Limits and Potential of a Multilateral Approach to Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan and NATO |...

" Among the many issues within the International Security Assistance Force, and Operation Enduring Freedom as well, the cause of all woes can be traced back to the decisionmakers’ shortsightedness, naiveté, and disregard for the actual situation on the ground in post-Taliban Afghanistan. As a result, ISAF found itself fighting an “accidental counterinsurgency” despite it being anything but accidental. As mentioned previously, the preconditions for an insurgency were already apparent in the immediate aftermath of OEF’s success, as the Afghan government, as well as the army and police, were essentially nonexistent, and Pakistan – or at least the FATA – was providing sanctuary for the fleeing Taliban.

In face of this, conscious or not of the consequences, the US decided to shift its attention to Iraq and engage in another front. While it would have been hard to predict the outcome of the war in Iraq, or foresee the 2008 financial crisis, these have all been significant intervening variables.

ISAF’s initial UN-mandated mission was restricted to Kabul and envisaged nation-building and security provision, and was destined to fail since the very beginning. The mission, bounded by the availability of resources, had completely overlooked the institutional history of the country, by focusing nation-building efforts within the capital and not the rural areas. In a country were state-penetration is very limited, a bottom-up approach from the rural areas would have been more effective."