Posted on Apr 9, 2017
Should an officer be allowed to continue to serve on Active Duty after being relieved from command?
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Some officers are meant to command and lead, and others probably should never be allowed the opportunity. I'm a witness to the case of an ousted ex-commander now working as a staff-O "leading" a highly technical department - his lack of technical competence and inability to mentor and lead others is obvious. Should such an officer be "encouraged" to separate or retire early to make room?
Posted 8 y ago
Responses: 267
MAJ (Join to see) going on what you provided:
You're right, some people do well in command and some don't. Some of those who don't do well are so bad that the need to be removed to prevent the unit becoming ineffective. If the officer was removed for a criminal offense (substance abuse, sexual harassment, misappropriation of government funds for example) then he or she should be prosecuted under the UCMJ. Sometimes otherwise honorable service members are offered the opportunity to retire or separate in lieu of prosecution. Automatic forced separation for doing a job poorly, even a job as important an unit command, may not be in the best interests of the Service.
Based on the information you've provided, it looks like the officer has been relieved and shifted to a staff officer position. This may be a holding pattern while senior leaders decide what to do with the officer or it may be an opportunity for an otherwise excellent officer to rehabilitate. His department leadership is a natural consequence of his staff job and rank. His lack of technical competence may not matter much if his subordinates are good at their jobs and he's willing to listen to their inputs. Same with an inability to mentor subordinates. My experience on staffs indicates that most officers and NCOs on staff duty are capable of managing their own careers. The one place where this officer might hurt his subordinates is the reporting process. If he doesn't write OERs and NOCERs well and honestly with accompanying counseling, then his subordinates could be hurt. Hopefully the Chief of Staff will look out for this problem and relieve him of his supervisory responsibilities if necessary.
You're right, some people do well in command and some don't. Some of those who don't do well are so bad that the need to be removed to prevent the unit becoming ineffective. If the officer was removed for a criminal offense (substance abuse, sexual harassment, misappropriation of government funds for example) then he or she should be prosecuted under the UCMJ. Sometimes otherwise honorable service members are offered the opportunity to retire or separate in lieu of prosecution. Automatic forced separation for doing a job poorly, even a job as important an unit command, may not be in the best interests of the Service.
Based on the information you've provided, it looks like the officer has been relieved and shifted to a staff officer position. This may be a holding pattern while senior leaders decide what to do with the officer or it may be an opportunity for an otherwise excellent officer to rehabilitate. His department leadership is a natural consequence of his staff job and rank. His lack of technical competence may not matter much if his subordinates are good at their jobs and he's willing to listen to their inputs. Same with an inability to mentor subordinates. My experience on staffs indicates that most officers and NCOs on staff duty are capable of managing their own careers. The one place where this officer might hurt his subordinates is the reporting process. If he doesn't write OERs and NOCERs well and honestly with accompanying counseling, then his subordinates could be hurt. Hopefully the Chief of Staff will look out for this problem and relieve him of his supervisory responsibilities if necessary.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Sir,
Your response is very interesting to me for two reasons. One reason is that the decision to retain a poorly performing officer resembles a decision to recuperate or mitigate sunk costs for a product that does not perform to standard. Instead of accepting that the monies and man-hours spent to develop the product (in this case, a competent officer) may never be recuperated, the DoD would choose to retain the poor performer vice cutting their losses (i.e. retiring or separation from service).
The second key point from your response is a fairly narrow interpretation of the concept of mentoring. Oftentimes, mentoring is more than just getting guidance on how to make the next rank through rote career management. It's an opportunity to share experiences and tacit knowledge to make a better future for the organization you are currently a part of. Yes, career management is pretty much a "self-service" function, but delimiting mentorship to such a narrow definition leaves a lot of qualitative aspects out that contributes value to the mentor-mentee relationship.
When we have a system that prefers retention of demonstrably substandard people in positions of authority or leadership because (a) we already threw so much money into their career so far and (b) the paperwork is just "too much/too hard" to make room for a more competent alternative, we risk dedicating more effort mitigating the damage or inefficiencies created than improving our organizations by moving the real performers up and encouraging the good ones to stay in.
