Any one else getting ready for another boring lame listless lonely Valentines?

so some 20 years homeless broke confused what the hell happened blaming yourself cutting you find these things. The whole command was investigated by the Navy itself. Your enlistment was also chopped up. It would all together completely explain your medically disqualfied attempt to save your future Navy ARMY TRANSFER OFF the ship,

iMagine given a hot complex dangerous rubix cube that you must take home and never sure how it goes together for 8 years 18-26 and how that might like play out in your life. Then you are an honest young american. WE THE PEOPLE!!!! so here is a story. A Sea Air Mariner Enlistment assigned ships. See if you can piece it all together and put the rubix together.

Imagine being told to fly a plane now knowing that 1 wing is not going to work! and you keep on flying that plane and crashing for years.

It was not mean to fly.


"""To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66"""




NAVPERS 15909
Naval Military Personnel Manual MILSPERMAN
3. Criteria for Hardship Status.
a. A severe hardship exists, not normally encountered and resolved by other members of the Naval Service.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a032080.pdf

1975 DOD Secretary Defense Annual Report of Reserve Forces quotes:
"Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other than a national security emergency or a declaration of war."
"This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the "TOTAL FORCE POLICY" in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements"
"In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited".
"B. NAVY
1. Test Manning Active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80% active personnel and 20% reservist in comparison with 100% active manned ships and Naval Reserve Ships Manned at 65/35% and 35/65% Active/Reserve Mixes"

https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417

1976 DOD Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Annual Defense Department Report quotes:
"We plan to test the 80/20 concept on five destroyers in FY 1977 and FY 1977. If the program proves successful we are prepared to expand the program in subsequent years."
"Admittedly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept...."
"...we are intensifying our efforts to make better use fo Navy Reserve Personnel in our surface combatant force."


https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/21272


Date
1985

Author
Scott, Dwight F. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

Development of a new screening table for Sea/Air Mariners.
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the attrition behavior of the first accessions, fiscal year 1984 accessions, into the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program and develop an improved screening table for SAM applicants.

"4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the active forces because reserve personnel train only part—time and must retain skills over longer periods with less practice and supervision. CRef. 303 "



1990
DOD Total Force Policy Interim Report
"Use of Reserve Volunteers has tended to work well for unit or individual missions that do not require close, intra-unit coordination. It has been less effective in force elements such as ground combat units or ship crews, where unit training and cohesiveness is more important."


In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve . The CINCPACFLT
Det 42 0 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.

The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )



COMNAVSURFRESFOR believes that it has been short -suited
in people and money for its programs.



The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and responsibility.




1995/1998 COMNAVSURFRESFOR 5040.1/5040.1A "Navy
IG report documenting "systemic" weaknesses in the training and
administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships."


https://www.justice.gov/ag/systemic-weakness-reports


SYSTEMIC WEAKNESS REPORTS
DEFINITION
During the course of investigating and prosecuting health care fraud, systemic weaknesses or vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement are sometimes discovered in health care benefit programs.¹ A systemic weakness is one that is judged to be a fundamental problem that requires corrective action through administrative, regulatory, legislative or policy change. A systemic weakness report should be prepared whenever a policy, procedure or systems process fails to prevent, detect or minimize losses due to fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement in health care benefit programs



NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS
MANUAL
JULY 1995

Redress Of Wrongs -

Systemic weaknesses or management problems disclosed dur-ing the investigation must be reported.

Accountability - Commanders, commanding officers, and supervisors have the duty to hold their subordinates accountable for their ac-tions and to correct systemic faults.


Complaints from individuals seeking relief from adverse personnel or disciplinary actions, unfavorable findings in discrimination cases, or other mat-ters for which a statute or regulation sets forth a resolution process, should be accepted for IG investigation only when coupled with a non-frivolous allegation that the chain of command is unable or unwilling to address the matter fairly and impartially for reasons related to conflicts of interest

However, IG organiza-tions should be sensitive to complaints or requests that indicate systemic problems may exist that should be addressed through an IG investigation or inspection.

