Posted on Apr 3, 2020
131
131
0
(Update: 14 Jun 2020) - While this story remains in the news (https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/06/19/navy-wont-reinstate-crozier-fires-1-star-over-poor-decision-making.html), we are reminded of what is today!!!
On this Father's Day and Flag Day for 2020 it might serve all of us to think about all the fathers and mothers too who are serving away from home and on whom their fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen rely. While many have voiced opinions on many sides of this event, and its implications are not yet fully felt, the point is simply this quote:
"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty (aka freedom)"
It does not matter who made the quote often attributed to a particular Founding Father, but with little tangible evidence to verify that attribution; rather, it is the meaning in the words that are much more important!!! In the world of politics, we are reminded, that the mastery of the gymnastic linguistics involved in the defense of an indefensible position is the tangled web woven by the venom of the spiders that need absolute power.
With > 22.5 views, >1.3 K likes and >370 comments as of this date this post has had a lot of play. I want to thank all those the posted. Have a great Father's day, Flag Day and think deeply about the event that will be soon upon us - the 4th of July. Our nation is difficult, but in that difficulty has always been hope. I continue to pray that our nation of men, of women, of black, of white, of so many others learns that our common humanity it more important than our, often contrived differences. We'd be wise to remember that:
ALL people have "...certain unalienable rights..." and "...that among thee are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness..." None of which can ever be truly achieved when small minds are willing to act out of fear and ignorance to save only themselves and deny these "...unalienable rights..." to the least among us who are in our care!
Blessing to all....
-------------
(Update: 13 Apr 2020) - Thank you SGT (Join to see) for this "interesting update" regarding the Pentagon's "worries" over CAPT Crozier's actions (https://www.rallypoint.com/shared-links/pentagon-worries-capt-crozier-s-concern-for-his-sailors-may-be-contagious--3). Humm. So, a Pentagon spokesperson could have actually said. “...This makes us sitting here in the Pentagon look like out-of-touch asses....” Now that is interesting!?!?!?!?!
Oh, I love the phrase "Crozier-20" - funnyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy!!!
But, in all seriousness, if you are going to train officers and senior enlisted leaders that taking care of the troops is the #1 priority when it comes to being resilient, mission focused and combat ready, you should expect - the truth.
But, it is the update (https://www.rallypoint.com/shared-links/rising-navy-coronavirus-cases-put-heightened-tempo-into-question?loc=similar_main&pos=0&type=qrc) from PO1 William "Chip" Nagel that makes the update from SGT (Join to see) not just funny from Duffelblog, but actually poignant. Humm!
I'd bet good money that the CO has this over his desk in his stateroom: http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Documents/maninarena.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------
(Update: 09 Apr 2020) - Thank you SSG Robert Mark Odom for this intel - https://www.rallypoint.com/shared-links/roosevelt-sailor-with-covid-19-found-unresponsive-in-guam.
-------------------------------------------------
Dear RP Family,
By now, the world knows the CO, CAPTAIN B.E. Crozier, of the USS Theodore Rooselvet (CVN-71) has been relieved of command for a letter he wrote dated 30 March 2020 regarding Coronavirus.
CAPT Crozier's letter (https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Exclusive-Captain-of-aircraft-carrier-with-15167883.php) is interesting and reminds me of another CO I once gladly served, CAPT Howick. Capt Howick, I believe, would have taken the same action as Capt Crozier, based on my service with him during an evolution at REFTRA in GITMO just prior to our deploying as part of Desert Shield.
Capt Crozier, stated the obvious impact and outcomes of an uncontrolled disease state on an advanced ship of war. Is that not what a competent war fighter does? So the YES's are:
- Yes, our enemies now know (perhaps have always known) how rapidly they can degrade our at sea war fighting forces with a simple 'invisible bug';
- Yes, I am sure the DoD, especially the US Navy, did not want to reveal this as I am sure it scared the crap out of the CoC;
- Yes, the families of those sailors are scared, but I think those who are honest with themselves are glad their sailors or marines served with this Capt. as much as I was proud to serve a CO like USN Capt. Howick or USMC Col. Doyle in the 1980s.
Perhaps what Capt. Crozier was thinking about was what Sun Tzu was reported to have said: "So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak." His mighty warship was weakening and he knew it. The CoC was apparently not listening, so he took the only course of action that was seemly left to him in order to take care of "his crew - aka his shipmates" and "attempt to maintain mission readiness."
