Posted on Nov 25, 2015
Is the concept of the Infantry Battalion Task Force viable and necessary in the Active Army?
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As a part of the plan to get the Active Army to 450K, we will be inactivating an Infantry Brigade Combat Team at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska and one at Fort Benning, GA. We will replace these with an "Infantry Battalion Task Force," of just over 1000 Soldiers. Our doctrine is Brigade Combat Team centric. While we have doctrine for the Infantry Battalion (FM 3-21.20), they aren't meant to operate alone. They don't have the logistics to do so for more than 24 hours even though they often do. How does a lone Infantry Battalion do everything it needs to in garrison as well? How will this thing be used in combat?
Infantry
Command
Edited 10 y ago
Posted 10 y ago
Responses: 17
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We(the Infantry), can exist much longer than 24hrs-on our own! If not, you don't have the right soldiers for the job. Anything needed-ammo, food, water-can be airdropped. No combat unit ever passed inspection, and it never should. Political correctness gets you killed. Why so many guys? If you can't take care of business with 150-300 well trained/armed/pissed off grunts, you've got bigger issues. Your creating your own problems the bigger you get. Bigger isn't always better. With CAS, and the longe range on call assets, you can get some pretty good danger close support-IF THEY'LL RELEASE IT! ROE? We don't need no stinking ROE....
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COL (Join to see)
Yeaaah...well...so can anyone else. You could airdrop a lot of stuff. The battalion cannot. That's the point. You can't support yourself for more than 24 hours. You run out of water...and become non mission effective in 48 hours.
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Having worked in TRADOC during the BCT development process I am left with deep prejudices regarding Brigade feasibility, let alone a battalion. Plus the inability for the Army to train in all climes and places, with all sorts of technologies, in as many types of environments conceivable, any sort of paring down or specializing/generalizing simply means doom.
This question is best responded by a long history of reporting on the unpreparedness
of various task forces of infantry battalion strength, stemming from both conventional/general purpose and special forces/Ranger concepts. We continue perpetuating a version of this to address past, present and future events. Probably responding to a return on investment vis a vis cost effectiveness (what ever that may mean) solution in austere and constrained periods of our political history.
Such that "Task Force Smith" itself was not a failure because of its own admitted shortcomings, but rather a victim of the US Army knowingly assigning an impossible mission, "failing" because its mission was not achievable by any single infantry battalion where problems rested with senior leadership up and down the chain of command, the Executive Branch, and Congress.
Obscure as it may seem, but these units, such as A Battery/52nd Field Artillery Bn & 1st Bn/21st Infantry Regiment, and its higher the 24th Infantry Division had many shortcomings due to austerity suffered by the US Army post WW II. Again, same parallels as before are manifesting again today. Contrary to perceptions, 1/21st Inf Rgt was one of the most trained and fit units in the US Army; this a testament to LTC Brad Smith and his experiences from WW II. He personally ensured that his unit was trained, cross-trained, and physically fit. To the point where they practiced theater infiltration techniques (ie. Glider-borne operations), vehicle, dismounted, and urban terrain training. Most of those soldiers cross-trained in other facets of warfighting, tactical operations, and enabling functions to ensure not one individual was a single point of failure.
It was the theater commander's intent to utilize a Regimental Combat Team for the type of action in a prelude known as the Korean War; however, he was overruled by the Pentagon and thwarted by the lack of dedicated support from the 24th Infantry Division. Finger pointing continues today who was at fault: MacArthur, MG Dean, LTG Walker, or the US Army in general.
In striking irony, the 34th Infantry Regiment deployed by sea while airlifted TF Smith arrived simultaneously in Pusan on 1 July, except that the 34th Regiment was intact. Alpha Battery, 52nd FA also deployed by sea, able to link up and fight with task force. The TF Smith airlift supposedly met MacArthur's requirement to fly forces into a mission. Semantics to be sure, however TF Smith was given a RCT mission, with not even ten percent of its assets; it was given a mission it could not possibly achieve.
So one artillery battery of 105mm howitzers was sent in lieu of an artillery Battalion of 155mm cannons, two 4.2 mortars instead of a company. Two rifle companies instead of sixteen and zero armor instead of fourteen elements, no forward air controllers, no engineers, no signal, no medical, no air defense, no military police, no signal company, and no reconnaissance capability.
I interviewed LTC Brad Smith, Bill Cole and few others for doctoral research. Their commentary was extremely insightful; a definite learning event for myself other than a real pleasure. Lessons noted, but nothing learned after all these years.
This question is best responded by a long history of reporting on the unpreparedness
of various task forces of infantry battalion strength, stemming from both conventional/general purpose and special forces/Ranger concepts. We continue perpetuating a version of this to address past, present and future events. Probably responding to a return on investment vis a vis cost effectiveness (what ever that may mean) solution in austere and constrained periods of our political history.
