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One of the worst oil spills in U.S. territory begins when the supertanker Exxon Valdez, owned and operated by the Exxon Corporation, runs aground on a reef in Prince William Sound in southern Alaska. An estimated 11 million gallons of oil eventually spilled into the water. Attempts to contain the massive spill were unsuccessful, and wind and currents spread the oil more than 100 miles from its source, eventually polluting more than 700 miles of coastline. Hundreds of thousands of birds and animals were adversely affected by the environmental disaster.
It was later revealed that Joseph Hazelwood, the captain of the Valdez, was drinking at the time of the accident and allowed an uncertified officer to steer the massive vessel. In March 1990, Hazelwood was convicted of misdemeanor negligence, fined $50,000, and ordered to perform 1,000 hours of community service. In July 1992, an Alaska court overturned Hazelwood’s conviction, citing a federal statute that grants freedom from prosecution to those who report an oil spill.
Exxon itself was condemned by the National Transportation Safety Board and in early 1991 agreed under pressure from environmental groups to pay a penalty of $100 million and provide $1 billion over a 10-year period for the cost of the cleanup. However, later in the year, both Alaska and Exxon rejected the agreement, and in October 1991 the oil giant settled the matter by paying $25 million, less than 4 percent of the cleanup aid promised by Exxon earlier that year.
It was later revealed that Joseph Hazelwood, the captain of the Valdez, was drinking at the time of the accident and allowed an uncertified officer to steer the massive vessel. In March 1990, Hazelwood was convicted of misdemeanor negligence, fined $50,000, and ordered to perform 1,000 hours of community service. In July 1992, an Alaska court overturned Hazelwood’s conviction, citing a federal statute that grants freedom from prosecution to those who report an oil spill.
Exxon itself was condemned by the National Transportation Safety Board and in early 1991 agreed under pressure from environmental groups to pay a penalty of $100 million and provide $1 billion over a 10-year period for the cost of the cleanup. However, later in the year, both Alaska and Exxon rejected the agreement, and in October 1991 the oil giant settled the matter by paying $25 million, less than 4 percent of the cleanup aid promised by Exxon earlier that year.
Exxon Valdez runs aground - Mar 24, 1989 - HISTORY.com
Posted from history.comPosted in these groups: 
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Natural Disaster
Posted 7 y ago
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I have an industry insiders' view on this incident, (I've spent nearly 2 decades hauling oil out of Valdez specifically) and I can tell you that the reality is a little different from what the public got to hear. First thing, a big deal was made of Hazelwood's drinking -- alcohol was allowed back then, and nearly everyone had it. He was not a special case. I'm not excusing what happened, I'm just giving context that the press won't. Next, the 3rd mate was NOT unlicensed -- you can't get a job as a 3rd mate without the appropriate license. Regulations state that the captain should have been on the bridge for the portion of the trip that she ran aground, and in that sense, the mate was unauthorized to be alone in command. He lacked the Prince William Sound endorsement that's required.
First some background: on American-flagged ships, there is always at LEAST 3 people on the bridge at sea (and more in transit to or from a port, which is part of why Hazelwood screwed the pooch): a deck officer in command of Navigation, and 2 Able-bodied Seamen, one of whom is the wing lookout, and the other is the helmsman. The look out...well, looks for things that might be hazardous to the ship, like other vessels, icebergs (Alaska has plenty)....traffic lane buoys (this one is important for this purpose). Ships entering and leaving port have traffic lanes, just like cars, and traffic control, just like aircraft. The ditty they teach in Nav school is 'red right returning, red left leaving'. Again, this will be important in a moment. Finally, all ships are equipped with autopilots that the helmsman controls. Generally, s/he won't make a course change without a command from the deck officer but is definitely allowed to make corrective adjustments in order to maintain course.
Now, for the meat of the matter. From talking to Exxon crew members, and other pilots, officers, crews, a picture comes clear that gives more of the story than the official report.