Your response is very interesting to me for two reasons. One reason is that the decision to retain a poorly performing officer resembles a decision to recuperate or mitigate sunk costs for a product that does not perform to standard. Instead of accepting that the monies and man-hours spent to develop the product (in this case, a competent officer) may never be recuperated, the DoD would choose to retain the poor performer vice cutting their losses (i.e. retiring or separation from service).
The second key point from your response is a fairly narrow interpretation of the concept of mentoring. Oftentimes, mentoring is more than just getting guidance on how to make the next rank through rote career management. It's an opportunity to share experiences and tacit knowledge to make a better future for the organization you are currently a part of. Yes, career management is pretty much a "self-service" function, but delimiting mentorship to such a narrow definition leaves a lot of qualitative aspects out that contributes value to the mentor-mentee relationship.
When we have a system that prefers retention of demonstrably substandard people in positions of authority or leadership because (a) we already threw so much money into their career so far and (b) the paperwork is just "too much/too hard" to make room for a more competent alternative, we risk dedicating more effort mitigating the damage or inefficiencies created than improving our organizations by moving the real performers up and encouraging the good ones to stay in.
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LtCol Robert Quinter
I don't want to sound like a broken record, but reviewing LtCol Coe's thoughts caused some aggravation. By the time an officer has attained a rank where he is eligible for command, his primary responsibilities and requirements should be firmly engrained. When an officer is considered for command, the assigning officer will review the paper trail of the candidate's service and decide if his record indicates potential success as a commanding officer. If the commanding officer fails, there are many other officers ready to step forward and take his place. The purpose of an officer is to ensure that a mission is accomplished. The way to accomplish any mission is to ensure your people are qualified in their specialty (training), have the will to accomplish the task (leadership), have the equipment and means to accomplish the mission (administration), and are free from distractions, either personal or professional that would detract from their ability to accomplish the mission (personal leadership). If an officer is incapable of providing these essential elements, he should be removed from the system because he is failing his people, his superiors and the nation. It is not overstatement to say that the welfare of our military people and our nation depends upon retaining only the best. Mentoring of field grade officers should be fine tuning, not basic.
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Lt Col Jim Coe
MAJ (Join to see) and LtCol Robert Quinter:
First, I disagree with a human resource being compared to a deficient product. Only products or projects incur sunk cost; however, I think I know what MAJ Polzin is trying to say and maybe that's how his command looks at people, a training cost. I don't know his organization, so I won't speculate further on why your senior officers decided to allow the officer to continue on duty after failing in command.
Mentoring wasn't a big consideration during my active duty time. We tended to emphasize career management and sponsorship. Sponsorship in the Air Force sense was connecting ones career to a more senior officer. This works best if the connection is made when the junior officer is a Captain and the more senior officer is at least a Lt Col Unit Commander. By linking your career to the more senior officer though professional and perhaps social or personal association, the junior officer is betting the sponsor will do well and bring his associates along with him or her. This informal relationship works well for the few officers who correctly select a sponsor who becomes a General Officer. They routinely end up with increased opportunity for "good" assignments. Once the sponsor becomes a GO, then he or she can guide the sponsored officer's career into a path leading to unit command at the O-5 and O-6 levels opening the door to promotion to GO. Of course, the sponsored officer has to succeed in unit command to keep their career moving. However, the GO sponsor might protect an officer who fails command by facilitating their move to a staff job until retirement. I don't know if sponsorship is alive and well in the Air Force today. It worked well for me until my sponsor abruptly retired as a Brig Gen before I had the opportunity to compete for Squadron Command.
First, I disagree with a human resource being compared to a deficient product. Only products or projects incur sunk cost; however, I think I know what MAJ Polzin is trying to say and maybe that's how his command looks at people, a training cost. I don't know his organization, so I won't speculate further on why your senior officers decided to allow the officer to continue on duty after failing in command.
