Why weren't Marines chosen for Normandy?

Why Marines not at Normandy (from a related 36 EN BDE LPD a few years ago).
- BLUF: It makes more strategic sense to mass a service (Marines vs Army) in a theater of operation as opposed to giving each theater a slice of each service. It therefore made more sense to mass Marines in the Pacific Theater of Operation (PTO) and mass the Army in the European Theater of Operation (ETO) based upon the below.
- There were seven major amphibious operations in the WWII ETO whereas there were about 40 major (Regimental size or larger) amphibious operations in the PTO. US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Army & Marine Corps, Pacific Theater and US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Mediterranean & European Theaters by Gordon Rottman
- PTO amphib operations were generally smaller. All of the islands in the Pacific add up to a land mass about the size of Ohio (42,000 mi2). The AO covered 9600 miles, 13 time zones with maps/intel of beaches that were not well charted and were lightly opposed. Their purpose was to secure small islands and were generally conducted during the day. ETO amphib operations, meanwhile, were generally larger in scale and their purpose was to secure lodgements and seaports. They were generally conducted at night on beaches that were well charted and heavily opposed.
- Marines rely upon Navy logistics within about 40 miles from a coastline and beyond that they rely upon Army logistics. Based upon the data above, using Marines in the PTO generally meant they did not have to transition from Navy to Army support.
- There are four basic defenses against an amphibious attack: preemptive (hit force at base), shoreline, mobile, and combination. Each has a different focus, advantages, and disadvantages. At the Water’s Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault by Theodore L. Gatchel.
- Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare by LTC Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC

We couldn't come fight the Battle of Normandy because we were too busy fighting the Pacific War.

Most of the comments here have given fair and valid reasons.

The Corps was heavily engaged beginning 7 Dec 1941 in the Pacific. By the Normandy landings in 1944 the Navy/Marine Corps team (with undeniable help from the Army especially in the Philippines) had been heavily at war for years with (strategically) minor battles beginning in 41 and the real campaign opening with Guadalcanal in 42. Truly, despite all the politics involved, the Corps could only operationally afford advisory detachments to the ETO, which were provided and mostly ignored. (The Army preferred "surprise" in the landings to the Marine doctrine of "shoot them with naval guns for a few days or weeks, then land." Arguments on both sides are very interesting.)

Because using both the Army and Marines against the Germans would have been far to cruel and against the Geneva Convention.

I want to thank everyone for participating, we largely agreed on why Marines were not used at Normandy. Let now refer to a 2004 article titled 'Rivalry at Normandy', of which this rather larger excerpt comes from, read and post a secondary post to your first one...after reading...it's worth the read. Some of you will not like it nor agree, some of you will smile, while others will question bias. In either case, enjoy.

*Rivalry at Normandy*

Sixty-years-ago, along a 60-mile stretch of France’s Normandy coastline, a combined force of American, British, and Canadian soldiers began streaming ashore as German artillery, mortar, machine-gun, and rifle fire ripped into their ranks. The mission of the Allied force was to kick down the door of Nazi Germany’s Fortress Europe, and then launch a drive toward the heart of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich.

Overseen by American Gen. Dwight D. “Ike” Eisenhower, the operation was–and remains to this day–the largest amphibious assault in history.
Since then, the question has often been raised as to why the U.S. Marine Corps did not play a leading role in the landings. After all, the Corps’s raison d’être was amphibious warfare. Marines had been perfecting the art of the amphibious assault since the 1920’s, and between 1942 and 1944, they had put their skills to practical use at places like Guadalcanal, Makin, Bougainville, and Tarawa, in the Pacific.

In the Atlantic, Marines had trained Army forces for seaborne landings prior to the North African campaign in 1942, and then made landings during the same. Marines trained Army forces for the Sicilian-Italian landings in 1943. Marine Corps amphibious experts were on Ike’s staff. And most Normandy-bound Army units were in fact instructed by Marines prior to the 1944 invasion.

So why didn’t U.S. Marines storm the French coast with their Army counterparts?

First, the Marine Corps was then–as it has always been–much smaller than the Army. During World War II, the Corps swelled to a force comprising six divisions, whereas the Army expanded to 89 divisions. The Corps’ resources were stretched thin, and much of its efforts were focused on the fighting in the Pacific.

Second, a deep-seeded rivalry between the Army and Marines was in full bloom: Its origins stretching back to World War I; the defining period of the modern Marine Corps.

Following the 1918 Battle of Belleau Wood (France), in which Marines played a leading role, newspapers in the U.S. credited much of the success of the American Expeditionary Force to the Marines. This occurred at the expense of deserving Army units even when referring to actions in which Marines did not participate.

