Good R.E.D Friday Morning RallyPoint on this day, 22 January, 2021, thank you for your service. Here is your history for the Vietnam War on this day 22 January through the years of the war.
Welcome home all Veterans.. and to those that gave their all, …may you rest in peace...!

Today, 22 January in Vietnam war history;

22 January 1955, Viet Minh leader Lê Đức Thọ departed from southernmost Vietnam for North Vietnam in accordance with the Geneva Accords which permitted free movement for 300 days between the provisional states of North and South Vietnam. His commander, Lê Duẩn, remained clandestinely in the Mekong Delta and Saigon. Lê Duẩn was charged with maintaining a communist infrastructure in southern region. He remained in the south until 1957.

22 January 1959, Influenced by the reports of Lê Duẩn and others, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of North Vietnam adopted Resolution 15. The resolution sanctioned armed force to "end the plight of the poor and miserable people in the South" and "defeat each wicked policy of the American imperialists and their puppets." The content and adoption of Resolution 15 remained a closely held secret among senior Party members until details were worked out for its implementation.
Moderates, probably including Ho Chi Minh and General Võ Nguyên Giáp, were reluctant to support a revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam. However, Party members, in the words of one historian, were convinced that they "could no longer continue to advocate restraint without losing the control and allegiance of the southern communists as well as the reunification struggle with Diệm."

22 January 1959 -19 April 1961, Under Project Hotfoot United States Army Special Forces secretly began training the Royal Lao Army.
Background;
In March 1945, in the waning days of World War II, the Japanese occupiers of the Kingdom of Laos forced Lao independence from France. However, the French reasserted themselves in French Indochina after war's end. During the ensuing First Indochina War, the Vietnamese Communist revolutionists invaded Laos in March 1953. After occupying large portions of Phongsaly, Houaphanh Province, and mountainous terrain that would become the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Vietminh moved south to the Plain of Jars and in a column menacing Luang Prabang. The Plain of Jars offered the French forces the advantages of attacking the Viet Minh in the open with artillery and air strikes; that assault was halted. The column near Luang Prabang was also stopped when it was ambushed. A third Vietminh force captured Thakhek on 25 December 1953, cutting Laos in two. This force would not be evicted until February 1954.
As France departed Laos after losing the First Indochina War, the United States moved in to support the Royal Lao Government. In the wake of the 1954 Geneva Conference and its treaties, the U.S. embassy in Vientiane established the Programs Evaluation Office to oversee military aid to Laos. It was established on 13 December 1954. Purportedly staffed by civilians, its personnel were U.S. military retirees, veterans, and reservists. Because the PEO personnel were not serving on active military duty, they were not in violation of the terms of the Geneva treaty.

The Heintges Plan;
In September 1958, Brigadier General John A. Heintges left the U.S. Army. In November, he flew to Laos to evaluate the Programs Evaluation Office, with a mandate to take charge of it. Heintges concluded that the staff of the PEO was too small, and seemed intent only on delivering equipment. There was a suspicion that some military aid to Laos was diverted for French use in the Algerian War.
Returning to Washington, DC, Heintges lobbied for a larger PEO. He pointed to the sad shape of the Royal Lao Army as proof of need of U.S. military materiel and training. He was granted an increase in staff. Also, on 22 January 1959, CINCPAC levied a requirement for 12 Special Forces Mobile Training Teams of eight men each; they were slated to start six months temporary duty in Laos on 1 April. The operation was kept secret from the American public and, in fact, U.S. commandos that were sent to Laos were given written orders stating they were going to Vietnam. A cover story was arranged; the U.S. mission was purportedly from the U.S. National Geodetic Survey. U.S. commandos were disguised as civilians and carried civilian identifications.[7] General Donald Blackburn was charged with command of the mission. He prepared his men by requiring tutoring in both French and Lao, and insisting that all hands read the nonfiction book Street Without Joy, as well as the novel The Ugly American, before departure.
However, negotiations with the French government delayed things. It was finally decided that the French instructors in Laos under the Geneva treaty would continue to teach tactics, while the American trainers would teach technical subjects. On 24 July 1959, the Mobile Training Teams arrived in Vientiane. Augmented by a control team 11 strong, the force was dubbed Project Hotfoot (Operation Hotfoot for security purposes); it was also known by the official but little-used title of the Laos Training Advisory Group. They were to work for the PEO as a training arm, teaching Lao soldiers the use of the M1 Garand, Browning Automatic Rifle, M1 Carbine, bazooka, M18 recoilless rifle, and both 60mm and 81mm mortars. The Green Berets were commanded on site by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Simons

