Posted on May 19, 2016
Are the Military Academies producing the same quality of leader today as in years past? In what way are they changing?
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Leadership Development
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Having been to one, gotten the class ring, etc, etc, I will simply say that an Academy grad gets out what they put in, so there is plenty of variety. Some of my classmates were outstanding as mids and almost certainly still are as officers. Some were duds, and a lot were fairly average. In comparison to ROTC or OCS, the academies probably have a much tighter spread, but I wouldn't prejudge graduates either way.
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Never thought of the AF Academy producing the best AF leaders. In my experience with AF leaders, the best seemed to emerge from OTS and ROTC. "Zoomies" while certainly well educated and qualified, seemed to be lacking in people skills, particularly empathy. Again in my experience, the officers from OTS or ROTC were more likely the ones to exhibit these qualities.
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It has been my experience that every graduating class from the Naval Academy believed that it underwent harsher and more demanding training than any class thereafter.
There most probably is some truth to that, as the requirements placed on officers in the Navy have changed over time, especially with more need for technological savvy and less on brute force and physical strength.
Additionally, with the integration of women into the academies, changes were made, and probably had to be made, to adjust to a mixed gender environment along with the physiological and psychological differences between men and women. Neither men or women are better than the other -- but yes, they are different.
Furthermore, the nature of warfare continually changes. When I graduated we were still in a "Cold War" with the Soviet Union who was aggressively challenging the US Navy at sea. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of insurgency warfare changed the needs of the navy and its officer corps. Iraq increased coastal warfare and reignited the need for coastal patrol craft and operators. With the war in Afghanistan, having no access to the sea, the role of the Navy would have been greatly diminished without the Navy shifting resources and emphasis to special operations and aviation.
I have no particular opinion on the quality of leaders graduating today compared to those in my time because I am not there to observe them, work under them, or have them work for me. Certainly there are challenges that did not previously exist. Certainly integration of women into every role in the navy has brought with it challenges to overcome, almost all of which were predicted well in advance. After all, when you place young men and women, at the height of their physical health and sexual drive together, far from home, not everyone will resist temptation and opportunity. There will be misunderstandings. And yes, unfortunately, there also will be sexual assaults and rapes.
In order to achieve gender integration, I believe that many leaders chose to "feminize" the men through training and indoctrination. Now there is a Politically Correct movement to even change historical job titles, rates, and language to be "Gender Neutral." This may be a good thing for the average woman in the navy, but a bad thing for men and a deleterious effect upon the ability of some units to achieve their mission. Taking any action to achieve political correctness is a gross waste of time and resources.
In summary I will say two things.
First, the quality of officers graduating from the service academies is almost certainly as good as it ever has been. Different most certainly, but as good to meet today's need of the Navy.
Second, and what truly scares me, it what the current administration has attempted and achieved in the senior officer corps of all the services. Too many of these officers have given their allegiance to the President and the Administration over and above their allegiance to the US Constitution. It has been all too clear to the officer corps that any dissension, any public disagreement with the President and his policies will terminate a career thus senior officers have become risk averse politicians instead of the leaders and warfighters we will need in whatever our next major challenge may be.
There most probably is some truth to that, as the requirements placed on officers in the Navy have changed over time, especially with more need for technological savvy and less on brute force and physical strength.
Additionally, with the integration of women into the academies, changes were made, and probably had to be made, to adjust to a mixed gender environment along with the physiological and psychological differences between men and women. Neither men or women are better than the other -- but yes, they are different.
Furthermore, the nature of warfare continually changes. When I graduated we were still in a "Cold War" with the Soviet Union who was aggressively challenging the US Navy at sea. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of insurgency warfare changed the needs of the navy and its officer corps. Iraq increased coastal warfare and reignited the need for coastal patrol craft and operators. With the war in Afghanistan, having no access to the sea, the role of the Navy would have been greatly diminished without the Navy shifting resources and emphasis to special operations and aviation.
