Posted on Sep 19, 2017
Bringing North Korea into the World By Acknowledging Their Nuclear Weapons and Strike Capabilities
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I recently read a great position article by Victor Cha from the Center for Strategic and International studies on how to play the China card in regards to handling the events we are seeing out of North Korea. For the most part, the general consensus to dealing with North Korea will be through their closest friend, China. To this point, I completely agree. It is likely that we will (and are) attempting to pressure China to, in turn, pressure North Korea. However, as Victor points out, this pressure is not likely to lead to our best envisioned end state of a regime change and diminished focus on weapons of mass destruction. Why? Multiple factors of competition, mistrust, history, regime collapse and more lead to a litany of variables that China just doesn’t want to be responsible for or tied to. As Victor argues, it’s time to consider a change in diplomacy; I argue that it also is a time to consider a change in end state expectations and how we get there. [1]
Multiple presidential administrations have attempted to curb North Korean weapons development and engage the hermit country in a way that would stabilize the peninsula and tone down the rhetoric. From the “preventive defense” attempts of the 1994 U.S.- North Korea Framework to curb nuclear power ambitions to the crippling sanctions of today, all attempts to change the regime’s trajectory towards nuclear weapons have been some sort of a failure.[2] However, I believe the actions themselves aren’t the failure, but the underlying assumptions with a focus on the stabilization of the country rather than the stabilization of the Kim Regime itself is the underlying issue.
Although I am by no means an expert on the Kim Jong-un regime or the Kim Dynasty as a whole, from the discussions I have had to the research I have conducted, I am thoroughly convinced every action conducted by the leader is for the security of his Regime, not the country. So, as initiatives have consistently worked to deter action and stabilize a country, I argue it is time we work to stabilize the regime and, in turn, help manage its actions. Now, before we talk about this, let’s acknowledge that working with a regime like this goes against our moralistic nature, as the regime of North Korea is brutish and just down right horrible to its population. However, to that point, its brutal practices are likely actions driven by a regime who consistently is working to secure itself and thereby, has the potential to diminish as the regime’s future is secured.
So, where would we begin to stabilize what seems to be a regime of non-rational actors? First, I believe we need to start by treating them as rational actors. Although their actions may not seem rational to us, as former Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey once pointed out to a poor reporter, that doesn’t mean they aren’t rational actors. I do believe the regime has an envisioned future and understands where they want to sit in the world. What is that position? Likely, a mid-level country like their cousins to the South. A regime who holds an array of respect and positions in the international system. A position that can influence trade, maritime operations, or weigh in on regional and international issues. Essentially, a position that projects the regimes divinity and strength from within. What is important to remember is that we are talking about the regime, not the country, and thereby we have to acknowledge that this will look vastly different than the free and connected society in the south, but with all the basic tenants of holding a position in the world. This fundamental change in an underlying assumption and focus is a strong facet to seeing that the regime has the potential to stabilize as their envisioned future comes to fruition.
Operating off this assumption, I believe to bring a regime like Kim’s to that point of stability, we have to employ a preventative style of strategy that integrates North Korea into the world system. This would be very familiar to post-Cold War strategies for integrating a fledgling Russian federation back into the world. We’d utilize methods like inviting the Russians into peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Kosovo, which developed communication frameworks and enabled Russia to find their prideful place in the world structure. Similar activities like investment and repurposing of military personnel in the Ukraine, post Soviet collapse, helped to secure the region and denuclearize a once heavily nuclear country. Many of these strategies of preventative defense, outlined by former Secretaries of Defense Carter and Perry in their book, “Preventative Defense” could yield positive results, as long as their strategies are employed with a focus on the Kim Jong-un regime, rather than the country itself.
To put these ideas into perspective a little more, let’s expand on a few things. To date, the regime is clearly not deterred from developing their weapons of mass destruction and I believe that is because the regime believes it is their most effective and most feasible entry to the international community. To support this, we have to understand that the hermit nation really has no place in modern society. They are not a world player in exports or imports. They do not possess advanced technology which they can offer to the world, and they do not carry any cultural or historic envy in the world. So, what do they have? What do they have to offer? From the regime’s eyes, I believe its only option is their military capability or threat. Basically, “a pay attention to us by force” motto.
