Posted on Nov 7, 2014
The deployment of up to 1,500 more troops authorized for Iraq.
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Today our President authorized an additional 1500 more troops to Iraq to battle ISIS. If all 1,500 are deployed, it would almost double the American presence in Iraq. The troops will serve in a non-combat role, expanding the U.S. mission of training and advising Iraqi forces, the "Pentagon said". That will include helping Iraqi forces in the highly volatile section of Anbar Province mostly under ISIS control. As reported by NBC.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102129732
So have we passed the point of continually stating "no boots on the ground"? And if our troops are in a high volatile section controlled by ISIS are we really non-combat? Are our troops under any ROE's or are they under direction to not respond to any action that may put them in harms way?
I think we are getting close to the point of no return and the inevitable fight we really don't want to start in country again. Not that it has really ever stopped.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102129732
So have we passed the point of continually stating "no boots on the ground"? And if our troops are in a high volatile section controlled by ISIS are we really non-combat? Are our troops under any ROE's or are they under direction to not respond to any action that may put them in harms way?
I think we are getting close to the point of no return and the inevitable fight we really don't want to start in country again. Not that it has really ever stopped.
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 20
The real question is with the deep cuts to troop levels, where will he find 1500 deployment-ready troops to deploy?
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SGT(P) Harry Clyde Jr.
Recall of Retirees and the Reserves. Thats about all thats left nowadays with the cuts/drawdown.
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SSG Genaro Negrete
The reserve and national guard are going to get hit up. If not, then so long dwell time.
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What kind of authority will American advisors have over Iraqi soldiers?
Since the beginning of time, foreign advisors have often served as de facto commanders, issuing orders directly to the troops or through the mouthpiece of the nominal indigenous commander. In contrast, there are also plenty of historical examples of foreign advisors being ignored by their indigenous charges. Given the Iraq government’s suspicion regarding U.S. motives, what role U.S. advisors will be able to play in guiding Baghdad’s military operations is a critical question.
Since the beginning of time, foreign advisors have often served as de facto commanders, issuing orders directly to the troops or through the mouthpiece of the nominal indigenous commander. In contrast, there are also plenty of historical examples of foreign advisors being ignored by their indigenous charges. Given the Iraq government’s suspicion regarding U.S. motives, what role U.S. advisors will be able to play in guiding Baghdad’s military operations is a critical question.
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SSG Virgil Stripes
You don't win a war by slowly increasing a pitiful few soldiers at a time. You win a war by overwhelming the freaking enemy, surely, swiftly, and decisively.
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SSG Genaro Negrete
SSG Virgil Stripes , very true. It's worked for ISIS.
MSgt (Join to see) , I think with the national emergency Iraqi soldiers are facing, they'd be willing to listen to some advice. In my time over there, many Iraqis, soldiers and civilians, stated that with out US or outside backing for their military (in terms of tactics and logistics) the current national force wouldn't be able to sustain itself for long. Granted, that was only a small sample, but I would be willing to say those Iraqi forces are willing to listen.
MSgt (Join to see) , I think with the national emergency Iraqi soldiers are facing, they'd be willing to listen to some advice. In my time over there, many Iraqis, soldiers and civilians, stated that with out US or outside backing for their military (in terms of tactics and logistics) the current national force wouldn't be able to sustain itself for long. Granted, that was only a small sample, but I would be willing to say those Iraqi forces are willing to listen.
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Those who thought we were through over there are as stupid as the one that pulled everyone out of there.
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SSG Jim Foreman
The POTUS thinks we are all sheep. We follow blindly. As military men/women we know the "advisors" are combat ready and will engage the enemy. My biggest problem is our Government won't commit. If the politicians would stay out of the way we could finish ISIS and clean up that region.
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I said it the day that we left....We'll be back! We should have never left is a state of such array! They were defenseless and we knew it. We tore them down, gave them the tools and never taught them how to use them! Its our fault they are where they are and our duty as humans to pick them back up to where they were
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CW5 (Join to see)
SSG Jeremy Siebenaller, based on the way ISIS rolled there for a while, it does seem that we left things somewhat discombobulated. Thanks for your reply.
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Suspended Profile
MSgt (Join to see).
Precisely what is the total number of these supposedly limited "advisor" boots are now authorized to be in country?
The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in South Vietnam started with 128 advisors in 1950, grew to 342 advisors in 1954, grew again to 685 advisors in 1960, grew again to almost 3,000 advisors in 1962, and grew again to 3,250 advisors in 1963. Following the coup de etat by Maj Gen Nguyen Khan supported by the United States in January 1964 . . . the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) grew to 23,300 advisors by December 1964.
In other words, we advised and supported a corrupt elitist government increasingly alienated from their people from 1950 through 1963 . . . then supported a coup d'etat to replace that totally ineffective government in 1964 . . . then rapidly ramped up US advisor commitment . . . and then US combat troop commitment to unsustainable levels . . . all the while trying to impose our goals, mission, and standards on local government, community, and fighting forces.
Source: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/091/91-6/CMH_Pub_91-6.pdf
What makes anyone think a strategy that ultimately foundered in Vietnam from 1950 to 1975 is any different now?
Warmest Regards, Sandy
Precisely what is the total number of these supposedly limited "advisor" boots are now authorized to be in country?
The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in South Vietnam started with 128 advisors in 1950, grew to 342 advisors in 1954, grew again to 685 advisors in 1960, grew again to almost 3,000 advisors in 1962, and grew again to 3,250 advisors in 1963. Following the coup de etat by Maj Gen Nguyen Khan supported by the United States in January 1964 . . . the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) grew to 23,300 advisors by December 1964.
In other words, we advised and supported a corrupt elitist government increasingly alienated from their people from 1950 through 1963 . . . then supported a coup d'etat to replace that totally ineffective government in 1964 . . . then rapidly ramped up US advisor commitment . . . and then US combat troop commitment to unsustainable levels . . . all the while trying to impose our goals, mission, and standards on local government, community, and fighting forces.
Source: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/091/91-6/CMH_Pub_91-6.pdf
What makes anyone think a strategy that ultimately foundered in Vietnam from 1950 to 1975 is any different now?
Warmest Regards, Sandy
SSG Genaro Negrete
Military efficacy is a product of the politicians either supporting or hamstringing the armed forces. Our government, by it's very design, very rarely reacts swiftly and decisively. Add that to the fact that nation building takes time, time needed to reshape cultural norms, and you have a situation that does not lend itself to a quick, neat solution.
That was the on going debate for withdrawal from Iraq; what does "success" look like.
That was the on going debate for withdrawal from Iraq; what does "success" look like.
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More troops eventually, no doubt about it in my humble opinion.
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Didnt our fathers get their ass's kicked in nam with this sort of thing??? they called it a police action and not a combat action if I am not mistaken.
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