluate prevailing laws and policy relating to reserve component health care.

Participants will identify legislative and policy changes necessary to ensure members of the reserve components receive health care benefits that are consistent with the increased reliance on today's reserve force.
"We have a vested interest in the health readiness of our reserve component personnel," said Dr. Ed Martin, acting assistant secretary of defense for health affairs.

Beginning late December, the second phase of the summit will address incapacitation and disability issues. In mid-January 1998, the third phase will address reserve component access to VA benefits and programs.
Recognizing the increased reliance on the reserve components in recent years, Cohen said, "We must ensure their medical readiness to achieve a truly integrated total force. I am pleased that this summit is a partnership effort - with the DoD, the private sector and VA all working together."
(from a DoD release)
Contact Author


<< Navy War College report shows duplication cost of surface commands actually eliminates the savings of the 80/20 undermanning active duty ships and putting them in the Naval Reserve >>

https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF)



VIII. CONCLUSION
A. TOTAL SAVINGS
The bottom line is that sending an FFG from the Active
Fleet to the Naval Reserve Force saves about $979,000 per year, or about 6.1% of all operating and support costs.

A. THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE
The primary mission of the U. S. Navy is to conduct sustained combat operations at sea in support of American national interests under Title 10 of the U. S. Code. The mission of the Naval Reserve under 10 USC 262 is to provide trained units and qualified personnel to augment the Active Fleet in time of war, national emergency and at such other times as national security requires.

Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).


The Naval Reserve surface program has allowed the Navy to have a slightly larger Order of Battle, but at acost of reduced readiness for 14 to 16 ships, and with significantly fewer deployable assets.
From these savings one would have to deduct any cost of duplication between active and reserve areas. To quote from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
We found areas of active and reserve forces that, if eliminated, better integrate the Total Force and preserve robust combat capabilities at lower cost. One such example is the parallel headquarters structures in the active and reserve components... In the Navy, there is a Commander, Naval Reserve Force; A Commander, Naval Air Reserve; and a Commander, Naval Surface Reserve, each
with a headquarters staff duplicating the functions of
one another and of the Active Navy component."
By being in the business of operating surface ships, the Naval Reserve is forced to duplicate staff functions of the Active Navy. The costs of operating headquarters staff is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it could cut considerably into the $18M-44M savings achieved at the shipboard level by the NRF FFG program.





<< These 1975 and 1976 Reports “Total Force” Policy developing integrating young non-prior reserve enlisted and the “potential problems” with the Navy 80/20 “test” >>


https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf

1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs.

Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.

Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.

This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.



3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”


https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417


1976 Annual Defense Department Report

Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”

Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”

<< Navy Health Research Studies on occupational injuries of ship crew >>




https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213071.pdf

Search Results
Web results

Sleep Problems, Health Symptoms, and Tension ... - dtic.mil

Naval Health Research Center.

Approach
A cross-sectional sample of officers' and enlisted personnel aboard nine
U.S. .Navy combatant ships vas surveyed. Shiptypes included tvo Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs), five Minesweepers (MSOs), one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG),
and one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).

Tension/Anxiety
Overall, tension/anxiety levels of the cross-sectional sample appeared to
be within normal limits. However, Junior enlisted personnel (El to E3) reported
greater subjective tension/anxiety than higher paygrade personnel.
This result may have been a reflection of the relative inexperience of these
sailors in extended at-sea operations and the potentially hostile environment.


https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
Physical and Psychological Effects of Sustained Shipboard ...

Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).

Crewmen aboard
the FFG experienced significantly more psychological fatigue. Although not
statistically significant (t = 1.85, p = 0.070), personnel aboard the FFG
also reported more problems with physical fatigue than personnel aboard the
CG.

A more likely explanation is the fact that due to fewer staff, personnel
aboard the FFG were required to spend longer periods of time on watchstanding
duty. Thus, the FFG presented fewer opportunities for prolonged rest
periods. The CG, on the other hand, had three different watch sections. As
noted elsewhere (Congleton, Englund, Hodgdon, Palinkas, Armstrong, and
Kelleher, 1988), crewmen aboard the FFG also reported shorter and more
fragmented sleep periods. In addition, the FFG had undergone a series of GQ
drills prior to entering the operational area which further fatigued its
crew.