Beyond attention-seeking, let’s talk about the potential personal ambitions of Kim Jong-un and his Regime. Kim is a leader, a divinity to some, and one of the privileged few that gets to look beyond the gates of the Regime. Enter the mind of a man in that position, looking out and knowing his influence has significant limits and that those limits actually threaten the life span of his regime, and thereby, his influence. Wouldn’t that drive you to build a mechanism to gain more, or to at least secure your regime’s future both within the country and the international community? I believe it would. This goes back to the understanding that the regime’s survival is priority number one and, therefore, any and all mechanisms to strengthen it must be pursued, no matter the cost.
Moving on to the next piece of bringing North Korea into the world; allowing their sustained nuclear strike capability. Before we talk about nuclear weapons as a means of communication vs. a threat, let's first acknowledge a few other issues that are likely to come up with a reliable nuclear strike platform. With an increased capability like this, the conventional military threat could be emboldened as well, and the regional stability could be threatened. Additionally, we could see increased rhetoric and open threats as North Korean leaders learned how to negotiate and communicate on the world stage - threats would likely be their default response. Further, we could see an intrepid nuclear-capable regime backtrack or cheat on negotiated deals, which could deteriorate security worldwide. These, and many more, are all risks we must acknowledge and account for. We must be heavily involved in the management of regime actions as they move forward as a nuclear power.
Now, with all that we have outlined here - the changes in the assumptions and the changes in focus from country to the regime - we can talk about nuclear capability in North Korea as a potential conduit of communication rather than strictly a threat. Acknowledging their nuclear capability and immediately bringing them into established frameworks for nuclear capable countries could potentially open lines of communication that have not yet been achieved. With a strong deterrence in his pocket from “western interdiction”, Kim could possibly be more willing to establish norms and predictability in their military exercises and actions as they attempt to garner an image of a world player. To circle back to Victor Cha’s article, these lines of communication will likely never be directly with the U.S. or “West” due to the regime’s lack of trust, but would more likely be directed through China. However, the closer the regime gets to established frameworks, the closer those lines of communication can become.
Years of attempting to deter a nuclear North Korea have seem to have little effect, and the time for acknowledging their capability may be presenting itself. So, there are interesting questions that need to be asked. If Kim Jong-un has his desired nuclear program with strike capabilities around the world, could that actually be the missing piece that brings him within the international framework? Will it actually be the conduit that brings stability to the regime and, thereby, the entire region of North Korea? Or are we actually sitting at the brink of a mad-man ready to destroy the world? Either way, these are two extremely interesting and important questions.
What do you think?
-----
Luke Jenkins is an Active Duty Army officer and founder of OweYaa.com, a veteran service organization. He is a passionate student of strategy and matters relating to national defense strategy. This article reflects his personal analysis and thoughts and does not reflect an official stance of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any organization related to national defense framework.
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[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/right-way-play-china-card-north-korea
[2] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework
Photo by Roman Harak - https://www.flickr.com/photos/roman-harak/ [login to see]
Multiple presidential administrations have attempted to curb North Korean weapons development and engage the hermit country in a way that would stabilize the peninsula and tone down the rhetoric. From the “preventive defense” attempts of the 1994 U.S.- North Korea Framework to curb nuclear power ambitions to the crippling sanctions of today, all attempts to change the regime’s trajectory towards nuclear weapons have been some sort of a failure.[2] However, I believe the actions themselves aren’t the failure, but the underlying assumptions with a focus on the stabilization of the country rather than the stabilization of the Kim Regime itself is the underlying issue.
