Posted on Nov 27, 2022
Why does Army BCT not include Crew Served Weapons in its POI?
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I just left a visit with my son who is in AIT. He graduated from BCT last month at Fort Jackson. He is in what we used to call a Combat Support MOS. In conversation it came up that they were shown an M249 and an M240B but did not train on either of those, nor the M203! You have got to be kidding! Not to mention that they did not even see an M-2 .50 Caliber.
Folks, these are not Infantry weapon systems, they are Army Weapon systems.
It was thinking like this that led the Army in the early 2000s to cancel machinegun training for IET soldiers. That had devastating results in combat and as a result I and a couple other NCOs had to rewrite the TSP and POI for heavy machine guns in IET. Now TRADOC has again scrapped machineguns from BCT! What did they need the time for?
How many times will young troops not be taught vital Soldier skills before the powers that be learn?
Folks, these are not Infantry weapon systems, they are Army Weapon systems.
It was thinking like this that led the Army in the early 2000s to cancel machinegun training for IET soldiers. That had devastating results in combat and as a result I and a couple other NCOs had to rewrite the TSP and POI for heavy machine guns in IET. Now TRADOC has again scrapped machineguns from BCT! What did they need the time for?
How many times will young troops not be taught vital Soldier skills before the powers that be learn?
Basic Combat Training (BCT)
Fort Jackson
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 20
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The same reason the Marine Corps doesn’t train those weapon systems at Boot Camp. Time and funding. They are introduced in follow on training down the road as needed and ultimately will be on the receiving unit to train them to meet mission requirements.
Not everyone will be hands on with every weapon system when they hit their duty stations and ammunition is a resource.
Not everyone will be hands on with every weapon system when they hit their duty stations and ammunition is a resource.
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MSG Thomas Currie
The difference is that NCOs in some units acknowledge their responsibility to train their soldiers and NCOs in some other units are better at complaining that someone else should have done the training.
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SGM (Join to see)
MSG Thomas Currie - It has nothing to do with the crew served weapons being available to their units? Or, the ammunition for those weapons was not forecast years prior?
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MSG Thomas Currie
No, SGM (Join to see) the failure of some units to train their personnel on the unit weapons is NOT due to the weapons being unavailable. It might be partly due to the incompetence of the headquarters S3 shop that failed to forecast ammo for necessary training and the incompetence of the higher headquarters G3 failing to question the omission -- but that takes us right back to what I said: some units acknowledge their responsibility to train their soldiers and other units are better at complaining about why they can't do their jobs.
I will acknowledge that reserve components units not on active duty really do have legitimate problems finding time to properly train their METL due to a variety of "required" nonsense. In fact, at the height of the GWOT farce, even some active component units faced the problem of needed training falling below the line due to the Army's unique notion that every Brigade was interchangeable with every other Brigade meaning that everyone suddenly became an infantry brigade regardless of organization or manpower.
Having TRADOC punch everyone's ticket for every possible crew served weapon is not really a solution -- 90% of soldiers will have forgotten that half-day of training by the time they arrive at their first unit.
I will acknowledge that reserve components units not on active duty really do have legitimate problems finding time to properly train their METL due to a variety of "required" nonsense. In fact, at the height of the GWOT farce, even some active component units faced the problem of needed training falling below the line due to the Army's unique notion that every Brigade was interchangeable with every other Brigade meaning that everyone suddenly became an infantry brigade regardless of organization or manpower.
Having TRADOC punch everyone's ticket for every possible crew served weapon is not really a solution -- 90% of soldiers will have forgotten that half-day of training by the time they arrive at their first unit.
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SSgt Christophe Murphy
MSG Thomas Currie I find it unlikely they wouldn’t have the proper equipment per TO&E. That’s some high vis stuff I don’t see happening.
But it’s fully possible that training doesn’t happen due to a failure in planning/logistics.
It’s
But it’s fully possible that training doesn’t happen due to a failure in planning/logistics.
