Posted on May 28, 2020
The Story of a Homeless Veteran Who Fell Through the Cracks - Veterans Coming Home
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With Navy Pride I share my story and try to update this article that was written about me.
There are a lot of Navy Service Members. Many of us with amazing amounts of pride. We are smart. We know when something is wrong. I now find out the Navy shut down not only my units but the whole command it served, as the reports I show in this update.
Remember what happened to the slowest guy in bootcamp? They got hazed and worse.
Now just imagine bootcamp was extended to 5 years. For 5 years you were inserted into bootcamp for a few days weeks and even month and sent home. At home you had to read all the manuals and qualfication systems and show back up at bootcamp with some idea that you could take this reading and do something with it funcionally in the heat of bootcamp with a drill instructor yelling at you analyzing everything you do, and there is no where to run.
So replace bootcamp with a guided missle frigate at sea. You are put on and off that ship at sea monthly othertwise taking all the manuals home with no pay thinking this is how the Navy runs. This is the 1990s.
You get deployed. This is still bootcamp and it is all termed "IDT" and "ADT" Inactive Duty Training" and "Active Duty Training".
And because you never get 2 years full time Active Duty orders in this type of training, like it was bootcamp type experience, on this ship, the VA will not consider you a veteran for veteran purposes blaming the law.
I do not believe the law was written for this type of circumstnace.
I believe in the Constitution of which we swore and oath to defend
Constitution Preamble below
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
I do not believe any system of government created with the constitiotnal Preamble as its base of creation reading "we the people" would create such a paradigm to leave me so unprotected by any support system that other service members would get with an honorable discharge. I had to wait 5 years for support.
That is 13 years. 8 years in the enlistment and 5 years of the va issue. Dont you think I had family that may have witnessed their older brother, first born son, go through this daily? I was going around the VA meeting Vietnam Veterans 40 years removed from Vietnam who were coming to my support who were telling me daily that I may have to wait forever. Dont you think that would not make me feel something very strong?
I flash back to bootcamp full of pride jump on a grenade for your hommies type of guy graduating meritiriousily. Then I was sent to ship where Inexperience gets people injured and or killed and I had to live with this type of fear for 5 years what my inexperience would make me feel.
Imagine being put on a space shuttle part time shot into space monthtly for various amounts of time and sent home wondering what happened. Just replace a space shuttle to a guided missle frigate in my situation. This situation started when I was 18 till 23. You might feel instant pride and amazement being assigned to a space shuttle. But then you soon realize you have to actually adapt and learn and perform. But how do you do this with a true reserve enlistment package which gives you poverty wages and no health care access off the space shuttle. This space shuttle also has a lot of weapons and it is always preparing for war.
I love being American! But man I am like amazed
I was proud, but I was also not impervious to being scared.
You are both inexperienced and getting lit up because of it to the point you attempt a Navy Army Transfer.
But regardless this story is very rare. My experience is so rare that I have not found another sailor with this combination of my enlistment package and duty assignment.
I write To set the record straight on this KQED article written about me that made me to look like a weak defenseless human punching bag which is embarrassing when you were trying so hard with such a confusing situation. This article on me does not take into account recent discovery of numerous Navy Reports explaining the actual purposeful undermanning of certain ships and replacing billets with a reserve enlisted. The Navy IG itself reported as Systemically Weak in Training and Administration these specific ships. This IG report would actually most affect my role, or amplify the weakness, of the situation I was dealing and confused by, being a part time sailor on a full time operational ship from 18-23.
Here is the Navy Surface Force Training Instruction that had a small section about these ships
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
Look I love America. I need your friendship. I want to go to music school. Can anyone help me figure this out. I read parts of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. I believe in “We the People”.
I swore an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States of America.
Why is this so important?
Well this our Constitution basically has all the basic ideals of our human rights built into it. You read that when you read the Preamble to both the Declaration of Independence and The Constitution's Preamble.
