Posted on Jun 28, 2020
The Story of a Homeless Veteran Who Fell Through the Cracks - Veterans Coming Home
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http://veteranscominghome.org/station_media/the-story-of-a-homeless-veteran-who-fell-through-the-cracks/
Imagine just for 1 moment you went to bootcamp, ROTC, or any other training or operational command that had this reported about it?
“operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives”
Specifically requesting any leadership
who can help me figure out how to have this article written about me updated, to references to any of these government reports that I am finding about my command and enlistment that are all gone, that create the backdrop to why things happened and my Navy Army Transfer was medically DQd by MEPS in 1998.
Here are just some experts of the reports I am finding referenced below.
“In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
Structure.”
“Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations”
“Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity.”
“training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force”
“systemic weakness in the training and administration”
“training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties”
“these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control”
“ cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF”
“dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report”
“Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists.”
“Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.”
Personally, I think of:
John Paul Jones (6 July 1747 – 18 July 1792) was a Scottish American sailor and the United States' first well-known naval fighter in the American Revolutionary War.
“I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast; for I intend to go in harm's way.”
,"I have not yet begun to fight!"
Now I fight for the Constitution, of which I swore an oath to defend when I enlisted at 18, and the Preamble and Bill of Rights, and the Simple Language of “We The People” and “Justice” and “Rights” discussed within.
(( So lets go back to the beginning. First to join the military at 18 you swear an oath to defend the constitution.))
10 U.S.C. § 502 - U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 10. Armed
Forces § 502. Enlistment oath: who may administer
(a) Enlistment oath. --Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the following oath:
“I, _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.”
The U.S. Constitution: Preamble
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
“We The People”
“Form a more perfect Union”
“Establish Justice”
“Provide for the Common Defense”
“Promote the General Welfare”
“Secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”
(( Here it the report that discusse the beginning and end of my commands and SAM Enlistment. I still have not found another SAM assigned a FFG. This is like the Guinness book of world records, how rare, so rare, possibly there is only 1 case known of a SAM who was assigned to a FFG. And you see both referenced in this report.))
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
((Here is the USCODE for the SAM Enlistment definition. The benefits and pay for a SAM enlistment are below poverty limits. That may seem logical. But what if you are assigned to a FFG? Your SAM Enlistment does not have medical benefits like the full time guys. on the ship, although you are obligated part time, with full time readiness recall deployment status))
10 USC 511(d)
“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.
(( I was recruited into SAM enlistment for $4000 to fund an entire 4 year degree. I thought it was something similar to ROTC except I would go to bootcamp first))
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shopinstruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a non degree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
(( 1994 DOD report states the end of the SAM enlistment all together. There is always the last year of everything. But why enlist someone in a new 8 year enlistment when you are giving up on the same program the same year? If I am reading this correctly there were only 600 SAM enlisted in all the Navy ))
https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY1994
Naval Reserve Manpower Requirements
(Strength in Thousands)
SAM (0.6)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel.
(( These 1975 and 1976 DOD Reports discuss the end of the draft and the new need for junior enlisted reserve recruiting, and the “test’ to underman active ships and fill billets with a reserve enlisted. Mind you the SAM enlistment has not yet been created. At this moment Navy Reservist are prior active duty))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs. Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
(( Navy Health Research Studies state specifically a known that junior enlisted experienced more tension and anxiety at sea and under potentially hostile environments on the ffg. The reports also state that my class the ffg the crew in general experience more fatigue then a larger class ship. So basically I was assigned to a class of ship known for generating more fatigue physically and mentally on a normal fully manned crew, but on the NRF FFG the crew was undermanned further with the 80/20 model, and inserting me at the earliest age. How was the overworked full time crew experiencing this to monitor me and my health when we would get back from sea every month with a SAM enlistment off the same ship every month? It seems the overworked crew would not be focused or have any purpose to monitor me if I was sent home in some state of shock or fatigue or confusion. You will see below that the surface training instructions would actually require me to qualify to the same standard. I think it should be of no surprise the Navy Army transfer was disqualified just for these medical conditions listed in this Navy Health Research study. ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213071.pdf
Search Results
Web results
Sleep Problems, Health Symptoms, and Tension ... - dtic.mil
Naval Health Research Center.