It’s
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Time and funding, more than likely. Only so much time in the day of a BCT for training. Plus, the amount of funds those rounds cost. When I went thru BCT (1993), we had a brief moment to fire 50 rounds from the M-60, a 9mm tracer round from the AT-4, and a chalk/paint round from the M203. I never saw nor fired an M2 .50 in BCT. In fact, from 1993 to 1997 I never once touched a .50. For that matter, it wasn't until '97 or '98 that I fired a M9
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SSG Roger Ayscue
SGM Erik Marquez - I agree it was a gaining unit leadership failure. Totally, 100%. It was a Unit failure in Pre-deployment train up, those NCOs and officers from Team Leader to Battalion Commander have a slice of that Failure pie to eat.
All I was saying is that it might be a good thing if the BCT at least did a familiarization, and coming from an Army in the past that emphasized Gunnery, marksmanship and basic weapon proficency, I am confused how the Army got away from it.
All I was saying is that it might be a good thing if the BCT at least did a familiarization, and coming from an Army in the past that emphasized Gunnery, marksmanship and basic weapon proficency, I am confused how the Army got away from it.
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SGM Erik Marquez
SSG Roger Ayscue - "Gunnery, marksmanship and basic weapon proficency" BCT, AIT or OUST has Never trained on "gunnery"
"Markminship" is trained at all three
"Basic weapon proficiency" is just that proficiency with your basic weapon. Meaning proficiency with your individual weapon. Crew Served weapons have never been a doctrinal focus of training at BCT, AIT or OUST. Machine gunners or Squad assault weapon gunners are assigned at the unit level. And while a pistol may be an assigned weapon at the unit level, only a few MOS carry it routinely as a personal weapon...say 31B MP, or 31 K dog handler. and THEY do get training specific to the weapon in AIT
"Markminship" is trained at all three
"Basic weapon proficiency" is just that proficiency with your basic weapon. Meaning proficiency with your individual weapon. Crew Served weapons have never been a doctrinal focus of training at BCT, AIT or OUST. Machine gunners or Squad assault weapon gunners are assigned at the unit level. And while a pistol may be an assigned weapon at the unit level, only a few MOS carry it routinely as a personal weapon...say 31B MP, or 31 K dog handler. and THEY do get training specific to the weapon in AIT
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1LT William Clardy
I'm going to share a heretical thought about pistols, SGM Erik Marquez: In a military (not law-enforcement) context, they are morale tools, not weapons.
Pistols require a disproportionate amount of training to be used effectively, training which almost no soldiers receive. Even with that training, they are vastly less effective than every other weapon in the arms room, and the abysmal hit probability is doubled down by the limited amount of ammo issued (does anybody get issued more than enough for 3 loaded magazines?).
We now return you to the argument already in progress...
Pistols require a disproportionate amount of training to be used effectively, training which almost no soldiers receive. Even with that training, they are vastly less effective than every other weapon in the arms room, and the abysmal hit probability is doubled down by the limited amount of ammo issued (does anybody get issued more than enough for 3 loaded magazines?).
We now return you to the argument already in progress...
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Guess I’m an antique. When I went through BCT & AIT at Ft Jackson as an 11B10, we trained on the M2 and M1919, as well as the M60. That was in 1966. From there, I went to Ft Benning for OCS and came out a 1542, was immediately assigned to Ft Bragg and the 3SFG. All of nine moths at Ft Bragg and off I went to Vietnam and the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile).
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The content of BCT is always inadequate -- and always will be. There simply isn't the time or money to teach every soldier everything they ought to know for every Skill Level 1 slot in every unit in the Army.
Some of what isn't taught in BCT gets covered in AIT, but AIT has to focus primarily on specific MOS skills and has little time left to cover soldiering skills.
Bottom line: The training base does not produce fully qualified soldiers in any MOS -- never has and never will. That PVT or PFC arriving at his or her first unit still needs a lot of training. Like it or not conducting that training is the job of the NCOs in the unit.
We can all complain about the things that aren't taught in BCT+AIT or in OSUT, and yes, we can all whine and blame it on the "woke" content in those courses (most of that "woke" content comes from Congress, not TRADOC , DA, or DOD). But none of that changes the bottom line and none of that changes the responsibility of NCOs to evaluate and train their soldiers.
Some of what isn't taught in BCT gets covered in AIT, but AIT has to focus primarily on specific MOS skills and has little time left to cover soldiering skills.
