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SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL
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LTC Eric Udouj
LTC Eric Udouj
4 y
I totally enjoyed listening to it and did get me thinking!
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LCDR Joshua Gillespie
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Ah, the ancient paradox. I believe the simplest way to understand it is that leadership is about mastering the junction between knowledge, experience, and purpose. Some may assume (and I think rather incorrectly) that the process of vetting junior officers imparts some level of intrinsic "ability" based on knowledge. The reality is that no true JO (lacking significant prior enlisted experience) arrives at their first platoon or division with ANY knowledge. The real "vetting" they've been through was only to identify and hone potential. Ostensibly, they are persons of altruism and character, who though young... are willing to accept ever greater levels of responsibility within a certain sphere as they earn it. The NCOs are the one's with both the knowledge, and the experience to use it effectively. They are ALSO very often persons of very high altruism and character who have readily accepted ever greater responsibility as THEY earned it...

... so why do we even NEED officers?

The answer, I believe, is that there is an intentional and objective "rift" maintained towards one purpose: duality within the decision making process. I could further point to recent events as evidence that this time-tested and critical "rift" is fading... and offer possible "pros" and "cons" resulting from it. Modern JOs are (with notable exceptions who usually pay the price) entering their careers with a trained-in, and deep-seated respect for their SNCOs. Their heroes are no longer colonels, generals, and admirals... but enlisted men who through sacrifice, bravery, and endurance have fought our nation's wars. I believe this means that for many, their first duty station is viewed as just another "training module"; one in which they are presumed to be "stupid", "careless", and even "dangerous"... because their Platoon Sergeant will always be there to "catch" them and put them back on course. Many logically infer then that "at some point down the road", they will possess "enough" of that knowledge and experience to finally be "real" officers. This too, I believe, is false.

The reality is that if a captain or major arrives at a command genuinely believing they've amassed enough "wisdom via osmosis" from their former platoon and company NCOs... there are only two results: Either they will try to "mirror" the decision making process of an SNCO (and come off as being "fake") or they will attempt to "match" the SNCOs influence and authority (which will only make them appear arrogant). The former usually find their careers cut short; the latter usually end up being hated by the very people they believe they deeply admire.

I think the "right" result is when a JO understands that despite their inexperience and ignorance.. they ARE the Platoon Leader, and that they will NEVER be the equal of the Platoon Sergeant. Such officers learn as quickly as they can to fulfill the role they are paid to serve. As they advance, they maintain the same perspective: they are there to do their job... and the NCOs are there to do theirs. This will naturally lead to varying levels of conflict... conflict which creates pause, reconsideration, and recalculation. Executed properly, this means that even a four-star general will continue to listen to his very senior enlisted leadership... as they will continue to ultimately follow his orders.
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SFC Sr. Instructor
SFC (Join to see)
4 y
That's an interesting take on the situation. My own impression of the interesting "problem" of mentoring junior officers seems to be a disconnect between what they where taught to be as they metriculated vice what their actual role is in the service. Cadets seem to be primarily groomed to be squad/small group leaders while in school and training. From the enlisted side, it is sure entertaining to watch a new Platoon Leader try to take the reigns of first line leadership, rather than rely on those already performing those duties to get on with it. However, it's incumbent on those NCO's to be trustworthy enough to allow those JOs comfortable allowing them to continue doing their jobs.

With a proper relationship between PL and PSG, the Platoon Sergeant better be explaining things and how they work. The Platoon Leader (or any officer) ought to be sharing their vision of where they want to go, and then taking the feedback they receive in to account as reality dashes those initial visions to pieces.

At all times though, there is not any greater need for anything than communication.
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LCDR Joshua Gillespie
LCDR Joshua Gillespie
4 y
SFC (Join to see) - Extremely well said. I was blessed with some extremely good divisional NCOs as a JO. My first Chief and I also shared a great deal in common in terms of background...and perhaps that helped with communicating and working together-I'd like to think we even became good friends. For a short time, due to manning issues, I went without a division chief... and was fortunate enough to have had a very strong LPO who could fill those shoes in the interim. One of the best NCOs I served with, would often go out of his way to teach me the "nuts and bolts" of what the guys were doing ... and that made it a great deal easier for me to step into my own role when appropriate. I have however seen the opposite... where there is an invisible "wall" being built, and the goal seems to be keeping the JO "out of the loop", and "out of the way". Sometimes, that would work "ok" for a while... but when things went pear shaped, all it served was to leave an officer to bear the brunt for errors he wasn't really equipped to have prevented, and enlisted personnel who felt they were serving under a weak, disjointed chain of command.
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SFC Ralph E Kelley
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Excellent Post. Disagree with some but think that's differences in
Style and Ignorance vs-vs Techniques and Brute Force.
Did I get that right? :D
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