Approach
A cross-sectional sample of officers' and enlisted personnel aboard nine
U.S. .Navy combatant ships vas surveyed. Shiptypes included tvo Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs), five Minesweepers (MSOs), one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG),
and one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).
Tension/Anxiety
Overall, tension/anxiety levels of the cross-sectional sample appeared to
be within normal limits. However, Junior enlisted personnel (El to E3) reported
greater subjective tension/anxiety than higher paygrade personnel.
This result may have been a reflection of the relative inexperience of these
sailors in extended at-sea operations and the potentially hostile environment.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
Physical and Psychological Effects of Sustained Shipboard ...
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
Crewmen aboard
the FFG experienced significantly more psychological fatigue. Although not
statistically significant (t = 1.85, p = 0.070), personnel aboard the FFG
also reported more problems with physical fatigue than personnel aboard the
CG.
A more likely explanation is the fact that due to fewer staff, personnel
aboard the FFG were required to spend longer periods of time on watchstanding
duty. Thus, the FFG presented fewer opportunities for prolonged rest
periods. The CG, on the other hand, had three different watch sections. As
noted elsewhere (Congleton, Englund, Hodgdon, Palinkas, Armstrong, and
Kelleher, 1988), crewmen aboard the FFG also reported shorter and more
fragmented sleep periods. In addition, the FFG had undergone a series of GQ
drills prior to entering the operational area which further fatigued its
crew.
(( By 1998 Navy Analysis reports “Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )” ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf
NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION
by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.
A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was
attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at
various echelons of command.
Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of
command were noted in which clear lines of authority and
responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe"
commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of
standardization of command authority and responsibility was
contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.
Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of
the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional
concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized
politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies
and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily
consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff
work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although
the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated
that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that
poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor
staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in
reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to
unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged
confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and
responsibility.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserre units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)
(( The Navy IG is reporting “systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships”. I had to google the IG Manual to understand what the importance of this was. I had just been assigned to NRF FFG’s 1994 18 years old with a SAM enlistment ))
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1995 5040.1
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a NavyInspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRFships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
1998 5040.1A
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
(( Here are Navy Surface Training Instructions that have a small chapter that discusses a reservist and how they must match the full time guys qualifications, while acknowledging all the problems associated, and also stating “Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.” But never is it considered to monitor the 18 year old SAM enlisted on the same ship ))
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units requires that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
(( These NAVY reports review attempt to save money in the NRF FFG’s ))
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a218963.pdf
March 1987
Reserve Manning of FF-1052 and FFG-7 Class Frigates:
A Critique of the Accuracy and Completeness
of Existing Costing Studies
by
Patrick Robert Rearden
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1976
M.A., Pepperdine University, 1979
The purposes for this research have included:
1. To evaluate studies that have attempted to make a
cost analysis of either Regular Navy or Naval Reserve
Force ships.
2. To collect and analyze data related to the costs of
operating selected Regular Navy and NRF ships during
Fiscal Year 1986.
The focus of this work were the costs observed by eight
selected Pacific Fleet frigates. Of the eight, four each
belonged to the Regular Navy and the NRF. Of these, two
ships were of the FF-1052 (La"x) class, while the other two
belonged to the FFG-7 (Perry) class.
Operating costs were divided into three families: manpower,
equipment and supplies, and variable costs of
operation. Data was obtained in most cases from original
documents and ship's manning records.
The thesis observed that the actual costs of operating
an FF-1052 class in the NRF was higher than to do so in the
Regular Navy. By contrast, FFG-7s proved to be more economical
when associated with the Naval Reserve Force.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA294225.pdf
A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE FRIGATES
December, 1994
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000
by
Jeffrey S. Davis
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve
B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1987
This thesis analyses the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7) guided missile
frigates. It assesses the cost-effectiveness of operating these ships in the Naval Reserve fleet vice the
Active fleet.