I want to tell the story correctly of this KQED article written about me that did not take into account all the Navy reports I have since discovered. These reports document a highly command structure manning doctrine on some ships, in a brief time period, that has since all been shut down.
This KQED article makes it seem like I was some kid that was some malcontempt and looking for a fight. I tried desperatly risking all to fit in with my full time crew and i fell apart. I got scared.
The guiding surface training instruction of my time period states something that would affect me, but does not even mention the reality of which it brings up.
“most of these individuals have previous active duty experience”
What if you are 18 and have no previous active duty experience, assigned to a full time operational guided missile frigate for 5 years, part time continuously. Does anyone consider what that might do to this 18 year old? Is the assumption this is Normal Navy training?
Would my Navy Army Transfer that was medically DQ’d off that ship by MEPS be more understood.
The Navy IG itself investigated and reported that my ship in particular was “systemically weak in training and administration”. Basically the undermanning of the full time manpower, and filling a full time billet, with a part time reserve enlisted with no active duty experience, was not going unnoticed. But no one removed me.
I never complained. Those were my boys on the ship. I was a varsity athlete in cross country and track. I was used to putting out. But I was going home ill every month off the ship confused and not able to relate to them. The assumption is that I had it easy because I was part time on the ship. But well a few days and weeks and months of duty on these ships will take you to places that are going to change you. I had to pass multiple levels of security to get on that ship and be trusted.
But there are so many reports now that basically tell me that someone knew something was not right, and all the commands are gone, and even my enlistment is no longer. A report I found said the Army and the Air Force in the same time period had better similar enlistments that out competed the Navy, as the reason. I reference that recent report. That same report actually documents the end of the ship and the commands of which I was.
I go back to Navy Surface Training Instructions that don’t cover the reality if yo if you were always part time, simply undertrained compared to the full time guy with the same pay grade as you on the same ship, a undermanned operational crew, that does rely on you to relieve them on the watch bill?
You remember what happens to the slowest kid in bootcamp?
The assaults, bullying, threats, in general hostile working relationships between the full time crew and me as a part time crew on those guided missile frigates, were the result of “inherent limitations” “inherent problems of discontinuity” that could never be solved with “innovative programs to overcome these limitations”. How was the CO beyond everything else he had to do on a normal guided missile frigate supposed to change course read this surface fro training instruction and actually do this “Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations.” Would that mean the CO had to do something so rare, something never even considered, something Navy Ship Apprenticeship never was meant for with “inherent limitations” 'Inherent problems of discontinuity”. A navy apprenticeship on a ship in any form any rate was never meant to be accomplished with “inherent limitations” 'Inherent problems of discontinuity”.There would never be any Navy Manuls or systems of training to ‘Overcome these limitations”.
I never complained. I cant really remember all the time I spent at sea.
What really boggles the mind is that even with a honorable discharge I had to wait 5 years for the VA to grant me homeless veteran support housing. I was waiting those 5 years in another Navy Veterans house, twice my age, who befriended me, who actually liked men. You can guess what happened. The VA was taking note of it in my patient records I later come to find out. I think the list of doctors noting what was going on mentioning “assaults” in my patient records while they recorded I was also on SSDI which only has 2 levels of disability evaluation 0 or 100, and I was already on the 100, which meant, my only income for psych at $900 a month, and on food stamps at 38 years of age, was somewhere in the line.
Finding this Navy Surface Training Instruction would explain my suicide hospital intakes due loss of my initial desire to be an officer enlisting at 18 in a reserve enlistment, which was recruited upon me by the recruiter, who basically set a scenario where it was like ROTC,but you are already in and going to college.
I enlisted went to bootcamp, graduated meritorious. I was going to college on a reserve GI Bill which meant over those 8 years I would receive $4000 based on instruction, to navigate college to a degree, and commission. But unlike ROTC I was already enlisted obligated to have deployability recall rapid readiness assigned to a ship already, going to sea monthly supporting a undermanned crew in San Diego.
How was the CO supposed to track me back at home feeling a bit well listless from motion illness, and beyond confused having to read thousands of pages of ship and rate manuals without pay and benefits of the full time crew, qualify in all that same stuff they were qualified.
