Posted on Jul 30, 2016
Chewing Up Charlie in the Renegade Woods | HistoryNet
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By Howard Landon "Dutch" McAllister
5/9/2012 • Vietnam Magazine
“Let me know what you need…watch your fire discipline…you don’t want to run out of ammo,” said Custer, a master at coordinating air and artillery
The 1970 battle in the Renegade Woods, like most fierce fights in the Vietnam War, came up with the suddenness of a violent tropical storm. The densely wooded area in Tay Ninh Province nestled under a broad curve in the Vam Co Dong River was covered by thick, double-canopy jungle heavily undergrown with vines. Open areas were few within the Renegades, and they were thatched with elephant grass and bordered by hedgerows. Close to the Cambodian border, this area that had long harbored bandits and outlaws served as ideal staging areas for North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units that crossed the border. This was Indian Country for sure, where only the technological superiority and mobility of combined forces could overcome the advantages of the NVA/Viet Cong (VC) forces, which could typically evade and escape to Cambodian sanctuaries before suffering too much damage.
At 7 a.m., April 2, 1970, a helicopter light scout team from the 25th Aviation Battalion flew a visual reconnaissance of the area. While the intended landing zone showed no sign of enemy activity, two other potential LZs nearby bore unmistakable signs, including footprints. Ranger teams 38 and 39, Company F, 75th Infantry, were put on the ground to investigate, and within minutes a light machine gun opened up on them at short range, destroying 1st Lt. Philip Norton’s radio and wounding Sergeant Fred Stuckey. Stuckey and Spc. 4 Donald Purdy managed to kill the machine gun crew with hand grenades, but from all directions the Rangers began taking fire, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Obviously they were facing a much larger enemy force than they could handle, so Lieutenant Norton ordered them to move where the team could be extracted or reinforced by air.
Using fire and maneuver, the two elements of the Ranger team moved toward the location Norton designated. Norton’s element reached the site, finding momentary security in a bomb crater, but the second element, under the assistant team leader, Sgt. 1st Class Alvin Floyd, did not. Floyd and Sergeant Michael Thomas were killed by small-arms and RPG fire, while Spc. 4 Donald Tinney fell wounded in the open. Norton was able to drag Tinney to the relative safety of the crater.
As the chaos on the ground unfolded, Warrant Officer James Tonelli brought his UH-1 into a low-level approach under heavy fire, dropping down 15 feet from the crater. After the Rangers raced to the chopper and piled in, Tonelli managed to get the overloaded helicopter airborne in spite of taking multiple hits from ground fire, even as 1st Lt. David Parsons in an OV-10 Bronco fired his miniguns in strafing passes following the extraction. While 11 Rangers had been rescued, two dead men were left in the clearing.
I was the operations officer of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, the Wolfhounds, and at 0900 we were ordered into the fray. Two of the 2nd Battalion’s companies were already operating in the area. The night before, Company C had served as a blocking force for an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) unit engaged with the enemy four kilometers southwest of the Renegade Woods, and Company B had conducted ambush patrols nine kilometers south. Now Company C, under Captain Jerry D. Bateman, and Company B, commanded by Captain Charles Criswell, hastily moved to helicopter pickup points.
Company C was first to get into the fight, but with only three helicopters available, it was 1100 hours before it was on the ground and moving toward the NVA/VC force. By 1140 all the platoons were exchanging fire with the enemy.
I listened to the radio transmissions between the battalion commander and the company commander from the battalion tactical operations center at Fire Support Base (FSB) Jackson, which was built to block a major infiltration route known as the An Ninh Corridor. The route made use of canals and swampy lowlands on the Vam Co Dong River to the east, known by its shape on the map as the Angel’s Wing. Things were already beginning to go wrong. Two of the platoons had been advancing to contact in parallel columns, with the 1st Platoon under 1st Lt. Ronnie Clark, followed by the 3rd Platoon, led by 2nd Lt. Ronald Kolb. The 2nd Platoon, commanded by 2nd Lt. Monte Hack, moved parallel on the right flank of the other two platoons, separated from them by a dense hedgerow. Immediately after becoming engaged, the lead platoon was pinned down by a machine gun firing from its right front.
The point man was wounded, followed by Lieutenant Clark, who was shot in the stomach by a burst of enemy fire. As the 1st Platoon returned fire, Kolb tried to maneuver his 3rd Platoon around to the right, but his point man was killed almost immediately. Kolb pulled his men back and maneuvered them to come up on the left side of 1st Platoon, but he was killed in a burst of fire from an unseen enemy. First Platoon’s Staff Sgt. Melvyn Hamana Kalili was then killed as he moved forward in an attempt to assist the wounded point man. As the leaders fell, the platoons went to ground and the attack stalled. As his junior leaders were falling one by one, Captain Bateman, the slight but scrappy Company C commander, tried to keep his faltering unit in the fight, but moving from platoon to platoon, he became a choice target. When he was wounded by rifle fire, Company C was out of action, except for 2nd Platoon.
Second Platoon had been spared the withering fire to which the other two platoons had been subjected, but after moving rapidly in the intense heat and humidity of the jungle on the other side of the hedgerow, platoon leader Lieutenant Hack and others were becoming heat casualties. Talking with Hack on the radio, I could tell his judgment was impaired. Second Platoon went to ground, and Company C was no longer a fighting force.
As I listened to the desperate situation unfold, I hurriedly cleaned my CAR-15, checked my loaded magazines and readied my web gear for an extended stay in the field. My battalion commander, Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer III, the grandnephew of Yellow Hair himself, was rushing back to the battalion in a command and control (C&C) helicopter to pick me up. Custer was a mercurial leader. “Bald, blocky and bad-mouthed” was how another battalion commander in the brigade described him, referring to his combativeness in discussing tactical matters with superiors and subordinates alike. During one heated discussion Custer had with another battalion commander, I had to personally intervene. Certain that Custer was about to swing at the other lieutenant colonel, I had grabbed a handful of the back of his fatigue jacket. He turned instantly, smiled broadly at me and stalked out of the room.
I’d been under Custer’s command for about three months and had seen how his fearless nature and curiosity kept him just a step away from disaster most of the time. Tough, but also kindhearted, he never passed up an opportunity to perform humanitarian acts. He once ordered his pilot to land his unarmed observation helicopter in a village of questionable loyalty to take a sick child and its mother to a hospital.
“Colonel, you have got to stop doing this stuff,” I told him afterward. “You’re going to get yourself—and the pilot—killed in one of these insecure villages.” He smiled contritely, then turned on me: “You can’t talk to me like that,” he said, still smiling. “I am your commander.”
As we flew from FSB Jackson toward the Renegade Woods fight, Custer calmly impressed on me the need to take charge of the situation on the ground. “You won’t have a lot of time to get things under control before dark,” said Custer. “There is no way of knowing what kind of shape Charlie Company is in until you get there. You’ve got the ball. Let me know what you need, and I will make sure you get it. Watch your fire discipline. You don’t want to run out of ammunition.” We had agreed that it would simplify command problems if I went in with a single radio on the battalion command net, allowing me to move around on the battlefield without additional radio antennas to draw fire. I would request artillery and air support from him, and he would handle it from the C&C helicopter.
Covered by 118th Helicopter Company gunships, seven UH-1 slicks carrying 1st Platoon of Company B, two squads of 2nd Platoon and Criswell’s command group landed at 1423 at an LZ tucked inside a horseshoe curve of the Vam Co Dong River on the Renegade Woods’ northern edge. Our C&C Huey flared and landed behind the last slick. Custer shook my hand and I jumped out with my radio operator, Spc. 4 Danny Klossner.
Fortunately, the LZ was cold. I had a hurried conference with Criswell, who had been in the field for several days. I told him we had to get control of the situation on the ground quickly, without waiting for the rest of his company. I had no idea how much time or combat power it would take to clean out the enemy, but we had to be ready; our slender force and whatever remained of Company C had to organize for defense before dark.
We weren’t worried about support. Custer, a master at coordinating air and artillery, had practically unlimited artillery on call and an incredible amount of air support on station, since it was a quiet day for action elsewhere in the division. With Custer in the helicopter above, we knew we would make the most of it.
