Posted on Mar 18, 2021
Blame Over Justice: The Human Toll of the Navy’s Relentless Push to Punish One of Its Own
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This story is based on hours of interviews with Bryce Benson and his wife, Alex, over the course of several months, as well as interviews with Benson’s family members; his lawyer; those who have known him for decades in and out of the Navy; more than a dozen current and former ship captains and Navy officers; and experts in military leadership and criminal justice. ProPublica also drew from information provided by a Navy spokesman; ProPublica’s extensive investigations into the Fitzgerald and McCain crashes and Navy accountability leading up to them; and thousands of pages of investigative and legal documents.
By pursuing Benson, the officers said, Richardson and others atop the Navy hierarchy could avoid taking responsibility for their role in setting commanders, and their ships, up for disaster. For years, a ProPublica story in February found, the Navy had ignored reports, audits and the warnings of many top Navy and Pentagon officials that the fleet was dangerously overworked, undermanned and in disrepair, putting sailors’ lives at risk.
Commanders still talk about how Richardson was publicly saying safety first while privately urging commanders to be more daring and take more risks. One skipper boldly asked Richardson at a luncheon how his position squared with prosecuting commanding officers “when something goes wrong.” Richardson, said some in attendance, sidestepped the question.
Sullivan, captain of the USS Whidbey Island, said all captains accept that they are responsible for what happens aboard their ships — even if they are asleep. But, she said, it “was very shocking” to see Navy leadership decide to hold the commanders criminally accountable. “I’m willing to sacrifice my life; that’s my job. But it’s hard to do that when you don’t think the organization has your back.”
In all, Sullivan said, “The herd is spooked.”
The call, like the others before it, came when Benson thought his ordeal was mercifully over.
He learned in September that the Navy had not given up; it was taking him to a Board of Inquiry, an adversarial hearing before a three-person military panel that would judge the value of Benson’s 20 years of service in light of his “misconduct.” He’d have to fight to keep his rank and retire honorably.
Over the summer, Benson’s therapist at Walter Reed had written to the admiral charged with deciding whether Benson could retire and told him that the Navy’s continued pursuit of him had “led to an exacerbation of his PTSD symptoms and stymied his progress.”
While he had improved, she wrote, “his status remains tenuous” and he had suicidal thoughts. She recommended that Benson be allowed to retire.
A military review board over the summer also found him medically unfit for service because of his PTSD.
When Benson’s 14-year-old daughter, Mia, learned there was yet another round to fight, she told her mom she wanted to write her own letter to Navy leaders to tell them how her house only used to have vitamins and Tylenol and now there’s lots of prescription bottles. How her house is a stressful place. How she’d just like to have her dad back.
On Oct. 28, after seven more weeks of limbo, the Navy reversed course and decided not to take Benson to the misconduct hearing.
But, with now-numbing predictability, the Navy swiftly followed up with a letter warning Benson that it might not be over. “You are advised this determination does not in any way preclude or limit … future administrative or other proceedings.” The head of Navy personnel could ask the secretary of the Navy to decide whether Benson should be allowed to retire with his rank, the letter said. Henderson said he’d never seen anything like it with this set of facts.
Then, a week after ProPublica sent the Navy a list of questions about its actions in Benson’s case, the Navy made a final decision: Benson would be allowed to medically retire at his current rank of commander.
“I just want to go back to those times before everything just went to shit,” she said.
Benson still talks about the shame he feels the Navy continues to cast on him. He tries to separate the guilt from who he is as a person, a distinction he said is crucial to stay off the path he describes as “blame, shame,” and then almost mouthing the last word, “suicide.”
Ever since it filed the charges, he said, it feels like “the Navy has been trying to put me back in my cabin to kill me.”
Over the summer, Benson’s therapist at Walter Reed had written to the admiral charged with deciding whether Benson could retire and told him that the Navy’s continued pursuit of him had “led to an exacerbation of his PTSD symptoms and stymied his progress.”
----And here is a recent Navy Post Graduate Report----
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1052581.pdf
“The thesis finds that, over the past 25 years, Navy policy changes
have resulted in decreased Destroyer manning, insufficient training due to revised methodologies, and deficient maintenance.”
THE UNRESOURCED BURDEN ON
UNITED STATES NAVY SAILORS AT SEA
By
Christine L. Fletcher
Lieutenant Commander, USN
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2018
Approved by: Nita Lewis Shattuck
Thesis Advisor
Charles Good
This thesis seeks to determine why U.S. Navy Sailors work longer hours than accounted for in Navy manpower models. The study
focuses on at-sea tasks of enlisted Sailors aboard Guided Missile Destroyers. To address the question, we reviewed the full Navy
Manpower Analysis Center model for Destroyer task requirements, interviewed Destroyer subject-matter experts knowledgeable about
enlisted tasking, analyzed self-reported workload questionnaires administered to deployed Sailors, developed a comprehensive enlisted
at-sea task model, and contrasted that model with Navy task models. The thesis finds that, over the past 25 years, Navy policy changes
have resulted in decreased Destroyer manning, insufficient training due to revised methodologies, and deficient maintenance. Relying
on technological advancements to reduce workload, the Navy cut manning levels. These manning shortfalls, combined with higher
operational tempos, resulted in misalignment between actual at-sea tasks and manning models. The largest misalignment occurs in
training, including on-the-job training and qualifications, warfare training, and underway drills. Additionally, the study finds that Navywide
policy changes were not vetted through OPNAV N1 to determine their effect on at-sea Sailor workload. This thesis recommends
instituting centralized policy analysis for new initiatives potentially affecting Sailor workload and periodic reassessment of the Navy
Availability Factor (afloat wartime workweek).
