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In a February talk with the Center for Strategic and International studies, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Goldfien stated, “I think in future conflict the victory will go to that individual who can actually turn data to decision.”[1] For me, I couldn’t agree more. However, after having a few discussions with individuals across multiple age groups, questions arise if senior leaders, as of today, are able to actually take data to a decision, or more specifically, the right decision? I ask this because of the underlying question: can our senior leaders see the whole picture?
First, let’s start with a disclaimer that this is not condemning or critiquing any past decisions, current decisions, or the decisions of our senior leaders in the months and years to come. This is an exercise for all leaders, at every level, to self-analyze and see if we may be missing parts of the picture. After all, the world is filled with data today, so really, we must all ask, are we seeing all there is to see?
Danah Boyd of Microsoft Research annotated in a Pew Research article that young minds of today “are being rewired - any shift in stimuli results in a rewiring.”[2] She continues and says that “the techniques and mechanisms to engage in rapid-fire attention shifting will be extremely useful for the creative class whose job is to integrate ideas; they [millennials] relish opportunities to have stimuli that allow them to see things differently.”[3] Additionally, it is important to note here that research supports the fact that the brain is fully matured by age 25.[4]
Now, take into account that stimuli in today’s data heavy world is literally rewiring the synapsis of a young mind and coupling that with a brain reaching full maturity by 25. This gives us a window of time where a young mind can potentially change to the point where they actually see things differently. So we ask, does this rewiring and changing perspective allow them to see more of the picture, the whole picture? By asking this question of our younger generation we can then expand on the original question. If millennials are seeing “more of the picture”, does that mean senior leaders are not?
This question is an important one for today’s extremely turbulent, fast-paced, and hyper-connected world. With hundreds to thousands of new data points being taken into account on our battlefields, our boardrooms, and nearly every other facet of life, we have to wonder if we are living in a technological gap where those that make the decisions are doing so with less than optimal comprehension of the information.
To explore this further, we need to understand the difference between comprehension of the data and just being a user of the data systems. Today, leaders are very consistent in their language and vision that cyber and data will play a vital role in the future of operations. To this point, I would support the fact that our senior leaders are “inclusive users” of data systems. I believe they are able to operate, analyze, and synthesize the data streams that enter their command modules and sphere of influences. I am a firm believer that all senior leaders are lifelong learners as well, therefore enabling them to operate in this environment. However, I question the completeness of their data analysis, or their full comprehension of what the data says. Are leaders able to account for every data point? Would the decision be different, or the outcome change if a missed data point had been accounted for? So, if the answers to these are no, every data point was not accounted for, and yes, the outcome could have been different, then we finish with one more question. What would happen if their senior level experience was coupled with the rapid and large stimulus comprehension of our younger generation? My hypothesis is the decisions, and thereby the outcomes, could be very different.
If senior leaders are missing parts of the story within the data, how do we fix it? Over time, any issues with this could resolve themselves, as junior leaders with the ability to better analyze data become the senior leaders. But for now, it might be interesting to test, or to at least entertain, the idea of restructuring our personnel management to include junior leaders directly into the decision processes of senior leaders. Not as aides, not as interns, not even as analysts, but as individuals who are directly involved in a command team’s decision process. Call them the “technological-gap liaisons” perhaps. Whatever the title may be, the integration of a mind who can rapidly analyze and synthesize data like a mind has never done before, could possible cause a shift in our entire decision-making processes, and thereby the outcomes, as we propel forward into this century.
What do you think?
---
Luke Jenkins an Army LT and Founder of a Veteran Service company called OweYaa.com. He consistently writes and learns on matters pertaining to veteran unemployment/underemployment, strategy, and technology at relates to national defense and the military. These expressed views are his personal thoughts and in no way, reflect any official positions in relation to our armed services.
--
[1]"The Imperatives of Airpower: Challenges for the Next Fight." The Imperatives of Airpower: Challenges for the Next Fight | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed June 12, 2017.
[2] Rainie, Janna Anderson and Lee. "Main findings: Teens, technology, and human potential in 2020." Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. February 28, 2012. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/02/29/main-findings-teens-technology-and-human-potential-in-2020/.