I had to do two more things before we went into action: Give Custer my plan for movement to make contact with the enemy, and issue an order for smoke to mark our movement through the jungle. My greatest concern as we moved under the canopy was being hit by our own air and artillery support. But, in the helicopter above, Custer was already orchestrating this with artillery liaison officer Captain C. Merton Agena, and within seconds after the smoke had drifted up through the canopy, artillery rounds were slamming into known enemy positions ahead of us.
Radio reports from the mostly leaderless Company C hunkered down in the jungle indicated our artillery was hitting enemy positions, and that enemy fire had fallen off, except from one spot on their right front. I ordered Company C to stay in place and keep up its fire on the enemy until the men of Company B passed through their position. The volume of small-arms fire from their direction was not encouraging. It seemed to be largely enemy fire, and the few tracers we observed were green.
At 1445, the leading element of 1st Platoon, Company B, started to receive small-arms and light machine gun fire, but it was light and ragged, so I ordered an immediate assault. Criswell brought his short-handed 2nd Platoon up on line with the full-strength 1st Platoon and started the assault. Increased enemy fire slowed the lead platoon, and the attack was halted briefly to prevent the lagging platoon from firing into it. At this point, a small group of enemy soldiers emerged from a hedgerow, either bent on escape or making an attempt at a flanking attack. First Platoon shot down two, and a gunship killed two others as they changed direction and tried to run away. One man from 1st Platoon was wounded in the brief encounter.
By this time, 2nd Platoon was able to resume the assault. While the enemy was no longer defending positions in an organized way, snipers were left on stay-behind missions or were unable to withdraw with their unit. They killed 2nd Lt. Orville Kitchen, the artillery forward observer with Company B, and Spc. 4 John Lyons, a radiotelephone operator. We were directing artillery and airstrikes on the positions, which quickly became untenable for the NVA. Except for the sniper activity, by about 1500, all reports indicated that the enemy had withdrawn from contact, abandoning prepared positions and slipping away in characteristic fashion to safer spots. At this point, Criswell turned his attention to the bypassed hot spot, where the body of the dead point man still lay. Sergeant Stephen Adams, a 1st Platoon squad leader, and Spc. 4 Richard Nast, a medic, volunteered to retrieve the soldier’s body, but the effort was abandoned when the light machine gun opened up again. Specialist 4 Orlando Noriega, a 1st Platoon machine gunner, took the gun under fire and silenced it.
By 1800, light under the gloomy canopy was beginning to fail, and I knew it was time to begin moving into a night defensive position (NDP). Throughout the fighting that afternoon, Custer had kept me abreast of plans to seal off the enemy force within the Renegade Woods, where it could be surrounded and destroyed. Our forces would be enlarged the next day by the addition of two mechanized infantry companies from 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, the “Triple Deuce.” As the day ended, enemy contacts dwindled to an occasional sniper round. I knew there was plenty of fighting yet to be done, but it would have to wait until tomorrow since our ammunition was running low and there was much to do in the last hours of daylight.
The location of the NDP was ideal: It was near the LZ, in the crook formed by the river and supported by artillery fire from Fire Support Bases Hull and Hampton. At 1820, 1st Sgt. Domingo Rodriguez-Colon arrived at the LZ with the remainder of Company B, a full platoon and the missing squad from the short-handed 2nd Platoon. He was ordered to begin organizing the NDP, clearing fields of fire as necessary. Twenty minutes later, I ordered Company B to break contact and withdraw to the NDP. The first order of business was to round up and reorganize Company C. Criswell soon had his company at full field strength, except for the day’s casualties. First Lieutenant Cyril Weisner, executive officer of Company C, then arrived with 1st Sgt. Gengoro Higa to take command of his company, which had lost all of its officers to death or wounds during the day’s fighting. The company still lacked enough leaders to be fully effective, but I decided that trying to introduce replacement officers in the middle of a battle could result in confusion and hesitancy.
The final airstrike of the day was put in by OV-10 Bronco pilot Captain John MacLeod. When the fighters drew ground fire, he rolled in and blasted the sources of the fire with his own rockets and machine guns. The enemy fire ceased.
After I had issued orders to complete our night defenses, I caught up on events in several radio conversations with Colonel Custer. I already knew that we would begin operations in the morning with significant reinforcements. Company A of our battalion had been airlifted to some 1,000 meters south of us, where it was preparing an NDP. Two mechanized infantry companies from 2-22 Infantry would come under our operational control on the following day. Together, the five companies of this task force were to seal off the Renegade Woods and destroy the enemy.
The night was interrupted only by the mutter of distant artillery and a dazzling electric show put on by an Air Force AC-119, which rained a stream of fire on a nearby enemy position.
I had a fitful sleep because of pain from RPG fragments in my left arm. Klossner, my radio man, sustained cracked ribs in the same blast. I forced him to get on a dustoff to Cu Chi.
Although we didn’t know it at the time, we were up against two battalions of the 271st Regiment, 9th VC/NVA Division, and they had been badly bloodied by the number and variety of air and artillery resources expended on the first day. A battle, like a poker game, attracts many players when it is the only one in town, and the absence of other significant action in the division area at the time attracted bombs and artillery shells on a lavish scale. This produced casualties far beyond what the Communists would have suffered had they had more time to disengage and flee to their Cambodian sanctuaries, as was their usual habit.
Colonel Custer had some of the same propensity for taking risks as his namesake, but his luck and timing were better. All that I learned of his activities during the day’s fighting, except for his calm orders and questions on the radio, was drawn from the sometimes laconic, and sometimes excited comments of the pilots who observed him in the air. Yellow Hair rode again. What he did for his men on the ground was to put the lethality of air power where we needed it, when we needed it. He let us fight the battle on the ground. No combat infantryman can ask for more.
April 3 began with a reconnaissance of the first day’s fighting ground. It included recovering the two Rangers and the three Wolfhounds whose bodies had remained on the battlefield overnight, since retrieving them in failing light in the presence of enemy snipers would have been just too much of a risk.
My thin command group, including a grinning but hurting Danny Klossner, who had hopped on a resupply bird from Cu Chi to rejoin us, moved out between Criswell’s Company B and the battered Company C, led by its lone officer, Lieutenant Weisner. We moved west to link up with Company A and the mechanized Company B, 2-22 Infantry, advancing from the south.
One more recovery task remained. The day before, one of two UH-1C gunships from the 118th Helicopter Company had been shot down by ground fire. The pilot was able to make a forced landing in a clearing about 800 meters west of the battle’s initial contact site. The crew was rescued by their squadron companions in the other gunship. The rocket pod on one side of the aircraft was on fire and “cooked off” after the crew left, but the rest of the weapons and ordnance on it were intact. When our two Wolfhound companies reached the downed aircraft, we removed the weaponry so it could be lifted out by a CH-54.
As the morning wore on, aviation contacts with the enemy occurred more frequently, but infantry contacts fell off. At 0745, a light scout team assigned to Delta Troop, 3-4 Cavalry, received ineffective fire from three enemy soldiers; the scouts returned fire, killing all three. Similar firefights continued all day, but the enemy presence had clearly been reduced to those who were trying to escape. For the next two days, the remnants of enemy forces were destroyed through good use of the speed of the mechanized units in hammer-and-anvil movements.
On April 5, Company A of 2-27 Infantry was ordered to a 24-hour maintenance “stand down” at Cu Chi while the two mechanized infantry companies and the two rifle companies continued their clearing missions, closely supported by the available air support. There was no longer a need for centralized control on the ground and it was time for me to go back to the battalion.
The final score card of the action in the Renegade Woods is a gruesome reminder of the cost of war. A total of 101 enemy bodies were counted on the battlefield. There was one enemy prisoner of war, and two who switched sides in the conflict. Our own casualties were 12 killed, including one who later died of wounds received in the battle. Eight of them were Wolfhounds from our battalion, two were Rangers from Company F of the 75th Infantry, and one was the artillery forward observer from Battery B, 2-77 Artillery, in the field with Company B, 2-27 Infantry. Sixteen other men were wounded and hospitalized.