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Navy manpower, fleet manning, Navy training, Navy maintenance, operational tempo, OPTEMPO, Navy
Availability Factor, NAF, Navy Standard Workweek, NSWW, Navy Manpower Analysis Center, NAVMAC,
working hours, Ship Manpower Document, SMD, Guided Missile Destroyer, DDG, fleet friction, readiness gap,
command and control, sea/shore imbalance, maritime regulations, optimal manning, Revolution in Training,
RIT, behavior analysis workload creep, workload imbalance, task shedding, fatigue, stress
2.2.2 History of Manpower Requirements
After World War II, the Navy began to study manning issues. In 1963, “a sustained effort
was implemented to define the work functions required in the Navy and to develop and
promulgate staffing criteria as a means of improving the allocation of manpower resources”
(Bright et al., 1969, p. v). Artis I. Platowas a project engineer in theNaval Ship Engineering
Design Work Study Section within the offices of the Secretary of the Navy. In 1966, he
worked on several manning projects to include the creation of the “Manpower Determination
Model,” developed to accurately predict the adequacy of crew size for U.S. Navy vessels
(Plato, 1974). In his paper, he discussed the background and rationale for the development
of a Navy Ship Manpower Document (SMD), attributing the manning issues for all U.S.
military services to the extensive economic growth after World War II.
The Effects of Reduced Manning- Naval Postgraduate School
XXII. EFFECTS OF REDUCED MANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
With the budgetary constraints experienced by DOD during the 1990s, the Navy leadership started exploring reduced manning onboard ships. In 1995 Admiral Boorda, then Chief of Naval Operations, sponsored the Smart Ship Program to test some of the ideas and technologies that could potentially lead to reduced manning in every ship of the U.S. Navy.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Reduced manning initiatives have been explored in the U.S. Navy for less than ten years. Only two ships in the Navy, the USS Yorktown (CG 48) and the USS Rushmore (LSD 47) have implemented this new concept. With only a manning reduction of 10% and reports that software conflicts left the ships dead in the water (Government Computers News, 1998), the Navy claims a total success in the case of the Yorktown. In the case of the Rushmore, Cedrik Pringle’s Naval Postgraduate School thesis evaluated the impact of the Smart Gator concept on the mission readiness of the Rushmore, and concluded that the reduction in manpower and the additional training requirements for the crew negatively impacted mission readiness (Pringle, 1998).
It is a fact, as current manning doctrine shows, that on average close to 50% of amphibious ships crew is relatively junior, inexperienced, and their absence would not prevent the ships from getting underway and operating in an efficient manner. Could we get rid of every single E-1 through E-3 aboard these ships? Absolutely not. The answer is because ships like Yorktown, Rushmore and the rest of the fleet were not design for reduced manning.
In order for reduce manning to work, it has to be an integral part of the ship’s design philosophy. Reduce manning and automation systems, along with new manning doctrines can work, but they have to be planned, integrated, and implemented from conception. Reduced manning will not come easily. Software research is barely scratching the surface of key technologies such as Expert Systems, Decision Support Systems, and Artificial Intelligence. In addition, reduced manning has tremendous implications for the Navy in areas such as recruitment, training, and retention. Finally, there is some institutional resistance that will oppose reduced manning every step of the way.
Executive Summary
Reduced Ship Manning
In the current post-Cold War era of down-sizing and reduced budgets, the Navy, tasked with new and expanded missions, is expected to do more with less. In this climate, approaches to reduced ship manning, without sacrificing readiness or jeopardizing mission, would be of great benefit inasmuch as manpower-related expenses combine to consume about 60% of the budget. With that background, the Panel reviewed reduced manning concepts and technologies with the potential to enable significant ship manning reductions. The Panel then evaluated the impact of automation on ship design and training.
Other than the "Law of the Sea" requirement for a posted lookout, there are no legal impediments to crew reduction. Barriers can, however, be found in an unwillingness to break with culture and tradition, in self-imposed policies that inhibit or discourage manpower reduction, in a pervasive perception in the Fleet that manpower is a "free" commodity and need not be constrained, and in a risk aversion philosophy founded on a lack of confidence in earlier attempts at automation.
Foreign navies, also faced with draconian budgetary constraints, have ventured into crew reduction through automation.
DISPEL THE MYTH OF "FREE" MANPOWER
At all levels of command in the Fleet, there seems to be a general perception that manpower is a "free" commodity. Thus, there is no inclination to either conserve or reduce manning since there is no "cost" to the user. The CNO should establish in the Fleet a system of accountability for the real cost of manpower and create at the Fleet and Type Commander levels a manning budget in the personnel (MP,N) account, with responsibilities similar to Operating Target (OPTAR) accounting in the operations and maintenance (O&M,N) account.