Although I am by no means an expert on the Kim Jong-un regime or the Kim Dynasty as a whole, from the discussions I have had to the research I have conducted, I am thoroughly convinced every action conducted by the leader is for the security of his Regime, not the country. So, as initiatives have consistently worked to deter action and stabilize a country, I argue it is time we work to stabilize the regime and, in turn, help manage its actions. Now, before we talk about this, let’s acknowledge that working with a regime like this goes against our moralistic nature, as the regime of North Korea is brutish and just down right horrible to its population. However, to that point, its brutal practices are likely actions driven by a regime who consistently is working to secure itself and thereby, has the potential to diminish as the regime’s future is secured.
So, where would we begin to stabilize what seems to be a regime of non-rational actors? First, I believe we need to start by treating them as rational actors. Although their actions may not seem rational to us, as former Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey once pointed out to a poor reporter, that doesn’t mean they aren’t rational actors. I do believe the regime has an envisioned future and understands where they want to sit in the world. What is that position? Likely, a mid-level country like their cousins to the South. A regime who holds an array of respect and positions in the international system. A position that can influence trade, maritime operations, or weigh in on regional and international issues. Essentially, a position that projects the regimes divinity and strength from within. What is important to remember is that we are talking about the regime, not the country, and thereby we have to acknowledge that this will look vastly different than the free and connected society in the south, but with all the basic tenants of holding a position in the world. This fundamental change in an underlying assumption and focus is a strong facet to seeing that the regime has the potential to stabilize as their envisioned future comes to fruition.
Operating off this assumption, I believe to bring a regime like Kim’s to that point of stability, we have to employ a preventative style of strategy that integrates North Korea into the world system. This would be very familiar to post-Cold War strategies for integrating a fledgling Russian federation back into the world. We’d utilize methods like inviting the Russians into peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Kosovo, which developed communication frameworks and enabled Russia to find their prideful place in the world structure. Similar activities like investment and repurposing of military personnel in the Ukraine, post Soviet collapse, helped to secure the region and denuclearize a once heavily nuclear country. Many of these strategies of preventative defense, outlined by former Secretaries of Defense Carter and Perry in their book, “Preventative Defense” could yield positive results, as long as their strategies are employed with a focus on the Kim Jong-un regime, rather than the country itself.
To put these ideas into perspective a little more, let’s expand on a few things. To date, the regime is clearly not deterred from developing their weapons of mass destruction and I believe that is because the regime believes it is their most effective and most feasible entry to the international community. To support this, we have to understand that the hermit nation really has no place in modern society. They are not a world player in exports or imports. They do not possess advanced technology which they can offer to the world, and they do not carry any cultural or historic envy in the world. So, what do they have? What do they have to offer? From the regime’s eyes, I believe its only option is their military capability or threat. Basically, “a pay attention to us by force” motto.
Beyond attention-seeking, let’s talk about the potential personal ambitions of Kim Jong-un and his Regime. Kim is a leader, a divinity to some, and one of the privileged few that gets to look beyond the gates of the Regime. Enter the mind of a man in that position, looking out and knowing his influence has significant limits and that those limits actually threaten the life span of his regime, and thereby, his influence. Wouldn’t that drive you to build a mechanism to gain more, or to at least secure your regime’s future both within the country and the international community? I believe it would. This goes back to the understanding that the regime’s survival is priority number one and, therefore, any and all mechanisms to strengthen it must be pursued, no matter the cost.
Moving on to the next piece of bringing North Korea into the world; allowing their sustained nuclear strike capability. Before we talk about nuclear weapons as a means of communication vs. a threat, let's first acknowledge a few other issues that are likely to come up with a reliable nuclear strike platform. With an increased capability like this, the conventional military threat could be emboldened as well, and the regional stability could be threatened. Additionally, we could see increased rhetoric and open threats as North Korean leaders learned how to negotiate and communicate on the world stage - threats would likely be their default response. Further, we could see an intrepid nuclear-capable regime backtrack or cheat on negotiated deals, which could deteriorate security worldwide. These, and many more, are all risks we must acknowledge and account for. We must be heavily involved in the management of regime actions as they move forward as a nuclear power.