<< 1998 Navy Analysis reports “Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )” >>


https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf

NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION
by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978



ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.




A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was
attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at
various echelons of command.
Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of
command were noted in which clear lines of authority and
responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe"
commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of
standardization of command authority and responsibility was
contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.
Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of
the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional
concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized
politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies
and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily
consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff
work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although
the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated
that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that
poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor
staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in
reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to
unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged
confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and
responsibility.



b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserre units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)





<<1995 and 1998 Navy IG is reporting “systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships >>



https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF


1995 5040.1

1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.




3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.





1998 5040.1A

Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”



<< 1997 Navy Surface Training Instructions that have a small chapter that discusses a reservist and how they must match the full time guys qualifications >>




1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan

1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.



Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations

Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.

1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units requires that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.



2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.



COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.

1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.




https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf

COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.

Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.

To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.




<< These NAVY reports review attempt to save money in the NRF FFG’s >>






https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y


A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).


https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a218963.pdf

March 1987
Reserve Manning of FF-1052 and FFG-7 Class Frigates:
A Critique of the Accuracy and Completeness
of Existing Costing Studies
by
Patrick Robert Rearden
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1976
M.A., Pepperdine University, 1979


The purposes for this research have included:
1. To evaluate studies that have attempted to make a
cost analysis of either Regular Navy or Naval Reserve
Force ships.
2. To collect and analyze data related to the costs of
operating selected Regular Navy and NRF ships during
Fiscal Year 1986.





<< Another Navy Cost Report about the NRF FFG >>



https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA294225.pdf

A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE FRIGATES
December, 1994

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000

by
Jeffrey S. Davis
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve
B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1987

This thesis analyses the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7) guided missile
frigates. It assesses the cost-effectiveness of operating these ships in the Naval Reserve fleet vice the
Active fleet.

The analysis then assesses the ship's operational
readiness by comparing the ships' performance on Combat System Assessments and the major engineering
exams. Following this, the quality of life on board the NRF FFGs is qualitatively evaluated. This analysis
concludes that using FFGs in the NRF is not the most cost-effective option. Alternative recommendations
are then provided for their more efficient use.





<< This Navy War Colllege Reported by an XO the head of training of a NRF FFG, give the deck plate reality >>


---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What is you are 18 in this command?
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf

TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN.

ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).


Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.


As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.

Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.


Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.

<< While assigned to the same ship, the full time young guys had dental insurance to pay for there dental requirements for deploy ability. The next report shows a I on the same ship with a different enlistment reservist has to pay for dental, even if they are young have no insurance. I was class 3. I was forced to get my own dental fillings. They all have fallen out. I had no health insurance to maintain them >>


https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf

Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited



Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingenecy Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.





<< Finally you get to the VA 2015. 2016 OSC reports Oakland VA had problems. I was denied every service of a veteran even a homeless housing voucher using my reserve enlistment as the reason for the numerous denails, without even a concept of a humanitarian waiver >>




https://www.disabledveterans.org/2016/10/14/osc-busts-oakland-va-regional-office-14000-claim-blunder/


VARO received an application in February 2006 from a veteran with Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was not correctly processed for seven years and eight months.
In addition, the Oakland VARO’s recordkeeping was so poor that investigators could not find logs or spreadsheets tracking the number of unprocessed claims, thus hampering their ability to fully investigate the scope of the whistleblowers’ allegations. However, another recent VA investigation confirmed that Oakland VARO staff had not processed a “substantial amount” of claims dating back to the mid‐1990s.

https://www.disabledveterans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/161014-OSC-Press-Release.pdf


WASHINGTON, D.C./October 13, 2016 – In a letter sent to the White House and Congress today, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) reported that the Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO) in Oakland, California, failed to process veterans’ benefits claims accurately and in a timely manner. This delayed the accurate payment of benefits to veterans and their dependents, in some cases by years. Three Oakland VARO whistleblowers came to OSC with disclosures of the Oakland VARO’s deficiencies, prompting an investigation. Those whistleblowers are Rustyann Brown, a former claims assistant, Roselyn Tolliver, a veterans service representative, and Lydia Cheney, a veterans service representative.

“The whistleblowers performed a public service by bringing to light the severe delays in processing veterans benefit claims and deserve our gratitude,” said Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. “These delays are particularly disturbing since the applicants are disabled veterans and their dependents. No veteran should have to wait years before receiving the benefits they are owed for their service to this nation.”