My Aaron Hassay's Navy Story only known SAM Sea Air Mariner Assigned FFG's 1994-1999
----Reports that can be referenced online begin below---
(A.H. Note This is an overview of the draw down of the whole program, the very SAM enlistment, and ships I would serve, which was a unique little segment of the Navy few really knew about. But it all has to do with trying to save money on the operational side, that is repeated in the other reports.)
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs.
Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
(A.H. Notes- I was recruited, a varsity letterman athlete, used to success and hard work, as a TEAM....way before I got to bootcamp and graduated meritorious 1994 18 years old, wanting to be big and go to college and be in the Navy, $4000 for an entire degree (not 1 month as is now I believe what the GI Bill is) Now I feel like a kid trapped in a mans body, no formal education, fell out of college 1998 unable to think jittery, and attempted ill fated medically disqualified Navy Army Transfer that was 3P Permanent Profile Psych Spine Musculoskeletal. I was sent back to the ship no medical clearance or checkup. They used up all my athletic ability and scrambled my thoughts and my fiancé dumped me because I was well sick. 4 years to go in the obligation, In 1999 The San Diego MTF Balboa documented me with major depression and bi polar and said I had trouble sleeping and concentrating and my fiancé of 4 years was disappearing, and they kept me on, no follow up ever, as if mental health stigma was something that was made up, and said I honorably discharged no discharge physical with the best code, meaning I could re-enlsit but in 3 months literally I was in a suicide homeless psych hospital in San Diego medicated for people, and within a few years after that I was in.a 5150 chiseling on my own arm, and then years later just pure stars aligning luck the internet found information that brought back those years 1994-2002, the forgotten years of young mans life 18-26 that had nothing to actually show, and Tried to move on, but a Army Vet brought me to his VSO as a straggler things connected as I read a pamphlet, and they took me as a client things I was o embarrassed about and had no words for, and when the VA denied me. even a homeless housing voucher, saying my enlistment did not qualify, and I found out about the BCNR who also could of corrected things and got me on my feet and a homeless housing voucher, both started denying me with one excuse...we recognize that you have all these medical records in service and a medical failed Navy Army Transfer in service, and you are homeless and in psych hospital only 3 months after discharge and a sucidie hospital a etc etc etc etc etc you know the battle...but so anyways the battle just like on the ship ..and in high school sports..but they don't like guys like me I suppose...guys that are all American...and well whatever their reasons were they said 2 things the doctor in 1999 said your fiancé of 4 years is on the rocks so that is the reason your life fell apart( by the way we will not even discuss you were on a ship and what the navy actually itself discusses in reports as injuries and illness for your Deck Job as you are showing ...it was your fiancé !!! ..lastly the enlistment was just used time and time as a negative...like I made it )
defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000
(A.H. Notes. I found this a few years ago, a 1994 DOD reports that they are shutting down the very enlistment I just signed!!! They had a version 2 specifically created for 2 years full time duty on the ship, which would of got the homeless housing voucher. I had version 1 but was sent to a ship anyways. There was only 900 SAM’s in the whole Navy
DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY1994
Naval Reserve Manpower Requirements
(Strength in Thousands)
SAM (0.9)
OSAM II (0.0)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service
accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet
its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down
to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and
skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program, Sea and Air
Mariner II (SAM II), was developed specifically to place individuals
serving two years on Initial Active Duty Training, onboard FFT 1052
class ships. With the cancelation of the FFT program, the SAM II
program draws down in FY 1994.
(A.H. Note you can see that 1.7 Percent of the Navy reserve in 1994 was in my age category 17-19. This is because most are older prior active duty, or even full time reserve called TAR Training Administration Reserve)
Table 5-7. FY 1994 Selected Reserve Enlisted Members, by Age aad Component,
(Percent)
Age
Group
17-19
Army
National
Guard
7.3
Army Reserve
9.7
Naval
Reserve
1.7
Marine Corps Reserve
11.7
Air Force Reserve
0.7
(A.H. Note look at Navy report on what happens on a regular FFG that is not running the 80/20 mix)
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SUSTAINED SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS ON
U. S.NAVY PERSONNEL
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
Crewmen aboard
the FFG experienced significantly more psychological fatigue. Although not
statistically significant (t = 1.85, p = 0.070), personnel aboard the FFG
also reported more problems with physical fatigue than personnel aboard the
CG.
A more likely explanation is the fact that due to fewer staff, personnel
aboard the FFG were required to spend longer periods of time on watchstanding
duty. Thus, the FFG presented fewer opportunities for prolonged rest
periods. The CG, on the other hand, had three different watch sections. As
noted elsewhere (Congleton, Englund, Hodgdon, Palinkas, Armstrong, and
Kelleher, 1988), crewmen aboard the FFG also reported shorter and more
fragmented sleep periods. In addition, the FFG had undergone a series of GQ
drills prior to entering the operational area which further fatigued its
crew.