He knew the risk the letter entailed. While he has been relieved, I think he will be asked to retire; and, I am not sure he will be Courts-Marshaled for this "seeming insubordination" as such an act by DoD could be spun in the media, if they chose to, into greater questions that would expose the military's ability to protect our own in times of this kind of crisis. He did not commit a USA LT William Calley or a USN Chief Gallagher type event from their 'personal actions'. If anything, from his letter he has outlined courses of action that could become military wide, if not US Navy, medical doctrine going forward under similar future conditions and provide a better process for OPSEC under such conditions. Even when we get a handle on testing and treatment, there will be other "hidden COVID-19 type" threats. The question should be for the CoC, is how will we now keep our war fighters at sea safer and mission responsive, especially aboard one of the most powerful platforms in our arsenal?
I have been a carrier sailor and I am sure the CMO and Senior PMT along with the entire Medical Department on TR are busting ass. In closing, I remember the singular case of Legionnaires disease we got aboard the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) when to the Med in 1989. The young (20 yo) sailor died about 10 days after arrival on board after his leave. I was a new PMT then, it was interesting times.
Finally, my sister is a DoD Civlian in the ME and she tells me that troops are coughing all over in her particular indoor-based operations. This operation is not mission essential. Apparently, no PPE or social distancing is being accomplished when I last spoke with her 26 Mar (4 days before CAPT Crozier's letter.)
In any event, just sharing some thoughts from an old sea dawg!
Blessing always to the RP family,
Question: Did CAPTAIN Crozier ultimately show "genuine leadership" or "fool-heartiness" by the penning of this letter and transmitting it in the open?
BTW, if you want to understand how sailors and marines feel about those that lead them under difficult circumstances this video might tell you something - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpNT5KUYhTM.
On this Father's Day and Flag Day for 2020 it might serve all of us to think about all the fathers and mothers too who are serving away from home and on whom their fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen rely. While many have voiced opinions on many sides of this event, and its implications are not yet fully felt, the point is simply this quote:
"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty (aka freedom)"
It does not matter who made the quote often attributed to a particular Founding Father, but with little tangible evidence to verify that attribution; rather, it is the meaning in the words that are much more important!!! In the world of politics, we are reminded, that the mastery of the gymnastic linguistics involved in the defense of an indefensible position is the tangled web woven by the venom of the spiders that need absolute power.
With > 22.5 views, >1.3 K likes and >370 comments as of this date this post has had a lot of play. I want to thank all those the posted. Have a great Father's day, Flag Day and think deeply about the event that will be soon upon us - the 4th of July. Our nation is difficult, but in that difficulty has always been hope. I continue to pray that our nation of men, of women, of black, of white, of so many others learns that our common humanity it more important than our, often contrived differences. We'd be wise to remember that:
ALL people have "...certain unalienable rights..." and "...that among thee are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness..." None of which can ever be truly achieved when small minds are willing to act out of fear and ignorance to save only themselves and deny these "...unalienable rights..." to the least among us who are in our care!
Blessing to all....
-------------
(Update: 13 Apr 2020) - Thank you SGT (Join to see) for this "interesting update" regarding the Pentagon's "worries" over CAPT Crozier's actions (https://www.rallypoint.com/shared-links/pentagon-worries-capt-crozier-s-concern-for-his-sailors-may-be-contagious--3). Humm. So, a Pentagon spokesperson could have actually said. “...This makes us sitting here in the Pentagon look like out-of-touch asses....” Now that is interesting!?!?!?!?!
Oh, I love the phrase "Crozier-20" - funnyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy!!!
But, in all seriousness, if you are going to train officers and senior enlisted leaders that taking care of the troops is the #1 priority when it comes to being resilient, mission focused and combat ready, you should expect - the truth.
But, it is the update (https://www.rallypoint.com/shared-links/rising-navy-coronavirus-cases-put-heightened-tempo-into-question?loc=similar_main&pos=0&type=qrc) from PO1 William "Chip" Nagel that makes the update from SGT (Join to see) not just funny from Duffelblog, but actually poignant. Humm!
I'd bet good money that the CO has this over his desk in his stateroom: http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Documents/maninarena.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------
(Update: 09 Apr 2020) - Thank you SSG Robert Mark Odom for this intel - https://www.rallypoint.com/shared-links/roosevelt-sailor-with-covid-19-found-unresponsive-in-guam.