Mentoring wasn't a big consideration during my active duty time. We tended to emphasize career management and sponsorship. Sponsorship in the Air Force sense was connecting ones career to a more senior officer. This works best if the connection is made when the junior officer is a Captain and the more senior officer is at least a Lt Col Unit Commander. By linking your career to the more senior officer though professional and perhaps social or personal association, the junior officer is betting the sponsor will do well and bring his associates along with him or her. This informal relationship works well for the few officers who correctly select a sponsor who becomes a General Officer. They routinely end up with increased opportunity for "good" assignments. Once the sponsor becomes a GO, then he or she can guide the sponsored officer's career into a path leading to unit command at the O-5 and O-6 levels opening the door to promotion to GO. Of course, the sponsored officer has to succeed in unit command to keep their career moving. However, the GO sponsor might protect an officer who fails command by facilitating their move to a staff job until retirement. I don't know if sponsorship is alive and well in the Air Force today. It worked well for me until my sponsor abruptly retired as a Brig Gen before I had the opportunity to compete for Squadron Command.
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PO1 William Ewing
That sounds like the old concept of patronage - a senior nurturing tje careers of juniors to feather his nest, more than providing good successors to his career.
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Here is the thing. My refection's of when I retired from the Army. I did serve with some good Officers however I also served with some officers that were more concerned with their statistics than they were with the welfare of their soldiers. In other words they were looking at the Monitor more than they were the Patient. With all the new bells and whistles in the computer world it has not gotten any better.
I saw a lot of problems that could have been solved with common horse sense. Yet the Officers didn't have the common sense of a horse but rather that of a Jack A$$. When Officers are more concerned about Metrics, and having NCO and Officers write things that no one will ever read then they will be a waste of time and manpower.
Early in my career I was lucky to have good Officers when I went on Active Duty but when you get transferred and find yourself in another unit you never know what you are going to get it's like spinning a roulette wheel.
One solution I found in dealing with incompetent Officers who were in Command was explain to the Article 138 of the UCMJ. which is the least article ever employed but the most powerful among them.
"Article 138 of the UCMJ, "any member of the armed forces who believes himself (or herself) wronged by his (or her) commanding officer" may request redress. If such redress is refused, a complaint may be made and a superior officer must "examine into the complaint."
It has been my opinion that all other avenues of solving a problem should be explored before employing article 138.
I saw a lot of problems that could have been solved with common horse sense. Yet the Officers didn't have the common sense of a horse but rather that of a Jack A$$. When Officers are more concerned about Metrics, and having NCO and Officers write things that no one will ever read then they will be a waste of time and manpower.
Early in my career I was lucky to have good Officers when I went on Active Duty but when you get transferred and find yourself in another unit you never know what you are going to get it's like spinning a roulette wheel.
One solution I found in dealing with incompetent Officers who were in Command was explain to the Article 138 of the UCMJ. which is the least article ever employed but the most powerful among them.
"Article 138 of the UCMJ, "any member of the armed forces who believes himself (or herself) wronged by his (or her) commanding officer" may request redress. If such redress is refused, a complaint may be made and a superior officer must "examine into the complaint."
It has been my opinion that all other avenues of solving a problem should be explored before employing article 138.
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The key words in your write-up are "his lack of technical competence and inability to mentor and lead others is obvious". Serving as an officer demands more than technical proficiency. If I want technical proficiency I'll turn to the individuals who demonstrate their qualifications every day, often a SNCO or another enlisted person who has taken the effort to know his field. An officer must be capable of providing direction to his people and creating an environment where his people can work to the betterment of his section, unit and nation. Very few CEOs of major corporations can perform the tasks necessary at lower levels of responsibility. An executive's responsibility is to monitor the well being of his company, be it civilian or military and provide the opportunity for the real experts to do their work. The officer in question should be concentrating on his future outside the military.