(A.H. Note Still trying to process this one 1988 Navy Report the discussed the command from the very top, that would be my central command)
dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf
NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION
by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.
A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserve units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)
(A.H Note This report shows accounting for the NRF program, it was all an attempt to save money, and I think this is where the fault in all the issues of all the reports from all the ships that are mentioned)
dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA294225.pdf
A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE FRIGATES
December, 1994
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000
by
Jeffrey S. Davis
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve
B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1987
This thesis analyses the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7) guided missile
frigates. It assesses the cost-effectiveness of operating these ships in the Naval Reserve fleet vice the
Active fleet.
The analysis then assesses the ship's operational
readiness by comparing the ships' performance on Combat System Assessments and the major engineering
exams. Following this, the quality of life on board the NRF FFGs is qualitatively evaluated. This analysis
concludes that using FFGs in the NRF is not the most cost-effective option. Alternative recommendations
are then provided for their more efficient use.
(A.H. Note God even 1995 the Navy IG condemed the training and administration on the NRF FFGs)
indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1995 5040.1
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
(A.H. Note this is the Navy Training plan with a small mention of how to train a reservist. Take in mind most if not all are prior active duty, who need touch up and refresher courses to maintain skills, and who have already been to sea and understand the navy. Can you think of being put in bootcamp part time from the get, and expecting anything less then a humiliated beatdown, from the rest of the full time bootcamp company for not being able ot match cadence, and then when you get back to berthgin being at risk of a towel party/) But my life was like being shot to the moon everry month and returned home. Mental health issue??)
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units requires that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
(A.H Note. Here is an Actual XO report discussing the impossibilies of what was going on. Can you imagine how a 18 year old with a sam enlsitment was treated or used and overwhelmed and forgotten easily ?)
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE’S SURFACE ASSETS?
LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
(A.H Note with all that said I still try to understand with all the budget cutting attempts on the ship for manpower, how and why is there still a large percentage of civilian manpower for the Navy as well as reported in 1990s?)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR FY 1990
E. Key Manpower Issues
1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth
It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing
an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries.
The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health
care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a
national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the
correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken
significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength
in FY 1989 and beyond:
C. Civilian Component
Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of
the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not
require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,
ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical
support; and operates and maintains military installations. They
contribute directly to the..readiness of the armed forces. Civilian
strength is projectod-V6'decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent)
between FY ljS9-•nd FY 1990.
C. Civilian Manpower
1. General
Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall
resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our
fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial
activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E,
printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the
readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation
and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in
supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance
facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support
in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development,
and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on
readiness.
Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people
needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to
procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenerio.
These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as
depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well
as associated equipment and supply support.
(A.H. Note)
PREAMBLE
We the People
Signed in convention September 17, 1787. Ratified June 21, 1788
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
I honor all my brothers and sisters at sea. I honor all my other brothers and sisters in all the branches. Just treat each other better.
Don’t worry I am just waking up. I am alone but wish for some friends.
Sometimes I wonder why there are not many Navy guys on here responding to my calls for understanding and camaraderie to a very specific issue a SAM assigned a NRF FFG in the 1990s (as if I was the only Army guy to do a very specific odd thing no one has a documented of doing or experiencing).. It is way beyond our pay grade.
I was expecting someone on my level to hey man got you. But now I realize as these reports state it is like systemic and we are all more or less traumatized and on different ships over different decades hard to really team up.
I mean my ship is been decommissioned a long time ago.
I do not blame no one on my crew for the harassment or even assaults as it was dangerous out there, and they were not responsible for me being there, sent from another command, to take up slack as a part time reservist assigned to them an undermanned overstretched crew that was insular just like bootcamp. I had to try to keep pace with what amounts to a NFL Football team that was not feeing well and had no time to like really you know make things better or safer or even correct.
It is not correct to basically assign a 18 year old reserve enlisted to an active duty guided missile frigate that is undermanned, and expect that crew to basically adopt, and spend extra time, doing the impossible bringing him up to speed, on things it takes only full time duty can achieve.
So it is a bit like being thrown into a race, a 10k, a fast paced stamina race, and you had not actually trained by running the whole month at home, but you put on your racing shoes and the race started and you were underway even for a few days weeks and longer, and then you were sent home without medical access
there was always a watch to stand and relieve the full time crew, I mean the ocean will turn you into marbles,
I don't even expect the army guys to understand completely what being out there on a guided missile frigate that is undermanned and pushed beyond
We out on the front lines
And well part of my problem will always be that when I finally got to the va ---I mean a decade plus of living standards that most here would not even understand --the va said that I was not a veteran for veteran purposes.
I looked at this thing called honorable discharge finally after 10 years of not ever opening that paper to scared to look at it, after 8 years of that enlistment, when I was given it out the back of an office on the Sub Base in San Diego. I was 26 and I don't think empty is the correct term
regardless like 2013 or something like that I get to the va, because a soldier Army guy I met in the streets took me, as a straggler, as he was on his way, and asked if I wanted to go.