While imperfect for sure, our success in the Renegade Woods came close to a textbook example of combined arms in action.
Four artillery batteries, firing 105mm guns and 155mm and 8-inch howitzers, had expended 741 rounds, mostly high explosives. Army aviation units that included Companies A and B of the 25th Aviation Battalion, the 116th, 118th and 187th Assault Helicopter companies, and Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, flew hundreds of missions. Massive support was furnished by the Air Force. The steel-nerved pilots of the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Air Control Party flew 36 missions in their OV-10s to direct and mark the locations on the ground for 18 airstrikes from A-37 and F-100 aircraft from three tactical fighter wings. The airstrikes dropped a total of 92 500-pound high-explosive bombs of various types, along with 48 500-pound napalm bombs and eight 750-pound napalm bombs. The Air Force also flew three missions by AC-119 Shadow aircraft.
While there was an element of luck in the unusual wealth of available assets to support our Renegade Woods battle, I remember Custer telling me once that we make our own luck. At its essence, however, Custer was simply following what was taught at the Infantry School in those days: Careful planning followed by violent execution of the plans.
After serving with the Wolfhounds, Howard Landon “Dutch” McAllister was commandant at Carolina Military Academy, public affairs officer at the National War College and chief of the Army News Service before his retirement in 1979.
5/9/2012 • Vietnam Magazine
“Let me know what you need…watch your fire discipline…you don’t want to run out of ammo,” said Custer, a master at coordinating air and artillery
The 1970 battle in the Renegade Woods, like most fierce fights in the Vietnam War, came up with the suddenness of a violent tropical storm. The densely wooded area in Tay Ninh Province nestled under a broad curve in the Vam Co Dong River was covered by thick, double-canopy jungle heavily undergrown with vines. Open areas were few within the Renegades, and they were thatched with elephant grass and bordered by hedgerows. Close to the Cambodian border, this area that had long harbored bandits and outlaws served as ideal staging areas for North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units that crossed the border. This was Indian Country for sure, where only the technological superiority and mobility of combined forces could overcome the advantages of the NVA/Viet Cong (VC) forces, which could typically evade and escape to Cambodian sanctuaries before suffering too much damage.
At 7 a.m., April 2, 1970, a helicopter light scout team from the 25th Aviation Battalion flew a visual reconnaissance of the area. While the intended landing zone showed no sign of enemy activity, two other potential LZs nearby bore unmistakable signs, including footprints. Ranger teams 38 and 39, Company F, 75th Infantry, were put on the ground to investigate, and within minutes a light machine gun opened up on them at short range, destroying 1st Lt. Philip Norton’s radio and wounding Sergeant Fred Stuckey. Stuckey and Spc. 4 Donald Purdy managed to kill the machine gun crew with hand grenades, but from all directions the Rangers began taking fire, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Obviously they were facing a much larger enemy force than they could handle, so Lieutenant Norton ordered them to move where the team could be extracted or reinforced by air.
Using fire and maneuver, the two elements of the Ranger team moved toward the location Norton designated. Norton’s element reached the site, finding momentary security in a bomb crater, but the second element, under the assistant team leader, Sgt. 1st Class Alvin Floyd, did not. Floyd and Sergeant Michael Thomas were killed by small-arms and RPG fire, while Spc. 4 Donald Tinney fell wounded in the open. Norton was able to drag Tinney to the relative safety of the crater.
As the chaos on the ground unfolded, Warrant Officer James Tonelli brought his UH-1 into a low-level approach under heavy fire, dropping down 15 feet from the crater. After the Rangers raced to the chopper and piled in, Tonelli managed to get the overloaded helicopter airborne in spite of taking multiple hits from ground fire, even as 1st Lt. David Parsons in an OV-10 Bronco fired his miniguns in strafing passes following the extraction. While 11 Rangers had been rescued, two dead men were left in the clearing.
I was the operations officer of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, the Wolfhounds, and at 0900 we were ordered into the fray. Two of the 2nd Battalion’s companies were already operating in the area. The night before, Company C had served as a blocking force for an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) unit engaged with the enemy four kilometers southwest of the Renegade Woods, and Company B had conducted ambush patrols nine kilometers south. Now Company C, under Captain Jerry D. Bateman, and Company B, commanded by Captain Charles Criswell, hastily moved to helicopter pickup points.
Company C was first to get into the fight, but with only three helicopters available, it was 1100 hours before it was on the ground and moving toward the NVA/VC force. By 1140 all the platoons were exchanging fire with the enemy.
I listened to the radio transmissions between the battalion commander and the company commander from the battalion tactical operations center at Fire Support Base (FSB) Jackson, which was built to block a major infiltration route known as the An Ninh Corridor. The route made use of canals and swampy lowlands on the Vam Co Dong River to the east, known by its shape on the map as the Angel’s Wing. Things were already beginning to go wrong. Two of the platoons had been advancing to contact in parallel columns, with the 1st Platoon under 1st Lt. Ronnie Clark, followed by the 3rd Platoon, led by 2nd Lt. Ronald Kolb. The 2nd Platoon, commanded by 2nd Lt. Monte Hack, moved parallel on the right flank of the other two platoons, separated from them by a dense hedgerow. Immediately after becoming engaged, the lead platoon was pinned down by a machine gun firing from its right front.
The point man was wounded, followed by Lieutenant Clark, who was shot in the stomach by a burst of enemy fire. As the 1st Platoon returned fire, Kolb tried to maneuver his 3rd Platoon around to the right, but his point man was killed almost immediately. Kolb pulled his men back and maneuvered them to come up on the left side of 1st Platoon, but he was killed in a burst of fire from an unseen enemy. First Platoon’s Staff Sgt. Melvyn Hamana Kalili was then killed as he moved forward in an attempt to assist the wounded point man. As the leaders fell, the platoons went to ground and the attack stalled. As his junior leaders were falling one by one, Captain Bateman, the slight but scrappy Company C commander, tried to keep his faltering unit in the fight, but moving from platoon to platoon, he became a choice target. When he was wounded by rifle fire, Company C was out of action, except for 2nd Platoon.
Second Platoon had been spared the withering fire to which the other two platoons had been subjected, but after moving rapidly in the intense heat and humidity of the jungle on the other side of the hedgerow, platoon leader Lieutenant Hack and others were becoming heat casualties. Talking with Hack on the radio, I could tell his judgment was impaired. Second Platoon went to ground, and Company C was no longer a fighting force.
As I listened to the desperate situation unfold, I hurriedly cleaned my CAR-15, checked my loaded magazines and readied my web gear for an extended stay in the field. My battalion commander, Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer III, the grandnephew of Yellow Hair himself, was rushing back to the battalion in a command and control (C&C) helicopter to pick me up. Custer was a mercurial leader. “Bald, blocky and bad-mouthed” was how another battalion commander in the brigade described him, referring to his combativeness in discussing tactical matters with superiors and subordinates alike. During one heated discussion Custer had with another battalion commander, I had to personally intervene. Certain that Custer was about to swing at the other lieutenant colonel, I had grabbed a handful of the back of his fatigue jacket. He turned instantly, smiled broadly at me and stalked out of the room.
I’d been under Custer’s command for about three months and had seen how his fearless nature and curiosity kept him just a step away from disaster most of the time. Tough, but also kindhearted, he never passed up an opportunity to perform humanitarian acts. He once ordered his pilot to land his unarmed observation helicopter in a village of questionable loyalty to take a sick child and its mother to a hospital.
“Colonel, you have got to stop doing this stuff,” I told him afterward. “You’re going to get yourself—and the pilot—killed in one of these insecure villages.” He smiled contritely, then turned on me: “You can’t talk to me like that,” he said, still smiling. “I am your commander.”
As we flew from FSB Jackson toward the Renegade Woods fight, Custer calmly impressed on me the need to take charge of the situation on the ground. “You won’t have a lot of time to get things under control before dark,” said Custer. “There is no way of knowing what kind of shape Charlie Company is in until you get there. You’ve got the ball. Let me know what you need, and I will make sure you get it. Watch your fire discipline. You don’t want to run out of ammunition.” We had agreed that it would simplify command problems if I went in with a single radio on the battalion command net, allowing me to move around on the battlefield without additional radio antennas to draw fire. I would request artillery and air support from him, and he would handle it from the C&C helicopter.