Now, with all that we have outlined here - the changes in the assumptions and the changes in focus from country to the regime - we can talk about nuclear capability in North Korea as a potential conduit of communication rather than strictly a threat. Acknowledging their nuclear capability and immediately bringing them into established frameworks for nuclear capable countries could potentially open lines of communication that have not yet been achieved. With a strong deterrence in his pocket from “western interdiction”, Kim could possibly be more willing to establish norms and predictability in their military exercises and actions as they attempt to garner an image of a world player. To circle back to Victor Cha’s article, these lines of communication will likely never be directly with the U.S. or “West” due to the regime’s lack of trust, but would more likely be directed through China. However, the closer the regime gets to established frameworks, the closer those lines of communication can become.
Years of attempting to deter a nuclear North Korea have seem to have little effect, and the time for acknowledging their capability may be presenting itself. So, there are interesting questions that need to be asked. If Kim Jong-un has his desired nuclear program with strike capabilities around the world, could that actually be the missing piece that brings him within the international framework? Will it actually be the conduit that brings stability to the regime and, thereby, the entire region of North Korea? Or are we actually sitting at the brink of a mad-man ready to destroy the world? Either way, these are two extremely interesting and important questions.
What do you think?
-----
Luke Jenkins is an Active Duty Army officer and founder of OweYaa.com, a veteran service organization. He is a passionate student of strategy and matters relating to national defense strategy. This article reflects his personal analysis and thoughts and does not reflect an official stance of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any organization related to national defense framework.
-----
[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/right-way-play-china-card-north-korea
[2] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework
Photo by Roman Harak - https://www.flickr.com/photos/roman-harak/ [login to see]
Posted in these groups: 
North Korea
Nuclear
World Affairs
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Command Post
North Korea Nuclear World Affairs Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Command Post
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 40
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A good CIA would destabilize the NKorea regime so that we can work with our puppet government.
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SPC Joe Davenport
Sir, I have had the good fortune to work with a couple of North Korean refugees over the years. Based on my conversations with them the CIA would have as much chance of pulling that off as LeBron James would of being a jockey.
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clearly there is no easy magic solution but to work with a regime to ensure they have access to potent and deadly mass weapons of death is insane to say the least. The US needs to make it painful to China to not crush N.K
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SPC Erich Guenther
SPC Joe Davenport - Nice..........so this is all about Charlie Tuna on the Starkist can?
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SGM Joseph Joyner
SPC Joe Davenport - Oh my God that would mean that we would have to the rebirth of an American industrial revolution again. Might means more and better economic times for this hemisphere.
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SPC Joe Davenport
With respect, have you looked at the sources for a lot of the equipment you would need to reopen an industrial plant? While you might be buying an American made milling machine or forge-many of the parts are IMPORTED. In fact it was revealed in 2013 that the propellant for EVERY Hellfire missile fired in anger was made in China. We have ZERO high volume textile mills operating, and we have no companies with the equipment needed to build a modern textile system. Then there are the jerks like me who would INSIST that if we do got back to that economy we force everyone to be a neighbor to a loud possibly smelly job creation plant. No more sticking just the poorer folks with that. Gonna take over your country club for that factory.
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CPT John Sheridan
SPC Joe Davenport - Well, they can keep the tuna, but holiday decorations? We better hold off on the war until January.
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There are several sad issues which I alluded to months ago when this same issue came up. My reasonings and answers are the same and unchanged. We cannot do anything - ANYTHING - without Russian and Chinese cooperation. It is highly possible/likely that the Chinese are using North Korea as a stooge to destabilize the area with or without Russian collusion. Look at China's current position in Asia and her perceived position in Asia. What does she stand to gain - or lose - by having a peaceful North Korea? While *OUR* feelings and thoughts are grand we sadly need to look outside our borders. I know this is tough for most of the nation, but the answer to the problem lies in one of those answers. Who stands to gain or lose the most? If China were angling to be the big money market in Asia, the LAST thing they would want is a unified Korea. China is in line to build/rebuild most of Russia's Eastern rail infrastructure, so dollars to donuts, Moscow's "stance" on North Korea is whatever-China-wants-it-to-be. So from a China-as-leader viewpoint, it is in their best interests to have a volatile North Korea that only they can control. "Well Don, what if you're wrong?" Yeah...there's a possibility I could be. And there's an easy way to know. Bring China and Russia to the table and let them know that
"a nuclear armed North Korea is a threat to ourselves and our allies and we are demanding that they be disarmed by force. Therefore, it is in everyone's best interests that they be disarmed by China, Russia and USA all at once so that there is no defcon confusion and so that the world knows that the three largest nuclear powers are capable of enforcing the law."