I have no particular opinion on the quality of leaders graduating today compared to those in my time because I am not there to observe them, work under them, or have them work for me. Certainly there are challenges that did not previously exist. Certainly integration of women into every role in the navy has brought with it challenges to overcome, almost all of which were predicted well in advance. After all, when you place young men and women, at the height of their physical health and sexual drive together, far from home, not everyone will resist temptation and opportunity. There will be misunderstandings. And yes, unfortunately, there also will be sexual assaults and rapes.
In order to achieve gender integration, I believe that many leaders chose to "feminize" the men through training and indoctrination. Now there is a Politically Correct movement to even change historical job titles, rates, and language to be "Gender Neutral." This may be a good thing for the average woman in the navy, but a bad thing for men and a deleterious effect upon the ability of some units to achieve their mission. Taking any action to achieve political correctness is a gross waste of time and resources.
In summary I will say two things.
First, the quality of officers graduating from the service academies is almost certainly as good as it ever has been. Different most certainly, but as good to meet today's need of the Navy.
Second, and what truly scares me, it what the current administration has attempted and achieved in the senior officer corps of all the services. Too many of these officers have given their allegiance to the President and the Administration over and above their allegiance to the US Constitution. It has been all too clear to the officer corps that any dissension, any public disagreement with the President and his policies will terminate a career thus senior officers have become risk averse politicians instead of the leaders and warfighters we will need in whatever our next major challenge may be.
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There are many fine Military Academy graduates who will serve not only in the Army, but also in the country in years to come. However, the new methods & changes at West Point suggest that discipline may have dropped off. The primary differences seem to be in the political influence that runs rampant throughout both the Army & West Point, which results in entering some without a strong character & will to serve. The most important thing in a leader is character.
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In many ways more strategic but not old school from little things learned before we had world and civil wars. Quite alot was learned from our british counterparts and the Romans when we were in league. Some of the most basic forms yet important rules were lost in history, one of respect for your leaders or die.
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This is a difficult question to answer as it involves perception and a changing demographic. It also brings some pride to bear - we have all heard and I dare say participated in the "it was so tough when ..." However I do know that when I sat in the USMA staff audience in 2001, the SUPE talked about trying to reverse a trend of 50% of the graduating Cadets leaving the service after 5 years. I understand from West Point friends who are faculty now - that has grown to 80% who leave after the first 5 years. Does that mean a better or worse leader - no correlation - what is does show is a poor return on investment (ROI) for the military. If only 20% of each graduating class are staying beyond 5 years the nation is getting 30% less return on our investment in education than 10 years ago. I think the Army might want to invest in a study to show IF these statements are facts, what the ROI is on ROTC vs the Academies and see if changes need to be made. The study might also yield results on why USMA graduates leave after 5 years? Is it truly a changing demographic - Millenials vs. Generation X, Y, or Z or is there something else? Personally, I enjoy the interaction with many of the Cadets I get to see around campus - they seem sharp, physically fit, well spoken and intellectually curious. But that is probably about 1% of the USMA cadet population - hardly a statistically significant population...
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LTC James Bozeman
MAJ (Join to see) - I am not sure if you are an Academy graduate or not but disagree with your assessment and believe several Academy Superintendents would too. Otherwise these senior leaders would not have brought their collective staffs together to highlight the problem, discuss the topic, and ask for assistance in different years. The purpose of the Academy is to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army, not to be be good business men or women - if I were to embrace your logic- what is the purpose of having West Point remain a Military academy? Could the nation not get the same result from private institutions - leaders who make significant contributions after the 5 year mark? I applaud that several people coming out of the commissioning sources continue to contribute after they have left but believe that as missing the fundamental point of the Academies.
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MAJ (Join to see)
LTC James Bozeman - I'm a grad, 2000.