The analysis then assesses the ship's operational
readiness by comparing the ships' performance on Combat System Assessments and the major engineering
exams. Following this, the quality of life on board the NRF FFGs is qualitatively evaluated. This analysis
concludes that using FFGs in the NRF is not the most cost-effective option. Alternative recommendations
are then provided for their more efficient use.
(( This Navy War Colllege Reported by an XO the head of training of a NRF FFG, give the deck plate reality ))
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What is you are 18 in this command?
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
Tell the Truth: Can the Operational Commander Rely ... - dtic.milapps.dtic.mil › dtic › fulltextPDFby TM Rossi - 1995 - Related articlesNov 9, 1995 - TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN. 13a. ... The NRF FFG is currently prohibited from participating in.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
(( Has any 22 year old assigned to a ship have to pay for their own dental and maintain it as well financially? Yes infact. This report documents reservists pay for their own dental. The active duty young guys on the ship did not have to pay for their own dental when the ship required it. But me? I was always in fear and shock. I was 22 I was given a dental requirement to perform a bunch of dental fillings, to be deployable, just for my part time assignment to the ship, which end up being a bunch of mercury filled dental fillings, at my own requirement to maintain with no health insurance to monitor or maintain, which resulted in many fillings failing, and infections, and extractions ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingenecy Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
(( This Report documents that the Oakland VA I would enter for assistance in 2013, was denying me benefits and support without even a concept of a humanitarian waiver, blaming my SAM Enlistment did not qualify as a Veteran for Veteran Purposes, and itself would be investigated by 2015))
https://www.disabledveterans.org/2016/10/14/osc-busts-oakland-va-regional-office-14000-claim-blunder/
VARO received an application in February 2006 from a veteran with Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was not correctly processed for seven years and eight months.
In addition, the Oakland VARO’s recordkeeping was so poor that investigators could not find logs or spreadsheets tracking the number of unprocessed claims, thus hampering their ability to fully investigate the scope of the whistleblowers’ allegations. However, another recent VA investigation confirmed that Oakland VARO staff had not processed a “substantial amount” of claims dating back to the mid‐1990s.
https://www.disabledveterans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/161014-OSC-Press-Release.pdf
WASHINGTON, D.C./October 13, 2016 – In a letter sent to the White House and Congress today, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) reported that the Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO) in Oakland, California, failed to process veterans’ benefits claims accurately and in a timely manner. This delayed the accurate payment of benefits to veterans and their dependents, in some cases by years. Three Oakland VARO whistleblowers came to OSC with disclosures of the Oakland VARO’s deficiencies, prompting an investigation. Those whistleblowers are Rustyann Brown, a former claims assistant, Roselyn Tolliver, a veterans service representative, and Lydia Cheney, a veterans service representative.
“The whistleblowers performed a public service by bringing to light the severe delays in processing veterans benefit claims and deserve our gratitude,” said Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. “These delays are particularly disturbing since the applicants are disabled veterans and their dependents. No veteran should have to wait years before receiving the benefits they are owed for their service to this nation.”
In Conclusion
When I read all these reports, and mix it with the article and then consider the ideals as laid out in the Preamble of the Constitution of which we swore an oath to defend, I hope to rewrite a new article.
The Article is written, for a guy with pride and self esteem, in such an embarrassing way, as if I am weak, and I could not handle a normal Navy experience, and on a normal Navy Ship operating with Normal Operating Conditions, was prone to being slower than others, isolated, dangerous operationally, and attacked as result. way to make it seem that simply an assault led to the transfer. I knew internally even when I was attempting to get out of this Command and transfer to the Army, that I was hoping the Army spent more money on training. I was falling apart on the ship. I did not understand how I was supposed to actually survive with that kind of duty assignment.
Now I know the Navy is a huge organization. And some in the Navy as there are many reports online I have found, that reference exactly the beginning and end of my commands and enlistment, including the Navy IG, investigated and reported problems, and seemingly were all together taken back by what was going on with the commands I was in.
