Posted on Feb 17, 2020
OSC Busts Oakland VA Regional Office 14,000 Claim Blunder
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Will you accept my apology? I had a few drinks. Today I am sober. I love being sober but it is lonely and sad when you read some of these things. I did not join the Navy to offend anyone. Infact I thought I would have such a nice career serving my country 18. Risk it all against the enemy you know!! But I did not know my enlistment would be targeted as not being worthy of protection at the VA of which I was in since 2013. They were investigated by OIG itself in headline news. Google Oakland Regional VA 2015. That was a 5 year battle for me. The last 5 years of my fathers life. A father I had only recently got in touch with. He was missing since I was 10 years old approximately. He had medical issues we found out. We later found out he was a Vietnam Combat Vet Infantry Army.
I was specifically denied benefits that would of let me be grounded and feel protected and spend time with my father as a son with support, 2 veterans reconnecting, FAMILY.
Time time again I was denied confused upset finally talking about the ship and what happened and my attempted Navy ARmy Transfer that was medically disqualired by MEPS. In those 5 years I was living with a landlord who was trying to have sex with me and the doctors at the VA were taking note of it, that I had no money to move and was already on SSDI for psych depression etc....
There main talking point was I had a reserve enlistment and that was the reason for denail time and time again. A sea service ribbon on deployments, No matter if I served 5 years assigned to Active Duty Guided Missile Frigates. My honorable discharge was different then the other guys on on the ship. My training in a category that will leave you in the streets wondering what happened.
There main reason using my reserve enlistment against me know was doubling down! THe reason I got injured and an anxiety issue that led to my Navy ARmy Transfer being disqualifed is because I was part time for those 5 years on the ship. WHich makes you go into warp speed mentally and physically holding your breath literally heart pounding not sure what to expect on duty as you are getting throwin to things you never encoutered before sporadically continuously for years with full time sailors who dont have much or no wiggle room for your lack of experience.
The Navy had actually reported a lot on this and made some intersting reports at the Navy College. Here is 1 quote!
1983 September
CNA Center Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A TOTAL FORCE PERSPECTIVE
Deborah Clay-Mendez
“Sea and Air Mariners are non-prior service recruits who take the Recruit Training Course (Bootcamp) and directly into the SELRES without service in the active force.”
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAMs may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that no previous experience a rating could be earned through only part time On-Job-Training.”
1985 Development of a new screening table for Sea/Air Mariners.
Scott, Dwight F. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
A. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT
A paper written at the Air Command and Staff College,
Washington, D.C., by Arthur MoKon stressed the effects of
active Navy policies on the SELRES forces in consonance with
the total force concept (integration of active and reserve
capabilities to maximize military effectiveness). CRef. 291
This total force concept is closely related to the all-
volunteer force concept, in the sense that the total force
policy assigned increased roles and responsibility to the
reserves and the termination of the draft ended the major
incentive for reserve enlistments. Moxon's major points
were:
4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the active forces because reserve personnel train only part—time and must retain skills over longer periods with less practice and supervision. CRef. 303 "
I honor all that sacrifice. I know the VA has a tasking that is large. There are good people that are at the VA.
You want to read a bit more of the ships the NRF FFGs I was on and the SAM Sea Air Mariner enlistment then here is all the reports
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
“Total Force Policy”
“In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be exploited.”
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve . The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )
Command Naval Surface Reserve Force COMNAVSURFRESFOR believes that it has been short suited in people and money for its programs.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and responsibility.
1995 5040.1 1998 5040.1A Department of Navy
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of Selective Reserve SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units require that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.
TELL THE TRUTH! CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE
ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE'S SURFACE
ASSETS?
by
Thomas M. Rossi
Lieutenant Commander, U.S, Navy
The FFG is a relatively low cost surface combatant whose
primary mission areas are anti-submarine warfare, anti-air
warfare, and anti-surface warfare.
In 1987 a policy of "horizontal integration" was adopted
which directed the assignment of modern ships and aircraft to the
Naval Reserve.7 By 1992, a total of 35 ships were transferred to
the NRF including 16 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (FFGs).
These 16 NRF FFGs are currently assigned equally to each coast
and, as previously stated, comprise over 31% of the United States
Navy's surface combatant escort force.