[3] Rainie, Janna Anderson and Lee. "Main findings: Teens, technology, and human potential in 2020." Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. February 28, 2012. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/02/29/main-findings-teens-technology-and-human-potential-in-2020/.
[4] "Young Adult Development Project." HR. Accessed July 06, 2017. http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html.
First, let’s start with a disclaimer that this is not condemning or critiquing any past decisions, current decisions, or the decisions of our senior leaders in the months and years to come. This is an exercise for all leaders, at every level, to self-analyze and see if we may be missing parts of the picture. After all, the world is filled with data today, so really, we must all ask, are we seeing all there is to see?
Danah Boyd of Microsoft Research annotated in a Pew Research article that young minds of today “are being rewired - any shift in stimuli results in a rewiring.”[2] She continues and says that “the techniques and mechanisms to engage in rapid-fire attention shifting will be extremely useful for the creative class whose job is to integrate ideas; they [millennials] relish opportunities to have stimuli that allow them to see things differently.”[3] Additionally, it is important to note here that research supports the fact that the brain is fully matured by age 25.[4]
Now, take into account that stimuli in today’s data heavy world is literally rewiring the synapsis of a young mind and coupling that with a brain reaching full maturity by 25. This gives us a window of time where a young mind can potentially change to the point where they actually see things differently. So we ask, does this rewiring and changing perspective allow them to see more of the picture, the whole picture? By asking this question of our younger generation we can then expand on the original question. If millennials are seeing “more of the picture”, does that mean senior leaders are not?
This question is an important one for today’s extremely turbulent, fast-paced, and hyper-connected world. With hundreds to thousands of new data points being taken into account on our battlefields, our boardrooms, and nearly every other facet of life, we have to wonder if we are living in a technological gap where those that make the decisions are doing so with less than optimal comprehension of the information.
To explore this further, we need to understand the difference between comprehension of the data and just being a user of the data systems. Today, leaders are very consistent in their language and vision that cyber and data will play a vital role in the future of operations. To this point, I would support the fact that our senior leaders are “inclusive users” of data systems. I believe they are able to operate, analyze, and synthesize the data streams that enter their command modules and sphere of influences. I am a firm believer that all senior leaders are lifelong learners as well, therefore enabling them to operate in this environment. However, I question the completeness of their data analysis, or their full comprehension of what the data says. Are leaders able to account for every data point? Would the decision be different, or the outcome change if a missed data point had been accounted for? So, if the answers to these are no, every data point was not accounted for, and yes, the outcome could have been different, then we finish with one more question. What would happen if their senior level experience was coupled with the rapid and large stimulus comprehension of our younger generation? My hypothesis is the decisions, and thereby the outcomes, could be very different.
If senior leaders are missing parts of the story within the data, how do we fix it? Over time, any issues with this could resolve themselves, as junior leaders with the ability to better analyze data become the senior leaders. But for now, it might be interesting to test, or to at least entertain, the idea of restructuring our personnel management to include junior leaders directly into the decision processes of senior leaders. Not as aides, not as interns, not even as analysts, but as individuals who are directly involved in a command team’s decision process. Call them the “technological-gap liaisons” perhaps. Whatever the title may be, the integration of a mind who can rapidly analyze and synthesize data like a mind has never done before, could possible cause a shift in our entire decision-making processes, and thereby the outcomes, as we propel forward into this century.
What do you think?
---
Luke Jenkins an Army LT and Founder of a Veteran Service company called OweYaa.com. He consistently writes and learns on matters pertaining to veteran unemployment/underemployment, strategy, and technology at relates to national defense and the military. These expressed views are his personal thoughts and in no way, reflect any official positions in relation to our armed services.
--
[1]"The Imperatives of Airpower: Challenges for the Next Fight." The Imperatives of Airpower: Challenges for the Next Fight | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed June 12, 2017.
[2] Rainie, Janna Anderson and Lee. "Main findings: Teens, technology, and human potential in 2020." Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. February 28, 2012. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/02/29/main-findings-teens-technology-and-human-potential-in-2020/.
[3] Rainie, Janna Anderson and Lee. "Main findings: Teens, technology, and human potential in 2020." Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. February 28, 2012. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/02/29/main-findings-teens-technology-and-human-potential-in-2020/.
[4] "Young Adult Development Project." HR. Accessed July 06, 2017. http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html.