In one instance, a number of newspapers covering the fighting at the Marne River bridges at Chateau-Thierry (a few days prior to the Battle of Belleau Wood) published headlines that read “Germans stopped at Chateau-Thierry with help of God and a few Marines.” The headlines contributed to the Corps’ already legendary reputation, and the Army was justifiably incensed. The Germans in fact had been stopped at Chateau-Thierry by the U.S. Army’s 7th machinegun battalion.

Army leaders–including Generals George C. Marshall, Eisenhower, and Omar N. Bradley–were determined not to be upstaged by Marines, again. Thus, when America entered World War II in late 1941, the Marine Corps was deliberately excluded from large-scale participation in the European theater. And when the largest amphibious operation in history was launched, it was for all intents and purposes an Army show.

In the wee hours of June 6, 1944, paratroopers from the American 82nd, 101st, and British 6th Airborne divisions began jumping over France. Hours later, the first assault waves of the initial 175,000-man seaborne force began hitting the Normandy beaches at the Bay of Seine. Five beaches comprised the landing areas: Sword, Juno, and Gold Beaches were struck by Lt. Gen. Miles Christopher Dempsey’s Second British Army. Omaha and Utah Beaches were stormed by Gen. Bradley’s First U.S. Army.

Between Omaha and Utah, 225 men of the U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion were tasked with scaling the 100-foot cliffs of Pointe du Hoc. There, five 155-millimeter guns were emplaced in reinforced concrete bunkers. As such the position encompassed “the most dangerous battery in France.” It had to be knocked out to protect the landings.

When the Rangers began suffering heavy losses, brief consideration was given to sending-in the Marines from one of the offshore ships’ detachments.

Those slated to go were leathernecks from the 84-man Marine Detachment aboard the battleship U.S.S. Texas. On the morning of June 7 (D-plus-one), the Texas’s Marines began making last minute preparations: Wiping down weapons, distributing grenades, waterproofing field packs, and sharpening K-Bar fighting knives. Others were on the mess decks eating the traditional pre-landing breakfast of steak and eggs: A fact that concerned the Navy’s medical corpsmen who feared they would be treating stomach wounds later in the day. Those anxious to go ashore, watched the ongoing action from the ship’s railings.

In his book, Spearheading D-Day, Jonathan Gawne writes, “Most of these Marines had no combat experience and had only been in the Corps for a few months [the same could have been said of many of the soldiers who had just landed]. One of them [the Marines] commented: ‘This is going to be the biggest slaughter since Custer got his at the Little Big Horn.’”

At the last minute, word was passed down through the Army chain of command that no Marines would be allowed to go ashore, not even riding shotgun on landing craft ferrying Army troops or supplies. Rumors quickly spread that the Army leadership feared a repeat of the media gaffes in 1918. They did not want to see headlines that read, Marines save Rangers at Normandy. Consequently, the Marines were ordered to “stand down.”

Easy: Size. The USMC was totally invested in the Pacific and they still didn't have enough troops to cover all of the amphibious assault requirements. Remember, the Marines weren't the only ground troops in the Pacific . They merely conducted one arm of the Pacific war advance (the nothern approach under Nimitz). The Army conducted the southern approach under MacArthur, which had just as many amphibious assaults as the northern route. That left absolutely ZERO Marines available for the amphibious assaults in Europe.

Because we were truly fighting a World War. Everyone had a job to do. Anything else I could say has already been said. Semper Fi Devel Dogs!!

The decision to use ALL the Marines in the Pacific was done at the White House level - though instigated by the Army (out of jealousy). During WWII the Marines expanded to only 6 Divisions - the Army had 89. The Army had been embarrassed in WWI by media improperly claiming that Marines had saved the day during one or more battles against the Germans - and the Army openly admitted they did not want a repeat in WWII. While there WERE Marines assigned to the invasion of Normandy - they were a small unit (84 personnel) assigned to the USS Texas (i believe) but they were never used. The entirety of the Marines were used in the Pacific.

1. In WWII, the army actually made more amphibious landings than the Marines did, so they knew what they were doing.

2. The Marines were sort of busy in the Pacific when Normandy went down.

3. The army landed a whomptillion soldiers on that beach, and there may not have been enough Marines to go around. In 1945, the Marine Corps had about 474,000 while the Army had more than 8.2 million.

Simple manpower and mission planning. The same army that landed in France began the long march to Berlin. The army is organized for sustained ground combat, the Marine Corps is not.

The invasion of Saipan going on at the same time. The invasion there by you badasses put the United States finally within B-29 range of Tokyo. The Seabees were rebuilding the airstrip still under fire.

Because they were too busy fighting the Japanese in the Pacific!!!!!