The Counterrevolution in Naval Affairs

I like it...and yet I hate it; I'll try and explain why.

Modern warfare is very different from wars of the past. We have technologies that render some strategies virtually obsolete...while creating the need for wholly different ones. The struggle between the services is nothing new, nor does if have any more to do with potential threats, than it does with funding. Ships cost money, planes cost money, personnel cost money, weapon systems cost money, tech costs money. There's a reason the mid-2000s saw Navy and Air Force personnel supplementing Army and Marine Corps personnel on the ground. There are reasons we've seen a shift from compartmentalization to "joint" operations. Yes, it has cost us something valuable...and the General is wise to confront it. However, we can't throw the baby out with the bathwater.

My sense of it is that we need more special operations capable forces, and we need them without reducing the quality or competency of the same. Culturally, it's abhorrent, but that may very well translate to a merging of the missions of the Army and the Marine Corps...as well as the Air Force and the Navy. We need a sustainable, large, deployment ready ground force...and an equally viable strategic power projection force. Ultimately, I think that means redefining roles within all services to focus away from service support, and increasing the focus on warfighting whether that's firing small arms, launching missiles, or dropping bombs.

Interesting but does it fit the enemy it wants - or does it really fit the PRC? Acceptability is something that is a Western thought. It does not take into account that the risk is not in the fighting of a war - but in the ability to complete the war to insure the the CCP maintains power despite the losses.

Interesting article, thank you for sharing.