As the military forces of the 1990's "rightsize", the
importance of the reserve force's contribution within each
service component cannot be overstated. In a recent message to
the entire Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda,
proclaimed:
"In the smaller Navy of today and in the future, it takes
everything and everybody working together to accomplish the
mission. 1994 was full of examples with daily contributions
by reservists (seabees, frigates, logistics and tactical
aircraft, medical intelligence and more) working side by
side with Active counterparts"
On top of
this minimum manning policy imposed upon the entire FFG-7 class
of ships, the active duty crew permanently assigned to NRF FFGs
is manned to only 70% of the Active Force FFG's manning
allowance. The following table illustrates the differences in
manning levels:
It is amazing these ships get underway and accomplish what they
do with the reduced active duty manning level and sporadic Selres
total component training they must endure.1
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct
corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.
Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
15
CONCLUSION
"I maintain, based on 27 months in command of one, that the
NRF FFGs are not, and should not be expected to be, fully
combat ready for immediate deployment into a high threat
area, under the present "system". Our manning and
employment policies are detrimental to their wartime combat
readiness. They will never be equal to their active sisterships
immediately upon mobilization because the selected
reservists (SELRES) portion of the crew receives neither the
quantity nor the quality of training received by their
active duty counterparts, neither as part of the "team" nor
as individual crewmembers. "30
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
A ship is an independent, self-sustaining city which
requires, not only the complete integration of its crew, but the
coordinated orchestration of qualified professionals to sustain
safe and effective operations at sea. Navy manning doctrine
directs the assignment of only the minimum number of men and
women to ships in specific ratings and billets required to
provide each ship with the opportunity to succeed at sea. In
short, there is very little room for unqualified or untrained
sailors at sea. So why then do we man 16 of the 51 ships in the
FFG-7 class to only 70% of their allotted manning and say, if
needed in a time of national crisis, we will augment these crews
with quality personnel who have less than 24 days of integrated
team training each year?
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN)
The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms
of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a
vi
mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the
former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of
capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to
offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath
of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve
to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the
end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet
declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not
require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in
standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to
deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate
ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
10 USC 511(d)
“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.”
From Title 10—ARMED FORCES
Ch. 79: CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS
§1552. Correction of military records: claims incident thereto
(2) In the case of a former member described in paragraph (1) or a former member whose application for relief is based in whole or in part on matters relating to post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury as supporting rationale or as justification for priority consideration, the Secretary concerned shall expedite a final decision and shall accord such cases sufficient priority to achieve an expedited resolution. In determining the priority of cases, the Secretary concerned shall weigh the medical and humanitarian circumstances of all cases and accord higher priority to cases not involving post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury only when the individual cases are considered more compelling.
(e) In the case of a former member of the armed forces (other than a former member covered by subsection (d)) who was diagnosed while serving in the armed forces as experiencing a mental health disorder, a board established under this section to review the former member's discharge or dismissal shall include a member who is a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a physician with special training on mental health disorders.
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS
MANUAL
JULY 1995
Redress Of Wrongs -
Systemic weaknesses or management problems disclosed dur-ing the investigation must be reported.
Accountability - Commanders, commanding officers, and supervisors have the duty to hold their subordinates accountable for their ac-tions and to correct systemic faults.
Complaints from individuals seeking relief from adverse personnel or disciplinary actions, unfavorable findings in discrimination cases, or other mat-ters for which a statute or regulation sets forth a resolution process, should be accepted for IG investigation only when coupled with a non-frivolous allegation that the chain of command is unable or unwilling to address the matter fairly and impartially for reasons related to conflicts of interest
However, IG organiza-tions should be sensitive to complaints or requests that indicate systemic problems may exist that should be addressed through an IG investigation or inspection.
DoN. However, the mission of DoN IG organizations does not include assistance in the correction of wrongs in individual cases absent special circumstances such as reprisal or systemic problems. Because DoN IG organizations are not advocates for individuals, complaints about actions personal to individuals should be carefully screened for referral to other DoN organizations that are a more appropriate forum. In such cases, every reasonable effort should be made to direct individuals to the proper organization to address their concerns. When an individual's complaint of wrong is a proper subject for IG investigation, it is appropriate for an IG organization to recom-mend the command consider remedial action that makes the complainant "whole."