Hotfoot at work;
Having been delayed in arrival, the Hotfoot contingent now found itself balked by Lao internal politics. While waiting for the local political situation to clear, the Hotfoot specialists hunkered in training centers at Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, Pakse, and Vientiane. They surveyed the Royal Lao Army as they waited. By the time they were free to begin training at the beginning of September 1959, they had an excellent idea of the retraining task before them. Nine of the Mobile Training Teams were matched with French training teams at regional training camps. Three teams were assigned to build a new training facility northeast of Vientiane on Route 13 at Kilometer 22. This center would be an all-Hotfoot operation, with no French involved. Nearby, at Kilometer 17, they built a ranger training center.
On 25 November 1959, one of the Green Beret teams moved from Savannakhet into Military Region 2. They co-located at Khang Khay with a French training team and began building a clinic, rifle range, and demolitions practice area. As 1960 began, training of both regular and irregular military troops began. The latter were Auto Defense Choc guerrillas.
The original Hotfoot contingent rotated out of Laos in February 1960, to be replaced by Hotfoot II. The new crew began ranger training for the RLA's 1 Bataillon Parachutistes (1st Paratroop Battalion) and 2 Bataillon Parachutistes (2d Paratroop Battalion). As Hotfoot II left Laos on 29 June 1960, to be replaced by Hotfoot III, 2nd BP began erecting a new battalion encampment for itself at KM 22. On 9 August, the 2nd BP commander, Kong Le, would stage his coup from there, commanding his loyal paratroopers

Hotfoot becomes White Star
Under incoming American President John F. Kennedy, Hotfoot was rapidly expanded. Andrew Jackson Boyle had just been appointed as chief of the PEO; on 31 January 1961, just after the 19 January inauguration, he requested nine more training teams. His rationale was that every existing or forming battalion in the Royal Lao Army should have an American advisor. The Pentagon signed off on the request, with three packets each consisting of three teams staggering their arrivals in Laos from March through May 1961. The Operation Hotfoot moniker changed to Operation Monkhood.[13]
On 19 April 1961, President Kennedy made a symbolic gesture in allowing the PEO to publicly become a MAAG; PEO members were allowed to don uniforms and resume usual public military courtesies. At the same time, the Hotfoot V teams were also renamed as Operation White Star. Operation Hotfoot had suffered five killed in action during its duties. When Lieutenant Colonel Simons later organized the Raid on Son Tay, he would call upon men who served with him in Laos, such as Richard Meadows and Elliott P. Sydnor, Jr.


22 January 1964, U.S. Joint Chiefs foresee larger U.S. commitment: The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff inform Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that they “are wholly in favor of executing the covert actions against North Vietnam.” President Johnson had recently approved Oplan 34A, provocative operations to be conducted by South Vietnamese forces (supported by the United States) to gather intelligence and conduct sabotage to destabilize the North Vietnamese regime. Actual operations would begin in February and involve raids by South Vietnamese commandos operating under American orders against North Vietnamese coastal and island installations. Although American forces were not directly involved in the actual raids, U.S. Navy ships were on station to conduct electronic surveillance and monitor North Vietnamese defense responses under another program called Operation De Soto. Although the Joint Chiefs agreed with the president’s decision on these operations, they further advocated even stronger measures, advising McNamara: “… We believe, however, that it would be idle to conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect on the communist determination to support the insurgency, and it is our view that we must therefore be prepared fully to undertake a much higher level of activity.” Among their recommendations were “aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets,” and “commitment of additional U.S. forces, as necessary, in support of the combat actions within South Vietnam.” President Johnson at first resisted this advice, but in less than a year, U.S. airplanes were bombing North Vietnam, and shortly thereafter the first U.S. combat troops began arriving in South Vietnam.

