Posted on Sep 19, 2017
Bringing North Korea into the World By Acknowledging Their Nuclear Weapons and Strike Capabilities
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I recently read a great position article by Victor Cha from the Center for Strategic and International studies on how to play the China card in regards to handling the events we are seeing out of North Korea. For the most part, the general consensus to dealing with North Korea will be through their closest friend, China. To this point, I completely agree. It is likely that we will (and are) attempting to pressure China to, in turn, pressure North Korea. However, as Victor points out, this pressure is not likely to lead to our best envisioned end state of a regime change and diminished focus on weapons of mass destruction. Why? Multiple factors of competition, mistrust, history, regime collapse and more lead to a litany of variables that China just doesn’t want to be responsible for or tied to. As Victor argues, it’s time to consider a change in diplomacy; I argue that it also is a time to consider a change in end state expectations and how we get there. [1]
Multiple presidential administrations have attempted to curb North Korean weapons development and engage the hermit country in a way that would stabilize the peninsula and tone down the rhetoric. From the “preventive defense” attempts of the 1994 U.S.- North Korea Framework to curb nuclear power ambitions to the crippling sanctions of today, all attempts to change the regime’s trajectory towards nuclear weapons have been some sort of a failure.[2] However, I believe the actions themselves aren’t the failure, but the underlying assumptions with a focus on the stabilization of the country rather than the stabilization of the Kim Regime itself is the underlying issue.
Although I am by no means an expert on the Kim Jong-un regime or the Kim Dynasty as a whole, from the discussions I have had to the research I have conducted, I am thoroughly convinced every action conducted by the leader is for the security of his Regime, not the country. So, as initiatives have consistently worked to deter action and stabilize a country, I argue it is time we work to stabilize the regime and, in turn, help manage its actions. Now, before we talk about this, let’s acknowledge that working with a regime like this goes against our moralistic nature, as the regime of North Korea is brutish and just down right horrible to its population. However, to that point, its brutal practices are likely actions driven by a regime who consistently is working to secure itself and thereby, has the potential to diminish as the regime’s future is secured.
So, where would we begin to stabilize what seems to be a regime of non-rational actors? First, I believe we need to start by treating them as rational actors. Although their actions may not seem rational to us, as former Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey once pointed out to a poor reporter, that doesn’t mean they aren’t rational actors. I do believe the regime has an envisioned future and understands where they want to sit in the world. What is that position? Likely, a mid-level country like their cousins to the South. A regime who holds an array of respect and positions in the international system. A position that can influence trade, maritime operations, or weigh in on regional and international issues. Essentially, a position that projects the regimes divinity and strength from within. What is important to remember is that we are talking about the regime, not the country, and thereby we have to acknowledge that this will look vastly different than the free and connected society in the south, but with all the basic tenants of holding a position in the world. This fundamental change in an underlying assumption and focus is a strong facet to seeing that the regime has the potential to stabilize as their envisioned future comes to fruition.
Operating off this assumption, I believe to bring a regime like Kim’s to that point of stability, we have to employ a preventative style of strategy that integrates North Korea into the world system. This would be very familiar to post-Cold War strategies for integrating a fledgling Russian federation back into the world. We’d utilize methods like inviting the Russians into peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Kosovo, which developed communication frameworks and enabled Russia to find their prideful place in the world structure. Similar activities like investment and repurposing of military personnel in the Ukraine, post Soviet collapse, helped to secure the region and denuclearize a once heavily nuclear country. Many of these strategies of preventative defense, outlined by former Secretaries of Defense Carter and Perry in their book, “Preventative Defense” could yield positive results, as long as their strategies are employed with a focus on the Kim Jong-un regime, rather than the country itself.
To put these ideas into perspective a little more, let’s expand on a few things. To date, the regime is clearly not deterred from developing their weapons of mass destruction and I believe that is because the regime believes it is their most effective and most feasible entry to the international community. To support this, we have to understand that the hermit nation really has no place in modern society. They are not a world player in exports or imports. They do not possess advanced technology which they can offer to the world, and they do not carry any cultural or historic envy in the world. So, what do they have? What do they have to offer? From the regime’s eyes, I believe its only option is their military capability or threat. Basically, “a pay attention to us by force” motto.
Beyond attention-seeking, let’s talk about the potential personal ambitions of Kim Jong-un and his Regime. Kim is a leader, a divinity to some, and one of the privileged few that gets to look beyond the gates of the Regime. Enter the mind of a man in that position, looking out and knowing his influence has significant limits and that those limits actually threaten the life span of his regime, and thereby, his influence. Wouldn’t that drive you to build a mechanism to gain more, or to at least secure your regime’s future both within the country and the international community? I believe it would. This goes back to the understanding that the regime’s survival is priority number one and, therefore, any and all mechanisms to strengthen it must be pursued, no matter the cost.