Long story short this paper that said honorable was basically the equivalent of the worth for a homeless housing voucher, denied because you had a dishonorable.
I relate to this whole story that is told about the crew and commanding officer as told about the Fitzgerald and Mccain in the last handful of years.
By pursuing Benson, the officers said, Richardson and others atop the Navy hierarchy could avoid taking responsibility for their role in setting commanders, and their ships, up for disaster. For years, a ProPublica story in February found, the Navy had ignored reports, audits and the warnings of many top Navy and Pentagon officials that the fleet was dangerously overworked, undermanned and in disrepair, putting sailors’ lives at risk.
Commanders still talk about how Richardson was publicly saying safety first while privately urging commanders to be more daring and take more risks. One skipper boldly asked Richardson at a luncheon how his position squared with prosecuting commanding officers “when something goes wrong.” Richardson, said some in attendance, sidestepped the question.
Sullivan, captain of the USS Whidbey Island, said all captains accept that they are responsible for what happens aboard their ships — even if they are asleep. But, she said, it “was very shocking” to see Navy leadership decide to hold the commanders criminally accountable. “I’m willing to sacrifice my life; that’s my job. But it’s hard to do that when you don’t think the organization has your back.”
In all, Sullivan said, “The herd is spooked.”
The call, like the others before it, came when Benson thought his ordeal was mercifully over.
He learned in September that the Navy had not given up; it was taking him to a Board of Inquiry, an adversarial hearing before a three-person military panel that would judge the value of Benson’s 20 years of service in light of his “misconduct.” He’d have to fight to keep his rank and retire honorably.
Over the summer, Benson’s therapist at Walter Reed had written to the admiral charged with deciding whether Benson could retire and told him that the Navy’s continued pursuit of him had “led to an exacerbation of his PTSD symptoms and stymied his progress.”
While he had improved, she wrote, “his status remains tenuous” and he had suicidal thoughts. She recommended that Benson be allowed to retire.
A military review board over the summer also found him medically unfit for service because of his PTSD.
When Benson’s 14-year-old daughter, Mia, learned there was yet another round to fight, she told her mom she wanted to write her own letter to Navy leaders to tell them how her house only used to have vitamins and Tylenol and now there’s lots of prescription bottles. How her house is a stressful place. How she’d just like to have her dad back.
On Oct. 28, after seven more weeks of limbo, the Navy reversed course and decided not to take Benson to the misconduct hearing.
But, with now-numbing predictability, the Navy swiftly followed up with a letter warning Benson that it might not be over. “You are advised this determination does not in any way preclude or limit … future administrative or other proceedings.” The head of Navy personnel could ask the secretary of the Navy to decide whether Benson should be allowed to retire with his rank, the letter said. Henderson said he’d never seen anything like it with this set of facts.
Then, a week after ProPublica sent the Navy a list of questions about its actions in Benson’s case, the Navy made a final decision: Benson would be allowed to medically retire at his current rank of commander.
“I just want to go back to those times before everything just went to shit,” she said.
Benson still talks about the shame he feels the Navy continues to cast on him. He tries to separate the guilt from who he is as a person, a distinction he said is crucial to stay off the path he describes as “blame, shame,” and then almost mouthing the last word, “suicide.”
Ever since it filed the charges, he said, it feels like “the Navy has been trying to put me back in my cabin to kill me.”
Over the summer, Benson’s therapist at Walter Reed had written to the admiral charged with deciding whether Benson could retire and told him that the Navy’s continued pursuit of him had “led to an exacerbation of his PTSD symptoms and stymied his progress.”
----And here is a recent Navy Post Graduate Report----
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1052581.pdf
“The thesis finds that, over the past 25 years, Navy policy changes
have resulted in decreased Destroyer manning, insufficient training due to revised methodologies, and deficient maintenance.”
THE UNRESOURCED BURDEN ON
UNITED STATES NAVY SAILORS AT SEA
By
Christine L. Fletcher
Lieutenant Commander, USN
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2018
Approved by: Nita Lewis Shattuck
Thesis Advisor
Charles Good
This thesis seeks to determine why U.S. Navy Sailors work longer hours than accounted for in Navy manpower models. The study
focuses on at-sea tasks of enlisted Sailors aboard Guided Missile Destroyers. To address the question, we reviewed the full Navy
Manpower Analysis Center model for Destroyer task requirements, interviewed Destroyer subject-matter experts knowledgeable about
enlisted tasking, analyzed self-reported workload questionnaires administered to deployed Sailors, developed a comprehensive enlisted
at-sea task model, and contrasted that model with Navy task models. The thesis finds that, over the past 25 years, Navy policy changes
have resulted in decreased Destroyer manning, insufficient training due to revised methodologies, and deficient maintenance. Relying
on technological advancements to reduce workload, the Navy cut manning levels. These manning shortfalls, combined with higher
operational tempos, resulted in misalignment between actual at-sea tasks and manning models. The largest misalignment occurs in
training, including on-the-job training and qualifications, warfare training, and underway drills. Additionally, the study finds that Navywide
policy changes were not vetted through OPNAV N1 to determine their effect on at-sea Sailor workload. This thesis recommends
instituting centralized policy analysis for new initiatives potentially affecting Sailor workload and periodic reassessment of the Navy
Availability Factor (afloat wartime workweek).
