Where Were You In '72

Thankfully I had left "the land of the little people" (sorry I'm not PC yet) back in 1967 ,physically that is,the mental part seems to be taking a bit longer.

Where was I in 1972? I was born 12 years after that! ;-)

I was in Germany dealing with Baeder-Meinhoff. Would have rather been in Nam at least there people were supposed to be trying to kill you.

I was out on Guam where I was a CWO2 serving as the Officer in Charge of the Naval Tele-Communications Center at NAS Agana, Guam. I had reported there earlier that year after completing a two year tour as a W1 on the USS Enterprise as the Assistant EMO for Communications and Radar and being deployed on Yankee Station. I had done a previous tour in-country Vietnam as an enlisted Radioman in a Communications Van located at Dong Ha on the DMZ from 1977-1978 and left there shortly after TET of 1968.

I have been reading first hand accounts of what the BUFF crews endured during Linebacker II. I spoke with my friend, James Pigg, a former BUFF driver and co-pilot during the 11 Days of Christmas. Below is his account. It's a bit long but riveting. I hope the admins don't mind this post.

The story below is how I spent 20 Dec 1972 - James Pigg

In December 1972, the Linebacker II BUFF missions over North Vietnam were flown from both UT and Andersen, but Linebacker II included pretty much every USAF and Navy aircraft in the Vietnam Theater of Operations. Linebacker II lasted from December 18 through December 29, 1972 with a stand-down on Christmas Day creating a time span of eleven days – hence, the 11-Day War. During that time, B-52s flew 729 sorties, dropped 15,000 tons of bombs, and were shot at by 1,240 SAMs. Fifteen B-52s were lost to combat.

In August 1972 our Loring crew, E-13, arrived as KC-135 passengers at Andersen AFB on a 179 day TDY to fly combat missions over Vietnam in the B-52G. The EW and I (co-pilot) had finished a D-model Arc Light tour to U-Tapao in February flying about 52 missions each, and we had flown about 45 more on this tour – so we were both approaching our 100th combat mission. Our crew flew four times during Linebacker II, three over North Vietnam in Route Pack 6 on 20, 27, and 29 December, and once on December 23rd to the south when SAC was fearful of losing more B-52Gs.

We watched the huge launch of 87 B-52s from Andersen on the 18th of December. It was an impressive sight. That night three B-52s were shot down and two were damaged. We knew when we were scheduled to fly on the third night that we would be in a high threat environment facing SAMs. The 20th of December 1972 (Day 3 of the 11-Day War), was the scariest mission of my life. I did not keep a written record of our cell color name, but our target on the 20th was the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant north of Hanoi.

While still over the ocean on our way to Vietnam, we could see cells of B-52s at a higher flight level exiting the country. The pilot and I counted the BUFFs and not all cells contained three aircraft. Several cells appeared to only have two BUFFs in them rather than three. As we “coasted-in” over Vietnam, we heard an excited “May Day” call over Guard. It sounded like a fighter to us, and the Navy did lose an A-6 on day three. So we were incredibly psyched-up and more than a little scared. A little later we also heard emergency locator beacons on Guard, which meant that someone had punched out of an aircraft and their parachute had opened automatically pulling a plug from the emergency radio in the chute and starting a “squawking” sound.

As we proceeded, the intercom became dead quiet as we all concentrated on flying the mission as precisely as possible. Somewhere in the jumbled radio traffic, we started hearing calls of SAMs being launched with a bearing off of Bullseye, which was Hanoi. Most of the calls were useless because “SAM launch vicinity Hanoi,” was not informative and just drove your adrenalin level up. We were number two in the cell, and the spacing for these high threat missions was only ½ mile nose to tail. I flew the throttles, and the AC flew position. When we were exactly ½ mile from lead, we could just make out the small blue flame or glowing dots in the tail cones of Number One’s engines. We held position visually using these glowing dots. Before we started the bomb run, the AC and I both saw a huge explosion in the night sky quite some distance away.