Covered by 118th Helicopter Company gunships, seven UH-1 slicks carrying 1st Platoon of Company B, two squads of 2nd Platoon and Criswell’s command group landed at 1423 at an LZ tucked inside a horseshoe curve of the Vam Co Dong River on the Renegade Woods’ northern edge. Our C&C Huey flared and landed behind the last slick. Custer shook my hand and I jumped out with my radio operator, Spc. 4 Danny Klossner.
Fortunately, the LZ was cold. I had a hurried conference with Criswell, who had been in the field for several days. I told him we had to get control of the situation on the ground quickly, without waiting for the rest of his company. I had no idea how much time or combat power it would take to clean out the enemy, but we had to be ready; our slender force and whatever remained of Company C had to organize for defense before dark.
We weren’t worried about support. Custer, a master at coordinating air and artillery, had practically unlimited artillery on call and an incredible amount of air support on station, since it was a quiet day for action elsewhere in the division. With Custer in the helicopter above, we knew we would make the most of it.
I had to do two more things before we went into action: Give Custer my plan for movement to make contact with the enemy, and issue an order for smoke to mark our movement through the jungle. My greatest concern as we moved under the canopy was being hit by our own air and artillery support. But, in the helicopter above, Custer was already orchestrating this with artillery liaison officer Captain C. Merton Agena, and within seconds after the smoke had drifted up through the canopy, artillery rounds were slamming into known enemy positions ahead of us.
Radio reports from the mostly leaderless Company C hunkered down in the jungle indicated our artillery was hitting enemy positions, and that enemy fire had fallen off, except from one spot on their right front. I ordered Company C to stay in place and keep up its fire on the enemy until the men of Company B passed through their position. The volume of small-arms fire from their direction was not encouraging. It seemed to be largely enemy fire, and the few tracers we observed were green.
At 1445, the leading element of 1st Platoon, Company B, started to receive small-arms and light machine gun fire, but it was light and ragged, so I ordered an immediate assault. Criswell brought his short-handed 2nd Platoon up on line with the full-strength 1st Platoon and started the assault. Increased enemy fire slowed the lead platoon, and the attack was halted briefly to prevent the lagging platoon from firing into it. At this point, a small group of enemy soldiers emerged from a hedgerow, either bent on escape or making an attempt at a flanking attack. First Platoon shot down two, and a gunship killed two others as they changed direction and tried to run away. One man from 1st Platoon was wounded in the brief encounter.
By this time, 2nd Platoon was able to resume the assault. While the enemy was no longer defending positions in an organized way, snipers were left on stay-behind missions or were unable to withdraw with their unit. They killed 2nd Lt. Orville Kitchen, the artillery forward observer with Company B, and Spc. 4 John Lyons, a radiotelephone operator. We were directing artillery and airstrikes on the positions, which quickly became untenable for the NVA. Except for the sniper activity, by about 1500, all reports indicated that the enemy had withdrawn from contact, abandoning prepared positions and slipping away in characteristic fashion to safer spots. At this point, Criswell turned his attention to the bypassed hot spot, where the body of the dead point man still lay. Sergeant Stephen Adams, a 1st Platoon squad leader, and Spc. 4 Richard Nast, a medic, volunteered to retrieve the soldier’s body, but the effort was abandoned when the light machine gun opened up again. Specialist 4 Orlando Noriega, a 1st Platoon machine gunner, took the gun under fire and silenced it.
By 1800, light under the gloomy canopy was beginning to fail, and I knew it was time to begin moving into a night defensive position (NDP). Throughout the fighting that afternoon, Custer had kept me abreast of plans to seal off the enemy force within the Renegade Woods, where it could be surrounded and destroyed. Our forces would be enlarged the next day by the addition of two mechanized infantry companies from 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, the “Triple Deuce.” As the day ended, enemy contacts dwindled to an occasional sniper round. I knew there was plenty of fighting yet to be done, but it would have to wait until tomorrow since our ammunition was running low and there was much to do in the last hours of daylight.
The location of the NDP was ideal: It was near the LZ, in the crook formed by the river and supported by artillery fire from Fire Support Bases Hull and Hampton. At 1820, 1st Sgt. Domingo Rodriguez-Colon arrived at the LZ with the remainder of Company B, a full platoon and the missing squad from the short-handed 2nd Platoon. He was ordered to begin organizing the NDP, clearing fields of fire as necessary. Twenty minutes later, I ordered Company B to break contact and withdraw to the NDP. The first order of business was to round up and reorganize Company C. Criswell soon had his company at full field strength, except for the day’s casualties. First Lieutenant Cyril Weisner, executive officer of Company C, then arrived with 1st Sgt. Gengoro Higa to take command of his company, which had lost all of its officers to death or wounds during the day’s fighting. The company still lacked enough leaders to be fully effective, but I decided that trying to introduce replacement officers in the middle of a battle could result in confusion and hesitancy.
The final airstrike of the day was put in by OV-10 Bronco pilot Captain John MacLeod. When the fighters drew ground fire, he rolled in and blasted the sources of the fire with his own rockets and machine guns. The enemy fire ceased.
After I had issued orders to complete our night defenses, I caught up on events in several radio conversations with Colonel Custer. I already knew that we would begin operations in the morning with significant reinforcements. Company A of our battalion had been airlifted to some 1,000 meters south of us, where it was preparing an NDP. Two mechanized infantry companies from 2-22 Infantry would come under our operational control on the following day. Together, the five companies of this task force were to seal off the Renegade Woods and destroy the enemy.
The night was interrupted only by the mutter of distant artillery and a dazzling electric show put on by an Air Force AC-119, which rained a stream of fire on a nearby enemy position.
I had a fitful sleep because of pain from RPG fragments in my left arm. Klossner, my radio man, sustained cracked ribs in the same blast. I forced him to get on a dustoff to Cu Chi.
Although we didn’t know it at the time, we were up against two battalions of the 271st Regiment, 9th VC/NVA Division, and they had been badly bloodied by the number and variety of air and artillery resources expended on the first day. A battle, like a poker game, attracts many players when it is the only one in town, and the absence of other significant action in the division area at the time attracted bombs and artillery shells on a lavish scale. This produced casualties far beyond what the Communists would have suffered had they had more time to disengage and flee to their Cambodian sanctuaries, as was their usual habit.
Colonel Custer had some of the same propensity for taking risks as his namesake, but his luck and timing were better. All that I learned of his activities during the day’s fighting, except for his calm orders and questions on the radio, was drawn from the sometimes laconic, and sometimes excited comments of the pilots who observed him in the air. Yellow Hair rode again. What he did for his men on the ground was to put the lethality of air power where we needed it, when we needed it. He let us fight the battle on the ground. No combat infantryman can ask for more.
April 3 began with a reconnaissance of the first day’s fighting ground. It included recovering the two Rangers and the three Wolfhounds whose bodies had remained on the battlefield overnight, since retrieving them in failing light in the presence of enemy snipers would have been just too much of a risk.
My thin command group, including a grinning but hurting Danny Klossner, who had hopped on a resupply bird from Cu Chi to rejoin us, moved out between Criswell’s Company B and the battered Company C, led by its lone officer, Lieutenant Weisner. We moved west to link up with Company A and the mechanized Company B, 2-22 Infantry, advancing from the south.
One more recovery task remained. The day before, one of two UH-1C gunships from the 118th Helicopter Company had been shot down by ground fire. The pilot was able to make a forced landing in a clearing about 800 meters west of the battle’s initial contact site. The crew was rescued by their squadron companions in the other gunship. The rocket pod on one side of the aircraft was on fire and “cooked off” after the crew left, but the rest of the weapons and ordnance on it were intact. When our two Wolfhound companies reached the downed aircraft, we removed the weaponry so it could be lifted out by a CH-54.