Senior Leaders
Leadership
Leadership Development
Generation
Command Post
Posted 7 y ago
Responses: 8
9
9
0
What a great point you have here today. In 1985 as a newly promoted CPL, I had a chance encounter with then Commanding Officer of Camp Lejuene, and then to become Commandant of the Marine Corps. I was a marine motor transport driver and Gen Grey need transportation to the Pentagon. He had asked a question, that I forget today, but I remembered my response. Good soldiers, make generals great. And your article of maturing minds made me think of that over 30 years later. Vary seldom do generals actually ask a enlisted man or NCO their point of view. But what we soldiers do to empliment our senior officers command is offend tweeked to get a more efficient result. I can only speak to my Marine Corps experience, but we are told the objective, but not always how to complete the objective. So what I think your emplying is more toward educating future leaders in the early stages of their training not only to continue learning what we have always been taught, but evolving the curriculum to include date, cyber, analytical, and analog ways of working out and emplimenting various military combat and peace time scenarios. But I can't help wondering if we have been subconsciously doing this all along. But we probably should be doing this intentionally through how we train our future leaders. Great article. I can't thank you enough.
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Cpl Thomas Kifer
My family has accepted least five generations of military service. And though I have be put of the Corps for 30 years, I have found that military wisdom helped me through all that life throws at me.
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The Senior Leaders I've observed in the public and private sector hunger for useful information on which to base a decision in a timely manner.
The problem of data versus information is at least as old as automation. Data by itself is useless and can easily overwhelm almost anybody in todays environment. To the useful, data needs to be put in context. That is it needs to be analyzed in light of the problem to be solved. Some, perhaps most, of the available data will have no bearing on the problem at hand. The remaining data must then be analyzed to demonstrate its effect on the potential solution sets.
Time is the second variable. In this case, time is the amount of time available to make a decision and have the desired impact on the operational situation. Sometimes this is referred to as the battle rhythm or OODA Loop. Understanding your OODA Loop and that of your adversary can allow you to make critical decisions quicker than the adversary by decreasing your decision time to less than the enemy's.
I think the capability of younger people to absorb data and convert it to useful information may provide some advantages. The experience of the older senior leader allows them to sort through information more quickly, select the valuable nuggets, and time their decision to have the desired impact.
As early as 2003, the military was talking about Knowledge Management and Knowledge Officers as part of a Senior Leader's staff. Knowledge Management was implemented at Army AMC and some of its subordinate commands in 2009-2012.
Understanding the Senior Leader's information requirements and preferences is always a challenge for the staff. Most of the Generals and SES I observed over nearly 20 years association with senior military staffs tried to lay out the information requirements and preferences. Some liked briefings while others preferred position papers, staff studies, or staff summaries. Some liked information in tabular form while others were fixated on the latest graphics that PowerPoint and Excel could pull together. When time was limited, most preferred face-to-face (in person or VTC) discussion with subject matter experts and senior staff. In the early 21st Century, senior leaders were enamored with near-real-time displays of the tactical or strategic situation on large screens. These displays often didn't present decision-ready information, but rather a satisfying display giving the illusion of knowing where everything was and being in control. They were only as good as the data behind them. As data quality and security improved, the value of the displays improved. For fast-moving units or vehicles, these displays provide information that the leaders need to make critical decisions. Based on their experience they can intuitively interpret the information and make those decisions. Slower moving assets, such as strategic sealift ships, don't require near-real-time decisions in most cases and usually a daily update is all that's needed.
Most Senior Leaders I've observed don't analyze data streams. They leave that to junior officers and technicians. They want information that is meaningful. They appreciate "dashboards" that provide graphical representations of information with frequent updates. They will tell their staff the few (usually six or less) things they want to look at in near-real-time and expect the information technologists to deliver the information. Other information should be available in the background for the senior leader to look at when needed. Sometimes the senior leader will request a deep dive into a subject or problem area allowing them to make more granular decisions or to rethink their critical indicators.
The problem of data versus information is at least as old as automation. Data by itself is useless and can easily overwhelm almost anybody in todays environment. To the useful, data needs to be put in context. That is it needs to be analyzed in light of the problem to be solved. Some, perhaps most, of the available data will have no bearing on the problem at hand. The remaining data must then be analyzed to demonstrate its effect on the potential solution sets.