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Navy manpower, fleet manning, Navy training, Navy maintenance, operational tempo, OPTEMPO, Navy
Availability Factor, NAF, Navy Standard Workweek, NSWW, Navy Manpower Analysis Center, NAVMAC,
working hours, Ship Manpower Document, SMD, Guided Missile Destroyer, DDG, fleet friction, readiness gap,
command and control, sea/shore imbalance, maritime regulations, optimal manning, Revolution in Training,
RIT, behavior analysis workload creep, workload imbalance, task shedding, fatigue, stress
2.2.2 History of Manpower Requirements
After World War II, the Navy began to study manning issues. In 1963, “a sustained effort
was implemented to define the work functions required in the Navy and to develop and
promulgate staffing criteria as a means of improving the allocation of manpower resources”
(Bright et al., 1969, p. v). Artis I. Platowas a project engineer in theNaval Ship Engineering
Design Work Study Section within the offices of the Secretary of the Navy. In 1966, he
worked on several manning projects to include the creation of the “Manpower Determination
Model,” developed to accurately predict the adequacy of crew size for U.S. Navy vessels
(Plato, 1974). In his paper, he discussed the background and rationale for the development
of a Navy Ship Manpower Document (SMD), attributing the manning issues for all U.S.
military services to the extensive economic growth after World War II.
The Effects of Reduced Manning- Naval Postgraduate School
XXII. EFFECTS OF REDUCED MANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
With the budgetary constraints experienced by DOD during the 1990s, the Navy leadership started exploring reduced manning onboard ships. In 1995 Admiral Boorda, then Chief of Naval Operations, sponsored the Smart Ship Program to test some of the ideas and technologies that could potentially lead to reduced manning in every ship of the U.S. Navy.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Reduced manning initiatives have been explored in the U.S. Navy for less than ten years. Only two ships in the Navy, the USS Yorktown (CG 48) and the USS Rushmore (LSD 47) have implemented this new concept. With only a manning reduction of 10% and reports that software conflicts left the ships dead in the water (Government Computers News, 1998), the Navy claims a total success in the case of the Yorktown. In the case of the Rushmore, Cedrik Pringle’s Naval Postgraduate School thesis evaluated the impact of the Smart Gator concept on the mission readiness of the Rushmore, and concluded that the reduction in manpower and the additional training requirements for the crew negatively impacted mission readiness (Pringle, 1998).
It is a fact, as current manning doctrine shows, that on average close to 50% of amphibious ships crew is relatively junior, inexperienced, and their absence would not prevent the ships from getting underway and operating in an efficient manner. Could we get rid of every single E-1 through E-3 aboard these ships? Absolutely not. The answer is because ships like Yorktown, Rushmore and the rest of the fleet were not design for reduced manning.
In order for reduce manning to work, it has to be an integral part of the ship’s design philosophy. Reduce manning and automation systems, along with new manning doctrines can work, but they have to be planned, integrated, and implemented from conception. Reduced manning will not come easily. Software research is barely scratching the surface of key technologies such as Expert Systems, Decision Support Systems, and Artificial Intelligence. In addition, reduced manning has tremendous implications for the Navy in areas such as recruitment, training, and retention. Finally, there is some institutional resistance that will oppose reduced manning every step of the way.
Executive Summary
Reduced Ship Manning
In the current post-Cold War era of down-sizing and reduced budgets, the Navy, tasked with new and expanded missions, is expected to do more with less. In this climate, approaches to reduced ship manning, without sacrificing readiness or jeopardizing mission, would be of great benefit inasmuch as manpower-related expenses combine to consume about 60% of the budget. With that background, the Panel reviewed reduced manning concepts and technologies with the potential to enable significant ship manning reductions. The Panel then evaluated the impact of automation on ship design and training.
Other than the "Law of the Sea" requirement for a posted lookout, there are no legal impediments to crew reduction. Barriers can, however, be found in an unwillingness to break with culture and tradition, in self-imposed policies that inhibit or discourage manpower reduction, in a pervasive perception in the Fleet that manpower is a "free" commodity and need not be constrained, and in a risk aversion philosophy founded on a lack of confidence in earlier attempts at automation.
Foreign navies, also faced with draconian budgetary constraints, have ventured into crew reduction through automation.
DISPEL THE MYTH OF "FREE" MANPOWER
At all levels of command in the Fleet, there seems to be a general perception that manpower is a "free" commodity. Thus, there is no inclination to either conserve or reduce manning since there is no "cost" to the user. The CNO should establish in the Fleet a system of accountability for the real cost of manpower and create at the Fleet and Type Commander levels a manning budget in the personnel (MP,N) account, with responsibilities similar to Operating Target (OPTAR) accounting in the operations and maintenance (O&M,N) account.