The Navy Army Transfer request off the ship, that was medically DQ’d somehow did not get anyone's attention as well.
It sounds like something I made up.
My mom watched it all. My fiance watched it all. They are both no longer around. I could not explain what I did not know. Now I have this Navy Instruciton that basically says someone in the Chain of Command was to make special training realities to place a 18 year old into an active NFL game and all its complexity, if the ship was a NFL game.
Then to top it. I would find my missing father years after my discharge. I am the son I found out of the real deal Army Infantry Soldier Vietnam 1966-68. That would not get me any support or consideration that I was missing a father, and sent home without any real support or family off that ship monthly, trying to do what I could to “develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations”
The pay of a reserve enlisted is far below poverty. When assigned to a guided missile frigate. You will spend countless hours trying to study books that are meant to be learned in coordination with actual full time duty.
A real navy apprenticeship, is a bit like playing NFL practicing as a team every day, and reading and implementing the play book, getting better with continuous practice.
I did not get that. I dont know how it affected me.
My experience on the ship was sort of like that movie groundhogs day.
It would be like going to bootcamp part time over 5 years, always experiencing only the first few days or weeks of bootcamp, and sent home, and having to study all the bootcamp manuals on your own time, without any pay or leadership to monitor and guide you.
Here are the Navy reports that I referenced before.
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiug [login to see] 4713
Annual report of the Secretary of Defense on reserve forces., 1974/75
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other than a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as an encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the "Total Force Policy" in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The "Total Force Policy" dictates that all available forces — U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies — would be considered in determining the Defense needs to meet future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
B. NAVY
1. Test manning active Navy destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent Reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships and Naval Reserve ships manned at 65%/35% and 35%/65% Active/Reserve mixes.
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT FY 1976
Another, more important, initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on Selected Reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization. These 80/20 ships, in terms of combat readiness, would fall somewhere between the fully manned active ships and the Naval Reserve ships which typically are manned at 60% active and 40% reserve. Hence, the 80/20 ships would be expected to be available somewhat earlier than the Naval Reserve ships in a major contingency involving mobilization. Moreover, by filling in the remaining billets with active shore establishment personnel designated in advance, they could be used to augment fully manned active ships during a prolonged contingency for which reserves are not called up. Admittedly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct required training for basic combat missions. Thus, the 80/20 ships could not be considered "deployable" to meet peacetime commitments. We plan to test the 80/20 concept on five destroyers in FY 1976 and FY 1977. If the concept proves successful we are prepared to expand the program in subsequent years.
Here is the end of this type of manning doctrine and the end of my actual SAM Enlistment in 1 report
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
---- In 1994 18 yo I enlisted with a SAM enlistment based on a $4000 to go to college to become an officer
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment can not exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shopinstruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a non degree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
-----This report states I was in the last recruited class of the SAM enlistment 1994. There were only 600 SAM in the entire Navy. It is easy to be overlooked with that low of a percentage.
https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY1994 SAM 1/ (0.6)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel.
——-Here is the Navy IG Report referenced
.
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assignresponsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)componentsin the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a NavyInspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in thetraining and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRFships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components felloutside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight ofthe administration and training of the SELRES component.
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What if you are 18 in this command?
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
Tell the Truth: Can the Operational Commander Rely ... - dtic.milapps.dtic.mil › dtic › fulltextPDFby TM Rossi - 1995 - Related articlesNov 9, 1995 - TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN. 13a. ... The NRF FFG is currently prohibited from participating in.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
----This report states the cost savings that the NRF FFG was created
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cashoutlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4945271/
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingenecy Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
---Just 2 years after being class 1 dental in bootcamp, I was class 3 for dental and had to pay for my own dental and had no insurance to maintain it, the dental the ship required. The active duty SN did not have to pay for their own medical care assigned to the same ship. My dental has all failed since. The fillings they required me to get. Abscesses and teeth loss as each filling would fail individually.