22 January 1965, Buddhists demonstrate against RVN Government at US Embassy in Saigon.

22 February 1967 – 2 February 1967, Operation Stark, Special Forces Detachment B-50 Project OMEGA operation, II Corps (The II Corps (Vietnamese: Quân đoàn II) was a corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the army of the nation state of South Vietnam that existed from 1955 to 1975. It was one of four corps in the ARVN, and it oversaw the region of the central highlands region, north of the capital Saigon. Its corps headquarters was in the mountain town of Pleiku.

22 January 1968 – 31 February, Operation Jeb Stuart I Operating in the two northernmost military regions, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) launches two major operations. In the first operation, conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, south of the Demilitarized Zone, “First Team” units launched Operation Jeb Stuart. This operation was a large-scale reinforcement of the Marines in the area and focused on clearing enemy Base Areas 101 and 114. Operation Jeb Stuart was part of Operation Checkers, to increase the number of maneuvered battalions in I Corps in order to support the besieged Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base and defeat any other PAVN attack across the DMZ.
On 21 January, COMUSMACV General William Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson to move the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from Landing Zone El Paso to Quảng Trị City in order to relieve the 3rd Marine Regiment and to move the 3rd Brigade from the Quế Sơn Valley to Camp Evans, to relieve the 1st Marine Regiment. To replace the 2nd Brigade which was involved in Operation Pershing, Tolson was also given operational control of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which flew into Phu Bai Combat Base from III Corps. When all three brigades were deployed Westmoreland instructed Tolson to commence Operation Jeb Stuart with the goal of locating and destroying PAVN units operating in Base Areas 101 and 114 to the west of Quảng Trị City and Huế. Jeb Stuart was terminated on March 31 with enemy casualties listed at 3,268; U.S. casualties were 291 killed in action and 1,735 wounded.

On the same day that Jeb Stuart was launched, other 1st Cavalry units launched Operation Pershing II in the coastal lowlands in Binh Dinh Province. This operation, designed to clear enemy forces from the area, lasted until February 29. 614 Enemy KIA, 156 U.S. KIA

22 January 1968, Operation Igloo White, a US electronic surveillance system to stop communist infiltration into South Vietnam begins installation. Operation Igloo White was a covert United States joint military electronic warfare operation conducted from late January 1968 until February 1973, during the Vietnam War. These missions were carried out by the 553rd Reconnaissance Wing (553 RW), a U.S. Air Force unit flying modified EC-121R Warning Star aircraft, and Observation Squadron SIXTY-SEVEN (VO-67), a specialized U.S. Navy unit flying highly modified OP-2E Neptune[1] aircraft. This state-of-the-art operation utilized electronic sensors, computers, and communications relay aircraft in an attempt to automate intelligence collection. The system would then assist in the direction of strike aircraft to their targets. The objective of those attacks was the logistical system of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) that snaked through southeastern Laos and was known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the Truong Son Road to the North Vietnamese). Igloo White was rushed into service during the Battle of Khe Sanh and successfully passed its first operational test. Combined with Operation Commando Hunt in 1969, the system served as the keystone of the U.S. aerial interdiction effort of the Vietnam War.

22 January 1969 – 19 March 1969, Operation Dewey Canyon, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines and ARVN 2nd Regiment offensive against PAVN communication lines in Laos, north of the A Shau Valley in Thừa Thiên Province;

Operation DEWEY CANYON perhaps the most successful high-mobility regimental-size action of the Vietnam War, began in the A Shau/Da Krong Valleys when the 9th Marines, commanded by Colonel Robert H. Barrow, and supporting artillery were lifted from Quang Tri. It was the last major offensive by the 3rd Marine Division during the Vietnam War. Its objective is to eliminate a North Vietnamese buildup in the Da Krong Valley, an enemy supply route between the Laotian border and the A Shau Valley. Over the course of two months, Marine infantry units, transported and supported by helicopters, operate in the two valleys constructing fire bases and clearing out North Vietnamese troops. The operation accounts for numerous enemy casualties and the capture or destruction of thousands of tons of enemy arms, ammunition, and supplies. The 56 days of combat were a tactical success but did not stop the overall flow of North Vietnamese men and matériel into South Vietnam.

Operation;
Phase 1;
On 18 January the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines was lifted from Vandegrift Combat Base to reoccupy Firebase Henderson. On 20 January Company L, 3/9 Marines reoccupied Firebase Tun Tavern (16.567°N 106.935°E) and on the 21st Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines reoccupied Firebase Shiloh (16.515°N 106.969°E).
On 22 January the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines was lifted from Vandegrift to establish two new firebases further south: Dallas (16.405°N 106.967°E) and Razor (16.441°N 107.002°E).