Bottom line: The training base does not produce fully qualified soldiers in any MOS -- never has and never will. That PVT or PFC arriving at his or her first unit still needs a lot of training. Like it or not conducting that training is the job of the NCOs in the unit.
We can all complain about the things that aren't taught in BCT+AIT or in OSUT, and yes, we can all whine and blame it on the "woke" content in those courses (most of that "woke" content comes from Congress, not TRADOC , DA, or DOD). But none of that changes the bottom line and none of that changes the responsibility of NCOs to evaluate and train their soldiers.
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SSG Roger Ayscue
MSG (Join to see) MSG Thomas Currie SSgt Christophe Murphy SP5 Peter Keane SGT Charlie Lee SFC (Join to see)
No doubt that you are correct. The gaining unit has the responsibility to do this. I am decrying the fact that there was not even a single day to do a familiarization with them. I am not saying that a qualification is required, but a this is how you load it, this is the safety, at least on the SAW. This should be easy to do.
The problem is that too many units will not train the Noobs They could add one day to BCT so that the Trainees could at least see a SAW or a 240 B or, God help us an M203.
No doubt that you are correct. The gaining unit has the responsibility to do this. I am decrying the fact that there was not even a single day to do a familiarization with them. I am not saying that a qualification is required, but a this is how you load it, this is the safety, at least on the SAW. This should be easy to do.
The problem is that too many units will not train the Noobs They could add one day to BCT so that the Trainees could at least see a SAW or a 240 B or, God help us an M203.
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SSG Roger Ayscue
SGT Charlie Lee You see my point? I have written POIs and TSPs and can tell you that you can find time and Big Army can find money if it is something that someone with a Star riding on it wants.
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We barely touch them in the Infantry Officer Course. The juice isn't worth the squeeze. There 6 tables that all Soldiers have to go through. It is not how we used to train. This is an example of just your M4. If you have a Crew Served Weapon then you would have to qual on your M4 and then your Crew Served Weapon. If he was going to the infantry then it would make sense to do that. If he is going to waste some some bullets just to see what it feels like then I would question what was the training objective. If he were to deploy down the road then he would have to qual on his assigned weapon system. AT the end of the day I would rather have him know his job.
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MSG Thomas Currie
SSG Roger Ayscue - CPT (Join to see) - At the risk of starting what ought to be a completely separate discussion, part of the problem is the whole concept of performance oriented training that the Army chose to embrace in the early to mid-1970's and still uses today.
Like many (most, in my opinion) new concepts that the Army adopts, this was a good idea that got mangled in the implementation. The idea was that the Army should stop wasting time and money teaching useless stuff and concentrate on teaching each soldier what he needed to be able to DO. The classic examples back when this was a new idea were that we should stop teaching stuff like where the rifle was manufactured and the exact weight of an unloaded rifle, or having the soldier know the serial number of his rifle, but instead should just teach the soldier how to operate the rifle. Sounds good, right? Why should a soldier need to know how many lands and grooves were in the rifling and what twist rate, or the muzzle velocity of the round?
Of course, in the military, anything worth doing must be worth overdoing. So once we embraced Performance Oriented Training, everything had to be a task or it couldn't be trained. Everything had to have a single Action, Conditions, and a Standard. Soldiers could not be taught anything just because it was useful to know, everything had to be a specific action that was done in a specific way.
What we ended up with was a system to teach monkeys to push buttons. Army training became teaching each monkey that when the red light comes on you push the blue button. This training strategy was very successful. Nearly all the monkeys learned to push the button -- and we had a clear standard under which to retrain or eliminate any monkey that failed to learn to push the blue button when the red light came on.
The monkeys don't need to know what the blue button does. The monkeys don't need to know why the red light come on. The monkeys only need to know that when the red light comes on they push the blue button. Great! The monkeys are all well trained and we have clear measurements of that training.
The problem only starts to show up when the Mark II box arrives and we find that the new box has one yellow light, one green light, one red button, and one orange button. Now we have to start from scratch to teach those monkeys how to operate the new box -- and they cannot use any of the skills they already learned. The brightest monkeys might guess that they probably need to push some button when some light comes on but neither the monkeys nor their trainers are allowed to link those concepts as part of the training.