There are a lot of Navy Service Members. Many of us with amazing amounts of pride. We are smart. We know when something is wrong. I now find out the Navy shut down not only my units but the whole command it served, as the reports I show in this update.
Remember what happened to the slowest guy in bootcamp? They got hazed and worse.
Now just imagine bootcamp was extended to 5 years. For 5 years you were inserted into bootcamp for a few days weeks and even month and sent home. At home you had to read all the manuals and qualfication systems and show back up at bootcamp with some idea that you could take this reading and do something with it funcionally in the heat of bootcamp with a drill instructor yelling at you analyzing everything you do, and there is no where to run.
So replace bootcamp with a guided missle frigate at sea. You are put on and off that ship at sea monthly othertwise taking all the manuals home with no pay thinking this is how the Navy runs. This is the 1990s.
You get deployed. This is still bootcamp and it is all termed "IDT" and "ADT" Inactive Duty Training" and "Active Duty Training".
And because you never get 2 years full time Active Duty orders in this type of training, like it was bootcamp type experience, on this ship, the VA will not consider you a veteran for veteran purposes blaming the law.
I do not believe the law was written for this type of circumstnace.
I believe in the Constitution of which we swore and oath to defend
Constitution Preamble below
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
I do not believe any system of government created with the constitiotnal Preamble as its base of creation reading "we the people" would create such a paradigm to leave me so unprotected by any support system that other service members would get with an honorable discharge. I had to wait 5 years for support.
That is 13 years. 8 years in the enlistment and 5 years of the va issue. Dont you think I had family that may have witnessed their older brother, first born son, go through this daily? I was going around the VA meeting Vietnam Veterans 40 years removed from Vietnam who were coming to my support who were telling me daily that I may have to wait forever. Dont you think that would not make me feel something very strong?
I flash back to bootcamp full of pride jump on a grenade for your hommies type of guy graduating meritiriousily. Then I was sent to ship where Inexperience gets people injured and or killed and I had to live with this type of fear for 5 years what my inexperience would make me feel.
Imagine being put on a space shuttle part time shot into space monthtly for various amounts of time and sent home wondering what happened. Just replace a space shuttle to a guided missle frigate in my situation. This situation started when I was 18 till 23. You might feel instant pride and amazement being assigned to a space shuttle. But then you soon realize you have to actually adapt and learn and perform. But how do you do this with a true reserve enlistment package which gives you poverty wages and no health care access off the space shuttle. This space shuttle also has a lot of weapons and it is always preparing for war.
I love being American! But man I am like amazed
I was proud, but I was also not impervious to being scared.
You are both inexperienced and getting lit up because of it to the point you attempt a Navy Army Transfer.
But regardless this story is very rare. My experience is so rare that I have not found another sailor with this combination of my enlistment package and duty assignment.
I write To set the record straight on this KQED article written about me that made me to look like a weak defenseless human punching bag which is embarrassing when you were trying so hard with such a confusing situation. This article on me does not take into account recent discovery of numerous Navy Reports explaining the actual purposeful undermanning of certain ships and replacing billets with a reserve enlisted. The Navy IG itself reported as Systemically Weak in Training and Administration these specific ships. This IG report would actually most affect my role, or amplify the weakness, of the situation I was dealing and confused by, being a part time sailor on a full time operational ship from 18-23.
Here is the Navy Surface Force Training Instruction that had a small section about these ships
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
Look I love America. I need your friendship. I want to go to music school. Can anyone help me figure this out. I read parts of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. I believe in “We the People”.
I swore an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States of America.
Why is this so important?
Well this our Constitution basically has all the basic ideals of our human rights built into it. You read that when you read the Preamble to both the Declaration of Independence and The Constitution's Preamble.
I want to tell the story correctly of this KQED article written about me that did not take into account all the Navy reports I have since discovered. These reports document a highly command structure manning doctrine on some ships, in a brief time period, that has since all been shut down.