SYSTEMIC WEAKNESS REPORTS
DEFINITION
During the course of investigating and prosecuting health care fraud, systemic weaknesses or vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement are sometimes discovered in health care benefit programs.¹ A systemic weakness is one that is judged to be a fundamental problem that requires corrective action through administrative, regulatory, legislative or policy change. A systemic weakness report should be prepared whenever a policy, procedure or systems process fails to prevent, detect or minimize losses due to fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement in health care benefit programs
NAVPERS 15560
4. Basic Criteria for Determining Humanitarian/Hardship
Situations.
a. A severe hardship exists, ot normally encountered an
resolved by other members of the Naval Service.
1983 September
CNA Center Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A TOTAL FORCE PERSPECTIVE
Deborah Clay-Mendez
“Sea and Air Mariners are non-prior service recruits who take the Recruit Training Course (Bootcamp) and directly into the SELRES without service in the active force.”
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAMs may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that no previous experience a rating could be earned through only part time On-Job-Training.”
1985 Development of a new screening table for Sea/Air Mariners.
Scott, Dwight F. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
A. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT
A paper written at the Air Command and Staff College,
Washington, D.C., by Arthur MoKon stressed the effects of
active Navy policies on the SELRES forces in consonance with
the total force concept (integration of active and reserve
capabilities to maximize military effectiveness). CRef. 291
This total force concept is closely related to the all-
volunteer force concept, in the sense that the total force
policy assigned increased roles and responsibility to the
reserves and the termination of the draft ended the major
incentive for reserve enlistments. Moxon's major points
were:
4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the active forces because reserve personnel train only part—time and must retain skills over longer periods with less practice and supervision. CRef. 303 "
1995 DOD Manpower Requirement Reports
900 SAM Sea Air Mariner (less than 1% of manpower)
Naval Reserve Manpower
The Sea Air Mariner program, a non prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meets its junior enlisted mobilization Requirements is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled Veteran personnel
I was specifically denied benefits that would of let me be grounded and feel protected and spend time with my father as a son with support, 2 veterans reconnecting, FAMILY.
Time time again I was denied confused upset finally talking about the ship and what happened and my attempted Navy ARmy Transfer that was medically disqualired by MEPS. In those 5 years I was living with a landlord who was trying to have sex with me and the doctors at the VA were taking note of it, that I had no money to move and was already on SSDI for psych depression etc....
There main talking point was I had a reserve enlistment and that was the reason for denail time and time again. A sea service ribbon on deployments, No matter if I served 5 years assigned to Active Duty Guided Missile Frigates. My honorable discharge was different then the other guys on on the ship. My training in a category that will leave you in the streets wondering what happened.
There main reason using my reserve enlistment against me know was doubling down! THe reason I got injured and an anxiety issue that led to my Navy ARmy Transfer being disqualifed is because I was part time for those 5 years on the ship. WHich makes you go into warp speed mentally and physically holding your breath literally heart pounding not sure what to expect on duty as you are getting throwin to things you never encoutered before sporadically continuously for years with full time sailors who dont have much or no wiggle room for your lack of experience.
The Navy had actually reported a lot on this and made some intersting reports at the Navy College. Here is 1 quote!
1983 September
CNA Center Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A TOTAL FORCE PERSPECTIVE
Deborah Clay-Mendez
“Sea and Air Mariners are non-prior service recruits who take the Recruit Training Course (Bootcamp) and directly into the SELRES without service in the active force.”
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAMs may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that no previous experience a rating could be earned through only part time On-Job-Training.”
1985 Development of a new screening table for Sea/Air Mariners.
Scott, Dwight F. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
A. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT
A paper written at the Air Command and Staff College,
Washington, D.C., by Arthur MoKon stressed the effects of
active Navy policies on the SELRES forces in consonance with
the total force concept (integration of active and reserve
capabilities to maximize military effectiveness). CRef. 291
This total force concept is closely related to the all-
volunteer force concept, in the sense that the total force
policy assigned increased roles and responsibility to the
reserves and the termination of the draft ended the major
incentive for reserve enlistments. Moxon's major points
were:
4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the active forces because reserve personnel train only part—time and must retain skills over longer periods with less practice and supervision. CRef. 303 "
I honor all that sacrifice. I know the VA has a tasking that is large. There are good people that are at the VA.