Then...stand back and pop the popcorn and watch how Moscow and Peking react. Anything other than a "hell-yeah?" They're in bed with Kim. In that case, cut off China's debt and cut their walmart imports by 1/3rd. (Sad that we rely on that shit so densely, but I digress...). See how it goes from there. Then sadly, in a monster case of "better-the-devil-you-know" we need to contemplate what removing Kim will leave us.
"a nuclear armed North Korea is a threat to ourselves and our allies and we are demanding that they be disarmed by force. Therefore, it is in everyone's best interests that they be disarmed by China, Russia and USA all at once so that there is no defcon confusion and so that the world knows that the three largest nuclear powers are capable of enforcing the law."
Then...stand back and pop the popcorn and watch how Moscow and Peking react. Anything other than a "hell-yeah?" They're in bed with Kim. In that case, cut off China's debt and cut their walmart imports by 1/3rd. (Sad that we rely on that shit so densely, but I digress...). See how it goes from there. Then sadly, in a monster case of "better-the-devil-you-know" we need to contemplate what removing Kim will leave us.
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This is a vile, reprehensible, and despotic communist regime that should've been wiped off the face of the Earth back in 1950, if only Harry Truman had had the balls to finish the job.
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Good book on N. Korea, "Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader", by Bradley K. Martin
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GySgt Charles O'Connell
Provides a good insight into the Kim's, as well as past and current N. Korean society.
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I think it would be extremely dangerous and put tens of millions of lives at risk to recognize the regime and accept their Nuclear weapons. The facts are the Kim family wants the entire pinnesula of Korea not just the North and they have repeated that claim over the generations. They want to see the absolute removal of U.S. Troops from Korea only as a means to accomplish forceable reunification. We can argue all day if the North has the capability or not via the South Korean Armed Forces which is kind of a moot point when one side has Nukes and the other does not. For example how would the South strike back at a conventional provocation by the North when it does not have Nukes? Conventionally?
Also I would disagree with the point that China does not want to see regime change in North Korea. I believe they do. The Chinese viewpoint on the street wants to dump the Kim regime in the North, only a few remaining hardliners in the Chinese government want to protect the regime. So in my view we are at a tipping point with China in regard to having a joint position on North Korea with only a very few Chinese holding back. China would also like to see the North as a reformed trading partner that believes largely in a capitalist system and would like whatever regime that ends up there to be friendly to China. In China's view millions of war refugees is a population where anti-Chinese government sentiment could be stirred up and embarrass the regime on the world stage much like Tinnamen Square did. So I can see why they are fearful of that outcome especially if the local Chinese join in. I think North Korea, Japan and U.S. could mount a massive relief program to alleviate that from happening after a regime collapse.
This is an opportune time in history where we can free yet another country from a family dynasty that has cost tens of millions of lives locally and shows no sign of interest in reform. I think as leader of the free world and as a country that is tired of overseas military commitments that never end we should leap at this chance not run from it. If we run from it, what does it say about extending our military forces in South Korea almost indefinitely as far as the eye can see. If we build up the North economically we likewise will need to build our military forces in the South until we can reach a position of mutual trust the North will not attempt forceful reunification. As a taxpayer I say noway to that option. Lets continue to work with China and fix this and when we are done with the Koreas and peace returns to the pennisula. Lets try to fix the China-Taiwan dispute to reduce the paranoia there among everyone.
Let us try to achieve a position with China where we trust each other militarily so much we both can go back to a position of reducing our military budgets again. Our interests are not that different from one another and China is living in a fantasy land if it can't see it's moment in the regional power category will not last all that long given declining population projections. I think we should sit down with China after this is all over and everyone is happy again and decide on what is reasonable and unreasonable for China in the South Pacific in regards to the neighboring countries and the United States.