Such that "Task Force Smith" itself was not a failure because of its own admitted shortcomings, but rather a victim of the US Army knowingly assigning an impossible mission, "failing" because its mission was not achievable by any single infantry battalion where problems rested with senior leadership up and down the chain of command, the Executive Branch, and Congress.
Obscure as it may seem, but these units, such as A Battery/52nd Field Artillery Bn & 1st Bn/21st Infantry Regiment, and its higher the 24th Infantry Division had many shortcomings due to austerity suffered by the US Army post WW II. Again, same parallels as before are manifesting again today. Contrary to perceptions, 1/21st Inf Rgt was one of the most trained and fit units in the US Army; this a testament to LTC Brad Smith and his experiences from WW II. He personally ensured that his unit was trained, cross-trained, and physically fit. To the point where they practiced theater infiltration techniques (ie. Glider-borne operations), vehicle, dismounted, and urban terrain training. Most of those soldiers cross-trained in other facets of warfighting, tactical operations, and enabling functions to ensure not one individual was a single point of failure.
It was the theater commander's intent to utilize a Regimental Combat Team for the type of action in a prelude known as the Korean War; however, he was overruled by the Pentagon and thwarted by the lack of dedicated support from the 24th Infantry Division. Finger pointing continues today who was at fault: MacArthur, MG Dean, LTG Walker, or the US Army in general.
In striking irony, the 34th Infantry Regiment deployed by sea while airlifted TF Smith arrived simultaneously in Pusan on 1 July, except that the 34th Regiment was intact. Alpha Battery, 52nd FA also deployed by sea, able to link up and fight with task force. The TF Smith airlift supposedly met MacArthur's requirement to fly forces into a mission. Semantics to be sure, however TF Smith was given a RCT mission, with not even ten percent of its assets; it was given a mission it could not possibly achieve.
So one artillery battery of 105mm howitzers was sent in lieu of an artillery Battalion of 155mm cannons, two 4.2 mortars instead of a company. Two rifle companies instead of sixteen and zero armor instead of fourteen elements, no forward air controllers, no engineers, no signal, no medical, no air defense, no military police, no signal company, and no reconnaissance capability.
I interviewed LTC Brad Smith, Bill Cole and few others for doctoral research. Their commentary was extremely insightful; a definite learning event for myself other than a real pleasure. Lessons noted, but nothing learned after all these years.
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This was tried in Vietnam. The Bn. XO and SGM stayed in Base Camps and along with the HHC staff were responsible for getting beans and bullets out to the line companies. The principal S-2/3 were out at the Firebase or LZ with the Bn. CO and Fire Support Battery. Most of the time we were resupplied about once a week. The line Companies were minus the FB or LZ security Company. This allowed only 3 maneuver Companies and they were normally patrolling around the FB/LZ sometimes several klicks out. Logistics was a nightmare. Totally dependent on Division air assets. Not a fan.....
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as a comparison The firepower of a civil war infantry regiment 3600 men +-,
single shot muzzle loader musket artillery cavalry support
was matched at w2 by an infantry platoon and one tank.
auto loader rifle multi use artillery mortar indirect direct in the 105 howitzer lighter mortars air support well coordinated near the end questionable before
an infantry brigade 5000+- man (combat command) a multi branch force major step to flag
all of the above finely polished
be shrunk back to 1000+- man combat command multi branch
some really interesting stuff is in the pipeline. will take really imaginative ltc's to make it work
your up lets have it.
single shot muzzle loader musket artillery cavalry support
was matched at w2 by an infantry platoon and one tank.
auto loader rifle multi use artillery mortar indirect direct in the 105 howitzer lighter mortars air support well coordinated near the end questionable before
an infantry brigade 5000+- man (combat command) a multi branch force major step to flag
all of the above finely polished
be shrunk back to 1000+- man combat command multi branch
some really interesting stuff is in the pipeline. will take really imaginative ltc's to make it work
your up lets have it.
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COL (Join to see)
The comparison against the Civil War Regiment is interesting, but irrelevant. If we were comparing ourselves to ourselves...sure. We're not. We compare ourselves against a threat. So...is the IBTF capable of acting alone, against a threat, with and without support? That's the question. In the age of Brigade Combat Teams and an Army built around them, do we need and should we build two organizations that are battalions at their core when we could get rid of them both and afford another BCT?
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This isn't really about capability, as much as it is about retaining the structure (i.e. manpower billets, and officer development opportunities). As COL G states below, we have multiple examples of BN Task Forces over the last thirty/forty years with SETAF being the most widely known. I wouldn't surprise me if this is just an interim step, and at some point the separate BN's will be attached into some higher maneuver HQ.
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COL (Join to see)
Agreed. This is a seed from which the Army can grow later. They will be incapable of operating on their own in a Combined Arms Maneuver sense. They will be attached to a Brigade Combat Team if they are called up.
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Think of it like the Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) as part of the MEU. Sounds like the same concept. We're very BN centric.
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COL (Join to see)
Ah, but that BLT can't operate without the MEU behind it. Is it a separate Battalion? Who does it answer to?
