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"Essentially – the Afghan war still counts as the “good war” because it really hasn’t met its objectives: destroying Al Qaeda, prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for international terrorist organizations and ensure no terrorist plot is planned from Afghan soil against US and its allies. On the contrary - Al Qaeda is not yet annihilated, there are more than 20 terrorist organizations active in Afghanistan and ISKP has managed to create a foothold in Afghanistan. The question is why such a reversal? The answer is simple – a halfhearted and under resourced campaign under heavy scrutiny.
The war in Afghanistan is not a civil war no an insurgency as portrayed by some within the security and military circles. It started as a war against terrorism, which is now transformed to proxy war with elements of criminal economy, and terrorism. It is in this environment that terrorist organizations thrive thus making victory difficult to claim in the absence of a long-term strategy and commitment."
The war in Afghanistan is not a civil war no an insurgency as portrayed by some within the security and military circles. It started as a war against terrorism, which is now transformed to proxy war with elements of criminal economy, and terrorism. It is in this environment that terrorist organizations thrive thus making victory difficult to claim in the absence of a long-term strategy and commitment."
Losing a Winnable War | Small Wars Journal
Posted from smallwarsjournal.comPosted in these groups: 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan
COIN (Counterinsurgency)CENTCOM HQ
Afghanistan
Leadership
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan COIN (Counterinsurgency)CENTCOM HQ Afghanistan Leadership
Posted 6 y ago
Responses: 2
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One constant problem is a halfhearted approach and not finishing the job. More often than not these Wars don't actually end as they were never actually brought to a conclusion. Just saying its a victory doesn't make it a victory. Winning a battle isn't winning the war. It not quite as easy to measure success when its not even a government being fought but terrorist organizations that need to eradicated completely not just knocked down a few pegs. Without a strategy to complete the task and actually do just that the problem will not go away but continue to rise over and over again. That seems to be the big failing, the unfinished job.
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SGT (Join to see)
SMSgt Lawrence McCarter “That seems to be the big failing, the unfinished job”. Call me cynical, but the unfinished job is the biggest success of those who planned it.
The past two decades have seen incredible gains in defense spending, technological investment, rebuilding/expansion of military infrastructure, etc. While the war sucks for you, me and every other joe, it’s been pretty great for a handful of people.
At this point, we’re still there because it’s good for business. (That’s quite oversimplified, but this isn’t a dissertation). Afghanistan will eventually be another duty station, similar to Korea.
The past two decades have seen incredible gains in defense spending, technological investment, rebuilding/expansion of military infrastructure, etc. While the war sucks for you, me and every other joe, it’s been pretty great for a handful of people.
At this point, we’re still there because it’s good for business. (That’s quite oversimplified, but this isn’t a dissertation). Afghanistan will eventually be another duty station, similar to Korea.
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SMSgt Lawrence McCarter
SGT (Join to see) - No question a handful of people are making plenty of money on Defense spending without actually finishing the job all that wonderful equipment was bought for. To keep involvements in area without finishing is a gold mine for some but as pointed out they aren't the ones paying the price for war with their lives. The program to control Fraud waste and abuse never worked as they didn't want it to work. The whistle blowers were always the ones to fall while nothing was ever resolved on the cost and the money kept flowing in to the contractors.
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1. “we need to crush the Taliban military machinery by targeting their command and control structure, sources of financing and safe havens. We are now killing the expendable soldiers and at best mid level commanders”
2. “...which is now transformed to proxy war with elements of criminal economy...”
Someone get this man some stars on his collar. Astute analysis. Two of the pearls of wisdom are quoted.
1. Great. We’ve wanted to do that for a while. However, all we have to do is convince a few someones that Quetta, Chaman, and Peshawar need to be invaded (probably Rawalpindi, too). I’m sure Pakistan won’t mind. And that’s ok, because (hypothetically) once we go to those cities, Taliban leadership would just push back deeper into Pakistan. So a full blown war with (very nuclear, very unstable) Pakistan might result.
2. To say there are elements of ‘criminal economy’ in Afghanistan is to say there are hints of stripes on the New York Yankees home uniforms. LTG Raziq, who was recently killedby the Taliban, was a THUG. The epitome of a ‘son of a b*tch, but he’s our son of a b*tch’ type of mentality.
As the author is the former Afghan Deputy Minister of Defense, it’s not surprise that the main point of his essay is, “This victory requires a long-term commitment; resources and a decisive military win in the battlefields with a broad-based and credible Afghan partner.”
Translation: keep pumping us with resources. Stalemate all day. Legitimize the Afghan government (downplay corruption and elements of criminal economy). Don’t let the Taliban reassume power”.
Still not sure? Here’s his key to victory.
“The ultimate end of the Afghan war comes with a political settlement but through a decisive military win on the battlefields.”
How many more decisive wins on Afghan battlefields do we need? We’re down to several thousand troops, and we’ve always self-restricted our own capabilities and ROEs. But when ISAF/coalition troops are involved in a tic, they’ve just about always come out on top. However, when there 100,000 of us there, it was still a stalemate, mainly because the Afghans simply didn’t get on board in a necessary manner.
But hey, as long as the Afghans think we should keep fighting the good fight, and paying them billions for the privilege of doing so (and the privilege of dodging green on blues. I was far more worried about being killed by my ANSF/ANA/etc ‘partners’ than I ever was of the Taliban). If I had to caption the photo I posted, it would read, ‘with allies like these, who needs enemies?’
2. “...which is now transformed to proxy war with elements of criminal economy...”
Someone get this man some stars on his collar. Astute analysis. Two of the pearls of wisdom are quoted.
1. Great. We’ve wanted to do that for a while. However, all we have to do is convince a few someones that Quetta, Chaman, and Peshawar need to be invaded (probably Rawalpindi, too). I’m sure Pakistan won’t mind. And that’s ok, because (hypothetically) once we go to those cities, Taliban leadership would just push back deeper into Pakistan. So a full blown war with (very nuclear, very unstable) Pakistan might result.
2. To say there are elements of ‘criminal economy’ in Afghanistan is to say there are hints of stripes on the New York Yankees home uniforms. LTG Raziq, who was recently killedby the Taliban, was a THUG. The epitome of a ‘son of a b*tch, but he’s our son of a b*tch’ type of mentality.
As the author is the former Afghan Deputy Minister of Defense, it’s not surprise that the main point of his essay is, “This victory requires a long-term commitment; resources and a decisive military win in the battlefields with a broad-based and credible Afghan partner.”
Translation: keep pumping us with resources. Stalemate all day. Legitimize the Afghan government (downplay corruption and elements of criminal economy). Don’t let the Taliban reassume power”.
Still not sure? Here’s his key to victory.
“The ultimate end of the Afghan war comes with a political settlement but through a decisive military win on the battlefields.”
How many more decisive wins on Afghan battlefields do we need? We’re down to several thousand troops, and we’ve always self-restricted our own capabilities and ROEs. But when ISAF/coalition troops are involved in a tic, they’ve just about always come out on top. However, when there 100,000 of us there, it was still a stalemate, mainly because the Afghans simply didn’t get on board in a necessary manner.
But hey, as long as the Afghans think we should keep fighting the good fight, and paying them billions for the privilege of doing so (and the privilege of dodging green on blues. I was far more worried about being killed by my ANSF/ANA/etc ‘partners’ than I ever was of the Taliban). If I had to caption the photo I posted, it would read, ‘with allies like these, who needs enemies?’
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