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Posted on Jul 11, 2015
General Dunford: Potent infantry essential to 'balanced' military portfolio. Do you agree/disagree? Why?
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The U.S. military's technological modernization cannot come at the expense of its ground combat forces, incoming Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford told Senate lawmakers earlier this week.
Rather, the general said during his confirmation hearing Thursday on Capitol Hill, planning for future threats requires a "balanced inventory of capabilities."
Dunford addressed the issue in response to a question from Sen. Tom Cotton, an Arkansas Republican and Army veteran who served as an infantry officer in Iraq and Afghanistan. Dunford, who if confirmed will become only the second Marine to hold the military's top post, also is an infantry officer by training.
After a briefly awkward exchange in which Cotton appeared to prod Dunford about the origin of his nickname, "Fighting Joe," the senator asked the general whether he worries tomorrow's infantry forces — namely soldiers and Marines — will go under resourced as the country pumps billions of dollars into the development of next-generation weapons systems such as the long-range strike bomber, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and a new ballistic missile submarine.
"I am concerned," Dunford responded, noting also that he doesn't self apply his nickname. "And I think it's broader than just the infantry piece. Experience tells us we need a balanced inventory of capabilities and capacities in joint force to be successful. ... What concerns me are people who actually think they know what the future is going to look like because, our experience tells us, we don't. So having a full range of capabilities that includes having effective Marines and soldiers, from my perspective, is the prudent thing to do."
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/tech/2015/07/11/video-joseph-dunford-says-infantry-essential-to-united-states-military-portfolio/30013701/
Rather, the general said during his confirmation hearing Thursday on Capitol Hill, planning for future threats requires a "balanced inventory of capabilities."
Dunford addressed the issue in response to a question from Sen. Tom Cotton, an Arkansas Republican and Army veteran who served as an infantry officer in Iraq and Afghanistan. Dunford, who if confirmed will become only the second Marine to hold the military's top post, also is an infantry officer by training.
After a briefly awkward exchange in which Cotton appeared to prod Dunford about the origin of his nickname, "Fighting Joe," the senator asked the general whether he worries tomorrow's infantry forces — namely soldiers and Marines — will go under resourced as the country pumps billions of dollars into the development of next-generation weapons systems such as the long-range strike bomber, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and a new ballistic missile submarine.
"I am concerned," Dunford responded, noting also that he doesn't self apply his nickname. "And I think it's broader than just the infantry piece. Experience tells us we need a balanced inventory of capabilities and capacities in joint force to be successful. ... What concerns me are people who actually think they know what the future is going to look like because, our experience tells us, we don't. So having a full range of capabilities that includes having effective Marines and soldiers, from my perspective, is the prudent thing to do."
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/tech/2015/07/11/video-joseph-dunford-says-infantry-essential-to-united-states-military-portfolio/30013701/
Infantry
Marine Corps
Army
Edited >1 y ago
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Responses: 16
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I totally agree, GySgt Wayne A. Ekblad. Smarter men than me have made such an assessment as well. Here are GEN George S. Patton's thoughts on the subject:
"It’s the unconquerable soul of man, not the nature of the weapon he uses, that insures victory."
"The soldier is the army."
"Wars might be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who leads that gains the victory."
"...many, who should know better, think that wars can be decided by soulless machines, rather than by the blood and anguish of brave men."
CPT (Join to see) COL Jean (John) F. B. LTC Stephen F. MAJ Ken Landgren
"It’s the unconquerable soul of man, not the nature of the weapon he uses, that insures victory."
"The soldier is the army."
"Wars might be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who leads that gains the victory."
"...many, who should know better, think that wars can be decided by soulless machines, rather than by the blood and anguish of brave men."
CPT (Join to see) COL Jean (John) F. B. LTC Stephen F. MAJ Ken Landgren
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CPT Chase Sanger
Excellent quotes, Sir LTC Stephen C. . Patton is my absolute favorite historical figure. It really is a shame that he was killed in that freak car accident. Who knows what he would have gone on to do otherwise
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The infantry will be the ones that toe the line with diplomacy fails. I am not a fan of losing troops but we need to choose wisely. Infantry should be the last resort. We need to maintain a potent and lethal ground force. Soldiers say that they did the same job as infantry when they deployed. That maybe true but it wasn't for their skills they were sent to perform those missions. It was for the lack of infantrymen. I am glad the Army is adding a third maneuver battalion to each of the BCTs. I didn't think the BCTs were composed of enough fighting soldiers. We need to be prepared for just about anything. As we have seen we didn't see ISIS coming. We didn't know how a lot of these situations would be playing out. We should be building an Army for what could possible happen and not an Army for what we think will happen.