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PO3 David Bernal
Pretty sure I can use a lot of what you said in my upcoming interviews. "Tell us how you would operate the medical telemetry department as manager"....'well as manager it will be my responsibility to monitor the well being of my department....... :)
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Sgt Chuck Witte
The learning process as well as the leadership process should be from the bottom up, it seems the best way to obtain competency and proficiency, but then again you may be both competent and proficient in a Military of Civilian field and still not be able to be good at being a leader
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SFC Thomas Butler
That all my apply generally speaking, but when the officer in question is in charge of a "highly technical department", some technical proficiency would have to be involved in order to make sound decisions.
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I have seen commanders relieved when they had well and truly earned it, and I have seen them relieved due to the ubiquitous "loss of faith in their ability to lead", usually because of some foul up committed by subordinates. This is the genesis of the damaging zero-tolerance policies that rob leaders of the opportunity to exercise judgment - exactly what I'd argue they are there for in the first place.
To answer the question, their career is likely over - or at least headed towards a dead end when the next board happens. That doesn't mean they are useless, but too often they are slid into a staff position to mark time.
It can definitely be handled better.
To answer the question, their career is likely over - or at least headed towards a dead end when the next board happens. That doesn't mean they are useless, but too often they are slid into a staff position to mark time.
It can definitely be handled better.
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It really depends on the circumstances I think. I have known a number of individuals both military and civilian who had all the leadership potential of a potato but were highly skilled within their specialty. Reassigning a failed CO to a position in line with his skills makes sense but placing him in a position just to avoid having to force him out of the service does not and can only cause damage to the people of whom he is assigned to oversee.
Early in my career I was assigned to an I level facility and our division was temporarily without an officer. The prior OIC had set up the shop to maximize the productivity and morale of the personnel. This had the effect to have given our division the highest turnaround efficiency in the department as well as the lowest disciplinary records. About a month into my assignment we acquired our new OIC, an LDO ensign. His first act was to scrap the setup of his predecessor and declare that no liberty requests would be approved for at least a month while he evaluated his new command. Morale went into the wastebin and productivity followed close after. Between orders that served no purpose and a practice of favoring one set of technicians over the other half of his command he just about had the division in outright rebellion. To be truthful it was the discipline and professionalism of the NCOs that kept the division together despite his efforts. Eventually the situation drew the attention of the department master chief due to noticing that several personnel had not been advanced in due time while others who had legitimate reasons for being held back were advanced. In due course he took the situation to the attention of the Department Head and things moved rather quickly after that. I transferred out before this drama reached its conclusion but one fo my shipmates wrote me some months later to let me know that the Officer was once again a CPO and someone else's problem.
Early in my career I was assigned to an I level facility and our division was temporarily without an officer. The prior OIC had set up the shop to maximize the productivity and morale of the personnel. This had the effect to have given our division the highest turnaround efficiency in the department as well as the lowest disciplinary records. About a month into my assignment we acquired our new OIC, an LDO ensign. His first act was to scrap the setup of his predecessor and declare that no liberty requests would be approved for at least a month while he evaluated his new command. Morale went into the wastebin and productivity followed close after. Between orders that served no purpose and a practice of favoring one set of technicians over the other half of his command he just about had the division in outright rebellion. To be truthful it was the discipline and professionalism of the NCOs that kept the division together despite his efforts. Eventually the situation drew the attention of the department master chief due to noticing that several personnel had not been advanced in due time while others who had legitimate reasons for being held back were advanced. In due course he took the situation to the attention of the Department Head and things moved rather quickly after that. I transferred out before this drama reached its conclusion but one fo my shipmates wrote me some months later to let me know that the Officer was once again a CPO and someone else's problem.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Geez, you would think that a prior record where that ensign's bad behavior was stamped out early on in his career would have been an indicator that he needed to be assigned to a non-supervisory position (preferably in a dark basement stomping out cockroaches with only a can of bug spray and a flashlight) until his initial four-year active-duty commitment was completed.