Its important to note the various commissioning sources all serve vastly different purposes. OCS exists to provide the Army a surge capability to produce officers quickly in time of war (say, like during WWII). Direct commissioning exists largely to bring documented experts with special skills into the Army, thereby saving the Army the time/money/effort required to train these special skills (say, like doctors and lawyers). ROTC exists to provide the bulk of officers for the Army in normal circumstances (with OCS surging in extraordinary circumstances). The Academy is the only commissioning source focused on larger objectives. This still being the case, the mission statement should be adjusted (back to what it prior to 2005) to reflect this reality.
Here's the CURRENT mission statement of USMA: ""To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army."
Two points to note: 1) Service to the Nation is highlighted. 2) "Career" is not defined or bound by time; the vast majority of Academy grads serve a 5-year "career" and then depart.
This CURRENT mission statement came into being in 2005. From 1987 to 2005, the mission statement did not include "prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army." Instead the phrase "a lifetime of selfless service to the Nation" was used.
You can read all about these changes in William Richardson's spring 2006 article in Military Review, titled "Getting West Point Back on Mission." (I'm not sure if this is retired GEN William Richardson, or not, though, and you'll need access to a journal search engine as the Military Review archives only go back to fall 2006).
I'd make the point that for 18 years, from 1987 to 2005, the mission of the Academy was to produce graduates dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation. This was the mission statement when I was at West Point, and I believe it is the proper mission statement (and I believe that the word "career" in the current mission statement doesn't imply a 20-year or 30-year or 40-year commitment). Why? Point 1: Cadets generally graduate at the age of 22-24, with some outliers for those who start a few years later. The vast majority of officers retire at the 20-year cliff, so around the age of 42-44. Life expectancy for males in the U.S. is 79 years. The vast majority of officers who do serve a full "career" will spend more time out of uniform (35 years, or so) after retirement than they will spend in uniform (20 years, or so). This provides a much longer time frame for service to the Nation out-of-uniform vs. in uniform. The Academy being focused on a career of service in the Army is myopic and perhaps a little self-defeating. Why is it self-defeating? Point 2: DOPMA-mandated promotion caps and normal retention patterns. DOPMA sets promotion rates at 90% to captain, 80% to major, 70% to LTC, and 50% to colonel. Applied logically, this means that 30% of Academy grads won't make it to a full "career" at 20 years (with MRD set at 18 years for majors), even if a majority of Academy grads didn't pop smoke after completing their initial 5-year service obligation. By design, then, if one believes the Academy exist to produce Army officers who serve a full 20-year career, DOPMA means that the Academy fails at its primary mission (assuming that Academy grads get promoted at/around the DOPMA rate, somewhere less than 70% of each graduating class will actually serve a full "career" of 20 years). With recent 5-year retention rates in the range of 20-50% (I don't have the data handy, but this is what I've seen/heard) and working with the DOPMA rates, somewhere between 14-35% of each class will make it to a full 20-yr "career." I think we can all agree that a score of 14% to 35% is a failing score. Which leads me to point 3: If we define "career" from the current mission statement as completion of the initial service obligation (and consider IRR time and time served in uniform after the initial service obligation as a bonus), then the Academy's success rate is much higher. I've seen data (again, don't have it handy) that the vast majority (95% plus) of each graduating class completes their initial service obligation (and for those that don't---say, ones killed or wounded in action and no longer able to serve---I think we can say they've successfully completed a full career, don't you? There will be those in each class that don't complete their initial service obligations--some resign, some become felons, etc, etc). Defining "career" this way accomplishes a similar purpose as changing the mission statement to "a lifetime of service to the Nation," which is in part to quantify that the Academy is successfully accomplishing its assigned purpose.
Another problem with the current mission statement is that it very narrowly defines the purpose of the Academy (ie, provide officers for service in the Army). The mission statement by definition considers those who do cross-Service transfers (which I think is always around 10-30 folks a year) as failures for the Academy, because these folks go on to serve in the other Services. It also defines all foreign cadets as failures for the Academy, as they serve their Nations, not the United States.