-------------------------------------------------
Dear RP Family,
By now, the world knows the CO, CAPTAIN B.E. Crozier, of the USS Theodore Rooselvet (CVN-71) has been relieved of command for a letter he wrote dated 30 March 2020 regarding Coronavirus.
CAPT Crozier's letter (https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Exclusive-Captain-of-aircraft-carrier-with-15167883.php) is interesting and reminds me of another CO I once gladly served, CAPT Howick. Capt Howick, I believe, would have taken the same action as Capt Crozier, based on my service with him during an evolution at REFTRA in GITMO just prior to our deploying as part of Desert Shield.
Capt Crozier, stated the obvious impact and outcomes of an uncontrolled disease state on an advanced ship of war. Is that not what a competent war fighter does? So the YES's are:
- Yes, our enemies now know (perhaps have always known) how rapidly they can degrade our at sea war fighting forces with a simple 'invisible bug';
- Yes, I am sure the DoD, especially the US Navy, did not want to reveal this as I am sure it scared the crap out of the CoC;
- Yes, the families of those sailors are scared, but I think those who are honest with themselves are glad their sailors or marines served with this Capt. as much as I was proud to serve a CO like USN Capt. Howick or USMC Col. Doyle in the 1980s.
Perhaps what Capt. Crozier was thinking about was what Sun Tzu was reported to have said: "So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak." His mighty warship was weakening and he knew it. The CoC was apparently not listening, so he took the only course of action that was seemly left to him in order to take care of "his crew - aka his shipmates" and "attempt to maintain mission readiness."
He knew the risk the letter entailed. While he has been relieved, I think he will be asked to retire; and, I am not sure he will be Courts-Marshaled for this "seeming insubordination" as such an act by DoD could be spun in the media, if they chose to, into greater questions that would expose the military's ability to protect our own in times of this kind of crisis. He did not commit a USA LT William Calley or a USN Chief Gallagher type event from their 'personal actions'. If anything, from his letter he has outlined courses of action that could become military wide, if not US Navy, medical doctrine going forward under similar future conditions and provide a better process for OPSEC under such conditions. Even when we get a handle on testing and treatment, there will be other "hidden COVID-19 type" threats. The question should be for the CoC, is how will we now keep our war fighters at sea safer and mission responsive, especially aboard one of the most powerful platforms in our arsenal?
I have been a carrier sailor and I am sure the CMO and Senior PMT along with the entire Medical Department on TR are busting ass. In closing, I remember the singular case of Legionnaires disease we got aboard the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) when to the Med in 1989. The young (20 yo) sailor died about 10 days after arrival on board after his leave. I was a new PMT then, it was interesting times.
Finally, my sister is a DoD Civlian in the ME and she tells me that troops are coughing all over in her particular indoor-based operations. This operation is not mission essential. Apparently, no PPE or social distancing is being accomplished when I last spoke with her 26 Mar (4 days before CAPT Crozier's letter.)
In any event, just sharing some thoughts from an old sea dawg!
Blessing always to the RP family,
Question: Did CAPTAIN Crozier ultimately show "genuine leadership" or "fool-heartiness" by the penning of this letter and transmitting it in the open?
BTW, if you want to understand how sailors and marines feel about those that lead them under difficult circumstances this video might tell you something - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpNT5KUYhTM.
CAPT
Mission
Integrity
Political Correctness
Medical
Edited 4 y ago
Posted 4 y ago
Responses: 86
2
2
0
Note the date of this article, right in the middle of a pandemic situation, a port visit releasing thousands to go on liberty that close to China, was kind of dumb. IMO, this created the crisis. The only reason it hasn’t been highlighted was it was approved by higher authority.
(2)
(0)
CPO Nate S.
MCPO Roger Collins This makes sense. The CO given the intel he "should have had access to in the medical traffic" from MEDCOM and surely considered by CNO who should have issued an ALNAV to instruct him (and all commands) to cancel this port and other near term port visits would have made sense. But, as the CO in concert with his CMO might have considered a change in port visit and could have explained to the crew using language similar to this:
"This is CO. I know all of you were looking forward to our port visit in ________. By now all of you have heard of the situation with the Coronavirus. Given the proximity of the port to the China where the virus originated and being concerned for your health as fell shipmates, I have asked to change our scheduled port visit to _______________ (aka somewhere not in close proximity) to knew the ship ready to serve. Again, I know you are disappointed, but after consulting with the CoC both medical and line this is a prudent course of action. Also, your families will appreciate me working to keep you safe!"s"
This kind of honesty is also well received by most well trained and properly disciplined crews when presented in this kind of approach. I know because I have experienced it.