You want to read a bit more of the ships the NRF FFGs I was on and the SAM Sea Air Mariner enlistment then here is all the reports
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
“Total Force Policy”
“In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be exploited.”
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve . The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )
Command Naval Surface Reserve Force COMNAVSURFRESFOR believes that it has been short suited in people and money for its programs.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and responsibility.
1995 5040.1 1998 5040.1A Department of Navy
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of Selective Reserve SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units require that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.
TELL THE TRUTH! CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE
ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE'S SURFACE
ASSETS?
by
Thomas M. Rossi
Lieutenant Commander, U.S, Navy
The FFG is a relatively low cost surface combatant whose
primary mission areas are anti-submarine warfare, anti-air
warfare, and anti-surface warfare.
In 1987 a policy of "horizontal integration" was adopted
which directed the assignment of modern ships and aircraft to the
Naval Reserve.7 By 1992, a total of 35 ships were transferred to
the NRF including 16 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (FFGs).
These 16 NRF FFGs are currently assigned equally to each coast
and, as previously stated, comprise over 31% of the United States
Navy's surface combatant escort force.
As the military forces of the 1990's "rightsize", the
importance of the reserve force's contribution within each
service component cannot be overstated. In a recent message to
the entire Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda,
proclaimed:
"In the smaller Navy of today and in the future, it takes
everything and everybody working together to accomplish the
mission. 1994 was full of examples with daily contributions
by reservists (seabees, frigates, logistics and tactical
aircraft, medical intelligence and more) working side by
side with Active counterparts"
On top of
this minimum manning policy imposed upon the entire FFG-7 class
of ships, the active duty crew permanently assigned to NRF FFGs
is manned to only 70% of the Active Force FFG's manning
allowance. The following table illustrates the differences in
manning levels:
It is amazing these ships get underway and accomplish what they
do with the reduced active duty manning level and sporadic Selres
total component training they must endure.1
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct
corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.
Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
15
CONCLUSION
"I maintain, based on 27 months in command of one, that the
NRF FFGs are not, and should not be expected to be, fully
combat ready for immediate deployment into a high threat
area, under the present "system". Our manning and
employment policies are detrimental to their wartime combat
readiness. They will never be equal to their active sisterships
immediately upon mobilization because the selected
reservists (SELRES) portion of the crew receives neither the
quantity nor the quality of training received by their
active duty counterparts, neither as part of the "team" nor
as individual crewmembers. "30
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
A ship is an independent, self-sustaining city which
requires, not only the complete integration of its crew, but the
coordinated orchestration of qualified professionals to sustain
safe and effective operations at sea. Navy manning doctrine
directs the assignment of only the minimum number of men and
women to ships in specific ratings and billets required to
provide each ship with the opportunity to succeed at sea. In
short, there is very little room for unqualified or untrained
sailors at sea. So why then do we man 16 of the 51 ships in the
FFG-7 class to only 70% of their allotted manning and say, if
needed in a time of national crisis, we will augment these crews
with quality personnel who have less than 24 days of integrated
team training each year?
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN)
The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms
of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a
vi
mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the
former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of
capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to
offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath
of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve
to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the
end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet
declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not
require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in
standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to
deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate
ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
10 USC 511(d)
“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.”
From Title 10—ARMED FORCES
Ch. 79: CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS
§1552. Correction of military records: claims incident thereto
(2) In the case of a former member described in paragraph (1) or a former member whose application for relief is based in whole or in part on matters relating to post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury as supporting rationale or as justification for priority consideration, the Secretary concerned shall expedite a final decision and shall accord such cases sufficient priority to achieve an expedited resolution. In determining the priority of cases, the Secretary concerned shall weigh the medical and humanitarian circumstances of all cases and accord higher priority to cases not involving post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury only when the individual cases are considered more compelling.
(e) In the case of a former member of the armed forces (other than a former member covered by subsection (d)) who was diagnosed while serving in the armed forces as experiencing a mental health disorder, a board established under this section to review the former member's discharge or dismissal shall include a member who is a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a physician with special training on mental health disorders.