MISHAP REVIEW TIME

<Injury to Investigate>

The injury would show up most drastically in service with my Navy Army transfer Permanently Profiled 3P Medical Disqualification at MEPS 1998 for Psych Spine Musculoskeletal. No treatment was rendered. I was sort of blanked out to tell you the truth.

I was 22. So how I was I supposed to understand these things, and the internet was not developed with these reports I am now referencing. So I blamed myself. Major Huge Destructive Life altering depression homeless shelters anger fights to many to count in the streets, and even on youtube, a rage for over a decade. The Navy the Ship was a place to develop only 1 caliber and it was life and death. I would go chronically jobless, no health insurance, and homeless for approximately 15 years. The VA denied a veteran homeless housing voucher for nearly 4 years saying my enlistment, with no care of my actual duty assignment, did not qualify me. That should viewed as another injury. This report (1) should show exactly where the MISHAP occurred originally.

The question?
Is it possible to assign a 18 year old to a operational duty assignment, with known hazardous exposures, but in such a way, they will never gain enough experience, acclimate adjust to said hazardous exposures and conditions, get an honorable discharge and the enlistment not qualify for a homeless veteran voucher benefits of a veteran?This all sounds like a recipe for disaster which is why we investigate to educate and learn lessons to eliminate future occurrences.



So that about wraps up all the information I can gather for a proper MISHAP Investigation.


I fight like John Paul Jones to honor honor

I fight like John Paul Jones for the Constitution I Swore an Oath to Defend, and the “more perfect Union” “Justice” and “general welfare” the Constitution's Preamble discusses.

So what did John Paul Jones say?

John Paul Jones (6 July 1747 – 18 July 1792) was a Scottish American sailor and the United States' first well-known naval fighter in the American Revolutionary War, who said:

“I would lay down my life for America but I cannot trifle with my Honor.”

“I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast; for I intend to go in harm's way.”

"I have not yet begun to fight!"







<<The beginning. First to join the military at 18 you swear an oath to defend the constitution and go to bootcamp which creates a foundation to follow leaders and orders>>

10 U.S.C. § 502 - U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 10. Armed
Forces § 502. Enlistment oath:  who may administer

(a) Enlistment oath. --Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the following oath:
“I, _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;  that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;  and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  So help me God.”


The U.S. Constitution: Preamble
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

(Interesting as it is, Congress has held committees to examine “Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel”)


1963 88th Congress Actually Debates “Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel”
PREFACE
No persons should be more entitled to protection of their constitutional rights than the servicemen engaged in protecting the sovereignty of the United States





<< This article written about me is better understood with all these reports I am finding that should all together explain my attempted Navy Army Medically Disqualified Transfer >>

The MISHAP report should answer how and why this story was written.

http://veteranscominghome.org/station_media/the-story-of-a-homeless-veteran-who-fell-through-the-cracks/


<<Report Takeaways>


Report takeaways

It is noted they noted the “drawing down” due inexperience (and youth 18 just enlisting in 1994) of a regular SAM enlisted to save billets for “a more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel”

Imagine if you had this SAM inexperience at 18, 1994, and were assigned to a FFG the updated replacement of the FF Fast Frigate (Trainer) for the SAM II. So basically you get assigned part time to a more updated frigate at 18 with out the correct enlistment SAM II package.

Don’t you think the detailer should of been aware of all variations of a duty assignment for the SAM enlistment?

It sound like the SAM II enlistment was made specially for FF Fast Frigate duty assignment with 2 years initial active duty. But there is no one actually listed as in this enlistment package in 1994

The regular SAM enlistment has 900 in all the Navy which is far below 1% of manpower. So there is a great chance you are going to be overlooked in detailing compared all the other more normal Navy Duty Detailing. Maybe the Navy Detailer thought you were a regular USN enlisted, and assigned you to a ship?

Don’t you think that the fact that the Navy was drawing down the enlistment all together might raise some eyebrows? Was there any leadership created to monitor these sailors with a SAM Enlistment?

Some say the Navy can just randomly nilly Willy assign you any way. I find that argument falls flat. A detailer can not just randomly assign someone to anything bypassing all Navy Standards for duty assignment.