Finally, I remember a number of times special medical msgs on disease states and having to provide instruction to the crew. I remember the CO once changing a port call because of a higher than expected STD rate in a port. We ended up going to a port none of us including the skipper had visited and had a blast! As an HM the STD rate was very low in the alternate port. A fact, I had to report to senior medical echelons. Turns out we only had < 10 cases of simple STDs. A SITREP from a couple of ships that visited that port in question before our scheduled visit allowed NEPMU6 in concert with 6th Fleet Medical to make a change port call recommendation to at least 10 other ships scheduled to make this port visit. A joint message from 6thFltMed and Cmd6thFlt was received and acted upon. So, I get it, the CAPT could have taken action to not visit the port, but that cuts two ways. Cancelling a port visit is a big deal and has all sorts of implications.
Yet, point taken MCPO Roger Collins, point taken. Of course I suspect you knew I'd make this commentary and I am sure you may have been aware of such situations during your career.
"This is CO. I know all of you were looking forward to our port visit in ________. By now all of you have heard of the situation with the Coronavirus. Given the proximity of the port to the China where the virus originated and being concerned for your health as fell shipmates, I have asked to change our scheduled port visit to _______________ (aka somewhere not in close proximity) to knew the ship ready to serve. Again, I know you are disappointed, but after consulting with the CoC both medical and line this is a prudent course of action. Also, your families will appreciate me working to keep you safe!"s"
This kind of honesty is also well received by most well trained and properly disciplined crews when presented in this kind of approach. I know because I have experienced it.
Finally, I remember a number of times special medical msgs on disease states and having to provide instruction to the crew. I remember the CO once changing a port call because of a higher than expected STD rate in a port. We ended up going to a port none of us including the skipper had visited and had a blast! As an HM the STD rate was very low in the alternate port. A fact, I had to report to senior medical echelons. Turns out we only had < 10 cases of simple STDs. A SITREP from a couple of ships that visited that port in question before our scheduled visit allowed NEPMU6 in concert with 6th Fleet Medical to make a change port call recommendation to at least 10 other ships scheduled to make this port visit. A joint message from 6thFltMed and Cmd6thFlt was received and acted upon. So, I get it, the CAPT could have taken action to not visit the port, but that cuts two ways. Cancelling a port visit is a big deal and has all sorts of implications.
Yet, point taken MCPO Roger Collins, point taken. Of course I suspect you knew I'd make this commentary and I am sure you may have been aware of such situations during your career.
(1)
(0)
2
2
0
Rare as it may be, sometimes senior leaders need to take that risk...but feel the CO should have ran that up the chain...
(2)
(0)
PO3 Donald Murphy
He did. Nothing wrong with that. But keep it secure. Can't blast it open air. Go open air, you blow OpSec. And your career.
(2)
(0)
2
2
0
1
1
0
Umm... the phrase is "foolhardy gesture". It seems that it was either malapropped by a fool hearty jester or by his spellcheck.
Whether or not he realized it, CAPT Crozier was following in the footsteps of his ship's namesake: in 1898 after then-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt and his 1st US Volunteer Cavalry Regiment (the Rough Riders) had led the assault and secured San Juan Ridge outside Santiago, Cuba during the Spanish-American War, which effectively ended the war in the Cuban theater, they were bivouacked in a swampland while awaiting transportation back to the US. Mosquito infestation was rampant and an epidemic of Yellow Fever broke out in the ranks, killing more men than were killed in combat. Having requested evacuation of the Rough Riders from the swamp and expedition of their transport home up the chain of command and getting no adequate response, TR sent a letter to Secretary of War Russell Alger requesting the same, and leaking a copy to the press. Alger had no real choice but to evacuate the Rough Riders and get them home, but received a black eye in public due to the press coverage.
TR had been nominated for the Medal of Honor for his actions at San Juan Ridge, but of course it was Dead on Arrival when it reached Alger's desk. He had to know this when he sent the letter, but his men were still dying weeks after the ceasefire. It wouldn't be until 103 years after the fact and 82 years after his death that he would finally receive the Medal of Honor.