The most important Human factor in this accident is that 3rd mate Cousins was a raging asshole. We've all seen it: officers who think that, because they're an officer, they are intrinsically and fundamentally a BETTER human being than the people (enlisted/unlicensed) who work for him. Every one I ever spoke to who knew him, said this same thing: he was one of those. His disdain bit him in the ass that night. 2 other Human factors that night was both AB's. The lookout AB, doing his job, noticed that the red buoys were on the starboard side of the vessel as they transited. He immediately went to the bridge and informed Cousins that they were on the wrong side of the buoys, out of the prescribed traffic lane. Cousins SHOULD have seen this himself, with his own eyes, and on radar -- those buoys have distinctive radar reflections built in for just this purpose. Compounding his inattention, however, was his assholishness: he told the AB to shut up and mind his own business (never mind that that WAS his business) and get back out on the bridge wing. This is one decision point that could have vastly changed the outcome. Now, the other AB. He was newly promoted to a green card (where he could by law helm the ship without a babysitter. Blue-card AB's are not considered experienced enough), and was, therefore, unfamiliar with the autopilot. When Cousins gave him a course command, he dutifully spun the wheel and brought the ship to the new heading (the wheel overrides the autopilot....when it's in use)...and then failed to enter the new course in the autopilot...which dutifully brought the Valdez back to the original, fatal, heading. Another decision point missed. A third one missed was the lookout AB, who should have shut Cousins down by telling him he was going to report the situation to the Captain. Merchant Marines are just like the Military: you can disobey stupid orders so long as you're RIGHT. I can tell you categorically that if I'd been that look out on that bridge that night, this accident would not have happened, simply because I would not have allowed that 3rd mate to bulldoze me when I knew we were out of the traffic lane. I would have at the very least spoken sharply to him, and then left my post to call the captain if he persisted. Sure, that's easy to say decades later, from my keyboard, but I know myself, I know my training, and I know how not to drive a fucking ship up onto a reef.
In short, if Cousins wasn't an assmunch, this wouldn't have happened. If the wing lookout had had more backbone, this wouldn't' have happened. If the helmsman had been better trained, this wouldn't have happened. And, of course, if Hazelwood had been where he was supposed to be, none of this would have happened. And then we could get into how the Coast Guard first responders and VTS were high, which added costly delays to response...the list of things that went wrong that night is long, and there's plenty of blame to go around, but all you ever hear is how fucked up Hazelwood was. Well, he was. But there were any number of other, much larger, contributing factors. Of course, the buck stops with the Captain, so there's no excuse for him whatsoever. I just get tired of that bridge team getting a pass in the national consciousness. They screwed the pooch. Repeatedly. Any one of the three could have prevented that accident. That all 3 missed it concurrently is baffling to any competent Mariner.
TSgt Joe C. SGT (Join to see) COL Mikel J. Burroughs SSgt Terry P. PO2 (Anonymous) MSG (Join to see) SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP4" SSG Carlos Madden PO1 John Crafton PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SFC (Join to see) COL Charles Williams Sgt Kelli Mays MSG Tom Earley MCPO Roger Collins PO1 Chris V. SSgt Mark Lines CPT Jack Durish CPT Gabe Snell PVT James Strait
First some background: on American-flagged ships, there is always at LEAST 3 people on the bridge at sea (and more in transit to or from a port, which is part of why Hazelwood screwed the pooch): a deck officer in command of Navigation, and 2 Able-bodied Seamen, one of whom is the wing lookout, and the other is the helmsman. The look out...well, looks for things that might be hazardous to the ship, like other vessels, icebergs (Alaska has plenty)....traffic lane buoys (this one is important for this purpose). Ships entering and leaving port have traffic lanes, just like cars, and traffic control, just like aircraft. The ditty they teach in Nav school is 'red right returning, red left leaving'. Again, this will be important in a moment. Finally, all ships are equipped with autopilots that the helmsman controls. Generally, s/he won't make a course change without a command from the deck officer but is definitely allowed to make corrective adjustments in order to maintain course.
Now, for the meat of the matter. From talking to Exxon crew members, and other pilots, officers, crews, a picture comes clear that gives more of the story than the official report.