This KQED article makes it seem like I was some kid that was some malcontempt and looking for a fight. I tried desperatly risking all to fit in with my full time crew and i fell apart. I got scared.
The guiding surface training instruction of my time period states something that would affect me, but does not even mention the reality of which it brings up.
“most of these individuals have previous active duty experience”
What if you are 18 and have no previous active duty experience, assigned to a full time operational guided missile frigate for 5 years, part time continuously. Does anyone consider what that might do to this 18 year old? Is the assumption this is Normal Navy training?
Would my Navy Army Transfer that was medically DQ’d off that ship by MEPS be more understood.
The Navy IG itself investigated and reported that my ship in particular was “systemically weak in training and administration”. Basically the undermanning of the full time manpower, and filling a full time billet, with a part time reserve enlisted with no active duty experience, was not going unnoticed. But no one removed me.
I never complained. Those were my boys on the ship. I was a varsity athlete in cross country and track. I was used to putting out. But I was going home ill every month off the ship confused and not able to relate to them. The assumption is that I had it easy because I was part time on the ship. But well a few days and weeks and months of duty on these ships will take you to places that are going to change you. I had to pass multiple levels of security to get on that ship and be trusted.
But there are so many reports now that basically tell me that someone knew something was not right, and all the commands are gone, and even my enlistment is no longer. A report I found said the Army and the Air Force in the same time period had better similar enlistments that out competed the Navy, as the reason. I reference that recent report. That same report actually documents the end of the ship and the commands of which I was.
I go back to Navy Surface Training Instructions that don’t cover the reality if yo if you were always part time, simply undertrained compared to the full time guy with the same pay grade as you on the same ship, a undermanned operational crew, that does rely on you to relieve them on the watch bill?
You remember what happens to the slowest kid in bootcamp?
The assaults, bullying, threats, in general hostile working relationships between the full time crew and me as a part time crew on those guided missile frigates, were the result of “inherent limitations” “inherent problems of discontinuity” that could never be solved with “innovative programs to overcome these limitations”. How was the CO beyond everything else he had to do on a normal guided missile frigate supposed to change course read this surface fro training instruction and actually do this “Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations.” Would that mean the CO had to do something so rare, something never even considered, something Navy Ship Apprenticeship never was meant for with “inherent limitations” 'Inherent problems of discontinuity”. A navy apprenticeship on a ship in any form any rate was never meant to be accomplished with “inherent limitations” 'Inherent problems of discontinuity”.There would never be any Navy Manuls or systems of training to ‘Overcome these limitations”.
I never complained. I cant really remember all the time I spent at sea.
What really boggles the mind is that even with a honorable discharge I had to wait 5 years for the VA to grant me homeless veteran support housing. I was waiting those 5 years in another Navy Veterans house, twice my age, who befriended me, who actually liked men. You can guess what happened. The VA was taking note of it in my patient records I later come to find out. I think the list of doctors noting what was going on mentioning “assaults” in my patient records while they recorded I was also on SSDI which only has 2 levels of disability evaluation 0 or 100, and I was already on the 100, which meant, my only income for psych at $900 a month, and on food stamps at 38 years of age, was somewhere in the line.
Finding this Navy Surface Training Instruction would explain my suicide hospital intakes due loss of my initial desire to be an officer enlisting at 18 in a reserve enlistment, which was recruited upon me by the recruiter, who basically set a scenario where it was like ROTC,but you are already in and going to college.
I enlisted went to bootcamp, graduated meritorious. I was going to college on a reserve GI Bill which meant over those 8 years I would receive $4000 based on instruction, to navigate college to a degree, and commission. But unlike ROTC I was already enlisted obligated to have deployability recall rapid readiness assigned to a ship already, going to sea monthly supporting a undermanned crew in San Diego.
How was the CO supposed to track me back at home feeling a bit well listless from motion illness, and beyond confused having to read thousands of pages of ship and rate manuals without pay and benefits of the full time crew, qualify in all that same stuff they were qualified.
The Navy Army Transfer request off the ship, that was medically DQ’d somehow did not get anyone's attention as well.