So an O-6 whose command is imperiled by a deadly disease jumps the chain of command while going public, sacrificing his personal advancement. Deja vu all over again. It would be an incredible coincidence if Crozier didn't know exactly what he was doing and was unaware of what his ship's namesake had done.
Who knows? Maybe someday Crozier will be POTUS.
Whether or not he realized it, CAPT Crozier was following in the footsteps of his ship's namesake: in 1898 after then-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt and his 1st US Volunteer Cavalry Regiment (the Rough Riders) had led the assault and secured San Juan Ridge outside Santiago, Cuba during the Spanish-American War, which effectively ended the war in the Cuban theater, they were bivouacked in a swampland while awaiting transportation back to the US. Mosquito infestation was rampant and an epidemic of Yellow Fever broke out in the ranks, killing more men than were killed in combat. Having requested evacuation of the Rough Riders from the swamp and expedition of their transport home up the chain of command and getting no adequate response, TR sent a letter to Secretary of War Russell Alger requesting the same, and leaking a copy to the press. Alger had no real choice but to evacuate the Rough Riders and get them home, but received a black eye in public due to the press coverage.
TR had been nominated for the Medal of Honor for his actions at San Juan Ridge, but of course it was Dead on Arrival when it reached Alger's desk. He had to know this when he sent the letter, but his men were still dying weeks after the ceasefire. It wouldn't be until 103 years after the fact and 82 years after his death that he would finally receive the Medal of Honor.
So an O-6 whose command is imperiled by a deadly disease jumps the chain of command while going public, sacrificing his personal advancement. Deja vu all over again. It would be an incredible coincidence if Crozier didn't know exactly what he was doing and was unaware of what his ship's namesake had done.
Who knows? Maybe someday Crozier will be POTUS.
(1)
(0)
CPO Nate S.
MAJ Lyle F. Padilla Nice response!!! You know! That might no be a bad idea to have his run. Yep! Gotta like TR.
(0)
(0)
1
1
0
I think he was in a “Catch 22” situation. Had he had gone through his direct chain of command and things got worse ( which it did) he would have been blamed for not having the intestinal fortitude to speak louder about the situation... On the other hand, by him speaking up as a TRUE CO, it cost him because of the politicization of our current military force. I wholeheartedly believe that when history is written, he would be viewed very positively. Trust and Respect is not given; it is earned! He earned lots of trust and respect from the real leaders be it current or past.
(1)
(0)
1
1
0
I served in both the Army and the Navy. The one thing I learned in the Navy is that OPSEC is number one. Ships move around and go in and out of ports...we don't announce those ports or conditions of the ships as keep our enemies guessing. The fool hardy re-fueling of an American Destroyer in Yemen several years ago is a very good example. Remember who was in office back then and was trying to play nice with those middle east countries. That port visit was announced and gave terrorist time to load up a small boat with explosives, to ram into the ships side killing sailors aboard. The CO of that carrier has a background that needs to be looked at. He was raised in San Francisco where the press just happened to get his letter first. Once he reported to his command what was happening, what do you do with a ship of 5000 sailors who are possibly infected? The CO wanted to return to their homeport...the Navy thought differnt of it because of facilities to handle that many cases at once. That's why they sent them to Guam. Then the press gets an open letter...so all of those here who have been in leadership postions, when you gave an order and your men decided they were not going to follow it or set out to undermine it, remember, it's the same thing.
(1)
(0)
CPO Nate S.
PO1 Steve Mitchell OPSEC is critical! I get it!!! I do remember the USS Cole incident. Here is the issue! While port schedules are not generally known, typically messages are sent to the port authorities for coordination needs (e.g. fuel, supplies, etc. ) in advance of anchorage. The US Navy does not simply pull up as if pulling into a Shell Gas Station on route 66 to fill up and also get a Coke and bag of peanuts! Regardless if anchored or tied up pier side message traffic takes place to coordinate a ship's resupply/refuel needs when such needs and are not accomplished during an UNDERWAY Replenishment event.
The minimum message traffic time I have seen is 4-hrs notice. The ashore US Military rep who receives the message is coordinating with "vetted" re-suppliers and that re-supplier just happens to have on their crew "bad-guy" operatives, would it be hard or easy to pack a small boat of C-4 in < 4-hrs to be ready to do some damage? Of course it would be. Keep in mind terrorists are trained to play the long game, as in the 9/11 attacked that was planned for years, and play the short game (aka be nimble) and on short notice act! If you don't believe this is true, then I don't know what else I can say.