As the morning wore on, aviation contacts with the enemy occurred more frequently, but infantry contacts fell off. At 0745, a light scout team assigned to Delta Troop, 3-4 Cavalry, received ineffective fire from three enemy soldiers; the scouts returned fire, killing all three. Similar firefights continued all day, but the enemy presence had clearly been reduced to those who were trying to escape. For the next two days, the remnants of enemy forces were destroyed through good use of the speed of the mechanized units in hammer-and-anvil movements.
On April 5, Company A of 2-27 Infantry was ordered to a 24-hour maintenance “stand down” at Cu Chi while the two mechanized infantry companies and the two rifle companies continued their clearing missions, closely supported by the available air support. There was no longer a need for centralized control on the ground and it was time for me to go back to the battalion.
The final score card of the action in the Renegade Woods is a gruesome reminder of the cost of war. A total of 101 enemy bodies were counted on the battlefield. There was one enemy prisoner of war, and two who switched sides in the conflict. Our own casualties were 12 killed, including one who later died of wounds received in the battle. Eight of them were Wolfhounds from our battalion, two were Rangers from Company F of the 75th Infantry, and one was the artillery forward observer from Battery B, 2-77 Artillery, in the field with Company B, 2-27 Infantry. Sixteen other men were wounded and hospitalized.
While imperfect for sure, our success in the Renegade Woods came close to a textbook example of combined arms in action.
Four artillery batteries, firing 105mm guns and 155mm and 8-inch howitzers, had expended 741 rounds, mostly high explosives. Army aviation units that included Companies A and B of the 25th Aviation Battalion, the 116th, 118th and 187th Assault Helicopter companies, and Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, flew hundreds of missions. Massive support was furnished by the Air Force. The steel-nerved pilots of the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Air Control Party flew 36 missions in their OV-10s to direct and mark the locations on the ground for 18 airstrikes from A-37 and F-100 aircraft from three tactical fighter wings. The airstrikes dropped a total of 92 500-pound high-explosive bombs of various types, along with 48 500-pound napalm bombs and eight 750-pound napalm bombs. The Air Force also flew three missions by AC-119 Shadow aircraft.
While there was an element of luck in the unusual wealth of available assets to support our Renegade Woods battle, I remember Custer telling me once that we make our own luck. At its essence, however, Custer was simply following what was taught at the Infantry School in those days: Careful planning followed by violent execution of the plans.
After serving with the Wolfhounds, Howard Landon “Dutch” McAllister was commandant at Carolina Military Academy, public affairs officer at the National War College and chief of the Army News Service before his retirement in 1979.
Chewing Up Charlie in the Renegade Woods | HistoryNet
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Thanks for providing details about the Ground Reconnaissance operation which was fought in Hieu Thien District, Tay Ninh Province by Teams 38 and 39, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry. Companies A, B, C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, and Companies A, B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry under control of 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division from April 2 - 6, 1970 as part of Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL.
MISSION: "Initially, the teams from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry were inserted into the contact area to exploit intelligence information. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which was preparing to begin normal operations in the same general area, was committed as a reaction force when the Rangers developed the large contact. Two companies from the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, were committee to the action as it expanded. The mission of the reacting forces was to conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area, and to extract the bodies of the two Rangers who had been killed."
This was a successful ground reconnaissance operation carried out by 3rd Brigade , 25th ID elements. "Enemy personnel losses during the five-day operation were 101 KIA (BC), one prisoner-of-war captured, and two Hoi Chanh received by US forces. Large amounts of enemy equipment were also captured or destroyed. US forces suffered 11 men killed and 35 wounded, of whom 18 were treated and returned to duty immediately, but one of whom subsequently died of wounds."
I found an after action report by the Division historian at: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/vietnam/reneg/rtxt.htm
Here are the details for that report:
1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Unnamed; Ground Reconnaissance.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 02 April - 06 April 1970.
3. LOCATION: Renegade Woods (XT2930); Sheet Number 6231 III N, Map Series L8020, 1:25,000; Hieu Thien District, Tay Ninh Province.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED:
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian.
7. TASK ORGANIZATION:
a. Teams 38 and 39, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry.
b. Companies A, B, C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry.
c. Companies A, B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry.
8. SUPPORTING FORCES:
a. Artillery.
(1) Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm howitzer).
(2) Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (8" howitzer).
(3) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, IIFFV (155mm howitzer).
(4) Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery, IIFFV (8" howitzer).
b. Army Aviation.
(1) Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Centaur).
(2) Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion (Little Bear).
(3) Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion (Diamondhead).
(4) 116th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion (Hornet).
(5) 187th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion (Crusaders).
(6) 118th Assault Helicopter Company, 145th Aviation Battalion (Thunderbird).
(7) 159th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) (Dustoff) - MEDEVAC.
(8) 3rd Brigade Aviation Element (Snoopy).
c. United States Air Force.
(1) Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FAC), 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (OV-10).
(2) 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100; A-37).
(3) 31st Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100).
(4) 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100).
(5) 8th Attack Squadron (A-37).
(6) 3rd Direct Air Support Center (AC-119 Show).
9. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The primary mission of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division is to destroy VC/NVA forces and their bases of operation; assist the Republic of Vietnam in rural development, pacification and civic action programs; assist in training and provide support to RVNAF; and to be prepared to reinforce US and ARVN forces within the TAOI as directed. This Brigade is continuing Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang.
10. INTELLIGENCE: a. Enemy: Intelligence indicated that enemy main force units might be moving into the Renegade Woods to establish a base area from which to conduct offensive operations. On 30 March elements of the 271 Regiment and elements of the 272 Regiment conducted an attack on Fire Support Base Jay (XT0375) of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), but were repulsed with a loss of 70 KIA (BC). After the attack these units were reported moving to base areas to refit. Subsequent moves of these regiments was not indicated, however, a move to the south along the border was suspected and watched for. The first indication of a sizeable enemy force in the Renegade Woods came when Teams 38 and 39, Co F (Ranger), 75th Inf made contact on 2 April 1970. Interrogation of prisoners-of-war and Hoi Chanh, plus readouts from captured documents, later identified the 271 Regiment, 9 VC/NVA Division as the enemy force contacted during this operation.
Interrogation of Nguyen Huong Mai, a prisoner-of-war captured on 3 April in the vicinity of XT264274 revealed that the 2 and 3 Battalions of the 271 Regiment were moving into newly established positions in the Renegade Woods to prepare for future operations. He further stated that the battalions were 80% NVA and that his battalion (2 Battalion) had a strength of 200-300 men. Documents captured on 3 April ln the vicinity of XT292312 identified the Executive Officer, C13 Company, 3 Battalion, 271 Regiment, and the same battalion was identified by further documents found the next day at XT289312.
The ground units involved in the action found numerous indications that the enemy was highly trained and well-equipped. They identified NVA equipment in large quantities, and believed the enemy to be highly aggressive NVA regulars.
For additional information, see Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 372nd Radio Research Company, 303rd Radio Research Battalion, dated 1 April 1970.
b. Terrain: The Renegade Woods is a flat area with thick double canopy jungle heavily undergrown with vines. The few open areas consist of elephant grass bisected by hedgerows and have isolated clumps of brush and a few dead trees, but are basically without cover or concealment. An exception was the landing zone of the Ranger team which had two bomb craters that provided the only cover. The hedgerows and jungle areas had been heavily bunkered and provided excellent defensive positions which were very difficult to locate. (See Overlay 1.)
c. Weather: Weather remained variable during the contact period and caused some difficulties during the early morning hours and again in the later afternoon when rainstorms forced air assets to operate at low level. Those periods, notably the mornings of 2, 3, and 4 April and the afternoon of 4 April, were the only exceptions to generally excellent visibility during the contact period. High temperatures in the 90s were typically seasonal for this area of Vietnam and caused only minor difficulties as most of the troops were acclimated. Heavy residual ground moisture on the morning of 2 April caused an unusually high number of weapons to malfunction among the Ranger team. It also served to lessen casualties among the elements engaged that day by absorbing much of the ricochet.