I recommend the Academy revert back to a mission statement that drops "commissioned" and "prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army" and uses "dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation." This mission statement could be: "To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation." In the current era of a shrinking Army and massive involuntary separations, we might be entering into conditions similar to what existed in the late 1980s when the mission statement was adjusted (for the better).
For those focused on retention of Academy grads, perhaps thinking about how to incentivize retention would be a good starting point. If we want Academy grads to stay longer, we could: 1) pay them more than officers commissioned from other sources; 2) consider their service at West Point as Active Federal Service for pay and retirement purposes (I hit what I believe to be 20 years of service in late June 2016, based on my report date to West Point in late June 1996; the Army says, though, that I hit 16 years of service today, as I graduated 16 years ago today); 3) promote them faster than officers from other sources (by say "adding" a year in grade every time they get promoted to captain and beyond); 4) increase the initial service obligation (perhaps in trade for one or more of the three previous suggestions--if you told a Firstie that by committing to 10 years of service upon graduation that they'd be paid more than their non-Academy peers, given AFS credit for their time at West Point, and promoted to major and beyond years ahead of their year-group non-Academy peers, I reckon you'd get a substantial number of folks to sign up for longer initial service obligations); etc. No one complains about poor retention rates of ROTC, OCS, or direct commission officers (which all have poor retention rates past 5 years of commissioned service), but everyone complains about poor Academy retention rates. This probably indicates a belief that the Academy serves a different purpose and produces a different type of officer. This likely being the case, perhaps actually treating these officers differently would increase retention. Clearly, continuing to do the same thing over and over again expecting a different result (ie, one definition of insanity) isn't leading to increased retention rates, so maybe we should try something different?
It is interesting to note that most of our current general officers would have graduated from the Academy when the mission statement focused more on a career of service to the Army (ie, pre-1987 grads), so its perhaps understandable that the mission statement has shifted over time (in 2005, by a 3-star who graduated from the Academy in 1971). In a few years, though, most of our general officers would have graduated from an Academy with a mission statement focused on a lifetime of service to the Nation (as we're starting to promote YG87 to GO now-ish). And then about 20 years later, most of our general officers would have graduated from an Academy with the current mission statement (as starting in around 2035, generals will be coming from YG2005 and later). (And, yes, most of our past and current general officers are Academy grads; this will continue to change over time to a point in the near future where Academy grads are a minority in the general officer corps; but this hasn't yet happened, at least according to the data I've seen).
Its important to note the various commissioning sources all serve vastly different purposes. OCS exists to provide the Army a surge capability to produce officers quickly in time of war (say, like during WWII). Direct commissioning exists largely to bring documented experts with special skills into the Army, thereby saving the Army the time/money/effort required to train these special skills (say, like doctors and lawyers). ROTC exists to provide the bulk of officers for the Army in normal circumstances (with OCS surging in extraordinary circumstances). The Academy is the only commissioning source focused on larger objectives. This still being the case, the mission statement should be adjusted (back to what it prior to 2005) to reflect this reality.
Here's the CURRENT mission statement of USMA: ""To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army."
Two points to note: 1) Service to the Nation is highlighted. 2) "Career" is not defined or bound by time; the vast majority of Academy grads serve a 5-year "career" and then depart.
This CURRENT mission statement came into being in 2005. From 1987 to 2005, the mission statement did not include "prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army." Instead the phrase "a lifetime of selfless service to the Nation" was used.
You can read all about these changes in William Richardson's spring 2006 article in Military Review, titled "Getting West Point Back on Mission." (I'm not sure if this is retired GEN William Richardson, or not, though, and you'll need access to a journal search engine as the Military Review archives only go back to fall 2006).