There is also a less obvious problem due to the vocabulary of our training system and the literal-minded nature of the military.
Whenever we translate a Task, Conditions, and Standard into a Training Objective, the narrative naturally places the conditions first. Thus the vocabulary of our training results in the first word of (nearly) every Training Objective being the word "given" -- that's how we say it, and that's how we train it.
Yes, surely a soldier needs to have whatever is needed before you can train them to perform a task, but that word "Given" has become so deeply impressed in both our vocabulary and our methodology that nearly all training begins with everything needed already provided and only the necessary items provided. Hand a soldier a lug wrench and show him how to tighten a lug nut on a wheel. The soldier learns the task. Now put the lug wrench in the tool bag with all the other tools, put the tool bag in the storage box, start with the soldier in the shop office, tell the soldier to tighten the lug nuts on the left rear wheel of his vehicle. How many of those "trained" soldiers know what tool they need and where to find the tool? Are you really sure they can all even find the left rear wheel?
What does all this have to do with SSG Roger Ayscue's original comment? When I was starting out, I was trained how a weapon worked. I understood the cycle of functioning. I understood what the major components did and how they worked together. When I encountered a new weapon, I could apply what I already knew and understood -- the chances were very good that I could figure out at least the basics quickly, perhaps not perfectly, but safely and close enough to learn what I needed to know. Under the training system we have used for the last 50 years, we had soldiers who were "fully trained" on the M16A2 who still needed two full days more training to be able to handle the M4 well enough to take one to a range. If a soldier cannot transition from an M16 to an M4 without extensive training, how can we expect those soldiers to figure out an M249??
Like many (most, in my opinion) new concepts that the Army adopts, this was a good idea that got mangled in the implementation. The idea was that the Army should stop wasting time and money teaching useless stuff and concentrate on teaching each soldier what he needed to be able to DO. The classic examples back when this was a new idea were that we should stop teaching stuff like where the rifle was manufactured and the exact weight of an unloaded rifle, or having the soldier know the serial number of his rifle, but instead should just teach the soldier how to operate the rifle. Sounds good, right? Why should a soldier need to know how many lands and grooves were in the rifling and what twist rate, or the muzzle velocity of the round?
Of course, in the military, anything worth doing must be worth overdoing. So once we embraced Performance Oriented Training, everything had to be a task or it couldn't be trained. Everything had to have a single Action, Conditions, and a Standard. Soldiers could not be taught anything just because it was useful to know, everything had to be a specific action that was done in a specific way.
What we ended up with was a system to teach monkeys to push buttons. Army training became teaching each monkey that when the red light comes on you push the blue button. This training strategy was very successful. Nearly all the monkeys learned to push the button -- and we had a clear standard under which to retrain or eliminate any monkey that failed to learn to push the blue button when the red light came on.
The monkeys don't need to know what the blue button does. The monkeys don't need to know why the red light come on. The monkeys only need to know that when the red light comes on they push the blue button. Great! The monkeys are all well trained and we have clear measurements of that training.
The problem only starts to show up when the Mark II box arrives and we find that the new box has one yellow light, one green light, one red button, and one orange button. Now we have to start from scratch to teach those monkeys how to operate the new box -- and they cannot use any of the skills they already learned. The brightest monkeys might guess that they probably need to push some button when some light comes on but neither the monkeys nor their trainers are allowed to link those concepts as part of the training.
There is also a less obvious problem due to the vocabulary of our training system and the literal-minded nature of the military.
Whenever we translate a Task, Conditions, and Standard into a Training Objective, the narrative naturally places the conditions first. Thus the vocabulary of our training results in the first word of (nearly) every Training Objective being the word "given" -- that's how we say it, and that's how we train it.
Yes, surely a soldier needs to have whatever is needed before you can train them to perform a task, but that word "Given" has become so deeply impressed in both our vocabulary and our methodology that nearly all training begins with everything needed already provided and only the necessary items provided. Hand a soldier a lug wrench and show him how to tighten a lug nut on a wheel. The soldier learns the task. Now put the lug wrench in the tool bag with all the other tools, put the tool bag in the storage box, start with the soldier in the shop office, tell the soldier to tighten the lug nuts on the left rear wheel of his vehicle. How many of those "trained" soldiers know what tool they need and where to find the tool? Are you really sure they can all even find the left rear wheel?