On 24 January the 9th Marines command post was moved from Vandegrift to Razor.

On 25 January 3/9 Marines established Firebase Cunningham 6 km southeast of Razor and over the following four days the 9th Marines command post and five artillery batteries from 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines moved to Cunningham.

Phase 2;
The Operation was renamed Operation Dewey Canyon and on 24-5 January Companies from 2/9 and 3/9 Marines began patrolling south from Razor and Cunningham discovering the PAVN 88th Field Hospital which had been abandoned the previous day.

On 31 January after a brief firefight with PAVN forces Company G secured Hill 1175, while Company F established Firebase Erskine (16.479°N 107.039°E). On 1 February Company K established Firebase Lightning which was occupied by the ARVN 1st and 2nd Battalions, 2nd Regiment.

On 2 February Firebase Cunningham was hit by 30-40 rounds of PAVN 122mm artillery fire from Laos resulting in 5 Marines killed.
With bad weather limiting patrolling and resupply, the Marine infantry were withdrawn to their bases.

On 5 February as Company G withdrew from Hill 1175 they were ambushed resulting in 5 Marines killed and 18 wounded, while only 2 PAVN bodies were found. LCpl. Thomas Noonan, Jr. would be posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the engagement.

On 10 February, Company H, 2/9 Marines captured a large cache of ammunition, weapons and equipment while on patrol five kilometers northwest of FSB Cunningham.[1]:89 The haul of ammunition included 363 RPG-2 rounds and 120 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition.

Phase 3 and the raid into Laos;

The third phase commenced on 11 February 1969. 1/9 Marines engaged a PAVN force preparing to attack Firebase Erskine and killed 25 PAVN. Company M repulsed a PAVN platoon killing 18 for the loss of 2 Marines, while Company C killed 24 PAVN for the loss of 2 Marines. On 16 February Company K, 3/9 Marines killed 17 PAVN.

On the 17th Company G, 2/9 Marines killed 39 PAVN for the loss of 5 Marines.

On the early morning of 17 February PAVN sappers attacked Firebase Cunningham resulting in 4 Marines and 37 PAVN killed.

On 18 February Company A, 1/9 Marines encountered a PAVN bunker system which they overran killing 30 PAVN. The following morning Company C continued the attack against nearby PAVN positions killing a further 30 PAVN with total Marine losses of 1 killed. On the afternoon of the 20th Company C encountered another PAVN bunker system killing 71 PAVN and capturing 2 122mm field guns. Company A continued the attack killing a further 17 PAVN, total Marine losses were 6 dead. Also on 18 February Company L, 3/9 Marines discovered a PAVN cemetery containing 185 bodies buried in June 1968. As the Marines approached the Laotian border and in response to the artillery attack on Cunningham, Major General Davis had sent requests up the chain of command to get permission to enter Laos. This led to a redirection of MACV-SOG's Operation Prairie Fire to conduct reconnaissance near Base Area 611 in Laos. On February 20, Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell forwarded Davis' request to have a limited raid into Base Area 611 up to COMUSMACV General Abrams for his approval.

By 20 February, 2/9 Marines had both Companies E and H on the Laotian border. From their position, Company H could see enemy convoys traveling along Route 922. Company H Commanding Officer David F. Winecoff later reported:
"The company, of course, was talking about let's get down on the road and do some ambushing. I don't think they really thought that they were going to let us go over into Laos ... I knew if the military had their way we'd be over there in Laos and the company was all up for it.... With the Paris Peace Talks going on, I wasn't sure what route was going to be taken."

On 21 February, Captain Winecoff received a message from Colonel Barrow, 9th Marines Commanding Officer, to set up an ambush along Route 922. The Captain's men needed rest, and he requested a postponement but was denied by Colonel Barrow. The Captain utilized his 1st and 2nd Platoons, and at 16:10, 1st Platoon moved out and made its way to 2nd Platoon's position. At 18:30, Winecoff briefed his men on the ambush. After dark they moved out towards Route 922, about 900 meters away. By 01:00, Captain Winecoff and Company H were in place and setting up the ambush. Within minutes of getting into position they started hearing trucks coming down the road and continued to observe as 40 minutes later, a lone truck and one PAVN soldier also walked through the kill zone. Winecoff had not wanted the ambush sprung on one truck or soldier, realizing that eventually a bigger target would come down the road. At 02:30, the lights of eight trucks appeared, and as three trucks came into the kill zone the column of vehicles stopped. Not wanting to give away the ambush or their position Winecoff, set off the claymores and the ambush. The Marines poured small arms and automatic weapons fire on the three vehicles, the forward observer alerted the artillery, and rounds bracketed the company position.

