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CW4 Guy Butler
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Reads a lot like the 507th Maintenance Company - with a better ending.
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CPT Military Police
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CW4 Guy Butler I'm thankful for the different ending. Let's not put all the responsibility on the 507th's personnel though, there was failure at all levels.
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CW4 Guy Butler
CW4 Guy Butler
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CPT (Join to see) Agreed. Matter of fact, a great deal of 507th's problems were already starting before they even left the departure line.
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LCDR Sales & Proposals Manager Gas Turbine Products
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I'd like to say it doesn't sound plausible...but, it all fits. We "assume" that our units are all properly manned, with perfectly maintained equipment and second-to-none support. The reality is that so much of what accounts for our national defense hinges on very tired, possibly ill-prepared personnel, operating equipment ill-designed for the mission at hand, under a host of less than ideal circumstances. What I want to know, if all of the above is true, is what forced an exhausted crew in a troublesome craft, out on a mission they didn't properly prepare for? Was it a "critical" need...the LT not having the spine to call it "down", or someone back shore-side not willing to take the "hit" for failure to launch? As to the LT's later actions...again, if all of the above is true, then once he found himself surrounded, the choices would've been limited, and once in custody, his primary focus was on keeping his people alive. Sounds like a soup-sandwich from the moment these folks hit the pier the night prior, and the real "blame" probably lies with the decisions made somewhere between then, and the push.
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CPO Steelworker
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I would say yes, but where was his Chief in all this that is part of the problem is senior NCO's and experience.
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LCDR Sales & Proposals Manager Gas Turbine Products
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Great point...I hate to say so, but my initial thoughts from the very first was that the dynamic between the commissioned and non-commissioned leadership may have been less than functional. An officer unwilling to be advised...or a Chief unwilling to advise could be equally damaging.
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CPO Steelworker
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Sir, I just retired 2013 and I saw this all over. My last deployment was AFG and we had same problem. We had Chiefs with many Combat deployments and officers with maybe one but it was a couples years and or they did an IA with the Army and sat on a FOB. The other mistake the NECC made was back in 2006-2007 when they started to from Riverine Units they said they were going to take from us (Seabees) and they never did because they would have had people that understand combat planning and principles, for what ever reason they didn't do what they said they wanted to do. This could be because we were deploy involved in Iraq, AFG and some other places. We just decommissioned battalions so why didn't they take some of them on they all belong to NECC and could have spread the man power out. The problem is the Navy falls back to that source rating thing and for what ever reason they only had one Seabee source rating on those teams. This is a bad subject fro me because I was very vocal on this and some other things in this Navy Ground operations world.
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LCDR Sales & Proposals Manager Gas Turbine Products
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Chief-I'm with you 100%; and know exactly the issues you accurately detailed (lots of miles in east AFG myself) . Our Navy sometimes forgets "quality over quantity" when trying to fill critical billets.
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PO1 William "Chip" Nagel
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