Training
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Posted on Dec 1, 2017
A congressional perspective on the Fitzgerald, McCain collisions [Commentary]
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This will stir up a hornet's nest CDR (Join to see) LCDR (Join to see) LCDR Rabbah Rona Matlow LCDR (Join to see) LT Brad McInnis LTJG Josh Thaxton CMDCM Gene Treants SCPO David Lockwood SCPO Morris Ramsey CPO Glenn Moss SN Greg Wright
A congressional perspective on the Fitzgerald, McCain collisions [Commentary]
Posted from navytimes.com
Maritime
Training
Budget
Leadership
Congress
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 4
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I am actually for the recommendation that SWOS spend some quality time on a merchant marine ship. A year is probably too long, but 6 months is doable. But, these accidents always come down to 2 things: more missions, inadequate manning. Fix those, add a few different things like the MM option, and you will see a vast change. I will say that the recent accidents have gotten a lot of press, as they should because sailors paid for it with their lives, but the vast majority of USN ships are doing okay. These fixes will increase readiness and capability to all ships. SN Greg Wright
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LT Brad McInnis
SN Greg Wright - How long does the 3rd Mate's Test take to prepare and pass? I would imagine it comes down to time....
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SN Greg Wright
LT Brad McInnis - Well for us, you can't even take it unless 1. You've sailed for a year (and that's day-for-day, not the Navy's version of merely being assigned to a ship, which is why the CG only credits Navy Sailors .5 sea-time) as an unlimited AB (which itself takes probably 3-5 years), or 2, you've graduated from one of the 7 maritime academies. So any newly-minted officer from one of those 7 schools would have it under their belt already. It wouldn't be difficult for USNA to add it as part of their curriculum. Frankly, I'm shocked it's not already since that license could be very valuable to transitioning officers who leave the Navy. Now, say you have all that under your belt, then a good 2 or 3 months of prep and study would be enough for new Ensigns. That said, if the Navy was going to implement it specifically for their officers, I'm sure they'd come up with some pipeline of their own that finished with butter bars sitting for it. Understand that I'm specifically outlining a process for Naval officers. A 3rd mate's license is NOT /nearly/ enough for a new 3rd mate to get a job as a MM. They'd need fire-fighting training. Bridge resource management certification, STCW certification, hazardous cargo certs, Radar and radio certs...the list is pretty extensive and isn't just for MM officers - unlicensed need most of them too.
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LT Brad McInnis
SN Greg Wright - There is something there, though... Learn seamanship from the Masters, and then layer on all the combat specific crap we have to know AFTER you learn the basics.... But, it all comes down to time and money....
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CPO John Dupee
A year IS too long. Six months is too long. Nobody joins the Navy to go somewhere else. Time and Money are the arguments against that. Fine. Then put some OHP Frigates back in service and/or keep a TICO or two around; staffed with some CIVMARS and get to the business of ship handling.
Start routing those young Ensigns through any one of the many MSC ships at the Navy's disposal. No money out of pocket in THAT scenario. TAD 3 to 6 months as 3rd Mate could prove helpful.
One thing our Navy does is rotate the duty DIVO through the CONN on Arrivals and Departures. We are the ONLY Navy that does that. HMS VENGEANCE arrives and the NAVIGATOR is conning the ship - In and Out. EVERY TIME. For the DURATION of the tour. Same with the Dutch and many other European navies. USS WARSHIP gets underway - whoever drew the short straw drives and it's JUST for that evolution, REGARDLESS of skill level. That should change, IMO.
Start routing those young Ensigns through any one of the many MSC ships at the Navy's disposal. No money out of pocket in THAT scenario. TAD 3 to 6 months as 3rd Mate could prove helpful.
One thing our Navy does is rotate the duty DIVO through the CONN on Arrivals and Departures. We are the ONLY Navy that does that. HMS VENGEANCE arrives and the NAVIGATOR is conning the ship - In and Out. EVERY TIME. For the DURATION of the tour. Same with the Dutch and many other European navies. USS WARSHIP gets underway - whoever drew the short straw drives and it's JUST for that evolution, REGARDLESS of skill level. That should change, IMO.
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An interestingly insightful article.
"We, the Navy and Congress, need to look past some of the bullet-point fixes and look at the total problem. For instance, I don’t believe we should add more high-level billets to oversee tasks that should have already been handled by existing staff. Creating more bureaucracy often doesn’t fix a problem. Further, adding a week or two of training to existing classes like the Basic Division Officer Course and the Advanced Division Officer Course isn’t going to fix the lack of ship-handling skills demonstrated by the recent rash of ship collisions and groundings. If we want to improve ship-driving skills, let’s provide an actual training experience on a ship rather than in a simulator, and let’s consider outside, independent credentialing."
Something I don't totally agree with here...aboard submarines, we have a qualification program and part of that qualification program is to actually demonstrate the ability to perform the job one is qualifying at. This includes a number of under-instruction watches which must be stood while performing certain tasks and drills. I'm assuming the surface fleet is much the same.
Like a teen driving a car, we don't just "turn these people loose at the helm". They're given training and must demonstrate a basic competency before actually being qualified to stand the watch on their own. And even so, who is put on what kinds of watches in what circumstances varies based on the skills and competency the person demonstrates as their experience grows. In this instance, you simply don't put junior qualified persons up on the bridge driving the ship in crowded sea lanes without giving them adequate support in the form of more senior qualified people, including their watch team, to do it safely.
ALSO...I notice in all the articles I've read on the subject, nothing was said about the professional attitude of the various individual crewmen on the bridge at the time of the incident. How much horseplay was going on between the watchstanders? How formal was their communications? Was the atmosphere of these crewmen actually focused on the job at hand? I'll bet that there were instances, possibly serious instances, in which this was seriously lacking. Typically, this is a command atmosphere, by which I mean it's something every level of command was slack on.
Standards....they're only as high as your lowest standard.
"We, the Navy and Congress, need to look past some of the bullet-point fixes and look at the total problem. For instance, I don’t believe we should add more high-level billets to oversee tasks that should have already been handled by existing staff. Creating more bureaucracy often doesn’t fix a problem. Further, adding a week or two of training to existing classes like the Basic Division Officer Course and the Advanced Division Officer Course isn’t going to fix the lack of ship-handling skills demonstrated by the recent rash of ship collisions and groundings. If we want to improve ship-driving skills, let’s provide an actual training experience on a ship rather than in a simulator, and let’s consider outside, independent credentialing."
Something I don't totally agree with here...aboard submarines, we have a qualification program and part of that qualification program is to actually demonstrate the ability to perform the job one is qualifying at. This includes a number of under-instruction watches which must be stood while performing certain tasks and drills. I'm assuming the surface fleet is much the same.
Like a teen driving a car, we don't just "turn these people loose at the helm". They're given training and must demonstrate a basic competency before actually being qualified to stand the watch on their own. And even so, who is put on what kinds of watches in what circumstances varies based on the skills and competency the person demonstrates as their experience grows. In this instance, you simply don't put junior qualified persons up on the bridge driving the ship in crowded sea lanes without giving them adequate support in the form of more senior qualified people, including their watch team, to do it safely.
ALSO...I notice in all the articles I've read on the subject, nothing was said about the professional attitude of the various individual crewmen on the bridge at the time of the incident. How much horseplay was going on between the watchstanders? How formal was their communications? Was the atmosphere of these crewmen actually focused on the job at hand? I'll bet that there were instances, possibly serious instances, in which this was seriously lacking. Typically, this is a command atmosphere, by which I mean it's something every level of command was slack on.
Standards....they're only as high as your lowest standard.
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