My Aaron Hassay's Navy Story only known SAM Sea Air Mariner Assigned FFG's 1994-1999
----Reports that can be referenced online begin below---
(A.H. Note This is an overview of the draw down of the whole program, the very SAM enlistment, and ships I would serve, which was a unique little segment of the Navy few really knew about. But it all has to do with trying to save money on the operational side, that is repeated in the other reports.)
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs.
Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
(A.H. Notes- I was recruited, a varsity letterman athlete, used to success and hard work, as a TEAM....way before I got to bootcamp and graduated meritorious 1994 18 years old, wanting to be big and go to college and be in the Navy, $4000 for an entire degree (not 1 month as is now I believe what the GI Bill is) Now I feel like a kid trapped in a mans body, no formal education, fell out of college 1998 unable to think jittery, and attempted ill fated medically disqualified Navy Army Transfer that was 3P Permanent Profile Psych Spine Musculoskeletal. I was sent back to the ship no medical clearance or checkup. They used up all my athletic ability and scrambled my thoughts and my fiancé dumped me because I was well sick. 4 years to go in the obligation, In 1999 The San Diego MTF Balboa documented me with major depression and bi polar and said I had trouble sleeping and concentrating and my fiancé of 4 years was disappearing, and they kept me on, no follow up ever, as if mental health stigma was something that was made up, and said I honorably discharged no discharge physical with the best code, meaning I could re-enlsit but in 3 months literally I was in a suicide homeless psych hospital in San Diego medicated for people, and within a few years after that I was in.a 5150 chiseling on my own arm, and then years later just pure stars aligning luck the internet found information that brought back those years 1994-2002, the forgotten years of young mans life 18-26 that had nothing to actually show, and Tried to move on, but a Army Vet brought me to his VSO as a straggler things connected as I read a pamphlet, and they took me as a client things I was o embarrassed about and had no words for, and when the VA denied me. even a homeless housing voucher, saying my enlistment did not qualify, and I found out about the BCNR who also could of corrected things and got me on my feet and a homeless housing voucher, both started denying me with one excuse...we recognize that you have all these medical records in service and a medical failed Navy Army Transfer in service, and you are homeless and in psych hospital only 3 months after discharge and a sucidie hospital a etc etc etc etc etc you know the battle...but so anyways the battle just like on the ship ..and in high school sports..but they don't like guys like me I suppose...guys that are all American...and well whatever their reasons were they said 2 things the doctor in 1999 said your fiancé of 4 years is on the rocks so that is the reason your life fell apart( by the way we will not even discuss you were on a ship and what the navy actually itself discusses in reports as injuries and illness for your Deck Job as you are showing ...it was your fiancé !!! ..lastly the enlistment was just used time and time as a negative...like I made it )
defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000
(A.H. Notes. I found this a few years ago, a 1994 DOD reports that they are shutting down the very enlistment I just signed!!! They had a version 2 specifically created for 2 years full time duty on the ship, which would of got the homeless housing voucher. I had version 1 but was sent to a ship anyways. There was only 900 SAM’s in the whole Navy
DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY1994
Naval Reserve Manpower Requirements
(Strength in Thousands)
SAM (0.9)
OSAM II (0.0)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service
accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet
its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down
to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and
skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program, Sea and Air
Mariner II (SAM II), was developed specifically to place individuals
serving two years on Initial Active Duty Training, onboard FFT 1052
class ships. With the cancelation of the FFT program, the SAM II
program draws down in FY 1994.
(A.H. Note you can see that 1.7 Percent of the Navy reserve in 1994 was in my age category 17-19. This is because most are older prior active duty, or even full time reserve called TAR Training Administration Reserve)
Table 5-7. FY 1994 Selected Reserve Enlisted Members, by Age aad Component,
(Percent)
Age
Group
17-19
Army
National
Guard
7.3
Army Reserve
9.7
Naval
Reserve
1.7
Marine Corps Reserve
11.7
Air Force Reserve
0.7
(A.H. Note look at Navy report on what happens on a regular FFG that is not running the 80/20 mix)
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SUSTAINED SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS ON
U. S.NAVY PERSONNEL
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
Crewmen aboard
the FFG experienced significantly more psychological fatigue. Although not
statistically significant (t = 1.85, p = 0.070), personnel aboard the FFG
also reported more problems with physical fatigue than personnel aboard the
CG.
A more likely explanation is the fact that due to fewer staff, personnel
aboard the FFG were required to spend longer periods of time on watchstanding
duty. Thus, the FFG presented fewer opportunities for prolonged rest
periods. The CG, on the other hand, had three different watch sections. As
noted elsewhere (Congleton, Englund, Hodgdon, Palinkas, Armstrong, and
Kelleher, 1988), crewmen aboard the FFG also reported shorter and more
fragmented sleep periods. In addition, the FFG had undergone a series of GQ
drills prior to entering the operational area which further fatigued its
crew.
(A.H. Note Still trying to process this one 1988 Navy Report the discussed the command from the very top, that would be my central command)
dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf
NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION
by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.