Some leadership would be appreciated.
Imagine just for 1 moment you went to bootcamp, ROTC, or any other training or operational command that had this reported about it?
“operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives”
Specifically requesting any leadership
who can help me figure out how to have this article written about me updated, to references to any of these government reports that I am finding about my command and enlistment that are all gone, that create the backdrop to why things happened and my Navy Army Transfer was medically DQd by MEPS in 1998.
Here are just some experts of the reports I am finding referenced below.
“In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
Structure.”
“Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations”
“Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity.”
“training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force”
“systemic weakness in the training and administration”
“training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties”
“these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control”
“ cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF”
“dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report”
“Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists.”
“Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.”
Personally, I think of:
John Paul Jones (6 July 1747 – 18 July 1792) was a Scottish American sailor and the United States' first well-known naval fighter in the American Revolutionary War.
“I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast; for I intend to go in harm's way.”
,"I have not yet begun to fight!"
Now I fight for the Constitution, of which I swore an oath to defend when I enlisted at 18, and the Preamble and Bill of Rights, and the Simple Language of “We The People” and “Justice” and “Rights” discussed within.
(( So lets go back to the beginning. First to join the military at 18 you swear an oath to defend the constitution.))
10 U.S.C. § 502 - U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 10. Armed
Forces § 502. Enlistment oath: who may administer
(a) Enlistment oath. --Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the following oath:
“I, _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.”
The U.S. Constitution: Preamble
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
“We The People”
“Form a more perfect Union”
“Establish Justice”
“Provide for the Common Defense”
“Promote the General Welfare”
“Secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”
(( Here it the report that discusse the beginning and end of my commands and SAM Enlistment. I still have not found another SAM assigned a FFG. This is like the Guinness book of world records, how rare, so rare, possibly there is only 1 case known of a SAM who was assigned to a FFG. And you see both referenced in this report.))
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
((Here is the USCODE for the SAM Enlistment definition. The benefits and pay for a SAM enlistment are below poverty limits. That may seem logical. But what if you are assigned to a FFG? Your SAM Enlistment does not have medical benefits like the full time guys. on the ship, although you are obligated part time, with full time readiness recall deployment status))
10 USC 511(d)
“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.
(( I was recruited into SAM enlistment for $4000 to fund an entire 4 year degree. I thought it was something similar to ROTC except I would go to bootcamp first))
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shopinstruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a non degree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
(( 1994 DOD report states the end of the SAM enlistment all together. There is always the last year of everything. But why enlist someone in a new 8 year enlistment when you are giving up on the same program the same year? If I am reading this correctly there were only 600 SAM enlisted in all the Navy ))
https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY1994
Naval Reserve Manpower Requirements
(Strength in Thousands)
SAM (0.6)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel.
(( These 1975 and 1976 DOD Reports discuss the end of the draft and the new need for junior enlisted reserve recruiting, and the “test’ to underman active ships and fill billets with a reserve enlisted. Mind you the SAM enlistment has not yet been created. At this moment Navy Reservist are prior active duty))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs. Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
(( Navy Health Research Studies state specifically a known that junior enlisted experienced more tension and anxiety at sea and under potentially hostile environments on the ffg. The reports also state that my class the ffg the crew in general experience more fatigue then a larger class ship. So basically I was assigned to a class of ship known for generating more fatigue physically and mentally on a normal fully manned crew, but on the NRF FFG the crew was undermanned further with the 80/20 model, and inserting me at the earliest age. How was the overworked full time crew experiencing this to monitor me and my health when we would get back from sea every month with a SAM enlistment off the same ship every month? It seems the overworked crew would not be focused or have any purpose to monitor me if I was sent home in some state of shock or fatigue or confusion. You will see below that the surface training instructions would actually require me to qualify to the same standard. I think it should be of no surprise the Navy Army transfer was disqualified just for these medical conditions listed in this Navy Health Research study. ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213071.pdf
Search Results
Web results
Sleep Problems, Health Symptoms, and Tension ... - dtic.mil
Naval Health Research Center.