After minutes of fire, Captain Winecoff had his men moved forward, ensuring that everything was destroyed. The company proceeded to move out to the rally point 600 meters away and waited till daylight. Later, it rejoined with 3rd Platoon who had not been involved with the ambush because of the heavy patrols it had been involved with in the previous days. H Company was resupplied and the men rested. They had destroyed three trucks and killed eight PAVN soldiers. Company H did not suffer any casualties.

After Action Reports of the patrol were met with positive reviews, General Abrams formally approved the operation. The success of the operation was more valuable than just the destruction of the enemy, because it allowed Colonel Barrow to request that continued operations in Laos be approved. His reasoning for continued operations was the presence of the enemy in the area was a threat to his troops. Barrow noted, "I put a final comment on my message, which said, quote, "Put another way, my forces should not be here if ground interdiction of Route 922 not authorized." The message finally reached General Abrams via General Stilwell, who had adopted the Colonel's recommendation. General Abrams approved further action on 24 February, but restricted discussions of the Laotian operation.

Also on 21 February Company M, 3/9 Marines discovered a PAVN maintenance facility including a bulldozer and on further searching around Hill 1228 discovered 2 122mm field guns and a large tunnel complex inside the mountain.

On 22 February Company A, 1/9 Marines overran a PAVN position eight kilometers southeast of FSB Erskine killing 7 PAVN for the loss of 1 Marine. As Company A continued patrolling they encountered and overran an entrenched PAVN Company killing 105 PAVN for the loss of 11 Marines. Captured documents indicated the unit in contact was the 3rd Battalion, 9th NVA Regiment (also known as the K.16 NVA Battalion). The Company A commander 1Lt Wesley L. Fox would be awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle. Company H was ordered to go down Route 922 on 24 February. Morale was low because the Marines were tired after several days of patrolling, additionally, they did not want to leave the resupplies that included 60 mm mortar ammunition and C-rations. Company H was to move into Laos followed by Companies E and F and push eastward on the road, forcing the PAVN into the 1st and 3rd Battalions.

After a six-hour night march, Company H set up a hasty ambush; at 11:00 on 24 February, six PAVN soldiers walked into their kill zone, of which four were killed. On February 25, Company H continued to move eastward again engaging PAVN, resulting in the capture of one 122 mm field gun, two 40mm antiaircraft guns and the killing of eight PAVN soldiers. Company H suffered two dead and seven wounded. Later that day a company patrol was ambushed by an estimated 15 PAVN troops who were dug in fortified bunkers and fighting holes. The patrol was reinforced and was able to fight its way through, capturing a second 122 mm gun and killing two. Casualties were mounting for Company H: three killed and five wounded. Corporal William D. Morgan was one of the men killed in action when he made a daring dash and directed fire away from Private First Class Robinson Santiago and Private Robert Ballou. Robert Ballou was wounded multiple times that day and Robinson Santiago was killed-in-action. Corporal Morgan was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for this action.
Company H, flanked by Companies E and F, continued their drive east, which was rapid and did not allow for the Companies to conduct thorough searches. Advancing much slower would have garnered much more equipment. However, 2nd Battalion did capture 20 tons of foodstuffs and ammunition, while killing 48 PAVN soldiers. On 26 February, Company F, 2/9 Marines discovered a large cache nine kilometers south of FSB Erskine which included 198 rounds of 122mm artillery ammunition and 1,500 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition for anti-aircraft guns.

On 28 February at 13:00 a squad patrol from Company G, 2/9 Marines came under heavy fire from approximately 25 PAVN. The squad was pinned down and reinforcements were sent to the location (16°18′17″N 106°58′40″E), however as the patrol leader had lost his map it was difficult to locate the patrol or use supporting arms. After some time, patrol was located and an artillery mission was called in which routed PAVN. 3 Marines were killed and 12 wounded, while PAVN losses were estimated to be 12 dead.