IG organiza-tions should be sensitive to complaints or requests that indicate systemic problems may exist that should be addressed through an IG investigation or inspection.


DoN. However, the mission of DoN IG organizations does not include assistance in the correction of wrongs in individual cases absent special circumstances such as reprisal or systemic problems. Because DoN IG organizations are not advocates for individuals, complaints about actions personal to individuals should be carefully screened for referral to other DoN organizations that are a more appropriate forum. In such cases, every reasonable effort should be made to direct individuals to the proper organization to address their concerns. When an individual's complaint of wrong is a proper subject for IG investigation, it is appropriate for an IG organization to recom-mend the command consider remedial action that makes the complainant "whole."



From Title 10—ARMED FORCES
Ch. 79: CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS
§1552. Correction of military records: claims incident thereto
(2) In the case of a former member described in paragraph (1) or a former member whose application for relief is based in whole or in part on matters relating to post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury as supporting rationale or as justification for priority consideration, the Secretary concerned shall expedite a final decision and shall accord such cases sufficient priority to achieve an expedited resolution. In determining the priority of cases, the Secretary concerned shall weigh the medical and humanitarian circumstances of all cases and accord higher priority to cases not involving post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury only when the individual cases are considered more compelling.





Exhibits

2014
San Francisco VET Center

“Worse, he is not considered a veteran because he did not have sufficient active duty time, and therefore no DD214.”

“As we discussed his lack of dd214, and after consultation with the Team Leader, writer informed

2015
VA Hospital Patient Records

“Documents efforts to be treated Reservist, but would be seen, then referred to the community for care. In 1998, after being assaulted, he attempted to join the Army, and was declined due medical and psych reasons.”

“However, per their current records, patient was a reservist and likely not eligible for services.”

“Per San Bruno Member Services, per Veteran’s current record, he is not eligible for VA programs (i.e. Grant and Per Diem, and VA Supportive Housing).

“ He finds himself in a situation where he “Served”, but because he was in the reserves, does not have a dd214, or evident access to VA services.”

“Vet reports emotional distress both about past military related traumas as well as current housing situation in which vet reports he feels forced to exchange sexual favors in order to maintain current living situation.”

“He further notes several incidents that occured while he was serving, that he recognizes now had detrimental effect upon him. These include verbal abuse, MST, being threatened by another sailor, and being assaulted by a petty officer, When he tried to enter the Army from the Navy Reserves, he was prevented by some physical problems, but also by indication of psychiatric problems.”

2015 April

VA Health Eligibility Center

“Dear Aaron Hassay,

We regret to inform you that after careful review of your records by our Enrollment and Eligibility staff, we are proposing to terminate your VA health care benefits. We have made an initial determination that you are ineligible for VA health care for the following reason:

Minimum Active Duty Service Requirements (i) 24 months of continuous active duty , or (ii) the full period for which the individual was called or ordered to active duty is not eligible for VA health care by reason of such period of active duty.”



10 USC 511(d)

“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.”


https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a246650.pdf












1983 May
All Hands
The Reserves-A Force in Readiness
Rear Admiral Robert F. Dunn talks about the reservist today
“A New Recruiting Program could ease some of the present problems for the Naval Reserve.”
“We Have the Sea Air Mariner program in the works now for recruiting non-prior service people.”
‘Just because an individual wears the uniform only one weekend a month, or during 2 weeks in the summer, and someone else wears it all year long, does not mean that the first one is less of a sailor or less of a naval person.”

1983 September
CNA Center Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A TOTAL FORCE PERSPECTIVE
Deborah Clay-Mendez
“Sea and Air Mariners are non-prior service recruits who take the Recruit Training Course (Bootcamp) and directly into the SELRES without service in the active force.”
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAMs may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that no previous experience a rating could be earned through only part time On-Job-Training.”1993 DOD Manpower Requirement Reports

1,100 SAMS were in the whole Navy 1993.