It blows my mind how much money we dump in the F-35. We could sell two of them and add a Division in the Army for the cost. The Army is taking a beating in this budget war.
It blows my mind how much money we dump in the F-35. We could sell two of them and add a Division in the Army for the cost. The Army is taking a beating in this budget war.
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1LT William Clardy
"You can bomb all you want, but you don't control a piece of ground until you can stand a 19-year-old with a rifle and bayonet on it."
Right, GySgt Wayne A. Ekblad and CPT (Join to see)?
Right, GySgt Wayne A. Ekblad and CPT (Join to see)?
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1LT William Clardy
CPT Chase Sanger, that's one of those pithy quotes that get attributed to Anon E. Mouse. You'll find minor variations of it just about anywhere folks with an Army (or Marine) background are discussing the wisdom/practicality/efficacy of an overseas military adventure -- especially one where there is a desire to avoid "boots on the ground" by means of "shock and awe" or "precision air strikes".
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There have been boots on the ground in every conflict since the beginning of time, and there always will be.
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I'm not Infantry, but I agree that a potent Infantry is absolutely necessary! Every other MOS in the operational Army (I'm talking conventional forces, not SF/PSYOPS/CA, etc) is supporting the trigger-pulling 11B on the ground. We can shoot artillery and mortars all day at the enemy, but we need those 11B guys to go in and mop up the enemy. As a Chemical guy, my job is to make sure that the infantry knows what type of CBRN-E hazards are out in front of them, how to prepare to operate in that environment, and clean themselves up afterwards (decon) so that they can continue mission and kill the bad guys. I have no problem supporting the infantry, because at the end of the day they are the ones securing objectives. All jobs in the Army are important, because we all work together to win the fight! Everyone job from the fuel supply specialist to the cook are necessary to ensure that the Army accomplishes its objectives.
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Infantry on the ground do a lot more than just perform combat duties. Those troops also perform humanitarian efforts and work to quell the violence before it starts. I noticed this first hand when our BN Commander decentralized our BN to ensure we had continuous presence in some of the more remote areas of our AO. The reduction in firefights and indirect attacks to our FOB were noticeable almost instantly. In return for the reduced attacks, the province received schools, wells, generation equipment, school supplies, clothing, water purification equipment, among many other things. After our RIP, we heard the BN that replaced us took a harder stance and the violence towards them ramped up almost instantly.
So essentially what I'm getting at is that our infantry and ground troops don't just fight the war with violence; they also perform a duty that no automated machine can perform. They have the ability to show compassion and care for those who would otherwise wish to destroy us.
So essentially what I'm getting at is that our infantry and ground troops don't just fight the war with violence; they also perform a duty that no automated machine can perform. They have the ability to show compassion and care for those who would otherwise wish to destroy us.
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Capt Lance Gallardo
Doing this sort of activity IS a form of asymmetric warfare. You are degrading the enemies support with the local population, and decreasing their recruitment efforts to replace their loses. You are also developing good intel sources with the goodwill that your unit earned with its activities. The payoff for your battalion was huge. Unfortunately the incoming battalion commander had a very poor understanding of COIN. But see also the limits of COIN in Afghanistan: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2013-08-12/limits-counterinsurgency-doctrine-afghanistan
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The Infantry is the only constant throughout all of human military history. It is foolish to imagine that track record is ending soon.
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We also greatly need to make sure we can effectively fight with no satelite support. Electronic warfare and countermeasures are my concern.
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I agree that our infantry should be the best-trained and most capable in the world. What I don't agree with is the notion that infantry should be the primary weapon of the United States. We are a strategic aerospace and maritime power, and we need to rebuild our capabilities in those areas.
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Sgt Ken Prescott
Not really the issue. We MUST rely more heavily on technology than continental powers because of two interrelated problems:
1. We're here, they're there. We are a long way from the fight. This means that we lose potential infantrymen to specialties like logistics, maintaining sea lines of communication, and everything that goes into moving a fighting force from here to there.
2. Population density. Our country doesn't have enough bodies, particularly military-age bodies, to intervene decisively in Eurasia and Africa on our own.