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS
MANUAL
JULY 1995
Redress Of Wrongs -
Systemic weaknesses or management problems disclosed dur-ing the investigation must be reported.
Accountability - Commanders, commanding officers, and supervisors have the duty to hold their subordinates accountable for their ac-tions and to correct systemic faults.
Complaints from individuals seeking relief from adverse personnel or disciplinary actions, unfavorable findings in discrimination cases, or other mat-ters for which a statute or regulation sets forth a resolution process, should be accepted for IG investigation only when coupled with a non-frivolous allegation that the chain of command is unable or unwilling to address the matter fairly and impartially for reasons related to conflicts of interest
However, IG organiza-tions should be sensitive to complaints or requests that indicate systemic problems may exist that should be addressed through an IG investigation or inspection.
DoN. However, the mission of DoN IG organizations does not include assistance in the correction of wrongs in individual cases absent special circumstances such as reprisal or systemic problems. Because DoN IG organizations are not advocates for individuals, complaints about actions personal to individuals should be carefully screened for referral to other DoN organizations that are a more appropriate forum. In such cases, every reasonable effort should be made to direct individuals to the proper organization to address their concerns. When an individual's complaint of wrong is a proper subject for IG investigation, it is appropriate for an IG organization to recom-mend the command consider remedial action that makes the complainant "whole."
SYSTEMIC WEAKNESS REPORTS
DEFINITION
During the course of investigating and prosecuting health care fraud, systemic weaknesses or vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement are sometimes discovered in health care benefit programs.¹ A systemic weakness is one that is judged to be a fundamental problem that requires corrective action through administrative, regulatory, legislative or policy change. A systemic weakness report should be prepared whenever a policy, procedure or systems process fails to prevent, detect or minimize losses due to fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement in health care benefit programs
NAVPERS 15560
4. Basic Criteria for Determining Humanitarian/Hardship
Situations.
a. A severe hardship exists, ot normally encountered an
resolved by other members of the Naval Service.
1983 September
CNA Center Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A TOTAL FORCE PERSPECTIVE
Deborah Clay-Mendez
“Sea and Air Mariners are non-prior service recruits who take the Recruit Training Course (Bootcamp) and directly into the SELRES without service in the active force.”
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAMs may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that no previous experience a rating could be earned through only part time On-Job-Training.”
1985 Development of a new screening table for Sea/Air Mariners.
Scott, Dwight F. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
A. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT
A paper written at the Air Command and Staff College,
Washington, D.C., by Arthur MoKon stressed the effects of
active Navy policies on the SELRES forces in consonance with
the total force concept (integration of active and reserve
capabilities to maximize military effectiveness). CRef. 291
This total force concept is closely related to the all-
volunteer force concept, in the sense that the total force
policy assigned increased roles and responsibility to the
reserves and the termination of the draft ended the major
incentive for reserve enlistments. Moxon's major points
were:
4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the active forces because reserve personnel train only part—time and must retain skills over longer periods with less practice and supervision. CRef. 303 "
1995 DOD Manpower Requirement Reports
900 SAM Sea Air Mariner (less than 1% of manpower)
Naval Reserve Manpower
The Sea Air Mariner program, a non prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meets its junior enlisted mobilization Requirements is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled Veteran personnel
OSC Busts Oakland VA Regional Office 14,000 Claim Blunder
Posted from disabledveterans.org
Reserves
Duty
Congress
Posted 5 y ago
Responses: 2
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I see no reason for an apology, as you are dealing with a great deal. From what you have written, I can understand a few drinks. However, verbal or written communication drunk is never a good idea. Keep fighting, RP is in your corner.