B. Reserve Component Military Manpower1. Naval Reserve ManpowerThe reduced threat of global war, longer warning times, andthe ability to rapidly generate certain capabilities have allowed a reduc-tion in Naval Reserve end-strength where directly linked to Navy's ForceStructure and Infrastructure reductions. Additionally, reductions weretaken in those areas where large numbers of requirements supported aglobal vice contingency war scenario. Other reductions focused on juniorunskilled positions while maximizing the retention of spaces for the moreskilled and veteran personnel.Despite the reduction in end-strength, the Naval Reserveremains the principal source of trained units and personnel to augmentactive forces during initial stages of mobilization. The Naval Reserveis therefore manned, equipped, and trained to a high state of readiness.To ensure effective training and integration of forces, the Naval Reserveprovides "mutual support" to assist active forces in performing their mis-sions while concurrently fulfilling mobilization training requirements.

“The Sea and Air Mariner program, inaugurated in FY 1984 tohelp the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilizationrequirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for themore highly trained and skilled veteran personnel.


1997 Department of Navy 3502.1B
Surface Master Training Plan

"Per OPNAVINST 1001.21A, these training requirements must
mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty
counterpart performing the same duties."

"Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve
Force training program requires an understanding of systemic
restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill
limitations, unit placement, billet location, and unit composition
are among the factors affecting the Surface Reserve
training strategy."






1995

https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF

The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships.



1998
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401A.PDF

The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships.




https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/39784

This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.


https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf

"Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF)."

As the military forces of the 1990's "rightsize", the
importance of the reserve force's contribution within each
service component cannot be overstated. In a recent message to
the entire Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda,
proclaimed:
"In the smaller Navy of today and in the future, it takes
everything and everybody working together to accomplish the
mission. 1994 was full of examples with daily contributions
by reservists (seabees, frigates, logistics and tactical
aircraft, medical intelligence and more) working side by
side with Active counterparts"

The post-Vietnam military would be shaped around a Total
Force Policy which called for the integration of the National
Guard and Reserve with active forces.5
Both the economy and public opinion demanded an end to the
massive levees experienced under Selective Service. The
logical replacement for conscription was a smaller, more
professional "all volunteer" force supplemented by well
trained, fully supported Reserves during national
emergencies.6

Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF personnel.

Selres personnel who serve in NRF FFGs are talented individuals who work hard to contribute to the missions of their ships while presenting a seamless crew structure.23

Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete team training NRF Selres personnel receive.

Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful supervision and, after certified completion of this training, competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without adequate training. In1990,theDepartmentofDefenseconducted a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force structure.

“While volunteers offer maximum flexibility, cost effectiveness, and responsiveness for the capability attained, several concerns remain. These include: (1) uncertainty regarding the amount and duration of voluntary participation; (2)lossofintegralteam/unitcapability when larger units (e.g., ships, companies) do not volunteer together, and (3) possible employer reprisals against employees who volunteer for active duty."31

A ship is an independent, self-sustaining city which
requires, not only the complete integration of its crew, but the
coordinated orchestration of qualified professionals to sustain
safe and effective operations at sea. Navy manning doctrine
directs the assignment of only the minimum number of men and
women to ships in specific ratings and billets required to
provide each ship with the opportunity to succeed at sea. In
short, there is very little room for unqualified or untrained
sailors at sea. So why then do we man 16 of the 51 ships in the
FFG-7 class to only 70% of their allotted manning and say, if
needed in a time of national crisis, we will augment these crews
with quality personnel who have less than 24 days of integrated
team training each year?




https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx

U.S. Navy (USN)

“The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact.


By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.”



To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66

lets see we can i will prey to jesus the jewish god and the muslim god all the gods and it will all be taken care of...there must be gods yet undiscovered...we are free ... your listless little future may be taken based on some things you never even knew... or considered..what if you found out some 20 years later all that was some sort of joke the commands you served and your enlistment were all written in a biography some historical review of things that few knew

i say deep breathe into the belly and prey to god your god...we are all going there.. our god