Follow-on effects of the above factors are:
1. We will need local allies to supply the infantry we will always lack. That means subordinating our own national goals to our allies' goals just to maintain the war effort.
2. We will always be sensitive to our own casualties, because each dead or wounded American "costs" us more than our foes' casualties do.
Part of the problem is that we haven't had any sort of national security strategy since the Berlin Wall came down. Failure to plan ultimately becomes planning to fail.
1. We're here, they're there. We are a long way from the fight. This means that we lose potential infantrymen to specialties like logistics, maintaining sea lines of communication, and everything that goes into moving a fighting force from here to there.
2. Population density. Our country doesn't have enough bodies, particularly military-age bodies, to intervene decisively in Eurasia and Africa on our own.
Follow-on effects of the above factors are:
1. We will need local allies to supply the infantry we will always lack. That means subordinating our own national goals to our allies' goals just to maintain the war effort.
2. We will always be sensitive to our own casualties, because each dead or wounded American "costs" us more than our foes' casualties do.
Part of the problem is that we haven't had any sort of national security strategy since the Berlin Wall came down. Failure to plan ultimately becomes planning to fail.
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1LT William Clardy
Sgt Ken Prescott, having done a touch of mobilization planning back in the days before the Army implemented an institutional lobotomy by replacing the S/G-4 staff positions with contractor positions with no provision for continuity or preservation of institutional knowledge, I can say with quite a bit of confidence that your "We're here, they're there" argument is absolutely without merit. If you want, I can go into more detail, but the quick and dirty version is that containerization has transformed shipping so dramatically that the cost (which reflects the overall difficulty) of transporting goods around the globe has become relatively inconsequential compared to 50 years ago.
Second, our country has plenty of military-age bodies, they are just vastly less fit and vastly more self-focused than they were a half-century ago. If we had the will as a society, that problem would be quite solvable. Despite our latest pretensions and propaganda, the majority of infantrymen do not need to be Ranger-qualified wundersoldaten -- they jsut need to be competent to hold their positions, able and willing to advance under fire, and fit enough to keep going.
Historically speaking, if you look back to World War II, you will see that we tried to de-emphasize infantry as we mobilized for that conflict, with the result that midway through the war the Army in the ETO was forced to reclassify thousands of soldiers into infantrymen.
Lastly, our sensitivity to casualties is a relatively new phenomenon. If you have a copy of "We Were Soldiers Once", dig through it and read the total butcher's bill for three gloriously bad days in a remote valley in Vietnam -- LZ X-ray, where 1/7 CAV endured 79 KIA, is only the most famous part of that battle.
Second, our country has plenty of military-age bodies, they are just vastly less fit and vastly more self-focused than they were a half-century ago. If we had the will as a society, that problem would be quite solvable. Despite our latest pretensions and propaganda, the majority of infantrymen do not need to be Ranger-qualified wundersoldaten -- they jsut need to be competent to hold their positions, able and willing to advance under fire, and fit enough to keep going.
Historically speaking, if you look back to World War II, you will see that we tried to de-emphasize infantry as we mobilized for that conflict, with the result that midway through the war the Army in the ETO was forced to reclassify thousands of soldiers into infantrymen.
Lastly, our sensitivity to casualties is a relatively new phenomenon. If you have a copy of "We Were Soldiers Once", dig through it and read the total butcher's bill for three gloriously bad days in a remote valley in Vietnam -- LZ X-ray, where 1/7 CAV endured 79 KIA, is only the most famous part of that battle.
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Sgt Ken Prescott
1LT William Clardy, you're overlooking some of the biggest costs associated with moving forces to the far shore--making sure they actually reach the far shore against an enemy who doesn't want gatecrashers. I am talking about command of the sea. The studies you participated in assume that forces in transit do not come under significant air or naval attack--but that is an extremely dangerous assumption to make. This isn't 1944, and we do not have the biggest merchant marine in the world any more. We also don't have a Navy nearly big enough for the demands that might be placed on it very soon (for example, if we have to deal with China going after Taiwan or the Senkakus at the same time as Pooty-Poot grabbing Gotland and/or Bornholm, we're going to be stretched to at least the limit, if not beyond). The Air Force is likewise in serious trouble, and there's another revolution in military affairs coming down that will probably neutralize land-based TACAIR for good (you do NOT want to base your aviation component anywhere near the FEBA in a world with ultra-cheap PGMs, and that's coming sooner than anyone cares to admit).