Also I would disagree with the point that China does not want to see regime change in North Korea. I believe they do. The Chinese viewpoint on the street wants to dump the Kim regime in the North, only a few remaining hardliners in the Chinese government want to protect the regime. So in my view we are at a tipping point with China in regard to having a joint position on North Korea with only a very few Chinese holding back. China would also like to see the North as a reformed trading partner that believes largely in a capitalist system and would like whatever regime that ends up there to be friendly to China. In China's view millions of war refugees is a population where anti-Chinese government sentiment could be stirred up and embarrass the regime on the world stage much like Tinnamen Square did. So I can see why they are fearful of that outcome especially if the local Chinese join in. I think North Korea, Japan and U.S. could mount a massive relief program to alleviate that from happening after a regime collapse.
This is an opportune time in history where we can free yet another country from a family dynasty that has cost tens of millions of lives locally and shows no sign of interest in reform. I think as leader of the free world and as a country that is tired of overseas military commitments that never end we should leap at this chance not run from it. If we run from it, what does it say about extending our military forces in South Korea almost indefinitely as far as the eye can see. If we build up the North economically we likewise will need to build our military forces in the South until we can reach a position of mutual trust the North will not attempt forceful reunification. As a taxpayer I say noway to that option. Lets continue to work with China and fix this and when we are done with the Koreas and peace returns to the pennisula. Lets try to fix the China-Taiwan dispute to reduce the paranoia there among everyone.
Let us try to achieve a position with China where we trust each other militarily so much we both can go back to a position of reducing our military budgets again. Our interests are not that different from one another and China is living in a fantasy land if it can't see it's moment in the regional power category will not last all that long given declining population projections. I think we should sit down with China after this is all over and everyone is happy again and decide on what is reasonable and unreasonable for China in the South Pacific in regards to the neighboring countries and the United States.
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SSgt Bruce Probert
The biggest fault in this response is the failure to realize who we are dealing with, to ascribe any human quality to Kim Jong Un is a mistake.
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SPC Erich Guenther
2LT (Join to see) - I think China tried more than once to form alliances with folks inside the North Korean regime only to see them sit before an execution squad. So I disagree that China is still attempting that. The fact China rushed troops up to the NK border during the last crisis I think is telling they have given up on reforming from within. Additionally, the fact China announced NK was on it's own if it attacked or threatened another country with an attack........also telling they are tired of NK regime. We need to remember that China abandoned other despotic relationships in the past. Pol Pot in Cambodia is one example after Vietnam invaded......sure they were ticked at Vietnam but China made no real effort to rescue Pol Pot or to intervene to stop the elimination of his movement. I think China realizes it could make more money with the Kim family out of NK then with maintaining the Kim regime. So I am pretty sure at this point they want Kim out and they want regime change but regime change in their favor.
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SGM Joseph Joyner
The one thing the kim regime has always wanted is power and this kim knows that if he does anything of the sorts that there will be no place for him to hide and all his power will be gone. So do you really think he wants to be hiding for the rest of his life? He has nothing to gain by a military strike.
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SPC Erich Guenther
SGM Joseph Joyner - A lot of times we here in the West ascribe rational motives to unknown future behavior. Clearest example of this applies to extra-terrestrial life, if it exists it must be peaceful because if they conquered the time / travel / space equation they can no longer be a violent species. We do similar on Earth with Russian (former Soviet) Leaders, they dress in Western style suits similar to us so they must share our value system. We ignore totally in order to get to that point of power they had to be ruthless criminals at some point. Likewise, I do not believe a leader who has had his azz kissed by uniform Generals since the age of 8 has a rational plan of anything. The fact that pictures show him acting as a General when he has no prior military experience should be a giant warning flare to everyone. The fact that most North Koreans consider him to be a diety should be another giant flare up in the air to be cautious of our rationalizations of him. Yet still we try and insist the guy must think a little like we do. I think he is clearly insane and trying to make him appear as sane or rational is a waste of time. You have to put down a rabid dog at some point and that is the best analogy I think that applies to Kim Un Ding-Dong. or whatever his name is.