What does all this have to do with SSG Roger Ayscue's original comment? When I was starting out, I was trained how a weapon worked. I understood the cycle of functioning. I understood what the major components did and how they worked together. When I encountered a new weapon, I could apply what I already knew and understood -- the chances were very good that I could figure out at least the basics quickly, perhaps not perfectly, but safely and close enough to learn what I needed to know. Under the training system we have used for the last 50 years, we had soldiers who were "fully trained" on the M16A2 who still needed two full days more training to be able to handle the M4 well enough to take one to a range. If a soldier cannot transition from an M16 to an M4 without extensive training, how can we expect those soldiers to figure out an M249??
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CPT (Join to see)
SSG Roger Ayscue - I understand what you are trying to say but things are a bit different. The Army has changed. Infantry OSUT is now 22 weeks. They so much more than they ever have. What is the use to training Soldiers that will most like never touch that weapon system again for years. POI is handled a bit different. I finished the Training Developers course a while back. The needs for training is based of the expectations of the performance of your job. So in the infantry world you will need a MG to conduct a platoon live fire so we are given the ammo to do that. If someone is a 42A they are only required to qualify with their M4. It would be great but if they need to qual with that weapon then their future unit will train them. This is why the Armor School only performs Abrams gunnery and not Bradley Gunnery. It would be great but the juice isn't worth the squeeze.
Now with it comes to Long Range Surveillance Units. They needed to go. The Special Recon mission set fell off form SF due to their higher demand for Direct Action. When they went to 4 battalions they would pick up the mission set again. After that there were more factors that doomed them. No one really wanted an external recon element that was foreign to them in their AO. UAVs can usually do the job at a much more proficient level. LRS was very limited with it's potential. The modern battlefield simply grew beyond their need.
Now with it comes to Long Range Surveillance Units. They needed to go. The Special Recon mission set fell off form SF due to their higher demand for Direct Action. When they went to 4 battalions they would pick up the mission set again. After that there were more factors that doomed them. No one really wanted an external recon element that was foreign to them in their AO. UAVs can usually do the job at a much more proficient level. LRS was very limited with it's potential. The modern battlefield simply grew beyond their need.
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CPT (Join to see)
MSG Thomas Currie - I almost forgot to address the Lynch Ambush. Just like the initial story the Army made excuses why they failed to defend themselves. They were doomed when their commander, CPT King, took the wrong route and drove directly into enemy controlled area. After that they had vehicles brake down and run out of fuel. They only had one M2 and it malfunctioned. Their M16s also malfunctioned. The company commander ordered issue of ammunition for the unit’s crew served weapons (.50 caliber and MK-19, 40mm) prior to movement, however, all pyrotechnics, hand grenades, and AT-4 Anti-tank weapons were consolidated and secured. Most of the Soldiers in there reported that they experienced weapons malfunctions. They should have focused on their M16s when training. "The fact that so many of the 507th's weapons malfunctioned is deeply disturbing to many. It might not be surprising to a layman that most soldiers in the 507th apparently hadn't spent enough time cleaning their weapons-the reason the weapons malfunctioned. After all, the soldiers were traveling for days with little rest and under harsh environmental conditions."
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This photo is the first time I saw an M60. Didn't even get to touch it. This was taken at the 25th Division Replacement training in Cu Chi RVN.
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Because they are not a critical component of many MOSs.
I technically had three different primary MOSs in the Army. Only the 11Bs had SAWs and 240s on my PLTs MTOE. About half of the MI Companies had the M2 on company MTOE, but even then only a very select few went to get trained.
It was not an MOS skill in anything other than infantry.
I technically had three different primary MOSs in the Army. Only the 11Bs had SAWs and 240s on my PLTs MTOE. About half of the MI Companies had the M2 on company MTOE, but even then only a very select few went to get trained.
It was not an MOS skill in anything other than infantry.