Second, compared to likely adversaries, we do not have enough military-age bodies--especially given that we have to maintain a reserve against other conflicts spiraling out of control, and maintain substantial aerospace, maritime, and cyberspace forces to both project power, and maintain and defend a base structure to maintain sea control to the far shore.
Re: "If we had the will as a society, that problem would be quite solvable."
We don't have that kind of will, and I'm not sure I'd want to live in a country that did. Your argument, when you field-strip down to its basic components, says that military-age persons--and everyone else, for that matter--are property of the state, and that the state has first call on the labor of its serfs. That is anathema to a free republic.
It's worth noting that Eisenhower's "New Look," which always gets bashed by the land power advocates, has one redeeming feature. Said redeeming feature was that IT ACTUALLY WORKED. We ended the 1950s with a coherent national security strategy that didn't break the bank and didn't destroy our credibility--our position was much better in 1960 than it was in 1950.
It took a decade of McNamara's "Flexible Response" strategy--i.e., playing to our adversaries' strengths and our own weaknesses--to create the debacle of national strategy that overtook us by the mid-1970s.
Third, LZ X-Ray demonstrates my point exactly. Remember, we lost that war. Sensitivity to casualties is both a short-term and long-term issue. Taking casualties over a long period of time without any visible success to show for it always undermines the credibility of the war. We put 500,000 bodies into South Vietnam by 1968, and it still wasn't nearly enough to actually secure the country. We couldn't have drafted enough bodies to actually secure South Vietnam; even if we could have, we couldn't have sustained that effort long enough to actually achieve our goal (the PAVN were far more willing and able to wait us out than we were willing and able to wait them out).
We can charge in, smash some stuff up, and leave. But we can't occupy long enough to achieve goals that the public would view as worth the cost of occupation.
We're in an era that resembles the era immediately after World War II--minus the benefits of actually winning the war, of course. We must get our fiscal house in order, we must recapitalize critical capabilities that have atrophied for a generation or more, and we must develop new capabilities to meet the evolving threat, and we're going to have to stay out of land wars because the public simply will not tolerate what's needed to actually win them.
All of that, in turn, means ruthlessly trimming capabilities that do not contribute sufficiently to the national security strategy relative to their cost. And that means that we're going to have to revert to a small, very professional Army (assuming we even keep one), because the Army isn't able to contribute meaningfully to the national strategy that the American public is willing to support.
Second, compared to likely adversaries, we do not have enough military-age bodies--especially given that we have to maintain a reserve against other conflicts spiraling out of control, and maintain substantial aerospace, maritime, and cyberspace forces to both project power, and maintain and defend a base structure to maintain sea control to the far shore.
Re: "If we had the will as a society, that problem would be quite solvable."
We don't have that kind of will, and I'm not sure I'd want to live in a country that did. Your argument, when you field-strip down to its basic components, says that military-age persons--and everyone else, for that matter--are property of the state, and that the state has first call on the labor of its serfs. That is anathema to a free republic.
It's worth noting that Eisenhower's "New Look," which always gets bashed by the land power advocates, has one redeeming feature. Said redeeming feature was that IT ACTUALLY WORKED. We ended the 1950s with a coherent national security strategy that didn't break the bank and didn't destroy our credibility--our position was much better in 1960 than it was in 1950.
It took a decade of McNamara's "Flexible Response" strategy--i.e., playing to our adversaries' strengths and our own weaknesses--to create the debacle of national strategy that overtook us by the mid-1970s.
Third, LZ X-Ray demonstrates my point exactly. Remember, we lost that war. Sensitivity to casualties is both a short-term and long-term issue. Taking casualties over a long period of time without any visible success to show for it always undermines the credibility of the war. We put 500,000 bodies into South Vietnam by 1968, and it still wasn't nearly enough to actually secure the country. We couldn't have drafted enough bodies to actually secure South Vietnam; even if we could have, we couldn't have sustained that effort long enough to actually achieve our goal (the PAVN were far more willing and able to wait us out than we were willing and able to wait them out).
We can charge in, smash some stuff up, and leave. But we can't occupy long enough to achieve goals that the public would view as worth the cost of occupation.
We're in an era that resembles the era immediately after World War II--minus the benefits of actually winning the war, of course. We must get our fiscal house in order, we must recapitalize critical capabilities that have atrophied for a generation or more, and we must develop new capabilities to meet the evolving threat, and we're going to have to stay out of land wars because the public simply will not tolerate what's needed to actually win them.