I could be mistaken, but I believe the CO suggested going to Guam and not returning to San Francisco. Also, and we don't really know this, or a least, I have not read about it yet; but, the CO could have written a "Personal For" message to SECNAV, SECDEF and even POTUS which is within his per view to do. We don't know that he did not. I once worked for CO who did exactly that, write a "personal For" and got results. I would find it hard to believe the knowing the US Navy has "Personal For" executive correspondence between COs of the line the top brass that it would be interesting if he actually ignored this line in favor of email. I cannot imagine a Navy CO who would not know the value of using this messaging approach. But, there is a 1st time for everything. In fact, if "personal for" message traffic has now been officially relegated to "secure email" and as reported "...The e-mail was sent to three superior officers in his chain of command, including his direct superior, Rear Admiral Baker, and was 'copied to' seven captains – five of whom were aboard the Roosevelt, the other two of whom were executive assistants to the admirals....", then I have to wonder if the leaker was not among those that received this form of 'secure' communication.
I would think message traffic, as it was in my day, still comes into a central place (aka message processing center) since some is TS, S, C, EO and UC. Those receiving ALL this traffic sort messages and provide them to those to whom they are addressed and have clearance to read. I don't think the US Navy changed that much in msg traffic management.
In closing, we do "... keep the enemy guessing..." much of the time, which is why when you say the "refueling" was fool-hardy of the USS Cole is interesting. We had refueled other ships in the same manner. The Cole became a target of opportunity. Keep in mind, that terrorism is about opportunity. Again, I have several seagoing commands under my belt both as junior and senior enlisted. There was msg traffic ONLY I could read and write under my responsibilities as a Chief that my sailors were provided limited awareness of. What the CO shared with the Chiefs in the manner shared was often "modified" at my level as NTK. So, please WADR, msg traffic mgmt is complicated. A letter can only be 'so open' if it is sent to a 'limited number' of people via official channels. It was not an ALNAV or generally unclassified. I doubt the CO considered his email "unclassified" one for ALNAV format. So, I believe someone who received the letter leaked it. I am too familiar with the process to believe the CO sent it directly to the SF Chronicle, as you seem to suggest. If he sent it to senior officers and also sent as BCC to the paper, THAT would leave an electronic trail; AND, that, IMVHO, would be - TREASON. If he did then that is entirely STUPID and he should go to LEAVENWORTH tomorrow! But, I don't think this is the case.
Also, when you write "...The CO of 'that carrier' has a background that needs to be looked at..." can you provide facts and references to back up this statement. Are you suggesting what I think you are suggesting???
Just saying....as a humble US Navy Chief!
COL Mikel J. Burroughs; Maj Marty Hogan; COL Lee Flemming; SMSGT Gerald "Doc" Thomas; SCPO Morris Ramsey; Lt Col Charlie Brown; LTC (Join to see); Maj William W. 'Bill' Price; LTC Stephen C.; LTC Stephen F.; LTC Jason Mackay; CMSgt (Join to see); MSgt Robert "Rock" Aldi; SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth
The minimum message traffic time I have seen is 4-hrs notice. The ashore US Military rep who receives the message is coordinating with "vetted" re-suppliers and that re-supplier just happens to have on their crew "bad-guy" operatives, would it be hard or easy to pack a small boat of C-4 in < 4-hrs to be ready to do some damage? Of course it would be. Keep in mind terrorists are trained to play the long game, as in the 9/11 attacked that was planned for years, and play the short game (aka be nimble) and on short notice act! If you don't believe this is true, then I don't know what else I can say.
I could be mistaken, but I believe the CO suggested going to Guam and not returning to San Francisco. Also, and we don't really know this, or a least, I have not read about it yet; but, the CO could have written a "Personal For" message to SECNAV, SECDEF and even POTUS which is within his per view to do. We don't know that he did not. I once worked for CO who did exactly that, write a "personal For" and got results. I would find it hard to believe the knowing the US Navy has "Personal For" executive correspondence between COs of the line the top brass that it would be interesting if he actually ignored this line in favor of email. I cannot imagine a Navy CO who would not know the value of using this messaging approach. But, there is a 1st time for everything. In fact, if "personal for" message traffic has now been officially relegated to "secure email" and as reported "...The e-mail was sent to three superior officers in his chain of command, including his direct superior, Rear Admiral Baker, and was 'copied to' seven captains – five of whom were aboard the Roosevelt, the other two of whom were executive assistants to the admirals....", then I have to wonder if the leaker was not among those that received this form of 'secure' communication.