Moving on to the next piece of bringing North Korea into the world; allowing their sustained nuclear strike capability. Before we talk about nuclear weapons as a means of communication vs. a threat, let's first acknowledge a few other issues that are likely to come up with a reliable nuclear strike platform. With an increased capability like this, the conventional military threat could be emboldened as well, and the regional stability could be threatened. Additionally, we could see increased rhetoric and open threats as North Korean leaders learned how to negotiate and communicate on the world stage - threats would likely be their default response. Further, we could see an intrepid nuclear-capable regime backtrack or cheat on negotiated deals, which could deteriorate security worldwide. These, and many more, are all risks we must acknowledge and account for. We must be heavily involved in the management of regime actions as they move forward as a nuclear power.
Now, with all that we have outlined here - the changes in the assumptions and the changes in focus from country to the regime - we can talk about nuclear capability in North Korea as a potential conduit of communication rather than strictly a threat. Acknowledging their nuclear capability and immediately bringing them into established frameworks for nuclear capable countries could potentially open lines of communication that have not yet been achieved. With a strong deterrence in his pocket from “western interdiction”, Kim could possibly be more willing to establish norms and predictability in their military exercises and actions as they attempt to garner an image of a world player. To circle back to Victor Cha’s article, these lines of communication will likely never be directly with the U.S. or “West” due to the regime’s lack of trust, but would more likely be directed through China. However, the closer the regime gets to established frameworks, the closer those lines of communication can become.
Years of attempting to deter a nuclear North Korea have seem to have little effect, and the time for acknowledging their capability may be presenting itself. So, there are interesting questions that need to be asked. If Kim Jong-un has his desired nuclear program with strike capabilities around the world, could that actually be the missing piece that brings him within the international framework? Will it actually be the conduit that brings stability to the regime and, thereby, the entire region of North Korea? Or are we actually sitting at the brink of a mad-man ready to destroy the world? Either way, these are two extremely interesting and important questions.
What do you think?
-----
Luke Jenkins is an Active Duty Army officer and founder of OweYaa.com, a veteran service organization. He is a passionate student of strategy and matters relating to national defense strategy. This article reflects his personal analysis and thoughts and does not reflect an official stance of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any organization related to national defense framework.
-----
[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/right-way-play-china-card-north-korea
[2] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework
Photo by Roman Harak - https://www.flickr.com/photos/roman-harak/ [login to see]
Multiple presidential administrations have attempted to curb North Korean weapons development and engage the hermit country in a way that would stabilize the peninsula and tone down the rhetoric. From the “preventive defense” attempts of the 1994 U.S.- North Korea Framework to curb nuclear power ambitions to the crippling sanctions of today, all attempts to change the regime’s trajectory towards nuclear weapons have been some sort of a failure.[2] However, I believe the actions themselves aren’t the failure, but the underlying assumptions with a focus on the stabilization of the country rather than the stabilization of the Kim Regime itself is the underlying issue.
Although I am by no means an expert on the Kim Jong-un regime or the Kim Dynasty as a whole, from the discussions I have had to the research I have conducted, I am thoroughly convinced every action conducted by the leader is for the security of his Regime, not the country. So, as initiatives have consistently worked to deter action and stabilize a country, I argue it is time we work to stabilize the regime and, in turn, help manage its actions. Now, before we talk about this, let’s acknowledge that working with a regime like this goes against our moralistic nature, as the regime of North Korea is brutish and just down right horrible to its population. However, to that point, its brutal practices are likely actions driven by a regime who consistently is working to secure itself and thereby, has the potential to diminish as the regime’s future is secured.
So, where would we begin to stabilize what seems to be a regime of non-rational actors? First, I believe we need to start by treating them as rational actors. Although their actions may not seem rational to us, as former Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey once pointed out to a poor reporter, that doesn’t mean they aren’t rational actors. I do believe the regime has an envisioned future and understands where they want to sit in the world. What is that position? Likely, a mid-level country like their cousins to the South. A regime who holds an array of respect and positions in the international system. A position that can influence trade, maritime operations, or weigh in on regional and international issues. Essentially, a position that projects the regimes divinity and strength from within. What is important to remember is that we are talking about the regime, not the country, and thereby we have to acknowledge that this will look vastly different than the free and connected society in the south, but with all the basic tenants of holding a position in the world. This fundamental change in an underlying assumption and focus is a strong facet to seeing that the regime has the potential to stabilize as their envisioned future comes to fruition.
Operating off this assumption, I believe to bring a regime like Kim’s to that point of stability, we have to employ a preventative style of strategy that integrates North Korea into the world system. This would be very familiar to post-Cold War strategies for integrating a fledgling Russian federation back into the world. We’d utilize methods like inviting the Russians into peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Kosovo, which developed communication frameworks and enabled Russia to find their prideful place in the world structure. Similar activities like investment and repurposing of military personnel in the Ukraine, post Soviet collapse, helped to secure the region and denuclearize a once heavily nuclear country. Many of these strategies of preventative defense, outlined by former Secretaries of Defense Carter and Perry in their book, “Preventative Defense” could yield positive results, as long as their strategies are employed with a focus on the Kim Jong-un regime, rather than the country itself.
