going-local-bernard-fall-gcma-french-guerrilla-david-phillips

Thanks for sharing LTC Eric Udouj
"There was French commando warfare behind Viet-Minh lines, but like much else good during the Indochina war, it was begin too late and, almost until the end of the war, was fought with too little of everything.

But commando warfare was fought since late 1951, although it did not receive one single mention in the English-language press. For obvious reasons, much will have to remain unsaid for the time being, but those among us who had the privilege of seeing some of the commandoes will forever remember them with admiration. Their official designation was Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes (Composite Airborne Commando Group) known by its French initials of G.C.M.A. until its name was changed in December 1953 to Groupement Mixte d’Intervention (G.M.I.) when it received control of all operations behind enemy lines, whether they were airborne or not.

The G.C.M.A.’s were organized on the basis of the experience gathered during World war II by the Eurpoean Maquis and by such Allied long-range penetration groups such as the British “Chindits” of General Orde Windgate in Burma, and the united States “Mauraders” of Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill. However, contrary to the two Allied groups, the G.C.M.A.’s were not meant to return to bases situated behind their own lines but were to remain permanently in enemy territory. Individual men were to be returned via aircraft from secret landing strips if they were sick or wounded or, as often happened, had simply broken down physically or mentally under the strain of that kind of warfare. In other words, the G.C.M.A.’s were not “raider forces,” but guerrilla forces; when the war ended in Indochina, they were far larger than both the Chidits or the Mauraders ever had been: by mid-1954, there were 15,000 of them, requiring 300 tons of airborne supplies a month.

The core until of a commando group was usually up to four hundred strong, each such group being commanded by two or three French senior NCO’s or perhaps by one lieutenant and a few NCO’s. In some cases, ever corporals found themselves at the head of a whole tribe at war with the Viet-Minh. [1] As is usually the case in all armies, the commanders of regular unity looked askance at those “bandits” with whom they were to cooperate, with the result that the recruitment of French cadres for the G.C.M.A. was very difficult [emphasis added].

For an officer to be posted to them meant losing contact with his parent unit (and chances for promotion and medals) while some of the sergeants found themselves saddled with tactical and supply problems usually assigned majors or lieutenant colonels, but again without the slightest recognition for their special performance. Hence the recruitment of cadres for the G.C.M.A. was at first based on a wonderful batch of characters and “trouble-makers” considered too individualistic by their unit commanders who were glad to get rid of them that way. Let it be said that the French Army never bothered to give the corporals or sergeants who commanded whole guerrilla battalions even fictitious officers’ ranks in order to give them “face” with the tribesmen. The latter obeyed them on affection alone and on the all-important fact that they proved themselves equal to the task. Those who did not were never heard from again. Perhaps this was the best way to get capable guerrilla leaders."

Thanks LTC Eric Udouj