I would think message traffic, as it was in my day, still comes into a central place (aka message processing center) since some is TS, S, C, EO and UC. Those receiving ALL this traffic sort messages and provide them to those to whom they are addressed and have clearance to read. I don't think the US Navy changed that much in msg traffic management.
In closing, we do "... keep the enemy guessing..." much of the time, which is why when you say the "refueling" was fool-hardy of the USS Cole is interesting. We had refueled other ships in the same manner. The Cole became a target of opportunity. Keep in mind, that terrorism is about opportunity. Again, I have several seagoing commands under my belt both as junior and senior enlisted. There was msg traffic ONLY I could read and write under my responsibilities as a Chief that my sailors were provided limited awareness of. What the CO shared with the Chiefs in the manner shared was often "modified" at my level as NTK. So, please WADR, msg traffic mgmt is complicated. A letter can only be 'so open' if it is sent to a 'limited number' of people via official channels. It was not an ALNAV or generally unclassified. I doubt the CO considered his email "unclassified" one for ALNAV format. So, I believe someone who received the letter leaked it. I am too familiar with the process to believe the CO sent it directly to the SF Chronicle, as you seem to suggest. If he sent it to senior officers and also sent as BCC to the paper, THAT would leave an electronic trail; AND, that, IMVHO, would be - TREASON. If he did then that is entirely STUPID and he should go to LEAVENWORTH tomorrow! But, I don't think this is the case.
Also, when you write "...The CO of 'that carrier' has a background that needs to be looked at..." can you provide facts and references to back up this statement. Are you suggesting what I think you are suggesting???
Just saying....as a humble US Navy Chief!
COL Mikel J. Burroughs; Maj Marty Hogan; COL Lee Flemming; SMSGT Gerald "Doc" Thomas; SCPO Morris Ramsey; Lt Col Charlie Brown; LTC (Join to see); Maj William W. 'Bill' Price; LTC Stephen C.; LTC Stephen F.; LTC Jason Mackay; CMSgt (Join to see); MSgt Robert "Rock" Aldi; SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth
(1)
(0)
PO1 Steve Mitchell
CPO Nate S. The Yemen port visit by the Cole was announced far in advance. As for the CO of the Roosevelt, the ship is homeported out of San Diego, not San Francisco. The Captain that was relieved was from San Francisco. The fact that the letter was first printed by the paper in the Co's hometown is the first red flag. The whole object of the open letter was to hurt Trump and the San Francisco media made the most out of it. The CO just took over the ship in Dec 2019. Now my understanding of what happened by talking to people I know in Washington DC was that the Captains family was at the ships homeport in San Diego. He wanted to bring his ship back to its homeport. The Navy sent him to Guam because it's far removed from the rest of the Navy (I think there is a sub stationed there) and they had the facilities to take care of 5000 sailors. When the CO first notified his Chain of Command of what was happening, they didn't respond fast enough for him. As for his background, he grew up with the liberals in San Francisco. Most likely he is very political...most of the Aviation types I have dealt with are book and tech smart, but don't have a lick of common sense.
(0)
(0)
1
1
0
1
1
0
Captain Crozier did go out of line. He did not have to keep his operational commander in the dark about what he was going to do. He could have talked with his Admiral in an off-book manner. Everybody knows this kind of "back channel" communication exists. He could have walked some 30 feet, I am told, down the passageway to the Admiral's cabin to discuss the situation. In addition, because of the strategic readiness nature of the situation, he should have communicated by classified electronic messaging up the Chain of Command using the existing crisis reporting system which is more than adequate to handle the situation. "Going Public" was a serious misjudgment on his part. Speaking from my personal viewpoint of a former ship's Captain, this is so basic, I can't understand why he felt compelled to do what he did. Or, maybe, it's because he acted on feelings rather than reason. I feel compassion for him and his caring for his crew, but if I were his superior, I would not have confidence in his ability to command.
(1)
(0)
LCDR William Johnston
In my first comment I didn't mention the OPSEC implications of Captain Crozier's action. I could have, and with great authority on the matter. In a few words, he blew it big time.