To put these ideas into perspective a little more, let’s expand on a few things. To date, the regime is clearly not deterred from developing their weapons of mass destruction and I believe that is because the regime believes it is their most effective and most feasible entry to the international community. To support this, we have to understand that the hermit nation really has no place in modern society. They are not a world player in exports or imports. They do not possess advanced technology which they can offer to the world, and they do not carry any cultural or historic envy in the world. So, what do they have? What do they have to offer? From the regime’s eyes, I believe its only option is their military capability or threat. Basically, “a pay attention to us by force” motto.
Beyond attention-seeking, let’s talk about the potential personal ambitions of Kim Jong-un and his Regime. Kim is a leader, a divinity to some, and one of the privileged few that gets to look beyond the gates of the Regime. Enter the mind of a man in that position, looking out and knowing his influence has significant limits and that those limits actually threaten the life span of his regime, and thereby, his influence. Wouldn’t that drive you to build a mechanism to gain more, or to at least secure your regime’s future both within the country and the international community? I believe it would. This goes back to the understanding that the regime’s survival is priority number one and, therefore, any and all mechanisms to strengthen it must be pursued, no matter the cost.
Moving on to the next piece of bringing North Korea into the world; allowing their sustained nuclear strike capability. Before we talk about nuclear weapons as a means of communication vs. a threat, let's first acknowledge a few other issues that are likely to come up with a reliable nuclear strike platform. With an increased capability like this, the conventional military threat could be emboldened as well, and the regional stability could be threatened. Additionally, we could see increased rhetoric and open threats as North Korean leaders learned how to negotiate and communicate on the world stage - threats would likely be their default response. Further, we could see an intrepid nuclear-capable regime backtrack or cheat on negotiated deals, which could deteriorate security worldwide. These, and many more, are all risks we must acknowledge and account for. We must be heavily involved in the management of regime actions as they move forward as a nuclear power.
Now, with all that we have outlined here - the changes in the assumptions and the changes in focus from country to the regime - we can talk about nuclear capability in North Korea as a potential conduit of communication rather than strictly a threat. Acknowledging their nuclear capability and immediately bringing them into established frameworks for nuclear capable countries could potentially open lines of communication that have not yet been achieved. With a strong deterrence in his pocket from “western interdiction”, Kim could possibly be more willing to establish norms and predictability in their military exercises and actions as they attempt to garner an image of a world player. To circle back to Victor Cha’s article, these lines of communication will likely never be directly with the U.S. or “West” due to the regime’s lack of trust, but would more likely be directed through China. However, the closer the regime gets to established frameworks, the closer those lines of communication can become.
Years of attempting to deter a nuclear North Korea have seem to have little effect, and the time for acknowledging their capability may be presenting itself. So, there are interesting questions that need to be asked. If Kim Jong-un has his desired nuclear program with strike capabilities around the world, could that actually be the missing piece that brings him within the international framework? Will it actually be the conduit that brings stability to the regime and, thereby, the entire region of North Korea? Or are we actually sitting at the brink of a mad-man ready to destroy the world? Either way, these are two extremely interesting and important questions.
What do you think?
-----
Luke Jenkins is an Active Duty Army officer and founder of OweYaa.com, a veteran service organization. He is a passionate student of strategy and matters relating to national defense strategy. This article reflects his personal analysis and thoughts and does not reflect an official stance of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any organization related to national defense framework.
-----
[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/right-way-play-china-card-north-korea
[2] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework
Photo by Roman Harak - https://www.flickr.com/photos/roman-harak/ [login to see]
Posted in these groups: 
North Korea
Nuclear
World Affairs
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Command Post
North Korea Nuclear World Affairs Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Command Post
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 40
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I think you are correct that the leadership of North Korea is a rational actor. They have determined that nuclear weapons are their "ticket" to avoid regime change. Their policies over the last few years work towards that goal. I would expect they won't go the extra step and actually attack the US with nuclear weapons, but it is not my job to make that assessment and I am not in the IC.
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Great Read, I would point out that previous "Chamberlain Like appeasement" attempts have failed as the North Koreans have shown that we will do nothing, as they hold the key cards. They may not win, but they know we don't do much as their big brothers (China & Russia) will protect them. China should not be man handled, but enticed into getting Kim back in line.