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Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS
COL (Join to see) - It's always either a BLT or a BN. Using my own experiences as a baseline:
3/1 (3rd BN, 1st Marines) belongs 1st Marines*. It becomes BLT 3/1 which belongs to 11/13/15 MEU (depending on cycle). The logistical/support chain depends on who has OPCON/ADCON at the time. We have a "small" internal supply/log, but as you said, it's good for about 24~ hours.
*1st Marines (1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/4, minus whoever is attached to the MEUs). 1st Marines belongs to 1 Mar Div, 1MEF. 1MEF has 1 Mar Div, 3 MAW, 1 MLG. The MAGTFs are formalized Task Forces which are stood up/down on a periodic basis (rotation). We just convert BNs into BLT. Every other unit just gets dropped in.
A BN has a very limited capability to operate on its own, but we're a much smaller force than the Army, so I'm not sure how that will translate.
3/1 (3rd BN, 1st Marines) belongs 1st Marines*. It becomes BLT 3/1 which belongs to 11/13/15 MEU (depending on cycle). The logistical/support chain depends on who has OPCON/ADCON at the time. We have a "small" internal supply/log, but as you said, it's good for about 24~ hours.
*1st Marines (1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/4, minus whoever is attached to the MEUs). 1st Marines belongs to 1 Mar Div, 1MEF. 1MEF has 1 Mar Div, 3 MAW, 1 MLG. The MAGTFs are formalized Task Forces which are stood up/down on a periodic basis (rotation). We just convert BNs into BLT. Every other unit just gets dropped in.
A BN has a very limited capability to operate on its own, but we're a much smaller force than the Army, so I'm not sure how that will translate.
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LTC Lawrence Hoffman
I am here in the Benning/Columbus area. I don't know about the BN in AK, but the BN here at Benning is still part of 3rd ID and has been for years.
The restructuring from the BDE to the BN TF gives the BN CDR all of his "normal slice" units so that he can continue to train for combat with all of the assets that he could expect to have in combat. Go back even further in 3ID (previously 24ID and activated in 1976) history at Ft. Stewart and you will see that the division at Stewart was a 2 BDE Division for many years. The 3rd BDE that is being drawn down was the 197th SIB at one time. It was going to be the Round Out BDE for the 24th and the 48th GANG IN BDE was going to be the Round UP BDE.
My take on this is that the Army is cutting the 3ID to what it used to be years ago (2 BDEs) and keeping on BN TF on the ground here in Columbus to appease the local community (loss of revenue). While DC is forcing the Army to cut people, the politicians here are fighting to keep the units intact in GA (Senators, Congressmen, local mayor, etc). Cuts are ok at long as it isn't in a politicians specific state. I know that one of our Senators sits on the Armed Forces Committee and he held up one of Obama's appointee's votes until the Army responded to him how FBGA was selected. Numbers wise we took the largest hit. % wise, the AK unit took the largest hit.
I see the BN TF used to handle BN sized missions and contingencies such as the MFO mission or something like a security force for a larger unit. It could also be the heavy element to augment a "light" unit (10th MTN, 82nd, 101st, etc). If we go to a full up war, I would expect the BN would be the nucleus for a 3rd BDE for the 3ID.
Bottom line, the BN TF has all the resources to train for limited/specific missions.
The restructuring from the BDE to the BN TF gives the BN CDR all of his "normal slice" units so that he can continue to train for combat with all of the assets that he could expect to have in combat. Go back even further in 3ID (previously 24ID and activated in 1976) history at Ft. Stewart and you will see that the division at Stewart was a 2 BDE Division for many years. The 3rd BDE that is being drawn down was the 197th SIB at one time. It was going to be the Round Out BDE for the 24th and the 48th GANG IN BDE was going to be the Round UP BDE.
My take on this is that the Army is cutting the 3ID to what it used to be years ago (2 BDEs) and keeping on BN TF on the ground here in Columbus to appease the local community (loss of revenue). While DC is forcing the Army to cut people, the politicians here are fighting to keep the units intact in GA (Senators, Congressmen, local mayor, etc). Cuts are ok at long as it isn't in a politicians specific state. I know that one of our Senators sits on the Armed Forces Committee and he held up one of Obama's appointee's votes until the Army responded to him how FBGA was selected. Numbers wise we took the largest hit. % wise, the AK unit took the largest hit.
I see the BN TF used to handle BN sized missions and contingencies such as the MFO mission or something like a security force for a larger unit. It could also be the heavy element to augment a "light" unit (10th MTN, 82nd, 101st, etc). If we go to a full up war, I would expect the BN would be the nucleus for a 3rd BDE for the 3ID.
Bottom line, the BN TF has all the resources to train for limited/specific missions.
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COL (Join to see)
I think you're correct that it's a "seed" unit for the growth in the future. As far as numbers, Alaska lost 22% of its active force while Georgia lost 11% of theirs. Texas saw the largest loss as far as actual people and families, but they have a much larger population of active service members, so it's not a large percentage.
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