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"In any case, the two poles of the engagement debate—suspension or continuation—are equally unconvincing. They rely on assumptions, expectations and anecdotal evidence rather than a thorough systematic investigation of the complex nature of military assistance programs.
For one thing, there’s no singular ‘military-to-military engagement’. It consists of dozens of activities and programs, from joint training and professional military education to arms sales and military dialogues. Each of these has different logics and functions, and there’s no one-size-fits-all approach to evaluate their value or problems. Sweeping statements that military engagement is either useful or repulsive provide us with little understanding about what specific promises and pitfalls they might have.
For another, there are different ways we could measure the effects and value of military engagement and assistance. Different bilateral military engagements have different historical donor–recipient contexts. Many donors and recipients in Southeast Asia, however, consider the value of military assistance or engagement to be primarily political."
For one thing, there’s no singular ‘military-to-military engagement’. It consists of dozens of activities and programs, from joint training and professional military education to arms sales and military dialogues. Each of these has different logics and functions, and there’s no one-size-fits-all approach to evaluate their value or problems. Sweeping statements that military engagement is either useful or repulsive provide us with little understanding about what specific promises and pitfalls they might have.
For another, there are different ways we could measure the effects and value of military engagement and assistance. Different bilateral military engagements have different historical donor–recipient contexts. Many donors and recipients in Southeast Asia, however, consider the value of military assistance or engagement to be primarily political."
What is military-to-military engagement good for?
Posted from aspistrategist.org.au
Allies
Training
Strategy
Posted 7 y ago
Responses: 2
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Just an LT but...
The crux of the article is that top-down change is the requirement for successfully altering a foreign military's culture via appointing foreign trained officers to positions of authority. I agree that it is one way to achieve that goal. However, it should also be possible to affect a bottom-up change in culture if a significant portion of the officer corps is trained by a foreign power. Potentially feasible to do with smaller militaries (i.e. microstates in Africa, C. America, and S.E. Asia). Obviously, not as likely to happen with larger militaries.
The crux of the article is that top-down change is the requirement for successfully altering a foreign military's culture via appointing foreign trained officers to positions of authority. I agree that it is one way to achieve that goal. However, it should also be possible to affect a bottom-up change in culture if a significant portion of the officer corps is trained by a foreign power. Potentially feasible to do with smaller militaries (i.e. microstates in Africa, C. America, and S.E. Asia). Obviously, not as likely to happen with larger militaries.
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LTC Eric Udouj
I would have to disagree in part with you on this Cody. At the upper levels - you do schooling together and you are planning the mil-to-mil exercises. However - its at the tactical level where you are going through each other's training that you really build bonds that last throughout both sides careers when you work together a couple times. You will find that many of the Western countries are interconnected in many things done already - and alot of interchange (same for Australia and Canada and Singapore - all who have billets in different US formations). But the goal should never be the short range - its the long range one and its more than just a change n culture.
One thing that has finally change is in regards to larger Non-NATO countries with large armed forces (other than treaty Allies) and that its not just us that provide the training. With India - those exercises are held in India and in the US now. Different nations have different specialties that we either do not have or that we can learn from. That is a huge change in our culture where we usually think we have the knowledge or the better equipment or the better way of planning. Hats off to GEN Brown for really kicking in the door with the Pathways.
One thing that has finally change is in regards to larger Non-NATO countries with large armed forces (other than treaty Allies) and that its not just us that provide the training. With India - those exercises are held in India and in the US now. Different nations have different specialties that we either do not have or that we can learn from. That is a huge change in our culture where we usually think we have the knowledge or the better equipment or the better way of planning. Hats off to GEN Brown for really kicking in the door with the Pathways.
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LTC Eric Udouj
Bottom line - change in culture is a two way street - adapt the best means vs ones that were designed for a different time and place. You both will learn as much in a 2 week exercise working with foreign forces as you will in four years of study.
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As the current advisor to the Commander of the Army for a significant ally in the middle east, I agree with your personal assessment here. This is about long term engagement in order to maintain access to the region and meet national strategic interests. The military is only one part of this, and it's coordinated through the State Department. I appreciate all aspects of the relationship now that I can see it first hand. Those who have only been on the tactical side or have never worked in the interagency world can't quite grasp the importance of the mission.
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LTC Eric Udouj
Well said Sir. Was at SOCPAC when we decided to start cutting off a key Allie after a coup... and short term do good had long term very bad consequences. Indonesia was another one - where we are still trying to recover from the split in the 90s and paid a heavy price for it in ours and their early operations against AQ elements in SEA. These engagements play into a longterm strategic balance that you build from bottom to top and the role of DoS is critical for the long term planning.
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