11. MISSION: Initially, the teams from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry were inserted into the contact area to exploit intelligence information. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which was preparing to begin normal operations in the same general area, was committed as a reaction force when the Rangers developed the large contact. Two companies from the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, were committee to the action as it expanded. The mission of the reacting forces was to conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area, and to extract the bodies of the two Rangers who had been killed.
12. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION:
At 0700 hours on 2 April the Commanding Officer, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry, CPT Paul Schierholz, was alerted by 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, to provide an element to exploit intelligence information in the Renegade Woods (XT3O32). From 0700 to 0800 hours a Light Scout Team (LST) from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry flew a visual reconnaissance of the area and noted no activity in the proposed landing zone (LZ), but saw signs of recent activity in a large clearing approximately 1000 meters to the west and 500 meters to the south. The AH-1G Cobra (Centaur 47) and OH-6A Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) (Centaur 13) saw a camouflaged structure just west of this clearing and made rocket and grenade passes at it, uncovering eight to ten buildings. They then returned to Cu Chi to refuel.
The 13-man Ranger element, composed of teams 38 and 39 (see Inclosure 4), boarded two UH-1H helicopters provided by D/3-4 Cav at 0800 hours and proceeded to the Renegade Woods, escorted by the LST. (See Inclosure 5). Upon arriving in the area they still found no signs of enemy activity near the proposed LZ, but discovered additional footprints in the other clearing (XT291316) along with a lister bag lying in the open near a well. At this time WO1 Kenneth Strand, Aircraft Commander in the Cobra,advised 1LT Philip Norton, the Ranger Team Leader who was riding in the lead UH-1H (Centaur 23) to supervise the insertion, of these findings. 1LT Norton decided to insert the team at the new location, which was accomplished at 0835 hours (see Overlay 2). Following standard operating procedures for Ranger insertions there was no preparation of the landing zone.
The Rangers deployed from the helicopters, immediately found signs of recent activity, and began moving west toward where the structures had been uncovered. At approximately 0840 hours a light machine gun (LMG) opened fire on the lead man, 1LT Norton, SGT Fred Stuckey and SP4 Donald Purdy, at a range of ten to 15 meters (see Overlay 3). In this initial burst of fire SGT Stuckey was wounded, 1LT Norton's AN/PRC-25 radio was rendered inoperable when the cord to its microphone was severed, and SP4 Purdy's extractor mechanism on his M-16 was shattered. SGT Stuckey and SP4 Purdy destroyed the LMG with hand grenades, killing its crew, but the team began taking fire from all directions. Since a LMG is usually found with at least a reinforced platoon, too large a force for the team to fight, it was decided that they should withdrew to the east and attempt to maneuver around the enemy. SFC Alvin Floyd, the Assistant Team Leader, contacted the Cobra with the remaining radio and requested that suppressive fire be placed on the western treeline, and that a reaction force be sent into the area.
The team split into its two elements, Team 39 under 1LT Norton moving eastward while Team 38 under SFC Floyd provided covering fire (see Overlay 4). The initial firefight lasted three to five minutes and died down to isolated sniping by the time Team 39 reached the eastern end of the clearing (100 meters away) and began deploying into the woods. During this withdrawal the Cobra made minigun and rocket passes on the western treeline to provide cover. At this time its 40mm automatic grenade launcher jammed after firing only one of the 250 rounds it carried. The LOH also made firing passes with its M-60 machine guns. The two UH-1H helicopters (Centaur 23 and 24) were dispatched to Cu Chi to bring out a reaction force. Centaur 23 had intended to land to MEDEVAC SGT Stuckey, but WO1 Strand refused it permission because no assistance had been requested and ground fire was too intense.
As Team 39 entered the eastern treeline they began to receive a heavy volume of fire from small arms and two or possibly three LMGs. Team 38 had just reached the vicinity of a large bomb crater, approximately 15 feet deep and 30 feet wide, when a combination of small arms and a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fired from the north killed SFC Floyd and SGT Michael Thomas and wounded SP4 Donald Tinney. SFC Floyd's radio was destroyed by the explosion, leaving the team without radio contact. Suppressive fire was placed by the Rangers in all directions to enable all of them to withdraw to the crater which provided the only cover in the area. At this time SFC Colin Hall silenced the western LMG and killed its crew with hand grenades and M-16 fire, and SGT Charles Avery silenced the RPG-7 and M-79 firing from the northern LMG site.
Once inside the lip of the crater 1LT Norton dragged SP4 Tinney to safety and obtained the microphone from SFC Floyd's radio, enabling him to regain communications. He repeated his request for a reaction force and gunship support, and additionally requested MEDEVAC for the three men struck by the RPG. The Cobra expended the rest of its rockets and minigun ammunition (4000 rounds) in laying suppressive fire. Tho LOH made passes with its M-60s expending 600 rounds. It also began jettisoning extra ammunition in preparation for an attempt to accomplish the MEDEVAC by leaving one of its gunners on the ground to make space for the wounded. The UH-1H helicopters heard the call and returned on station, having gotten as far towards Cu Chi as the French Factory (XT3532).
The Rangers inside the crater were taking small arms fire from all directions and hand grenade fire from a finger of the woods to the southwest. However, their suppressive fire succeeded in silencing the crew-served weapons. A NVA soldier emerged from the southern treeline to throw a hand grenade, but was wounded and then killed by two hand grenades thrown by SGT Stuckey. PFC Raymond Allmon expended the 700 rounds of M-60 ammunition he carried and a 50-round belt he removed from SGT Thomas' body, and was reduced to using his .45 caliber pistol. PFC Steven Perez expended all his M-79 ammunition and PFC Kenneth Langland fired 860 rounds before his M-60 malfunctioned. By about 0920 hours the team had expended most of their ammunition and were having many weapons failures. The LST had expended their ammunition and were making dry gun runs in an attempt to suppress the enemy fire.
At 0922 hours Centaur 23's Commander, WO1 James Tonelli, and its Pilot, CPT Philip Tocco, landed after a low-level approach to pick up the wounded. (See Overlay 5.) The helicopter received four hits from ground fire during the extraction (see Diagram 1), and was later examined by experts from Bell Aircraft who expressed amazement that it was still able to fly. The ship landed ten to 15 feet from the lip of the crater, and 1LT Norton gave his men the order to board, since they were in an untenable position. SP5 Charles Lowe, the Grew Chief, maintained fire with his M-60 on the treeline ten meters away while the doorgunner, PFC Richard Adams, a former member of Team 38, jumped off the ship to assist in getting SP4 Tinney aboard. After spending 30 seconds on the ground the overloaded UH-1H lifted off with maximum torque and severe vertical vibration and cleared the treeline with 11 Rangers and its crew of four aboard. One of its M-60 machine guns jammed as it was lifting off, but the Rangers continued firing their individual weapons. The two dead man were left on the ground along with some of the destroyed or damaged weapons and equipment. All the helicopters were running low on fuel and departed for Cu Chi, arriving there about 1000 hours. Centaur 23 had to stop near Trang Bang (XT4919) to administer initial first aid to SP4 Tinney and to redistribute the passengers, some of whom were literally hanging on, before landing at the 12th Evacuation Hospital.
At 0900 hours 1LT David Parsons, a Forward Air Controller (FAC), arrived on station over the contact area in an OV-10 and expended 1500 rounds of minigun ammunition strafing after the extraction. He received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the ground. Also at 0900 hours, Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, were alerted that they were to be inserted into the area as the reaction force. Company B had conducted Ambush Patrols (APs) in an area nine kilometers south of the contact area and were alerted to move to a pick-up point for airlift. Company C had been serving as a blocking force for an ARVN contact four kilometers to the southwest. Additionally, Company A which had just come into Cu Chi on standdown was placed on alert. The Battalion had been preparing to conduct operations in the same general area on that day. At 0925 hours LTC George Custer III, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, flying in a Command and Control helicopter from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, took off to supervise the action, and he remained on station for the majority of the five-day encounter.