Time is the second variable. In this case, time is the amount of time available to make a decision and have the desired impact on the operational situation. Sometimes this is referred to as the battle rhythm or OODA Loop. Understanding your OODA Loop and that of your adversary can allow you to make critical decisions quicker than the adversary by decreasing your decision time to less than the enemy's.
I think the capability of younger people to absorb data and convert it to useful information may provide some advantages. The experience of the older senior leader allows them to sort through information more quickly, select the valuable nuggets, and time their decision to have the desired impact.
As early as 2003, the military was talking about Knowledge Management and Knowledge Officers as part of a Senior Leader's staff. Knowledge Management was implemented at Army AMC and some of its subordinate commands in 2009-2012.
Understanding the Senior Leader's information requirements and preferences is always a challenge for the staff. Most of the Generals and SES I observed over nearly 20 years association with senior military staffs tried to lay out the information requirements and preferences. Some liked briefings while others preferred position papers, staff studies, or staff summaries. Some liked information in tabular form while others were fixated on the latest graphics that PowerPoint and Excel could pull together. When time was limited, most preferred face-to-face (in person or VTC) discussion with subject matter experts and senior staff. In the early 21st Century, senior leaders were enamored with near-real-time displays of the tactical or strategic situation on large screens. These displays often didn't present decision-ready information, but rather a satisfying display giving the illusion of knowing where everything was and being in control. They were only as good as the data behind them. As data quality and security improved, the value of the displays improved. For fast-moving units or vehicles, these displays provide information that the leaders need to make critical decisions. Based on their experience they can intuitively interpret the information and make those decisions. Slower moving assets, such as strategic sealift ships, don't require near-real-time decisions in most cases and usually a daily update is all that's needed.
Most Senior Leaders I've observed don't analyze data streams. They leave that to junior officers and technicians. They want information that is meaningful. They appreciate "dashboards" that provide graphical representations of information with frequent updates. They will tell their staff the few (usually six or less) things they want to look at in near-real-time and expect the information technologists to deliver the information. Other information should be available in the background for the senior leader to look at when needed. Sometimes the senior leader will request a deep dive into a subject or problem area allowing them to make more granular decisions or to rethink their critical indicators.
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2LT (Join to see)
Sir, thank you for the great response! It is wonderful to know that this is something that the military has been thinking about. To my point I am trying to invoke the question of how would the decisions be different if the information didn't have to be synthesized and put presentations for the senior command to see only the "important nuggets." When we do things like this we are putting in levels where information gets screened out before it makes it to the decision maker. Which, to your point, has to be done because of the time constraints. This is why it would be an interesting concept to integrate minds that can process more data in shorter periods of time directly at the decision level. This means more information at the final decision point can be taken into account, likely changing the decision. Thanks again for the response, lots of great information in it!
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Lt Col Jim Coe
2LT (Join to see) - Not to nit pick too much, but the issue isn't more information for the decision maker, it's more of the needed information for the decision maker at the right time and place in the decision cycle, the OODO loop. Let me try to put together an example:
An Air Force AMC Commander (O-10) has a dynamic near-real-time display of all the AMC transport and tanker missions on his desktop. He usually doesn't pay much attention to it because he knows this is tactical level information that doesn't deserve his very valuable time. He has an appointment in 10 minutes with his Director of Operations (an O-8). He looks at the display for a few seconds as a distraction from the endless stream of paperwork on his desk and hundreds of unanswered e-mails. His experience as a pilot, Squadron Operations Officer, Squadron Commander, Operations Group Commander, and Wing Commander helps him understand what he's seeing. He pans over to the missions in the USCENTCOM AOR and drills in on a C-17 Container Delivery System airdrop in Afghanistan. At this moment the symbology on the display changes telling him the mission is aborted and the aircraft is returning to its departure airport. The drill-down information doesn't tell why the mission was aborted (the mission command technicians haven't had time to fill in the remarks fields in the flight tracking system that would provide that information yet). He pulls up the weather overlay and sees that the weather in what he assumes to be the objective area is good with clear skies and light winds. About this time, the Director of Operations is ushered into the Commander's office.