We saw a huge fireball, and then two separate groups of flaming debris falling slowly from the sky. One piece was large and fell pretty much straight down, and the other was sort of flat and spun in slow, unbalanced turns like it could have been a single burning aircraft wing. In one video interview, a pilot described it as if someone poured burning gasoline out of a cup in the dark. That description is very accurate, and one I can picture very clearly to this day. Looking at the records for this date, I believe that we saw Orange 3 get shot down. The EW started picking up electronic signals from the SAM sites shortly after this. He would call SAM, and SAM uplink, which meant a SAM site had our aircraft locked in and was trying to guide a missile towards us. Most of the uplink calls were very brief as if the SAM site would bring the radar up and quickly shut it down to avoid the SAM support we had from the Wild Weasels.

About this time, the AC and I had started to see SAM launches. There was a layer of clouds quite some distance below us, and when a SAM ignited there would be a flash of diffuse light similar to the flash on the old pinball machines. When the SAM cleared the undercast, it would have a long flame (silver or blue, not yellow or red) shooting out behind it. You could see the flame, but not the body of the missile. The flame would hunt or seek and move quickly in tiny, jerky movements like a snake’s head but constantly leaving the flame trailing behind it. The AC and I would call out “SAM” on the intercom and give the clock position so the NAV could make a mark on the map for debriefing.

Prior to the IP, I saw a SAM at our three o’clock low and called it over the intercom. As I watched it, it remained in the same position on my wind screen. That meant it was on a collision course with our aircraft. The EW called uplink. These were good indicators that it was intended for us. The AC put the aircraft in a very steep bank turning towards the SAM, eventually reaching about 90 degrees of bank although 45 degrees was the maximum authorized, and I pulled the throttles to idle. We quickly lost altitude and accelerated only a small amount. After we lost about 1000 feet, the AC smoothly rolled the aircraft out of the bank and pulled up to regain the altitude as I jammed the throttles forward. The SAM passed above us, and we did not see the SAM explode. The EW called the uplink was lost. We ended up pretty much right behind Number One where we had started. We eased back into ½ mile spacing and started the bomb run once we reached the IP. From the IP through the bomb run, we flew straight and level following the PDI until bomb release. We noticed quite a few SAM launches during the course of the mission, and had stopped calling out SAM locations after we had counted over 25 launches. We could also see fires burning through the clouds below from secondary explosions from the earlier bomb runs. Most of the SAMs we saw exploded above our altitude.

After the bomb release, we made a hard left Post Target Turn (PTT) at 45 degrees of bank into a 100 knot headwind and again leveled our wings just about exactly ½ mile behind lead. Number three fell significantly behind when he rolled out of his PTT, and our gunner called three to verify his positon behind us, to ensure they were not an enemy aircraft. During our approach and bomb run, there were quite a few “Bogey” radio calls about Migs but no Bandit calls in our area of flight. We tightened up formation, and as we exited Vietnam, cell lead called “Feet Wet with three.” Meaning our cell was out of danger, and had not lost any aircraft. We climbed to 41,000, 41,500, and 42,000 feet, and returned without incident to Guam.

We lost six BUFFs that night. The single worst loss of the entire 11-Day War: four G-models and two D-models, plus the Navy A-6 mentioned earlier. The other two missions we flew in North Vietnam on the 27th and 29th were farther north and just west of the Chinese border with significantly fewer SAM launches.

After flying AH-1s out of Can Tho (IV Corps) and Hue Phu Bai (I Corps) South Vietnam (age 20/21), I was assigned to Ft Carson in May '71 flying UH-1s and OH-58s out of DIVARTY section, Butts AAF. I turned 22 in Feb '72, and at that young age, one of my biggest concerns was the start of the RIFs (Reduction in Force) that had begun as a "complete surprise" (with 90 day "notices") in late '71 and steamrolled into '72 and beyond.