Company C, utilizing three UH-1H ships, began helilifting to a LZ located in the vicinity of XT298313 (see Overlay 6). Artillery fire from Fire Support Bases (FSBs) Hull and Hampton provided a blocking fire into which the enemy was to be driven. By 1100 hours the 1st and 3rd Platoons, Company C, had assembled and began moving west towards the area of the Ranger contact, while part of the 2nd Platoon moved along a parallel course 300 meters north. At 1140 hours both elements became engaged. The heavier contact involved the southern group, which had been moving forward in a two-column formation through a series of open areas bordered by hedgerows (XT297313). The lead platoon, the 1st, was immediately pinned down by a LMG firing from the right front. The initial burst of fire killed the point man of the right column and wounded the other point man. The Platoon Leader, 1LT Ronnie Clark, was also wounded in the stomach by this burst which initiated a 20-minute firefight. At 1217 hours urgent MEDEVAC was requested by the Company Commander.
When this action began, 2/C/2-27 Inf began receiving small arms fire from the west (to their front), but most fell short. The Platoon Leader, 2LT Monte Hack, requested gunship cover to enable him to pull back and link up with the rest of the Company. He withdrew but was unable to rejoin the rest of the Company until about 1400 hours when Company B was lifted into the action. At that time his wounded man and five heat casualties were evacuated. The 3rd Platoon which had been on the right flank of the 1st pulled back and maneuvered in again on its left. 2LT Ronald Kolb, with 3/C/2-27 Inf was killed during this maneuver, and SSG Melvin Kalili, Platoon Sergeant of the 1st Platoon, was killed when he went to aid the wounded point man. The intense enemy fire was very accurate and well-directed. The men of Company C were effectively pinned down and had difficulty locating the source of the enemy fire. They remained pinned down by the sniper fire following the firefight for over six hours and had extreme difficulty extracting their casualties. The dead point was left overnight because it was impossible to reach his body.
At 1145 hours a Light Fire Team (LFT) composed of two UH-1C gunships from the 118th Assault Helicopter Company were orbiting the contact area trying to locate ground fire with other aviation elements and CPT William Wilson, a FAC. One of the gunships was shot down by small arms fire, but the pilot was able to set it down in a clearing about 800 meters west of the contact site (XT287314), and the crew safely evaded one hedgerow westward where the other gunship rescued them. The UH-1C's left side rocket pod was on fire and the rockets "cooked off" after the crew had left. The FAC and other gunships expended in support of the rescue.
At 1200 hours CPT Wendell Brown (FAC) was on station over the contact area and inquired if the ground commander wanted tactical air strikes in addition to the LFT from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion, then on station. He requested two immediate air strikes in addition to the one already scheduled. Those he directed on target at 1315, 1330, and 1345 hours in an area west of the contact (see Overlay 7 and Inclosure 3). At 1337, 1357 and 1421 hours resupply ships from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, brought in extra ammunition and evacuated seven wounded men and five heat casualties to Tay Ninh.
Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which had been waiting at its pick-up zone since 0900 hours was finally airlifted into a LZ (XT298315) to assist Company C. The seven UH-1H helicopters took the Commanding Officer, CPT Charles Creswell, and his command element with the 1st and part of the 2nd Platoons on the first lift. After an hour-long flight, it inserted at 1423 hours. The second lift brought in the remainder of the company and 1SG Domingo Rodriguez-Colon at 1820 hours. The element from the initial lift formed on line with 2/B/2-27 Inf on the right and moved forward 300 meters until they reached Company C (see Overlay 6).
At approximately 1445 hours they began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire, and assaulted forward, bypassing the strongpoint which was keeping Company C pinned down. The 1st Platoon worked through the open area to its front by fire and maneuver, but was forced to halt when the 2nd Platoon became pinned down temporarily, causing its fire to impact close to the front of the 1st Platoon's positions. While they were temporarily halted, the enemy attempted to maneuver around their right flank. Two men who emerged from the hedgerow were killed by the fire of 1/B/2-27 Inf, one of whom appeared to be either a junior officer or NCO who was attempting to lead his men. Other enemy soldiers were chased out of the hedgerow and two more were killed by gunship fire then they attempted to flee west. This firefight cost the 1st Platoon one machine gunner wounded.
The 2nd Platoon was finally able to move up on line, but highly accurate sniper fire immediately pinned them down, killing SP4 John Lyons, the RTO (radioman), and 2LT Orvil Kitchens the Forward Observer (FO) from Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, in rapid succession. The bypassed "hot corner", where the initial LMG fire had come from, had been quiet for some time, so SGT Stephen Adams, a squad leader from the 1st Platoon, Company B, and SP4 Richard Nast, a medic from HHC attached to his platoon, attempted to retrieve the body of the dead point man. The LMG opened fire on them and kept them pinned down until SP4 Orlando Noriega, a machine gunner from 1/B/2-27 Inf fired to his rear with his M-60 and an M-16 which he took from his assistant gunner and silenced it. This action also enabled the forward elements to commence a fighting withdrawal as they began to run out of ammunition. They were forced to leave two bodies at the limit of the farthest advance, as well as the dead point man, and abandon some equipment. MEDEVAC of casualties took place at 1533, 1545 and 1631 hours as the wounded and the bodies of the KIAs were brought back to the LZ.
At 1525 hours Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was alerted to move to a pick-up zone at Cu Chi and began lifting on two UH-1H helicopters at 1600 hours. By 1815 hours the last of the company had inserted into a LZ approximately one kilometer southwest of Companies B and C. The withdrawal of these two Companies to a night defensive position (NDP) in the vicinity of their LZ was covered by artillery fire from FSB Hull and FSB Hampton, and air strikes placed on enemy positions 400©600 meters west by 1LT Hamby Fagg at 1700 hours and again at 1805 hours. This second strike which was made by four F-100s struck positions marked by a Cobra in the area of the camouflaged structures. During this last strike 1LT Fagg expended 1000 rounds covering Company B's right flank with a Cobra. They spotted a group of enemy maneuvering to attack, and broke it up after the ground troops had marked their positions with smoke.
At 1820 hours the second lift of Company B arrived at the LZ and was directed by MAJ Howard McAllister, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, S-3 who had assumed command on the ground, to begin securing a NDP for the engaged troops to withdraw to. LTC Custer reported that the contact was broken off at 1840 hours, and a four-ship resupply mission brought ammunition, food and water into the NDP. Reinforcements were brought in for Company C from the Battalion rear, and 1LT Cy Weisner, Company C Executive Officer (XO), replaced the wounded 1LT Clark in command of 1/C/2-27 Inf. Helicopter gunships and flareships remained on station during the night but there was no contact. CPT John MacLeod directed the final airstrike of the day at 1900 hours and made rocket and machine gun runs when the fighters received ground fire.
The mission of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was to conduct a ground reconnaissance on 3 April of the previous day's contact area, and to retrieve the five bodies left overnight. The task force was composed of Companies A, B, C, and Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, which was made OPCON. Plans called for B/C/2-27 Inf to sweep west from their position through the area of their firefight to the area of the Ranger contact. There they would link up with Company A and B/2-22 Inf (M) moving up from the south (see Overlay 8).
At 0745 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged three enemy in the vicinity of XT292320. They received ineffective small arms fire from the enemy and killed all three. CPT Bobby Hawkins, FAC, arrived on station at 0945 hours as the ground troops began moving forward, and shut off artillery fire to clear the air for friendly aircraft. At 1000 hours he sent the day's first air strike (see Overlay 9) into the area, resulting in two enemy KIA (BC). His rocket and machine gun passes which were required to suppress ground fire directed at the aircraft resulted in another possible enemy KIA. Companies B and C had meanwhile moved up to the contact area and paused while the air strikes were bright in, and then moved forward to evacuate the three bodies left in the area the previous afternoon. They paused again at 1100 hours to let additional air assets be brought in.