The question is what does China want in return, and will the rest of the Pacific rim want to pay the fee? War on the Korean peninsula does not work out well for China either. A war between the Koreas can and will most likely end up with some sort of an embargo on Chinese goods by the current administration, should the Chinese back Kim's hand.. Would a retaliation by dumping US debt on the global markets ensue? This reminds of the classic crane and the bull frog meme With the crane having partially eaten the bullfrog, and the frog's hands wrapped around the Cranes neck with the caption reading "Hold on Baby!" Neither sides wins in this confrontation.
As both may be economically damaged for years to come. While China's current capacity to project its blue water capability is limited, its development of defenses to limit US Naval projections are growing. How well they work is something I would prefer we didn't find out.
Recently I read a report that a retired Navy SEAL came out with the idea of dropping a few million I-Phones and give them free access to the Western World would help bring North Korea in to the modern age. From the perspective of brining Kim to the table that isn't a half bad idea, and far cheaper to all sides except Kim's.
The question is what does China want in return, and will the rest of the Pacific rim want to pay the fee? War on the Korean peninsula does not work out well for China either. A war between the Koreas can and will most likely end up with some sort of an embargo on Chinese goods by the current administration, should the Chinese back Kim's hand.. Would a retaliation by dumping US debt on the global markets ensue? This reminds of the classic crane and the bull frog meme With the crane having partially eaten the bullfrog, and the frog's hands wrapped around the Cranes neck with the caption reading "Hold on Baby!" Neither sides wins in this confrontation.
As both may be economically damaged for years to come. While China's current capacity to project its blue water capability is limited, its development of defenses to limit US Naval projections are growing. How well they work is something I would prefer we didn't find out.
Recently I read a report that a retired Navy SEAL came out with the idea of dropping a few million I-Phones and give them free access to the Western World would help bring North Korea in to the modern age. From the perspective of brining Kim to the table that isn't a half bad idea, and far cheaper to all sides except Kim's.
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Wipe Kim Jong and his family off the face of the earth, free N. Koreans and set them up as capitalists and you will see as huge power shift.
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Neither Russia or China must believe our anti missile systems work. China wouldn't care about us putting them in Japan but won't want them in the ROK. Russia would be the opposite. I'm beginning to doubt that it works at all.
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Thanks for passing this on COL. Lt Jenkins seems well versed in this issue. However, I'm still 100% for making South Korea an island.
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Hell NO! We paid a trillion dollars for that THAAD system. From what I'm seeing the people who sold us this POS don't think it will work. Crank that thingy up and shoot them down or give us our money back
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2LT (Join to see)
Certainly agree. Which is why I believe he isn't looking to develop nuclear weapons to actually conduct any sort of attack but instead as a method to secure his place on the world stage. Which is why I believe we need a different approach then the current escalatory rhetoric we see
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SPC Erich Guenther
2LT (Join to see) - How do you know that? You do know his underground detonation site is near a major volcano on the Korea - China border and it has started to show signs of life again after his last underground blast...........does that sound like someone rational or careful conducting the tests? Now he is threatening an above ground detonation and if he carries through on that..........it's over for him and his country.
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2LT (Join to see)
I don't know that, and I'd say it's safe to say we don't have a real clear picture of anything internal to his regime. His testing progression follows similar to our early testing. Do we know open air testing is bad? Yes. Does he or is regime? Possibly not. They are simply trying to find the fastest way to having the capability and making sure the world knows they have the capability. The question is, why does he want it so bad? To me, especially after seeing him blink a touch on the Guam threat, it's not because they are preparing for attacks but because they want it for other political, economic, and positional gains.
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PO3 Donald Murphy
SSG Edward Tilton - Sadly we don't have the 8 inchers anymore. They are long retired.
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What is everyone’s take about bring the DPRK in to the fold with today’s developments? Do you believe the point that he is trying legitimize his power on a international stage is still valid?
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It's an unpopular course of action, but takes more than emotion into account. Armchair strategists underestimate the importance of culture and how it affects rationale.
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sorry but angles of approach to nk seem long winded , same with the thought that using or going through talks including aid of a friend of a country is possibly hoping that to is of help... ,, i just hope kim doesn't have an accident with his nuke stuff , and i hope the world leaders do reacquaint them selves with what happen to earth + atmospheric high altitudes that can last many decades space to~. other nearby countries may wish to do their own chats with their concern , already are nuke specific power concerns needing repairs ,those are worldly power plants + debris sunken to oceans floors from past. since it seems kim like to dominate placement over his apparent people , there is something about that .
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as far as china goes, we owe them money and we are one if not the largest consumer of their goods. so their are not going to jeopardize that.
as far as nk, i say we should use creative tactical measures to neutralize the electrical equipment and infrastructure followed by personal attention of violent and speedy nature.
that crazy rocket man needs to check out of the gene pool.
as far as nk, i say we should use creative tactical measures to neutralize the electrical equipment and infrastructure followed by personal attention of violent and speedy nature.
that crazy rocket man needs to check out of the gene pool.
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