The three companies were within 1,000 meters of the South Vietnamese border by 1 March and were flown by helicopter to Vandegrift Combat Base on 3 March, officially ending operations in Laos. 2nd Battalion sustained eight killed and 33 wounded during the operation. For the record, all of the dead were listed as being killed in Quảng Trị Province, South Vietnam and for political reasons no reference was made about being in Laos.

On 27 February Company D discovered a large PAVN weapons cache near Hill 1044 that included 629 rifles and over 100 crew-served weapons.

With the Marine objectives achieved by early March the operations plan called for the phased withdrawal of the Marines from the operational area, however this was hampered by bad weather. As 3/9 Marines withdrew to Firebase Cunningham on 3 March they were ambushed by a PAVN force and PFC Alfred M. Wilson would be posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the firefight. The operation concluded at 20:00 on 18 March as the last Marines arrived back at Vandegrift.
Aftermath
Marine losses were 130 killed and 932 wounded, in return, the Marines reported 1,617 PAVN killed, the discovery of 500 tons of arms and munitions including 16 artillery pieces and 73 antiaircraft guns and denial of the valley as a PAVN staging area for the duration of the operation. The disruption of Base Area 611 was only temporary and the 101st Airborne Division would assault the area again 2 months later in Operation Apache Snow. The 9th Marine Regiment and attached units were awarded the Army Presidential Unit Citation for their actions in Operation Dewey Canyon.
By 18 March the enemy’s base area had been cleared out, 1617 enemy dead had been counted, and more than 500 tons of weapons and ammunition unearthed.



22 January 1971, Communist forces shelled Phnom Penh, Cambodia for the first time.

22 January 1973, Former U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson, whose presidency was marred by the Vietnam War, died.


Today is 22 January 2021
Vietnam War Memorial facts
170 Names on the wall were born on 22 January
102 Names on the wall died on 22 January
245 men earned the Medal Of Honor in the Vietnam war and 160 of those men are listed on the wall

Other wall information/stories/quotes; None today



Of possible interest or Interesting things about Vietnam/Vietnam War/ Vietnam War quotes;

“The lessons I learned in Vietnam and in the NFL reinforced one another:
teamwork, sacrifice, responsibility, accountability, and leadership.” -Rocky Bleier

“I'm old and crazy, but I still give a damn. And I still think the boys got screwed over in Vietnam.” -Waylon Jennings


Links of interest?

Looking for a Brother or sister you served with? This might help you.
The Viet Nam Veterans Home Page to be quite useful in finding living veterans. They maintain a Lost and Found section http://www.vietvet.org/lostfnd.htm, with listings of people looking for people.

To find information on the availability of U.S. Navy deck logs during the Vietnam war era, check out this link. https://historyhub.history.gov/community/military-records/blog/2020/10/08/update-on-availability-of-vietnam-era-1956-1978-us-navy-deck-logs

Unit Reunions, Homecomings, Gatherings, Newsletters, Etc. can be found at http://www.vietvet.org/unitlist.htm
There are two replica versions of The Vietnam Veterans Memorial that tour the United States regularly. The first of them which is called The Moving Wall, has been traveling the country for almost twenty years. You can find their schedule at http://www.themovingwall.org/
Where can I find the latest information on the status of Prisoners of War and those listed as Missing in Action? A: The Library of Congress maintains POW/MIA information at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/pow/powhome.html


Quotes;
"The struggle of today, is not altogether for today--it is for a vast future also."- Abraham Lincoln (December 3, 1861)

“The best way to keep children at home is to make the home atmosphere pleasant” --- and let the air out of their tires. - Dorothy Parker

“Men of ill judgment oft ignore the good that lies within their hands, till they have lost it.”- Sophocles, Ajax

"I believe it's immoral to ask the sons and daughters of America to protect this land with second-rate equipment and bargain-basement weapons. If they can put their lives on the line to protect our way of life we can give them the weapons, the training, and the money they need to do the job right." - President Reagan, May 6, 1983

“If everybody is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking.” ― George S. Patton


Medal of Honor recipient for actions in the Vietnam War on this day 22 January in Vietnam War history; None on this day throughout the war years.