Approach
A cross-sectional sample of officers' and enlisted personnel aboard nine
U.S. .Navy combatant ships vas surveyed. Shiptypes included tvo Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs), five Minesweepers (MSOs), one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG),
and one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).
Tension/Anxiety
Overall, tension/anxiety levels of the cross-sectional sample appeared to
be within normal limits. However, Junior enlisted personnel (El to E3) reported
greater subjective tension/anxiety than higher paygrade personnel.
This result may have been a reflection of the relative inexperience of these
sailors in extended at-sea operations and the potentially hostile environment.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
Physical and Psychological Effects of Sustained Shipboard ...
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
Crewmen aboard
the FFG experienced significantly more psychological fatigue. Although not
statistically significant (t = 1.85, p = 0.070), personnel aboard the FFG
also reported more problems with physical fatigue than personnel aboard the
CG.
A more likely explanation is the fact that due to fewer staff, personnel
aboard the FFG were required to spend longer periods of time on watchstanding
duty. Thus, the FFG presented fewer opportunities for prolonged rest
periods. The CG, on the other hand, had three different watch sections. As
noted elsewhere (Congleton, Englund, Hodgdon, Palinkas, Armstrong, and
Kelleher, 1988), crewmen aboard the FFG also reported shorter and more
fragmented sleep periods. In addition, the FFG had undergone a series of GQ
drills prior to entering the operational area which further fatigued its
crew.
(( By 1998 Navy Analysis reports “Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )” ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf
NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION
by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.
A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was
attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at
various echelons of command.
Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of
command were noted in which clear lines of authority and
responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe"
commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of
standardization of command authority and responsibility was
contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.
Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of
the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional
concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized
politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies
and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily
consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff
work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although
the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated
that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that
poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor
staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in
reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to
unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged
confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and
responsibility.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserre units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)
(( The Navy IG is reporting “systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships”. I had to google the IG Manual to understand what the importance of this was. I had just been assigned to NRF FFG’s 1994 18 years old with a SAM enlistment ))
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1995 5040.1
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a NavyInspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRFships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
1998 5040.1A
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
(( Here are Navy Surface Training Instructions that have a small chapter that discusses a reservist and how they must match the full time guys qualifications, while acknowledging all the problems associated, and also stating “Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.” But never is it considered to monitor the 18 year old SAM enlisted on the same ship ))
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units requires that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
(( These NAVY reports review attempt to save money in the NRF FFG’s ))
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a218963.pdf
March 1987
Reserve Manning of FF-1052 and FFG-7 Class Frigates:
A Critique of the Accuracy and Completeness
of Existing Costing Studies
by
Patrick Robert Rearden
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1976
M.A., Pepperdine University, 1979
The purposes for this research have included:
1. To evaluate studies that have attempted to make a
cost analysis of either Regular Navy or Naval Reserve
Force ships.
2. To collect and analyze data related to the costs of
operating selected Regular Navy and NRF ships during
Fiscal Year 1986.
The focus of this work were the costs observed by eight
selected Pacific Fleet frigates. Of the eight, four each
belonged to the Regular Navy and the NRF. Of these, two
ships were of the FF-1052 (La"x) class, while the other two
belonged to the FFG-7 (Perry) class.
Operating costs were divided into three families: manpower,
equipment and supplies, and variable costs of
operation. Data was obtained in most cases from original
documents and ship's manning records.
The thesis observed that the actual costs of operating
an FF-1052 class in the NRF was higher than to do so in the
Regular Navy. By contrast, FFG-7s proved to be more economical
when associated with the Naval Reserve Force.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA294225.pdf
A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE FRIGATES
December, 1994
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000
by
Jeffrey S. Davis
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve
B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1987
This thesis analyses the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7) guided missile
frigates. It assesses the cost-effectiveness of operating these ships in the Naval Reserve fleet vice the
Active fleet.
The analysis then assesses the ship's operational
readiness by comparing the ships' performance on Combat System Assessments and the major engineering
exams. Following this, the quality of life on board the NRF FFGs is qualitatively evaluated. This analysis
concludes that using FFGs in the NRF is not the most cost-effective option. Alternative recommendations
are then provided for their more efficient use.