Does everyone know that 2 years of active duty coincidentally is the baseline for accessing the VA as a veteran for veteran benefits. The SAM II version assigned to a Ship was created just to meet that 2 year limit, then go into reserve.

So part timing a 18 year old regular SAM, on a hazardous operational FFG for 5 years is detrimental.

The SAM enlistment with no guarantee of 2 years active duty, was for assignments to a reserve center, where you are not going to experience operational occupational stresses and injury every day.

Everyone on the earth knows experience and acclimation and adjustment are keys to survival from injury in hazardous scenarios.

In all the history of all the Navy, everyone should know that a ship is not made for part time junior enlisted apprenticeship and qualifications systems as a team of individually. Everyone assigned a ship would assume that they are going to be treated as a veteran for veteran purposes

<Hassay Personal History-(its nearly impossible to remove some emotion as it is my story >

Now in 1994 you recruit and enlist a 18 year old in a regular SAM enlistment send him to bootcamp. The recruitment of these purely reserve enlistments to a 18 year old, similar to the Army National Guard, is to allow for college on a reserve GI Bill. A 18 year old could see this as an opportunity to get in quick, be committed, go to bootcamp, and college earn a degree by 22, and commission. A ROTC path is another college path, but with no contractual commitment initially, but receiving specific military officer ROTC leadership career counseling and monitoring. But in a purely reserve enlistment going to college next to a ROTC student, I have found there is no enlisted college leadership career counseling monitoring, when I was assigned to the FFG. Your SEA Pay and regular pay, in a SAM enlistment are just the days of assignment, which on average yearly $3000 to $8000 of which you need to feed and house yourself off the ship. You will be going to college, recovering from a few days or weeks or month of operational stress at sea, that you can never fully removed yourself, the elephant in the room, no one sees, and you have to be ready 24/7 for rapid recall deployment. How do you keep your bearing and adapt to anything?
You have a 8 year enlistment obligation, and your FFG assignment is for an unknown amount of time but in this case 5 years, still earns his sea service ribbon, part time, never to get 2 years full time orders, so you can never go the VA as a veteran homeless housing voucher. The silent wounds would be the combination of constant fear in a very technical job on the ship with crazy amounts of operational manuals to qualify individually and as a team. You will never feel safe. You will blank out. You will become confused. Proof of this being an odd Navy experience, is there are so far no other identified Navy service members with this combination of enlistment package and duty assignment identified. Even if there were 100 others that would still be abnormal. The 1998 Navy Army Permanent Medical Disqualification makes more sense as a MISHAP training injury. I was getting injured due lack of experience and training and unable to transition or adjust either to the ship or to civilian life, as I was always in a state of shock, with the knowledge I would be going back there for years every month for an undetermined amount of years, possibly the whole 8, on orders of a few days, weeks, or month.


I was enlisted in 1994 with the regular SAM enlistment and assigned to FFG’s for 5 years after bootcamp. There were only 900 SAM enlisted in all the Navy. The Navy was drawing all forms of the SAM Enlistment down. When I found this report I learned there was a SAM II version assigning 2 years of active duty to FF(T)s. FF Fast Frigate (T) Trainers. The SAM enlistment was a 8 year enlistment obligation.






<<<< So if you take the time and do a real deep dive, I found more reports beyond the 1994 report that really fill in the gaps, to start a proper Navy MISHAP investigation then I found more reports that detail the beginning and end of the 80/20 test to save money, that created known problems due to underman active a few ships and replace billets with reserve enlisted. This test spawned new SAM enlistments. The Test created many problems including duplication of Sea Commands, which basically eliminated all the cost savings attributed to undermanning these ships. These reports also report the complete end of these commands, and the SAM enlistment. >>>

<<This attempt to break from Navy Historical norms on how to properly crew a ship, to underman in a 80/20, with the goal, to save money, created more problems then it solved, eliminating any cost saving benefit. Maybe this is the 1 takeaway in any MISHAP report? It got the point the Navy Inspector General reported “Systemic Weakness in Training and Administration” on these Ships, in 1995 and 1998 in Navy Instructions created to solve the Systemic issue. But it was impossible







In Conclusion



This Preamble We the People of the United States...form a more perfect Union, establish Justice...insure domestic Tranquility...provide common defence...promote ...general Welfare...secure Blessings of Liberty...for the United States of America….