A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserve units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)
(A.H Note This report shows accounting for the NRF program, it was all an attempt to save money, and I think this is where the fault in all the issues of all the reports from all the ships that are mentioned)
dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA294225.pdf
A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE FRIGATES
December, 1994
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000
by
Jeffrey S. Davis
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve
B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1987
This thesis analyses the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7) guided missile
frigates. It assesses the cost-effectiveness of operating these ships in the Naval Reserve fleet vice the
Active fleet.
The analysis then assesses the ship's operational
readiness by comparing the ships' performance on Combat System Assessments and the major engineering
exams. Following this, the quality of life on board the NRF FFGs is qualitatively evaluated. This analysis
concludes that using FFGs in the NRF is not the most cost-effective option. Alternative recommendations
are then provided for their more efficient use.
(A.H. Note God even 1995 the Navy IG condemed the training and administration on the NRF FFGs)
indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1995 5040.1
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
(A.H. Note this is the Navy Training plan with a small mention of how to train a reservist. Take in mind most if not all are prior active duty, who need touch up and refresher courses to maintain skills, and who have already been to sea and understand the navy. Can you think of being put in bootcamp part time from the get, and expecting anything less then a humiliated beatdown, from the rest of the full time bootcamp company for not being able ot match cadence, and then when you get back to berthgin being at risk of a towel party/) But my life was like being shot to the moon everry month and returned home. Mental health issue??)
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units requires that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
(A.H Note. Here is an Actual XO report discussing the impossibilies of what was going on. Can you imagine how a 18 year old with a sam enlsitment was treated or used and overwhelmed and forgotten easily ?)
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE’S SURFACE ASSETS?
LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
(A.H Note with all that said I still try to understand with all the budget cutting attempts on the ship for manpower, how and why is there still a large percentage of civilian manpower for the Navy as well as reported in 1990s?)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR FY 1990
E. Key Manpower Issues
1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth
It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing
an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries.
The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health
care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a
national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the
correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken
significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength
in FY 1989 and beyond:
C. Civilian Component
Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of
the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not
require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,
ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical
support; and operates and maintains military installations. They
contribute directly to the..readiness of the armed forces. Civilian
strength is projectod-V6'decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent)
between FY ljS9-•nd FY 1990.
C. Civilian Manpower
1. General
Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall
resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our
fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial
activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E,
printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the
readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation
and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in
supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance
facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support
in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development,
and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on
readiness.
Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people
needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to
procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenerio.
These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as
depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well
as associated equipment and supply support.
(A.H. Note)
PREAMBLE
We the People
Signed in convention September 17, 1787. Ratified June 21, 1788
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
I honor all my brothers and sisters at sea. I honor all my other brothers and sisters in all the branches. Just treat each other better.
Don’t worry I am just waking up. I am alone but wish for some friends.
Sometimes I wonder why there are not many Navy guys on here responding to my calls for understanding and camaraderie to a very specific issue a SAM assigned a NRF FFG in the 1990s (as if I was the only Army guy to do a very specific odd thing no one has a documented of doing or experiencing).. It is way beyond our pay grade.
I was expecting someone on my level to hey man got you. But now I realize as these reports state it is like systemic and we are all more or less traumatized and on different ships over different decades hard to really team up.
I mean my ship is been decommissioned a long time ago.
I do not blame no one on my crew for the harassment or even assaults as it was dangerous out there, and they were not responsible for me being there, sent from another command, to take up slack as a part time reservist assigned to them an undermanned overstretched crew that was insular just like bootcamp. I had to try to keep pace with what amounts to a NFL Football team that was not feeing well and had no time to like really you know make things better or safer or even correct.
It is not correct to basically assign a 18 year old reserve enlisted to an active duty guided missile frigate that is undermanned, and expect that crew to basically adopt, and spend extra time, doing the impossible bringing him up to speed, on things it takes only full time duty can achieve.
So it is a bit like being thrown into a race, a 10k, a fast paced stamina race, and you had not actually trained by running the whole month at home, but you put on your racing shoes and the race started and you were underway even for a few days weeks and longer, and then you were sent home without medical access
there was always a watch to stand and relieve the full time crew, I mean the ocean will turn you into marbles,
I don't even expect the army guys to understand completely what being out there on a guided missile frigate that is undermanned and pushed beyond
We out on the front lines
And well part of my problem will always be that when I finally got to the va ---I mean a decade plus of living standards that most here would not even understand --the va said that I was not a veteran for veteran purposes.
I looked at this thing called honorable discharge finally after 10 years of not ever opening that paper to scared to look at it, after 8 years of that enlistment, when I was given it out the back of an office on the Sub Base in San Diego. I was 26 and I don't think empty is the correct term
regardless like 2013 or something like that I get to the va, because a soldier Army guy I met in the streets took me, as a straggler, as he was on his way, and asked if I wanted to go.
Long story short this paper that said honorable was basically the equivalent of the worth for a homeless housing voucher, denied because you had a dishonorable.
I relate to this whole story that is told about the crew and commanding officer as told about the Fitzgerald and Mccain in the last handful of years.
Blame Over Justice: The Human Toll of the Navy’s Relentless Push to Punish One of Its Own
Posted from propublica.org
CDR
CAPT
Reserves
PTSD
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
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