(( This Navy War Colllege Reported by an XO the head of training of a NRF FFG, give the deck plate reality ))
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What is you are 18 in this command?
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
Tell the Truth: Can the Operational Commander Rely ... - dtic.milapps.dtic.mil › dtic › fulltextPDFby TM Rossi - 1995 - Related articlesNov 9, 1995 - TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN. 13a. ... The NRF FFG is currently prohibited from participating in.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
(( Has any 22 year old assigned to a ship have to pay for their own dental and maintain it as well financially? Yes infact. This report documents reservists pay for their own dental. The active duty young guys on the ship did not have to pay for their own dental when the ship required it. But me? I was always in fear and shock. I was 22 I was given a dental requirement to perform a bunch of dental fillings, to be deployable, just for my part time assignment to the ship, which end up being a bunch of mercury filled dental fillings, at my own requirement to maintain with no health insurance to monitor or maintain, which resulted in many fillings failing, and infections, and extractions ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingenecy Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
(( This Report documents that the Oakland VA I would enter for assistance in 2013, was denying me benefits and support without even a concept of a humanitarian waiver, blaming my SAM Enlistment did not qualify as a Veteran for Veteran Purposes, and itself would be investigated by 2015))
https://www.disabledveterans.org/2016/10/14/osc-busts-oakland-va-regional-office-14000-claim-blunder/
VARO received an application in February 2006 from a veteran with Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was not correctly processed for seven years and eight months.
In addition, the Oakland VARO’s recordkeeping was so poor that investigators could not find logs or spreadsheets tracking the number of unprocessed claims, thus hampering their ability to fully investigate the scope of the whistleblowers’ allegations. However, another recent VA investigation confirmed that Oakland VARO staff had not processed a “substantial amount” of claims dating back to the mid‐1990s.
https://www.disabledveterans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/161014-OSC-Press-Release.pdf
WASHINGTON, D.C./October 13, 2016 – In a letter sent to the White House and Congress today, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) reported that the Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO) in Oakland, California, failed to process veterans’ benefits claims accurately and in a timely manner. This delayed the accurate payment of benefits to veterans and their dependents, in some cases by years. Three Oakland VARO whistleblowers came to OSC with disclosures of the Oakland VARO’s deficiencies, prompting an investigation. Those whistleblowers are Rustyann Brown, a former claims assistant, Roselyn Tolliver, a veterans service representative, and Lydia Cheney, a veterans service representative.
“The whistleblowers performed a public service by bringing to light the severe delays in processing veterans benefit claims and deserve our gratitude,” said Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. “These delays are particularly disturbing since the applicants are disabled veterans and their dependents. No veteran should have to wait years before receiving the benefits they are owed for their service to this nation.”
In Conclusion
When I read all these reports, and mix it with the article and then consider the ideals as laid out in the Preamble of the Constitution of which we swore an oath to defend, I hope to rewrite a new article.
The Article is written, for a guy with pride and self esteem, in such an embarrassing way, as if I am weak, and I could not handle a normal Navy experience, and on a normal Navy Ship operating with Normal Operating Conditions, was prone to being slower than others, isolated, dangerous operationally, and attacked as result. way to make it seem that simply an assault led to the transfer. I knew internally even when I was attempting to get out of this Command and transfer to the Army, that I was hoping the Army spent more money on training. I was falling apart on the ship. I did not understand how I was supposed to actually survive with that kind of duty assignment.
Now I know the Navy is a huge organization. And some in the Navy as there are many reports online I have found, that reference exactly the beginning and end of my commands and enlistment, including the Navy IG, investigated and reported problems, and seemingly were all together taken back by what was going on with the commands I was in.
Some leadership would be appreciated.
The Story of a Homeless Veteran Who Fell Through the Cracks - Veterans Coming Home
Posted from veteranscominghome.org
ADM
Constitution
Inspector General
Commanding Officer
Posted >1 y ago
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