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Great article. North Korea while a poor country does have resources. Bringing them in to the modern era will be tricky. They have a grip on the people so hard its not funny. How do you let 25 million people realize they have been lied to for their entire lives?
I am against another war but really don't see a way around it. If we bring them to the table. Invest in them and bring them up to a 2nd world country will it deter them? I do not know. Will it allow them to build more weapons? Yes, but it is a nation and it is allowed to do so.
The North Korea situation is like eating a bowl of crap or stuffing in the sock drawer for someone else to deal with later.
I am against another war but really don't see a way around it. If we bring them to the table. Invest in them and bring them up to a 2nd world country will it deter them? I do not know. Will it allow them to build more weapons? Yes, but it is a nation and it is allowed to do so.
The North Korea situation is like eating a bowl of crap or stuffing in the sock drawer for someone else to deal with later.
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The North Korean regime has had one consistent demand for the last fifty years, a permanent peace treaty to end the Korean War. Why is that so hard to negotiate? That alone coupled with the withdrawal of most US forces from Korea would stabilize the regime, opening the door to Serious diplomacy.
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CPT Lawrence Cable
SPC Erich Guenther - You have always had to be an 11b or 18 series serving in an infantry combat to get a CIB, That's why it's called a Combat Infantry Badge. I believe I stated serving in a Infantry unit. Yes, you have to have been shot at to get one. No, the cooks and other POG's don't qualify. My point being that there were "skirmishes" often enough along the DMZ during the period that the Army thought that it deserved to be recognized it as a combat zone. They have never issued CIB 's for just being in Theater without serving in a line unit that had been under fire.
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SGM Joseph Joyner
Did you know that when the north invaded the south there were virtually no American combat troops in South Korea? I wonder why they invaded the south when all they had to do was sit down and pursue the diplomatic route? If that had happened all would be just perfect today. They wanted then what they want now, to control the entire country under communist rule. Permanent peace treaties have been offered but they keep turning them down for any reason they can come up with but he one thing they wanted was the removal of all American forces. You try to make it sound so simple and probally could be if we gave the kims the control of the entire country and a buch of money every year.
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SSG Diane R.
SGM Joseph Joyner - Stalin ordered the Invasion, it has been revealed, after Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Korea from the area of US interest when he gave a briefing. Stalin took the cue and ordered Kim Sr. To invade.
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SGM Joseph Joyner
SSG Diane R. - World history has it that Russia and China "approved" kim's assumptions and supported him. Even though SK was left out of that speech does that give NK the right to conquer the south? Some have said that since SK wasn't a "country" that The SecState only included "complete" countries in that speech. The speech summary from historycentral.
On January 5, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, speaking at the National Press Club, articulated the American policy. He spoke of those countries that the US would defend with force: Japan, the Rykus islands and the Philippine Islands. Korea was left out. The withdrawal of the last American forces from Korea, as well as North Korean Kim's conviction that the US would not intervene, convinced the North Koreans to attempt to unify the country by force. The Soviets, led by Stalin, and the Chinese, led by Mao, concurred with both Kim's judgement about the United States and his plans to unify the country by force. In June, he struck.
Doesn't matter who ordered the invasion they were trying to enslave a population that had "voted" for leaders.
On January 5, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, speaking at the National Press Club, articulated the American policy. He spoke of those countries that the US would defend with force: Japan, the Rykus islands and the Philippine Islands. Korea was left out. The withdrawal of the last American forces from Korea, as well as North Korean Kim's conviction that the US would not intervene, convinced the North Koreans to attempt to unify the country by force. The Soviets, led by Stalin, and the Chinese, led by Mao, concurred with both Kim's judgement about the United States and his plans to unify the country by force. In June, he struck.
Doesn't matter who ordered the invasion they were trying to enslave a population that had "voted" for leaders.
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