I'd make the point that for 18 years, from 1987 to 2005, the mission of the Academy was to produce graduates dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation. This was the mission statement when I was at West Point, and I believe it is the proper mission statement (and I believe that the word "career" in the current mission statement doesn't imply a 20-year or 30-year or 40-year commitment). Why? Point 1: Cadets generally graduate at the age of 22-24, with some outliers for those who start a few years later. The vast majority of officers retire at the 20-year cliff, so around the age of 42-44. Life expectancy for males in the U.S. is 79 years. The vast majority of officers who do serve a full "career" will spend more time out of uniform (35 years, or so) after retirement than they will spend in uniform (20 years, or so). This provides a much longer time frame for service to the Nation out-of-uniform vs. in uniform. The Academy being focused on a career of service in the Army is myopic and perhaps a little self-defeating. Why is it self-defeating? Point 2: DOPMA-mandated promotion caps and normal retention patterns. DOPMA sets promotion rates at 90% to captain, 80% to major, 70% to LTC, and 50% to colonel. Applied logically, this means that 30% of Academy grads won't make it to a full "career" at 20 years (with MRD set at 18 years for majors), even if a majority of Academy grads didn't pop smoke after completing their initial 5-year service obligation. By design, then, if one believes the Academy exist to produce Army officers who serve a full 20-year career, DOPMA means that the Academy fails at its primary mission (assuming that Academy grads get promoted at/around the DOPMA rate, somewhere less than 70% of each graduating class will actually serve a full "career" of 20 years). With recent 5-year retention rates in the range of 20-50% (I don't have the data handy, but this is what I've seen/heard) and working with the DOPMA rates, somewhere between 14-35% of each class will make it to a full 20-yr "career." I think we can all agree that a score of 14% to 35% is a failing score. Which leads me to point 3: If we define "career" from the current mission statement as completion of the initial service obligation (and consider IRR time and time served in uniform after the initial service obligation as a bonus), then the Academy's success rate is much higher. I've seen data (again, don't have it handy) that the vast majority (95% plus) of each graduating class completes their initial service obligation (and for those that don't---say, ones killed or wounded in action and no longer able to serve---I think we can say they've successfully completed a full career, don't you? There will be those in each class that don't complete their initial service obligations--some resign, some become felons, etc, etc). Defining "career" this way accomplishes a similar purpose as changing the mission statement to "a lifetime of service to the Nation," which is in part to quantify that the Academy is successfully accomplishing its assigned purpose.
Another problem with the current mission statement is that it very narrowly defines the purpose of the Academy (ie, provide officers for service in the Army). The mission statement by definition considers those who do cross-Service transfers (which I think is always around 10-30 folks a year) as failures for the Academy, because these folks go on to serve in the other Services. It also defines all foreign cadets as failures for the Academy, as they serve their Nations, not the United States.
I recommend the Academy revert back to a mission statement that drops "commissioned" and "prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army" and uses "dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation." This mission statement could be: "To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation." In the current era of a shrinking Army and massive involuntary separations, we might be entering into conditions similar to what existed in the late 1980s when the mission statement was adjusted (for the better).
For those focused on retention of Academy grads, perhaps thinking about how to incentivize retention would be a good starting point. If we want Academy grads to stay longer, we could: 1) pay them more than officers commissioned from other sources; 2) consider their service at West Point as Active Federal Service for pay and retirement purposes (I hit what I believe to be 20 years of service in late June 2016, based on my report date to West Point in late June 1996; the Army says, though, that I hit 16 years of service today, as I graduated 16 years ago today); 3) promote them faster than officers from other sources (by say "adding" a year in grade every time they get promoted to captain and beyond); 4) increase the initial service obligation (perhaps in trade for one or more of the three previous suggestions--if you told a Firstie that by committing to 10 years of service upon graduation that they'd be paid more than their non-Academy peers, given AFS credit for their time at West Point, and promoted to major and beyond years ahead of their year-group non-Academy peers, I reckon you'd get a substantial number of folks to sign up for longer initial service obligations); etc. No one complains about poor retention rates of ROTC, OCS, or direct commission officers (which all have poor retention rates past 5 years of commissioned service), but everyone complains about poor Academy retention rates. This probably indicates a belief that the Academy serves a different purpose and produces a different type of officer. This likely being the case, perhaps actually treating these officers differently would increase retention. Clearly, continuing to do the same thing over and over again expecting a different result (ie, one definition of insanity) isn't leading to increased retention rates, so maybe we should try something different?