This is a great example of competent folks banding together to succeed despite the (bad) officer(s) appointed over them. If for no other reason, it's stories like this which distinguish the military from most any private organization in the U.S.
Thanks for sharing this enlightening anecdote, Andrew!
This is a great example of competent folks banding together to succeed despite the (bad) officer(s) appointed over them. If for no other reason, it's stories like this which distinguish the military from most any private organization in the U.S.
Thanks for sharing this enlightening anecdote, Andrew!
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PO3 Andrew Kelly
MAJ (Join to see) - Actually we were his first posting after receiving his commission. Our misfortune saved others down the line. As I said it turned out that he never redeemed himself sufficiently to attain his required advancement in time to retain his commission. I have to assume that as a CPO he had excelled to the point that he was accepted for the LDO program.
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I have always been curious as to how "toxic leadership" is handled long after the headlines have faded away from the headlines of the Army Times and the news media. Aside from my own personal experiences under the yoke of certain individuals who had no business (in my humble opinion) leading a bake sale, I have reviewed a few doctoral dissertations (all qualitative studies...it was for a class, I swear!) on the topic of toxic leadership from the perspectives of military families and service members.
Although my dissertation will not be in a management concentration, I have brought up with some of my classmates at symposium about the viability of toxic leadership as a topic for a doctoral-level study in management. I could see the applicability of such a study within the DoD, let alone in private industry.
You all have been providing some very diverse and interesting viewpoints and perspectives on this issue. Thanks to all of you for contributing to what appears to be a very lively and interesting discussion so far! :-)
Although my dissertation will not be in a management concentration, I have brought up with some of my classmates at symposium about the viability of toxic leadership as a topic for a doctoral-level study in management. I could see the applicability of such a study within the DoD, let alone in private industry.
You all have been providing some very diverse and interesting viewpoints and perspectives on this issue. Thanks to all of you for contributing to what appears to be a very lively and interesting discussion so far! :-)
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Officers are human too. They take command at an early age. Im sure young CO's will make mistakes. I have seen my fare share of officers relieved. I believe if it is a major violation of the UCMJ, then yes.
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Sir, I see 2 problems here.
First is that not everyone is capable of leadership. Some people don't have the ability, desire, or even the presence required to lead. As an officer or non-commissioned officer, that should be the end of your career. Your position could be filled by someone more capable.
The second problem is that as a leader you should be allowed to find a position that you would like to be you end point. I have known many NCOs that never wanted to progress beyond squadleader or PSG for reasons ranging from a distain for working in an S Shop or never wanting to give up their platoon. There should be an option for an excellent leader to decide that this is the final point of career progression. However refusing an assignment is the end of your service, even if you don't feel comfortable performing at the next position higher up.
These 2 problems make it so the military is stuck with leadership that is either incompetent or unmotivated.
First is that not everyone is capable of leadership. Some people don't have the ability, desire, or even the presence required to lead. As an officer or non-commissioned officer, that should be the end of your career. Your position could be filled by someone more capable.
The second problem is that as a leader you should be allowed to find a position that you would like to be you end point. I have known many NCOs that never wanted to progress beyond squadleader or PSG for reasons ranging from a distain for working in an S Shop or never wanting to give up their platoon. There should be an option for an excellent leader to decide that this is the final point of career progression. However refusing an assignment is the end of your service, even if you don't feel comfortable performing at the next position higher up.
These 2 problems make it so the military is stuck with leadership that is either incompetent or unmotivated.
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While I do agree with most on here that not all servicemembers are born to lead, I do not agree that they should be barred from service after being relieved. As some have stated, and I hate the phrase, but it is definitely situationally dependent. I think the responsibility falls more on the service to ensure they place the right people in the right positions, and you shouldn't fault every individual for failing in a position they potentially shouldn't have been placed in to begin with.
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Check the book "The Generals" by Tom Ricks. The entire book analyses the concept of relief of command from WWII to today.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Thanks for the reading list recommendation! I'll give it a read once I'm done with my current school session.
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