Posted on Dec 19, 2018
Five Years Ago, We Assessed the War in Afghanistan for Congress: How Did We Do?
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This is an interesting look at how an assessment was made 5 years back and how much they got right - and where they went wrong.
Five Years Ago, We Assessed the War in Afghanistan for Congress: How Did We Do?
Posted from warontherocks.com
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan
Warfare
Intelligence
Posted 6 y ago
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So I was part of that assessment as early as the end of 2013, where we briefed Gen Dunford directly, with regards to the Afghan Air Force. At the time we weren't looking at the UH-60 from MI-17s change too. The big deal then was the Super Tucanos light Attack platforms and how we would do that training. I can see why they ultimately moved to the UH-60, but at the time the MI-17 was believed to be the better choice since there was a working knowledge in the region (maintenance wise) and they were cheaper. Another issue, by the way, was training the Afghan Air Force to do Air Traffic Control. In 2013, you could count the number of people in Afghanistan (i.e. not coalition forces) on two hands who could competently manage Air Traffic Control and they all lived in Kabul.
Anyway, we briefed Gen Dunford around Dec 13, we requested then three years to implement our plan and then reassess. He agreed and pushed our analysis to the President who ultimately ignored Gen Dunford's final assessment. All to kinda sort of meet a campaign promise, which ultimately he failed to do. Instead he half ass-ed the issue trying to play both sides by taking a large number of troops out, but not all. This led to the failures we are experiencing in Afghanistan today.
Anyway, we briefed Gen Dunford around Dec 13, we requested then three years to implement our plan and then reassess. He agreed and pushed our analysis to the President who ultimately ignored Gen Dunford's final assessment. All to kinda sort of meet a campaign promise, which ultimately he failed to do. Instead he half ass-ed the issue trying to play both sides by taking a large number of troops out, but not all. This led to the failures we are experiencing in Afghanistan today.
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Maj Kevin "Mac" McLaughlin
SGT (Join to see) - We screwed up. We removed the necessary troops strength of advisers and training capabilities at the end of 2014, which were required to facilitate our recommendations to Gen Dunford. Did you not read my original post?
Shindand AB for example, was meant to be the AAF's Air Education and Training Command. Once we left that location in 2014, I heard from one of my interpreters that the AAF eventually did as well. Essentially reverting back to the pre-2001 mentality held by the senior members of the Afghan government. Their belief was that by consolidating the forces in Kabul, they retain their power.
Shindand AB for example, was meant to be the AAF's Air Education and Training Command. Once we left that location in 2014, I heard from one of my interpreters that the AAF eventually did as well. Essentially reverting back to the pre-2001 mentality held by the senior members of the Afghan government. Their belief was that by consolidating the forces in Kabul, they retain their power.
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SGT (Join to see)
Maj Kevin "Mac" McLaughlin - indeed, I read your original post. Did you not read second question? I was asking ‘how did we do’, specifically about the topics of corruption and infiltration of ANSF, continuing from my first question.
I’ve been there, I have a good of how we did. I was just interested in your perspective. Thanks.
I’ve been there, I have a good of how we did. I was just interested in your perspective. Thanks.
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Maj Kevin "Mac" McLaughlin
Not sure what you're driving at but read the report. Sounds like it's dead on in describing the issues faced by Afghanistan today. They're losing territory, Taliban is expanding their control/influence, the Afghan military is reverting to Soviet era and even pre-911 strategies. Over the last five years on "how did we do", we've essentially allowed the corruption to settle back in more comfortably. The Afghan military has lost many of the incentives that came with having a larger coalition presence which has led to the appeal of switching sides. As the Taliban increases their span of control, they are able to influence more members of the Afghan military to work for them.
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SGT (Join to see)
Respectfully, my question wasn’t ambiguous. I asked your opinion on two particular areas of assessment. If it wasn’t clear, I was asking, ‘in hindsight, on those particular topics, in your opinion, have those assessments from five years ago shown to be accurate?’
I’ve read the report. Some of it is spot on. Some of it is head-scratchingly off. Some of the assessments are Afghanistan 101 type pieces of information. (That’s not an insult. I’ve written plenty. I’ve briefed GEN Dunford. I know the drill).
Anyway, not driving at anything. Not a big deal. Just curious as to your opinion on the particular aspects mentioned, in hindsight. (As you were involved in the report). In my opinion, they are two of the biggest issues, and will continually to be, for as long as we’re involved in Afghanistan. I think we agree.
Thanks.
I’ve read the report. Some of it is spot on. Some of it is head-scratchingly off. Some of the assessments are Afghanistan 101 type pieces of information. (That’s not an insult. I’ve written plenty. I’ve briefed GEN Dunford. I know the drill).
Anyway, not driving at anything. Not a big deal. Just curious as to your opinion on the particular aspects mentioned, in hindsight. (As you were involved in the report). In my opinion, they are two of the biggest issues, and will continually to be, for as long as we’re involved in Afghanistan. I think we agree.
Thanks.
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Is it still the “war of necessity”, as designated by Obama? Despite, what I consider an excellent analysis five years ago, what effective strategies were employed to overcome obstacles identified. History is full of outsiders controlling Afghanistan, all unsuccessful.
“Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
George Santanaya
“Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
George Santanaya
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