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CPT Lawrence Cable
Unless things have changed a lot, 12B Combat Engineers have the M240 (still a M60 in my day) and M2 machine gun, as do MPs, Armor and Cav units. M249 Grenade Launcher was just being fielded when I left, so didn't get to play with it.
The CEV, AVLB and 88 crews still used M3A1 Grease Guns and the Line Squads carried a M67 90mm Recoilless Rifles when I was still around.
And Recoilless Rifles aren't recoilless, if you have never shot one.
The CEV, AVLB and 88 crews still used M3A1 Grease Guns and the Line Squads carried a M67 90mm Recoilless Rifles when I was still around.
And Recoilless Rifles aren't recoilless, if you have never shot one.
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SFC Casey O'Mally
CPT Lawrence Cable You are correct. I worded it poorly.
It was not an MOS skill in any of *my* MOSs outside the Infantry.
I am sure the Combat Engineers and Cav Scouts and MPs all have using a SAW and 240 as critical tasks for their MOS.
It was not an MOS skill in any of *my* MOSs outside the Infantry.
I am sure the Combat Engineers and Cav Scouts and MPs all have using a SAW and 240 as critical tasks for their MOS.
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CPT Lawrence Cable
SFC Casey O'Mally - I need to qualify the above with the fact that I believe all the MOS's I listed are OSUT MOS's. Gives the Drills some extra time to mold your personality and teach you a few extra things.
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I'll just go onto add:
When I had command of a full legit Quartermaster Unit I looked at my MTOE and authorized equipment and personnel numbers.
I had A LOT of vehicles........... and if the MTOE was perfectly equipped and EVERYHTING was operating TO THE SOLDIER!!!!!!!!!!!!! there was enough seats in vehicles to move every soldier provided that EVERY SINGLE SOLDIER was licensed and a trained TC in the passenger seat. '
Also......... if the MTOE was perfectly assigned personnel wise......... NO ONE COULD BE A SLACKER, meaning those that didn't have licenses or TC training could NOT just sit in the back of an LMTV (truck) for the ride.
So where I am going with this is on top of the issue of crew served weapons none of the soldiers are coming out of AIT with driver licenses. Then, no one is coming out of AIT with the ability to operate the RADIO either.
See where I am steering this........................
We can't shoot
We can't move
We can't communicate
When I had command of a full legit Quartermaster Unit I looked at my MTOE and authorized equipment and personnel numbers.
I had A LOT of vehicles........... and if the MTOE was perfectly equipped and EVERYHTING was operating TO THE SOLDIER!!!!!!!!!!!!! there was enough seats in vehicles to move every soldier provided that EVERY SINGLE SOLDIER was licensed and a trained TC in the passenger seat. '
Also......... if the MTOE was perfectly assigned personnel wise......... NO ONE COULD BE A SLACKER, meaning those that didn't have licenses or TC training could NOT just sit in the back of an LMTV (truck) for the ride.
So where I am going with this is on top of the issue of crew served weapons none of the soldiers are coming out of AIT with driver licenses. Then, no one is coming out of AIT with the ability to operate the RADIO either.
See where I am steering this........................
We can't shoot
We can't move
We can't communicate
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Lots of solid responses here. While I too could list a few reasons I will stick to unit requirements. Each crew serve is assigned a crew and backup crew. Weapons qualification is performed as well as systems introductions and familiarization.
If units do there jobs and Commanders apply resources appropriately, every Soldier who need to know a certain weapon does.
I do agree that it would be great to get to all of that in entry training, but I am not sure the retention required to put these weapons into action would be gained in entry training. Anyway it is awesome that your Son is a Soldier. God Bless.
If units do there jobs and Commanders apply resources appropriately, every Soldier who need to know a certain weapon does.
I do agree that it would be great to get to all of that in entry training, but I am not sure the retention required to put these weapons into action would be gained in entry training. Anyway it is awesome that your Son is a Soldier. God Bless.
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SSG Roger Ayscue
CSM Darieus ZaGara You never saw a young man that wanted to ba a Soldier that bad. But he is 5th Generation military and 4th Generation Army, so he is thriving, and where he needs to be.
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BCT is just that Basic Training needed to get a civilian into the military mode. AIT teaches the basics of the skills needed to start to perform the MOS. The rest should be taught in the unit.
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