It is interesting to note that most of our current general officers would have graduated from the Academy when the mission statement focused more on a career of service to the Army (ie, pre-1987 grads), so its perhaps understandable that the mission statement has shifted over time (in 2005, by a 3-star who graduated from the Academy in 1971). In a few years, though, most of our general officers would have graduated from an Academy with a mission statement focused on a lifetime of service to the Nation (as we're starting to promote YG87 to GO now-ish). And then about 20 years later, most of our general officers would have graduated from an Academy with the current mission statement (as starting in around 2035, generals will be coming from YG2005 and later). (And, yes, most of our past and current general officers are Academy grads; this will continue to change over time to a point in the near future where Academy grads are a minority in the general officer corps; but this hasn't yet happened, at least according to the data I've seen).
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LTC James Bozeman
MAJ (Join to see) - Thank you for the history lesson. It was a perfectly good waste of an explanation. From your rather lengthy statement, I gather you continue to miss the fundamental point of the Academy's current mission statement - you can certainly twist the mission statement by citing or highlighting certain points - but you have to take it as a whole statement. I am disappointed that you believe that the current Academy leadership is out of touch with what is best for the Cadets and future Officers. With that said, I certainly encourage you to seek to change the focus, the mission statement, and Academy as an alumni as well as the Army regulations which govern what is considered a Career of Service. 20 years is still the accepted standard, except in special occasions which you have noted. So no I don't share your rather Myopic and I dare say elitist view points and don't necessarily agree that service in the Academy realm equates to any special treatment.
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MAJ (Join to see)
LTC James Bozeman - Guess we'll agree to disagree on the fundamental purpose of the Academies--a bit myopic not to appreciate the history and discussion here, but whatever. With the new retirement system, 20 years is no longer the definition of a "career"--folks can now walk with retirement benefits much sooner, and TERA sets 15 years as a mark. I expected the "you're an elitist" response (which always seems to be the response to concepts like higher pay / faster promotion based on educational background/accomplishment) to my recommendations for how to address the issue of retention of Academy grads, and I note you haven't provided any suggestions on how to address this. Do you have any suggestions for this retention issue? On your larger point--if the purpose of the military academies is simply to produce officers, I don't understand why ROTC, OCS, and direct commissioning aren't sufficient for these purposes. The continued existence of the Academies suggest a larger purpose beyond simply commissioning officers for service in the Army.
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Yes. Chances are good that instructors have served under combat conditions which have changed since the start of the War on Terrorism. The instructors wouldn't be teaching at the Academies without being selected for the duty- same being true for ROTC.
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This is a loaded question. We should be asking "Are the service academies producing the leaders the United States needs?"
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The Academies, other commissioning sources, and the military in general are treading dangerous water right now with what many may call the "millennial" cultural shift. The entitlement attitude so frequently exhibited is the antithesis of military good order and discipline. Trying to adapt to these cultural shifts will destroy the very fabric of our military values. If you haven't seen this first-hand, just read half of the posts on RallyPoint complaining about promotions and opportunities for education and advancement being unfair. Is that really why we signed up? Go read some Sharpe's books (Bernard Cornwell)- "It's time to earn your pay boys!" That said, of ALL training sources, O & E alike, the Academies are probably doing the best job of removing trainees from some of these cultural influences that would be so damaging to our military. I'd be much more concerned about all the OCS grads I see from civilian colleges who get their commission and don't have a freaking clue about... well... anything. As for comparing to years past, and I must admit that I'm guilty of this too, every generation since Noah has thought that the next generation was a bunch of whiney, snot-nosed, kids who wouldn't be able to make it in the real world, so there's really nothing new or surprising there.
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