It sounds like something I made up.
My mom watched it all. My fiance watched it all. They are both no longer around. I could not explain what I did not know. Now I have this Navy Instruciton that basically says someone in the Chain of Command was to make special training realities to place a 18 year old into an active NFL game and all its complexity, if the ship was a NFL game.
Then to top it. I would find my missing father years after my discharge. I am the son I found out of the real deal Army Infantry Soldier Vietnam 1966-68. That would not get me any support or consideration that I was missing a father, and sent home without any real support or family off that ship monthly, trying to do what I could to “develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations”
The pay of a reserve enlisted is far below poverty. When assigned to a guided missile frigate. You will spend countless hours trying to study books that are meant to be learned in coordination with actual full time duty.
A real navy apprenticeship, is a bit like playing NFL practicing as a team every day, and reading and implementing the play book, getting better with continuous practice.
I did not get that. I dont know how it affected me.
My experience on the ship was sort of like that movie groundhogs day.
It would be like going to bootcamp part time over 5 years, always experiencing only the first few days or weeks of bootcamp, and sent home, and having to study all the bootcamp manuals on your own time, without any pay or leadership to monitor and guide you.
Here are the Navy reports that I referenced before.
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiug [login to see] 4713
Annual report of the Secretary of Defense on reserve forces., 1974/75
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other than a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as an encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the "Total Force Policy" in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The "Total Force Policy" dictates that all available forces — U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies — would be considered in determining the Defense needs to meet future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
B. NAVY
1. Test manning active Navy destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent Reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships and Naval Reserve ships manned at 65%/35% and 35%/65% Active/Reserve mixes.
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT FY 1976
Another, more important, initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on Selected Reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization. These 80/20 ships, in terms of combat readiness, would fall somewhere between the fully manned active ships and the Naval Reserve ships which typically are manned at 60% active and 40% reserve. Hence, the 80/20 ships would be expected to be available somewhat earlier than the Naval Reserve ships in a major contingency involving mobilization. Moreover, by filling in the remaining billets with active shore establishment personnel designated in advance, they could be used to augment fully manned active ships during a prolonged contingency for which reserves are not called up. Admittedly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct required training for basic combat missions. Thus, the 80/20 ships could not be considered "deployable" to meet peacetime commitments. We plan to test the 80/20 concept on five destroyers in FY 1976 and FY 1977. If the concept proves successful we are prepared to expand the program in subsequent years.
Here is the end of this type of manning doctrine and the end of my actual SAM Enlistment in 1 report
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
---- In 1994 18 yo I enlisted with a SAM enlistment based on a $4000 to go to college to become an officer
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment can not exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shopinstruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a non degree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
-----This report states I was in the last recruited class of the SAM enlistment 1994. There were only 600 SAM in the entire Navy. It is easy to be overlooked with that low of a percentage.
https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY1994 SAM 1/ (0.6)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel.
——-Here is the Navy IG Report referenced
.
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assignresponsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)componentsin the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a NavyInspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in thetraining and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRFships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components felloutside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight ofthe administration and training of the SELRES component.
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What if you are 18 in this command?
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
Tell the Truth: Can the Operational Commander Rely ... - dtic.milapps.dtic.mil › dtic › fulltextPDFby TM Rossi - 1995 - Related articlesNov 9, 1995 - TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN. 13a. ... The NRF FFG is currently prohibited from participating in.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
----This report states the cost savings that the NRF FFG was created
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cashoutlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4945271/
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingenecy Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
---Just 2 years after being class 1 dental in bootcamp, I was class 3 for dental and had to pay for my own dental and had no insurance to maintain it, the dental the ship required. The active duty SN did not have to pay for their own medical care assigned to the same ship. My dental has all failed since. The fillings they required me to get. Abscesses and teeth loss as each filling would fail individually.
The Story of a Homeless Veteran Who Fell Through the Cracks - Veterans Coming Home
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Edited >1 y ago
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