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PO3 Aaron Hassay
Thanks Bud for being there! I keep on finding report after report warning condemning and eventually stopping shutting down these commands and enlistment I served in starting 18. After successful bootcamp that was run the Navy way, when I got to my unit on the ship, I knew and felt something was wrong with this whole situation and did attempt a Navy ARmy Transfer to get out of it a few years into it. MEPS disqualified it. I was just 22. 15 years later, basically in the streets trying to piece my life together, suicide hospitals to many medications to list, I would find these Navy and DOD Reports the MEPS Medical Reasons for DQ, my missing father was infact that guy you see on tv, the Army Infantry Vet Vietnam 66-68. I found out my grandpa his father was a WW2 Lifer NAVY MM1 Battle of Coral Sea and Guadalcanal
I had to fight the VA just on the basis that my enlistment was not qualified as a veteran. The SAM enlistment was created not to qualify as a veteran even if you served 5 years assigned to FFG’s.
I think that would boggle anyone’s mind.
Assigning someone part time from the get go, 18 to a FFG for 5 years, part time, has no precedence in the Navy at all. It is exactly why someone would get injured and confused. And then the double up is when the VA kicks you out and denies you services for years because of the enlistment ignoring your actual unit and exposures. Well Ill tell you what you won’t tell a guy who served and suffered in deck on a FFG and got a sea service ribbon and never denied an order or complained even when he was very ill, and losing, this.
I may be the only guy with an Honorable Discharge under these conditions and experienced such a situation.
I guess this is the way that a Normal Navy guy might experience indoctrination on a ship. But mine was much different. No indoctrination just thrown right into the fire.
Reporting for Duty: Making the Transition to Shipboard Life
NEWPORT NEWS, Va. (NNS) -- A seaman recruit admits he didn't know what to expect when he left boot camp and basic seamanship school to report for duty aboard USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in mid-July.
"The hardest thing about reporting to my first command isn't what I expected it to be," said Lord. "For me, it isn't learning the shipboard lifestyle, it's leaving the boot camp environment, where you know everybody and they become your family, and then coming into unfamiliar territory and having to make a new family out of thousands of new faces."
Lord is assigned to temporary duty with the command's sponsor and indoctrination division; the first stop for every Sailor reporting aboard Carl Vinson. During this time, he will learn shipboard skills and earn damage control qualifications, as well as become generally familiarized with the shipboard lifestyle and the responsibilities and performance expected from each member of the crew.
I had to fight the VA just on the basis that my enlistment was not qualified as a veteran. The SAM enlistment was created not to qualify as a veteran even if you served 5 years assigned to FFG’s.
I think that would boggle anyone’s mind.
Assigning someone part time from the get go, 18 to a FFG for 5 years, part time, has no precedence in the Navy at all. It is exactly why someone would get injured and confused. And then the double up is when the VA kicks you out and denies you services for years because of the enlistment ignoring your actual unit and exposures. Well Ill tell you what you won’t tell a guy who served and suffered in deck on a FFG and got a sea service ribbon and never denied an order or complained even when he was very ill, and losing, this.
I may be the only guy with an Honorable Discharge under these conditions and experienced such a situation.
I guess this is the way that a Normal Navy guy might experience indoctrination on a ship. But mine was much different. No indoctrination just thrown right into the fire.
Reporting for Duty: Making the Transition to Shipboard Life
NEWPORT NEWS, Va. (NNS) -- A seaman recruit admits he didn't know what to expect when he left boot camp and basic seamanship school to report for duty aboard USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in mid-July.
"The hardest thing about reporting to my first command isn't what I expected it to be," said Lord. "For me, it isn't learning the shipboard lifestyle, it's leaving the boot camp environment, where you know everybody and they become your family, and then coming into unfamiliar territory and having to make a new family out of thousands of new faces."
Lord is assigned to temporary duty with the command's sponsor and indoctrination division; the first stop for every Sailor reporting aboard Carl Vinson. During this time, he will learn shipboard skills and earn damage control qualifications, as well as become generally familiarized with the shipboard lifestyle and the responsibilities and performance expected from each member of the crew.
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PO3 Aaron Hassay
Thanks SGT for reading. I keep on finding Navy and DOD report and report condemning and eventually dismantling the entire command units and enlistment I served. No wonder I tried a Navy Army Transfer to get out of it. I knew something was wrong. I felt it. I went to normal bootcamp then to be thrown into something was completely abnormal on a Navy ship for 5 years really messed with me in a way that had me try to serve in another capacity. But medically I was disqualified after 5 years assigned to those units.
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SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth
PO3 Aaron Hassay no problem brother,I don't mind being a sounding board.
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