Opinion: Don't ignore bad policy and the 'indolent chiefs mess'

Wow! That article was full of naivete, fluff, and is seriously reminiscent of the crappy TQL horsepucky we had to go through many years ago. Obviously this guy has some seriously limited experience to be laying the lazy Chief's mess excuse on the entire Navy.


"The fix is simple: Implement routine face-to-face meetings with the “doers” and “makers” of policy. The face-to-face aspect is key to eliminate the “telephone effect” that occurs when messages are pushed through a lengthy chain of command."

Oh, so it's SIMPLE, huh? As if the "makers" of policy don't have anything else to occupy their time with? If the makers of policy are spending all their time dictating face-to-face with the "doers", then what's the point of having a chain of command in the first place? Sounds a bit more like micromanaging, to me.

Regardless of ET2 Fisher's opinion on the matter, those who got to the upper reaches got there by traveling the path of experience as they advanced over the years. They HAVE the experiences of decades of actual work at the lower echelons to back them up. They rely on that experience, plus the chain of people below them, to make and set policy. They also rely on the chain of people below them to carry out those policies as applicable to each unit. These things aren't made in a vacuum.

Those in the upper echelons are directly responsible for the details of big picture. While it is important that everybody understand what they're doing and why, it's not always necessary that they know all those details of the big picture. They need to know enough to perform their jobs for their staring role in the big picture.

Those in the lower echelons are directly responsible for the details of their roles in supporting the efforts contributing to the big picture.

Not only is it not possible for EVERYBODY to be in on all the details of the big picture, it's not practical for everybody to have that level of knowledge in the first place. Know your job, know it well, and do it well. Trying to bring everybody up to the big picture level of knowledge means you have less time to master your own professional core competencies.

To put it another way, when the reactor has scrammed, the sub is taking on water and sinking, that's a d*mn good time for the Reactor Operator on watch to be damn proficient at performing a Fast Recovery Startup, not be on par with the "makers of policies".


"To fix this cultural malaise, the Navy must tie the feedback from junior sailors of their leadership into leadership’s evaluations. The concept of 360-degree evaluations is not new, but naysayers claim that junior sailors aren’t mature enough or don’t possess the big picture knowledge to give credible feedback."

The Chief running his division? His division's performance speaks for his evaluation. If his division is running well, that speaks well of the Chief. If not, that speaks badly of the Chief.

This seems to be a page right out of TQL. The Navy isn't a corporation and cannot be run like one. The leadership skills required, as well as the followership skills required, are radically different for very real reasons. When one is in port performing maintenance and has a problem, that's a great time for all this feedback from junior Sailors...because that's how we work together as a team to resolve problems and learn.

But when you're deployed, submerged off the coast of Khadzhak Aturdistan doing spook ops and you've been counterdetected with hostiles in the water and air after you, that's NOT the time for the Captain to gather everybody in the Ready Room and discuss how we're going to counter the Romulan attack. It's a time to STFU and do your job like you've been trained to do.


"Mature" junior Sailors are Sailors who take there jobs seriously, learn and execute them to the best of their abilities, continually strive to perform at the next highest level in their profession and rank.


AS TO ALL THOSE "LAZY" CHIEFS:

I remember when I was a Chief Selectee and making the rounds to all the Chiefs at my command. One comment from one of those Chiefs I talked to stuck to me ever since:

"As long as you've been in the Navy, I'm sure you've run across "That Chief", who didn't do his job well or was otherwise not a very good Chief. We all have. Don't be "That Chief"."

If ET2 Fisher REALLY knows Chiefs like that...my challenge to him is to stick around, push his professional and leadership development as required to make Chief himself...and then DON'T BE "THAT CHIEF". The Navy ALWAYS needs good Chiefs.

If he's not doing that, if all he's doing is complaining without acting...then he's a part of the problem and not a part of the solution. And that's just as bad...indeed, it's worse. Because as he moves up, he now becomes all that he says he despises.

At first glance, I was dumbfounded by the "balls" of an ET2 (SW or not) calling a Goat Locker LAZY. But then I had to ask myself if there might be any truth to the article at all. NOPE! If there were the CMDCM would already be hung from the yardarm. It does not take a long investigation to discover that the entire CPO Mess is lazy and not doing its job.

I find that the writer may be correct in some assumptions because Senior leadership may not have had a good idea of what these fleet units were going through - and I do mean Fleet Command, not the CO or the CMC. It is evident that there were many things wrong in these ships, but lazy CPO MESS, I really do not think that is the reason for it.

How many watch stations on the ships that collided were CPO, SCPO or MCPOs. How many were E-6 and below? What was the rank of the OOD and JOOD? Who is responsible for overall shipboard training and readiness? Did these two ships have a MCPOC? Yeah, let’s go for the goat Locker.