I am one of the last surviving members of the original PURPLE DRAGON OPSEC Team at Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. As a member of that 17-man group I helped to design the way OPSEC is practiced to this very day.
From 1967 to 1971 I was assigned as a Naval Operational Intelligence Officer and Operations Security Officer. I worked for both Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, and Admiral John S. McCain, III.
The OPSEC PURPLE DRAGON Team traveled extensively within all four Tactical Corps Areas of Vietnam as well as Pacific Rim Countries participating in joint-service “OPSEC surveys." We accompanied ground, sea, riverine, and airborne units of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force on combat operations, while conducting on-site observations, collecting data, and analyzing operational, administrative, and logistic support activities, to determine possible sources of enemy prior-awareness of friendly intentions.
We gathered, analyzed pertinent operational and administrative information that could be exploited by hostile interest, evaluated actions necessary to improve security. Then, we designed and developed countermeasure programs, methods, procedures for the operations security problems discovered.
As the record shows, implementation of the countermeasures we proposed resulted in successful prevention of further enemy exploitation, raising combat effectiveness and saving human lives and material resources.
As one of my last duties on the staff, I wrote the Commander Naval Forces, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Force Operations Security Manual, encompassing naval operations security “lessons-learned”. Information from this manual is now a part of normal naval operations security considerations.
Our PURPLE DRAGON Teams' efforts resulted in development of a systematic process and proved a methodology by which the Armed Services, the U.S. Government and supporting contractors could deny to potential adversaries information about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive Government activities. A major contribution of the team was the development of the techniques of inquiry and information collection associated with its “surveys”.
I was fortunate enough to we awarded the Navy Meritorious Service Medal for my contributions to the Team. Based upon the successes resulting from the implementation of the OPSEC methodology, President Ronald Reagan, on January 22, 1988, signed National Security Decision Directive 298 (NSDD 298).
I am one of the last surviving members of the original PURPLE DRAGON OPSEC Team at Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. As a member of that 17-man group I helped to design the way OPSEC is practiced to this very day.
From 1967 to 1971 I was assigned as a Naval Operational Intelligence Officer and Operations Security Officer. I worked for both Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, and Admiral John S. McCain, III.
The OPSEC PURPLE DRAGON Team traveled extensively within all four Tactical Corps Areas of Vietnam as well as Pacific Rim Countries participating in joint-service “OPSEC surveys." We accompanied ground, sea, riverine, and airborne units of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force on combat operations, while conducting on-site observations, collecting data, and analyzing operational, administrative, and logistic support activities, to determine possible sources of enemy prior-awareness of friendly intentions.
We gathered, analyzed pertinent operational and administrative information that could be exploited by hostile interest, evaluated actions necessary to improve security. Then, we designed and developed countermeasure programs, methods, procedures for the operations security problems discovered.
As the record shows, implementation of the countermeasures we proposed resulted in successful prevention of further enemy exploitation, raising combat effectiveness and saving human lives and material resources.
As one of my last duties on the staff, I wrote the Commander Naval Forces, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Force Operations Security Manual, encompassing naval operations security “lessons-learned”. Information from this manual is now a part of normal naval operations security considerations.
Our PURPLE DRAGON Teams' efforts resulted in development of a systematic process and proved a methodology by which the Armed Services, the U.S. Government and supporting contractors could deny to potential adversaries information about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive Government activities. A major contribution of the team was the development of the techniques of inquiry and information collection associated with its “surveys”.
I was fortunate enough to we awarded the Navy Meritorious Service Medal for my contributions to the Team. Based upon the successes resulting from the implementation of the OPSEC methodology, President Ronald Reagan, on January 22, 1988, signed National Security Decision Directive 298 (NSDD 298).
(0)
(0)
1
1
0
Yes, the Navy Capt was out of line for one and only one reason! He made his case as a lower enlisted personnel. Yes, he was right for speaking up! But as an officer he is held to a higher standard. I applaud him for speaking up for the personnel under his command.
(1)
(0)
1
1
0
No ifs, ands or buts about this. It is an unacceptable OPSEC violation. If he is only “fired” and allows to retire at Rank, he is extremely lucky. A Courtsmartial would be appropriate for this gross violation with a reduction in rank and Immediate discharge. I am a West Point Grad, Fighter Pilot, retired AF LTC and a lawyer, btw. The 3 answers below don’t cover his malfeasance.
(1)
(0)
Read This Next
Continue with Facebook 
Continue with Google