The Director of Operations, who also is a pilot with laudatory command experience, came to the Commander to get a required waiver to the maximum flying hour per month rule in an AMC Regulation. The Air Force-wide shortage of pilots is requiring the C-17 flying squadrons to task their pilots at a level that will exceed the monthly maximum. A Commander's waiver is required. The paperwork has been on the Commander's desk for a week and the Maj Gen is there to get it moving before the end of the month.
With the scenario above, take a guess as to what the Commander and Director of Operations are going to spend the next 20 minutes talking about. What will be the effect on the flying squadrons? What will be the effect on the mission command system? Will the Generals be sucked into making decisions at the Major Command Level about an individual mission? Was this an information problem or a leadership problem?
An Air Force AMC Commander (O-10) has a dynamic near-real-time display of all the AMC transport and tanker missions on his desktop. He usually doesn't pay much attention to it because he knows this is tactical level information that doesn't deserve his very valuable time. He has an appointment in 10 minutes with his Director of Operations (an O-8). He looks at the display for a few seconds as a distraction from the endless stream of paperwork on his desk and hundreds of unanswered e-mails. His experience as a pilot, Squadron Operations Officer, Squadron Commander, Operations Group Commander, and Wing Commander helps him understand what he's seeing. He pans over to the missions in the USCENTCOM AOR and drills in on a C-17 Container Delivery System airdrop in Afghanistan. At this moment the symbology on the display changes telling him the mission is aborted and the aircraft is returning to its departure airport. The drill-down information doesn't tell why the mission was aborted (the mission command technicians haven't had time to fill in the remarks fields in the flight tracking system that would provide that information yet). He pulls up the weather overlay and sees that the weather in what he assumes to be the objective area is good with clear skies and light winds. About this time, the Director of Operations is ushered into the Commander's office.
The Director of Operations, who also is a pilot with laudatory command experience, came to the Commander to get a required waiver to the maximum flying hour per month rule in an AMC Regulation. The Air Force-wide shortage of pilots is requiring the C-17 flying squadrons to task their pilots at a level that will exceed the monthly maximum. A Commander's waiver is required. The paperwork has been on the Commander's desk for a week and the Maj Gen is there to get it moving before the end of the month.
With the scenario above, take a guess as to what the Commander and Director of Operations are going to spend the next 20 minutes talking about. What will be the effect on the flying squadrons? What will be the effect on the mission command system? Will the Generals be sucked into making decisions at the Major Command Level about an individual mission? Was this an information problem or a leadership problem?
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2LT (Join to see) A division commander would appear, briefly chat with an Infantry squad or Mortar crew and vanish. He had heard what the Soldiers had to say! Other division commanders could not engage verbally troops, communicate w/ nor learn from them. In my eyes, the ability to communicate with Soldiers is vitally important!
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It is an evolutionary process, and those junior leaders of today will be the senior leaders of tomorrow, faced with the same constraints and opportunities. Can anyone see the entire picture? I seriously doubt it. I hope, though, that senior leaders can see the broad horizon, if you will. But still, how much data/information, as rapidly as it reproduces today, can any one individual digest? You can analyze till the proverbial cows come home, but at some point decisions have to be made. If you can't do that--and that generally takes a degree of maturity and experience, you are dead in the water. Or, as Nixon once put it, you'll suffer paralysis through analysis.
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2LT (Join to see)
Very true, and I love the Nixon quote because I myself am an action guy. Get your sight picture and shoot. But I still think it's interesting to ask what the decisions would look like if someone directly making he decision is taking in account say 50 data points vs a bulleted list of say maybe 10-15 data points. Could
Change a lot.
Change a lot.
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MSgt (Join to see)
I think that both sides of this coin are valid... The experience of senior officers has in-theory been earned through years of hard work, gleaning information and SA and having the ability to make a decision from said gouge. However, I can also see that having a human "data mine" (or at least a human with immediate access to the data and ability to filter that data expediently and intelligently) would be beneficial... with a slight modification to the CSAF's idea: Capitalize on the CGO and SNCO experience and youth but don't just have one general data-ist, have a data SME from each of the functional areas. So a Capt and SNCO for A1, same for A2, A3, etc... for each area that applies to the decision at hand. This way, senior leaders can game-out the decision along several tracks given the data AND more recent tactical/operational SME experience that is on-hand for this decision. How many times do we say "don't design this in a vacuum [bubble]"? With the sheer amount of macro data available these days, I think our senior leaders would probably welcome some more immediate and relevant advisors. Thoughts?