All of that, in turn, means ruthlessly trimming capabilities that do not contribute sufficiently to the national security strategy relative to their cost. And that means that we're going to have to revert to a small, very professional Army (assuming we even keep one), because the Army isn't able to contribute meaningfully to the national strategy that the American public is willing to support.
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SGT William Howell
Sgt Ken Prescott 1LT William Clardy Wow you guys have put a lot of thought into your post. I am just a much simpler person. I think that everything needs to be based off supporting infantry for the most part. To win a war there has to be boots on the ground.
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Yes GySgt Wayne A. Ekblad , potent infantry which is led from the front with more than competent flanking forces composed of whatever is useful to bring the fight to the enemy, supported by direct and indirect fires above and if necessary below ground is crucial to winning battles, campaigns and ultimately wars -especially this that are fought to the end. Infantry forces include, light, motorized, mechanized, airborne, air-mobile, special forces, marine infantry, and naval direct fire forces.
If necessary all soldiers and marines can fight as infantry either in direct fire assaulting forces or supporting forces on flanks, rear guards, lines of communications in non-linear warfare where are are no secure areas.
We do not need to draw down forces which strip our fighting forces to the point that a future Task Force Smith is called upon to hurriedly organize from a hodge-podge group of service members to fight a desperate rear guard delaying action until a proper response is organized after Congress approves the fight.
To fight effectively our infantry and other maneuver and support forces need to have well trained, disciplined and courageous leaders willing to stand up for the service members and units assigned and attached to their commands from LTC through GEN and if required 5-Star GEN. Leaders and their staffs need to be fully capable to work with units and capabilities brought by each Military Service and Special Operations when required to conduct operations.
In the past, I remember when Brigades had three maneuver combat arms battalions, with an indirect fire battalion and a cavalry capability. It will be good to see Brigades composed of three maneuver battalions again if they are equipped, manned and trained to fight together as teams. Non-linear fights require the capability to reorganize and reorient on the fly in quickly changing tactical and operational scenarios. Hopefully Brigade Combat Teams will be organized with required supporting forces to be reasonably self sufficient for at least 24 to 72 hours.
Critical to the success of all combat operations is a sufficient support capability which stretches from the current fight back to wherever depot-like sustainment is occurring and staging from. Sufficient, munitions, spares, fuel, medical and other essential support functions must be present in sufficient quantity and quality to support the world's best fighting force into the future. LTC Stephen C.
If necessary all soldiers and marines can fight as infantry either in direct fire assaulting forces or supporting forces on flanks, rear guards, lines of communications in non-linear warfare where are are no secure areas.
We do not need to draw down forces which strip our fighting forces to the point that a future Task Force Smith is called upon to hurriedly organize from a hodge-podge group of service members to fight a desperate rear guard delaying action until a proper response is organized after Congress approves the fight.
To fight effectively our infantry and other maneuver and support forces need to have well trained, disciplined and courageous leaders willing to stand up for the service members and units assigned and attached to their commands from LTC through GEN and if required 5-Star GEN. Leaders and their staffs need to be fully capable to work with units and capabilities brought by each Military Service and Special Operations when required to conduct operations.
In the past, I remember when Brigades had three maneuver combat arms battalions, with an indirect fire battalion and a cavalry capability. It will be good to see Brigades composed of three maneuver battalions again if they are equipped, manned and trained to fight together as teams. Non-linear fights require the capability to reorganize and reorient on the fly in quickly changing tactical and operational scenarios. Hopefully Brigade Combat Teams will be organized with required supporting forces to be reasonably self sufficient for at least 24 to 72 hours.
Critical to the success of all combat operations is a sufficient support capability which stretches from the current fight back to wherever depot-like sustainment is occurring and staging from. Sufficient, munitions, spares, fuel, medical and other essential support functions must be present in sufficient quantity and quality to support the world's best fighting force into the future. LTC Stephen C.
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1LT William Clardy
LTC Stephen F. and LTC Stephen C., have you read "Task Force Smith - The Lesson Never Learned"?
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA381834
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA381834
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LTC Stephen F.
No I do not think I have read "Task Force Smith - The Lesson Never Learned" However, I certainly learned about Task Force Smith in the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and CGSC 1LT William Clardy. I will check it out though. Thanks for posting.
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