The most important Human factor in this accident is that 3rd mate Cousins was a raging asshole. We've all seen it: officers who think that, because they're an officer, they are intrinsically and fundamentally a BETTER human being than the people (enlisted/unlicensed) who work for him. Every one I ever spoke to who knew him, said this same thing: he was one of those. His disdain bit him in the ass that night. 2 other Human factors that night was both AB's. The lookout AB, doing his job, noticed that the red buoys were on the starboard side of the vessel as they transited. He immediately went to the bridge and informed Cousins that they were on the wrong side of the buoys, out of the prescribed traffic lane. Cousins SHOULD have seen this himself, with his own eyes, and on radar -- those buoys have distinctive radar reflections built in for just this purpose. Compounding his inattention, however, was his assholishness: he told the AB to shut up and mind his own business (never mind that that WAS his business) and get back out on the bridge wing. This is one decision point that could have vastly changed the outcome. Now, the other AB. He was newly promoted to a green card (where he could by law helm the ship without a babysitter. Blue-card AB's are not considered experienced enough), and was, therefore, unfamiliar with the autopilot. When Cousins gave him a course command, he dutifully spun the wheel and brought the ship to the new heading (the wheel overrides the autopilot....when it's in use)...and then failed to enter the new course in the autopilot...which dutifully brought the Valdez back to the original, fatal, heading. Another decision point missed. A third one missed was the lookout AB, who should have shut Cousins down by telling him he was going to report the situation to the Captain. Merchant Marines are just like the Military: you can disobey stupid orders so long as you're RIGHT. I can tell you categorically that if I'd been that look out on that bridge that night, this accident would not have happened, simply because I would not have allowed that 3rd mate to bulldoze me when I knew we were out of the traffic lane. I would have at the very least spoken sharply to him, and then left my post to call the captain if he persisted. Sure, that's easy to say decades later, from my keyboard, but I know myself, I know my training, and I know how not to drive a fucking ship up onto a reef.
In short, if Cousins wasn't an assmunch, this wouldn't have happened. If the wing lookout had had more backbone, this wouldn't' have happened. If the helmsman had been better trained, this wouldn't have happened. And, of course, if Hazelwood had been where he was supposed to be, none of this would have happened. And then we could get into how the Coast Guard first responders and VTS were high, which added costly delays to response...the list of things that went wrong that night is long, and there's plenty of blame to go around, but all you ever hear is how fucked up Hazelwood was. Well, he was. But there were any number of other, much larger, contributing factors. Of course, the buck stops with the Captain, so there's no excuse for him whatsoever. I just get tired of that bridge team getting a pass in the national consciousness. They screwed the pooch. Repeatedly. Any one of the three could have prevented that accident. That all 3 missed it concurrently is baffling to any competent Mariner.
TSgt Joe C. SGT (Join to see) COL Mikel J. Burroughs SSgt Terry P. PO2 (Anonymous) MSG (Join to see) SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP4" SSG Carlos Madden PO1 John Crafton PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SFC (Join to see) COL Charles Williams Sgt Kelli Mays MSG Tom Earley MCPO Roger Collins PO1 Chris V. SSgt Mark Lines CPT Jack Durish CPT Gabe Snell PVT James Strait
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Sgt Kelli Mays
SN Greg Wright I remember this...it took years to clean it up....looks like you were there doing just that. So many wildlife killed...it was truly horrible...hopefully, they've learned from this incident...kind of seems like they have.
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SN Greg Wright
Sgt Kelli Mays - I wasn't in on the cleanup. I've just spent my career talking to people who were. It's a pretty small community, the number of MM's who service the Alaskan pipeline.
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SGT (Join to see)
I'm very grateful this long bit was written in a way that a Soldier with no Navy experience can easily understand. This deserves beer.
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SN Greg Wright
PO1 John Crafton - Yep. And as I say, Hazelwood gets no pass. He should have been up there, by regs, and in any case, it was his responsibility to ensure that his crew was properly trained, and to oversee the development of Cousins. I have seen AB's replaced countless times at the helm because they couldn't hold the course for whatever reason: weather, inexperience, etc. You'd find, though that Cousins is vastly more hated by MM's than Hazelwood is -- following that disaster, alcohol was banned, and over-time (a very large source of MM income pre-Valez. It still is, to a lesser extent) became regulated to no more than your 8 base hours + 4 OT. Every single one of us lays those regs at his feet.
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Thanks for reminding us TSgt Joe C. that on March 24, 1989 one of the worst oil spills in U.S. territory begins when the supertanker Exxon Valdez, owned and operated by the Exxon Corporation, runs aground on a reef in Prince William Sound in southern Alaska. An estimated 11 million gallons of oil eventually spilled into the water. Attempts to contain the massive spill were unsuccessful, and wind and currents spread the oil more than 100 miles from its source, eventually polluting more than 700 miles of coastline. Hundreds of thousands of birds and animals were adversely affected by the environmental disaster.
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