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Lol... In the fast paced technological world we are advancing too... in relationship to a real world combat zone and war... mehopesthat... Technological advanced snowflake/millennial generational soldiers will understand a simple concept. "You will be shot, bombed, cut, hurt, bleed and possibly die on the battlefield...unless you actually kill, maim, destroy or incapacitate the sumbitches who are trying to kill you".
Unless your beating the enemy to death with the wireless laptop that you hoped would kill him via the newest internet gaming program you just invented and programmed through virtual reality... or your in the middle of tossing a temper tantrum yelling life isn't fair over your friends not winning best in class at a comic-con dress up hero's show... battles are won essentially by killing and incapacitating the enemy.
Just sayin'....
Unless your beating the enemy to death with the wireless laptop that you hoped would kill him via the newest internet gaming program you just invented and programmed through virtual reality... or your in the middle of tossing a temper tantrum yelling life isn't fair over your friends not winning best in class at a comic-con dress up hero's show... battles are won essentially by killing and incapacitating the enemy.
Just sayin'....
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2LT (Join to see)
Interesting point. You are right in the fact that winning on the battle field comes down to inflicting more damage to the enemy then your formation. My question as it relates to the article is what conditions needed to be set before you were able to close width and destroy the enemy? Those conditions involve decisions and data, logistics, control systems, and a long chain of action tasks. Do you think you would have been more equipped to win on the battlefield if the individuals setting those conditions full understood the requirements? That's the question being asked here
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SSgt Clare May
2LT (Join to see) - Sure it does 2LT...Every single job in the military is critical...vital... every single one. No matter how tall or short, young or old, fat or skinny, no matter what race, religion or sex or national origin. Every single task being performed has and should be geared around one and only one issue. Win the battle, Win the Wars.
K.I.S.S. takes hold about right now... Keep It Simple Stupid. Every military job is about one thing. Winning. Everyone entering the services should know the bottom line is this. We exist because we won wars. We killed maimed and incapacitated a lot of people to insure we exist. We will kill others and destroy or maim them and incapacitate them in the future in order to achieve success. We have no other than can save us or anyone else we can fall back on to insure our success.
Our military should not be distracted about any issues other that train to win and succeed at war. If any issue rises that distracts our military, rid the distraction ASAP. Distractions do not win wars. Infighting or bickering that my job is better than yours, or my job is more critical than yours is ...a distraction. Inter-service rivalry's are different issues.
Every job in our military is a critical need. Sometimes we dont need to muddy waters and sideline Generals because an E-1 feels good about voicing an opinion that matters not one bit to gain success in war. Sometimes "the want to know" is overruled by "the need to know".
Then there another side... 2nd Lt'.'s fresh out of school making decisions based not on first hand knowledge of senior non coms under their command who have been in the trenches, working the wars, ones who have been playing the art of war, sometimes 15 years before the student 2Lt graduated kindergarden.
Boot camps exist to "REWIRE" the thought process to build and maintain a strong US military through discipline. Underestimating the enemy is the politicians job... not the military's. I hope that our politicians never underestimate the enemy "IF" a war is fought on our own soil.
I hope the supply Sgt. dosen't get paper shy & intimidated handing our resupply ammo, nor the typist gets too many finger cuts or arthritic fingers typing out requisition orders for contractors to supply ammo to the supply Sgt. I hope the E1-E2 driving the semi truck full of ammo from the contractor remembers how to shift gears into highway speeds... or the fella working pre load remembers how to pull those little red flags on sidewinders without having to send in 17 forms in triplicate to pull that little red flag...
Combat readiness...military dependability to win wars depends on every single military job position.
Just sayin'...
K.I.S.S. takes hold about right now... Keep It Simple Stupid. Every military job is about one thing. Winning. Everyone entering the services should know the bottom line is this. We exist because we won wars. We killed maimed and incapacitated a lot of people to insure we exist. We will kill others and destroy or maim them and incapacitate them in the future in order to achieve success. We have no other than can save us or anyone else we can fall back on to insure our success.