The first RIFs were "qualitative" based on personnel files and OERs. Everyone began "scrambling" to get their records up-to-date, and OERs cleaned up where possible. OER scores began to get hugely inflated as raters began realizing the implications of less-than-stellar ratings. As flying slots went away, RLOs scrambled to fill non-flying slots on Post wherever they could. A few "RIF-ted" senior Warrants reverted to their former enlisted ranks - usually just to make it to "retirement". A "mediocre" (re: "average") OER from the past - usually from an "unknown" rater could spell the end of your career. Lots of folks were making great effort to get "acquainted or re-acquainted" with their raters. Turns out, upon records check, I discovered that I had once been given an "average" OER (by a Captain I didn't even know) in my own records. I had to "sweat things out" for several years as a result..... The word was, DA was even "ranking" people based on their Awards and Decorations.....

The "qualitative" RIFs gave way to "quantitative" cuts based more along the lines of "throwing a dart" at lists of names to come up with the required levels. I lost a lot of colleagues that I thought were better Officers and pilots than I was. Although I did not yet consider myself a "Lifer" during this time, I was enjoying my assignment at Ft Carson. Scrambling to improve my records "footprint", I volunteered to fly for the local MAST (Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic) unit for a few months in late '71 early '72.

After that assignment and for the rest of '72 into '73, I became an Instrument Instructor (a local appointment - not "Rucker trained" - probably similar to the more modern "unit trainer"). Sometime earlier, the Army decided to do away with the TAC (Instrument) Ticket and require ALL pilots to have a STANDARD (Instrument) Ticket. There were perhaps a hundred Aviators scattered throughout the post who were in mostly "non-aviator" slots (lots of CPTs) that still needed upgrading, but Ft Carson (and I assume Ft Rucker and elsewhere) did not have enough instrument aircraft, flight simulators, or "school-trained" instructors (or funding) for the task. Ft Carson had a UH-1 simulator built during this period. We were tasked to develop a comprehensive instrument training program at Ft Carson using OH-58s (using NDB "faux" navigation routes, charts, frequencies, NDB approaches at area airports, simulated radar, GCA, and flight-following, etc to do the "lion's share of training for these pilots in order to get them the required ground training and flight time to pass an instrument check ride. We used a large, rather empty "training area" located east of Ft Carson, south of Colorado Springs all the way down to Pueblo, CO. The training was somewhat similar to the instrument training many of us received at Ft Rucker using the TH-13 Sioux "Instrument trainer", with made-up routes, intersections, names,etc. back in the day.

We "unit trainers" at first were initially allowed to log IP (Instructor) time, but at some point in the middle of the program, that privilege was revoked and we had to start logging our time as CP (Co-Pilot), even though WE were doing the instructing (and everything else such as communications with the "real world"; flight-following, simulated communications, watching out for other traffic, etc, etc. - while the pilot receiving the training (under the "hood") was logging P (Pilot) time. Logging UT (unit trainer) time had not yet come into existence. That way, it turned out that my flight records for the time show only a couple hundred hours of instrument IP time and a much larger number of CP hours. As I recall, AC (aircraft commander) time had been done away with (or we couldn't use it) by then.

The "TAC to STANDARD" program wound down, and I saw an opportunity to go into Safety when the Army decided to make Aviation Safety a career track instead of "extra duty". I went to a two-week ASO course at Ft Rucker became the Detachment Safety Officer.

In 1972 I had recently ETS'd and was taking it up as a civilian in Phoenix.

Merry Christmas to you and yours!

Went in during the summer of '72. In Basic at Ft. Dix, they were running us through training on booby traps in V'Nam villages while at the same time telling us, "You guys ain't going to 'Nam, but they ain't changed the training yet, so, we gotta do this!"

SSgt Jim Gilmore Finishing Jr High, Prairie Village, KS.

I was a Cold Warrior. In 1972 I was assigned to the 36th Tactical Airlift Squadron (C-130E) flying copilot. I was working on my upgrade to Aircraft Commander, but that wouldn't come until the next year. The Squadron rotated (called deployed now-days) to RAF Mildenhall, UK, for 3 months. We flew missions supporting USAREUR and USAFE (photo is offloading cargo in Turkey). When in CONUS we supported exercises at Ft Bragg/Pope AFB, NC, Nellis AFB, NV, and Cannon AFB, NM. I was promoted to Captain at 3 years of service in June 1972. My third child, Jennifer, was born.