Our military should not be distracted about any issues other that train to win and succeed at war. If any issue rises that distracts our military, rid the distraction ASAP. Distractions do not win wars. Infighting or bickering that my job is better than yours, or my job is more critical than yours is ...a distraction. Inter-service rivalry's are different issues.
Every job in our military is a critical need. Sometimes we dont need to muddy waters and sideline Generals because an E-1 feels good about voicing an opinion that matters not one bit to gain success in war. Sometimes "the want to know" is overruled by "the need to know".
Then there another side... 2nd Lt'.'s fresh out of school making decisions based not on first hand knowledge of senior non coms under their command who have been in the trenches, working the wars, ones who have been playing the art of war, sometimes 15 years before the student 2Lt graduated kindergarden.
Boot camps exist to "REWIRE" the thought process to build and maintain a strong US military through discipline. Underestimating the enemy is the politicians job... not the military's. I hope that our politicians never underestimate the enemy "IF" a war is fought on our own soil.
I hope the supply Sgt. dosen't get paper shy & intimidated handing our resupply ammo, nor the typist gets too many finger cuts or arthritic fingers typing out requisition orders for contractors to supply ammo to the supply Sgt. I hope the E1-E2 driving the semi truck full of ammo from the contractor remembers how to shift gears into highway speeds... or the fella working pre load remembers how to pull those little red flags on sidewinders without having to send in 17 forms in triplicate to pull that little red flag...
Combat readiness...military dependability to win wars depends on every single military job position.
Just sayin'...
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Danah mentions that the brains of young people are being rewired. This refers to creation of new neural pathways in the brain. It is precisely what treatment for PTSD aims to do. Deployed personnel who ate in combat roles vome back home with brains that have been rewired based on their experiences during their TDY. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) deactivates the neural pathways that have been established during combat and helps with the creation of new neural pathways that promote healing and a return to normalcy.
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Barbara Maxwell
Yes-- It is a process that involves a lot of practice and repetition. Conditions of high stress over time literally change the way the brain processes information. Therapy aims to interrupt the stress-induced processing pathways and return the way input is perceived to pre-deployment neural pathways.
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2LT (Join to see)
Please expand on your thoughts! No to the initial question or no to the concept? Thanks!
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MSgt Jason McClish
I don't think senior leaders are seeing the whole picture at all. Senior leaders are primarily focusing on strategic missions, policies, etc. That's what they're paid for and have been in the strategic realm more than likely over a decade. General Officers and senior civilians in the DoD are not tacticians or operationists. Those leaders are in different ranks. Tactical, operational, and strategic areas of the military have different hierarchies, and for good reason. Does the Service Chief need to know what's happening at the squad or element level? Ummm, no. Should those in the squads or elements know what's going on at the strategic level? To some degree, I would say definitely. All service members need that 'buy in', so they can understand the 'why' from the orders. Oftentimes, that isn't communicated to the tactician very well, of at all.
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PO1 Tony Holland
Interesting point. Sometimes the problem in a two-way flow of information is due to the tendency to limit and filter so as to appear to be an expert or to shore up one's importance in the overall scheme of things, thus becoming indispensable.
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LT Jenkins,
Both junior and senior leaders play a part in your depicted scenario...I agree. What is important for both is listening skills and respect so that egos do not get in the way of the need for the operation. That is one of the reasons for my PhD dissertation: "Overcoming the Adverse Impact of Internal Sub-Culture Communications Within Organizations." All organizations (military or civilian) experience some of this. Some of what you depict is the reason for it. Others are fear, obsolescence, acceptance, and dialogue so that understanding forms the baseline for decisions.
Both junior and senior leaders play a part in your depicted scenario...I agree. What is important for both is listening skills and respect so that egos do not get in the way of the need for the operation. That is one of the reasons for my PhD dissertation: "Overcoming the Adverse Impact of Internal Sub-Culture Communications Within Organizations." All organizations (military or civilian) experience some of this. Some of what you depict is the reason for it. Others are fear, obsolescence, acceptance, and dialogue so that understanding forms the baseline for decisions.
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LTC Terrence Farrier, PhD
Thanks. You picked a great subject and more and more government and civilian companies are starting to understand its relevance to their bottom lines. Feel free to reach out for more.
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