CPT MacLeod brought in an air strike at 1100 hours on positions marked with smoke by a LST from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and in response to ground requests for additional napalm had two more air strikes brought into the area by 1300 hours. At 1100 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged two enemy near an oxcart in the vicinity of XT275308, killing both. The NVA were attempting to fire an RPG at the LOH when they were killed by rockets and minigun fire from the Cobra. A .51 caliber machine gun mount, six RPG rounds and 1/4 pound of documents were evacuated to Cu Chi from this encounter. CPT MacLeod engaged two enemy in a bunker (XT283318) at 1146 hours, killing both of them. The weather had cleared by this time, enabling the follow-up missions to avoid the necessity of making low-level approaches which had plagued pilots earlier in the day. The first element of fighters at 1300 hours produced multiple secondary explosions.
During their pause to allow the air assets to be brought in, Companies B and C policed the contact area and gathered up abandoned equipment for evacuation. They also ate a hot meal at noon which was brought forward from the LZ by their respective security elements. Company C utilized its 1st Platoon for this task, with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons remaining on line. Company B kept three platoons as a striking force and had its Weapons Platoon (without heavy weapons) acting as a rear security element. The equipment was evacuated between 1400 and 1430 hours, with the two companies (minus security elements) sweeping forward to the area of the Ranger contact where they linked up with A/2-27 Inf and B/2-22 Inf (M) which had swept up from the south across their front. Two armored personnel carriers (APCs) broke down during the sweep and 2/B/2-27 Inf provided security for them until them were repaired.
At approximately 1400 hours CPT Brown and 1LT Parsons received permission to engage a bunker complex (XT290314) which 1LT Parsons had seen one NVA run into earlier. After having B/2-27 Inf mark its positions with smoke, CPT Brown made an initial rocket pass which flushed four or five enemy into the open. The two FACs made ten passes apiece on the target, chasing several more enemy into the open, and receiving fire from small arms, LMGs, and RPGs. Initially, the enemy ran towards Company B, which engaged them with organic weapons at 1415 hours. Six enemy were killed by the ground troops before they fled. Several weapons were found in the bunkers, indicating that the enemy was attempting to strike Company B on the northern flank.
After the bodies of the two dead Rangers were recovered by Company A, the ground troops swept west to the downed UH-1C. They provided security while it was disarmed and recovered by a CH-47. Recovery took place at 1815 hours with 1LT Parsons flying cover. At this time all four companies returned to the clearing where the Ranger contact had occurred and established a NDP with APCs positioned around the perimeter.
During the afternoon's sweep of the area, there were several isolated contacts. Company A engaged three enemy in a bunker (XT292312) located a LST from D/3-4 Cav. Using small arms fire at 1517 hours, they killed three enemy without taking any casualties. A ChiCom claymore mine and documents identifying the XO, C13 Company, 3 Battalion, 271 Regiment, were evacuated and three RPG rounds destroyed. At 1528 hours Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, engaged four enemy (XT294313) with organic weapons, killing all four. The enemy small arms fire produced negative casualties, and a cache containing 49 RPG rounds, 70 82mm mortar rounds, and 100 60mm mortar rounds was uncovered and evacuated. At 1529 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav located eight enemy killed by artillery at XT289316. The force sweeping from the south engaged another group of four enemy at 1535 hours at XT293314. Company A killed three of the enemy and captured one CKC rifle without receiving any return fire. Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, captured the fourth, who was taken to Tay Ninh for interrogation.
Two pounds of documents, two RPG launchers, five AK-47 rifles, two SKS rifles, three ChiCom claymores, 19 ChiCom hand grenades, one ChiCom field radio with S.O.I., 1500 rounds of small arms ammunition, 400 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition, one loaded RPD magazine, 23 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, four pounds of medical supplies, a bag of miscellaneous machine gunÔds of polished rice, two NVA backpacks, four NVA canteens, five NVA ponchos, three NVA shovels, two flashlights, and six pounds of clothing and miscellaneous web gear were gathered during the sweep of the battlefield and evacuated to Cu Chi. One enemy body was also discovered at XT291315.
After spending an uneventful night, all companies moved out from the NDP to continue their ground reconnaissance of the immediate area on the morning of 4 April. Company C prepared to move to Cu Chi Base Camp to conduct a 24-hour maintenance standdown, and Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry moved from Patrol Base (PB), Blue (XT258290) to replace them. At 0830 hours A/2-27 Inf located one enemy KIA in blue shorts and a blue shirt which baa credited to their contact at 1517 hours the previous day. At the same time B/2©27 Inf located another body at XT289314 which was credited to artillery fired at 1548 hours on 3 April. At 0915 hours one field telephone switchboard with batteries, two terminal boxes, one 82mm mortar sight, five pounds of documents, and one unknown type of booster which had been found during the morning by the two companies were evacuated to Cu Chi. Another cache (XT287317) containing 43 rounds of 82mm, 30 rounds of 60mm and three rounds of 75mm ammunition plus an 82mm mortar sight and one ton of unbagged rice was discovered by the two companies at 1136 hours and destroyed. At noon the companies returned to their NDP for a hot meal brought in by helicopter.
The two air strikes of the day were flown at 1100 hours and 1300 hours before weather conditions became too poor (see Overlay 10). CPT Brown directed the first on targets marked by helicopters from D/3-4 Cav. CPT MacLeod directed the second, which produced one large secondary explosion and several smaller ones. He had the Fª100s make strafing runs with their 20mm cannon, but they were unable to cause any more explosions. An artillery spotter in a LOH made a visual reconnaissance of the area and saw numerous boxes scattered on the ground, leading to the assumption that a supply bunker had been destroyed.
In the afternoon sweep (see Overlay 11) Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, moved northwest to establish a line, and then began sweeping southwest towards two large clearings. Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry provided security for them and then continued towards PB Blue for the night. During the sweep B/2-27 Inf located several bodies and miscellaneous equipment. At 1220 hours they located ten KIA (BC) at XT287317, of which six were credited to their small arms fire, two to the artillery, and two to air strikes. At 1230 hours two bodies were located (XT279313) which had been killed by D/3-4 Cav, and one RPG-2 launcher was evacuated. Fifteen minutes later at XT289315 one pound of documents, 660 small arms rounds, nine 82mm mortar rounds, and one RPG round were evacuated to Cu Chi. A/B/2-27 Inf halted at 1600 hours in the large clearings to eat their evening meal which was brought in on resupply helicopters. At this time the evening rainstorms set in.
During this meal, A/B/2-27 Inf used binoculars to select sites for platoon-sized ambush patrols which would be set out that night in the clearings. At 1930 hours the patrols moved out. Company B selected locations for its platoons along the northwest edge of their clearing (see Overlay 12). The 1st Platoon set up an Lªshaped ambush at the clearing entrance (XT275301), the 2nd Platoon chose an area to their northeast (XT278314), and the 3rd Platoon with the command element remained between them (XT277312). By 2000 hours, the 1st and 2nd Platoons had become established in their locations, but the 3rd still had not found a suitable site.
Just after dark (approximately 2010 hours), 1/B/2-27 Inf saw an unidentified element moving towards their positions from the southwest. The Platoon Leader, 2LT Dennis Heitner, wanted clearance before engaging the estimated 20 men because there were indications that they might be allied troops. Before he could contact the Company Commander, his men informed him that the force was composed of 200-250 heavily equipped NVA. 2LT Heitner ordered his men to lay down and let the enemy pass. The column, which had no forward or flank security and was observing lax route discipline, passed in such close proximity to the platoon's position that they walked over the wires strung out to the platoon's claymore mines. The enemy force paused for approximately 45 seconds near the platoon's posi¬tion to allow stragglers to close up, and the AP saw that they were heavily laden with LMGs, mortars, and large quantities of ammunition being transported on stretchers. As the two-man rear security element of the 300 meter long column came abreast of his position (about 2035 hours), 2LT Heitner told his men to get on the other side of their berm and open fire on the enemy who were disappearing into a large wooded area to the east. He initiated fire with his M-60 machine guns and M-79s, followed by a general engagement with small arms. The enemy replied with small arms and RPG fire.
The other two platoons, concentrated at the 3rd Platoon location, set up a cross fire. Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, was recalled to the scene and helicopter gunships, flareships and artillery were brought in. A/2-27 Inf never saw the enemy, most of whom had evaded into the woods when the contact was initiated. B/2-27 Inf gathered at the 3rd Platoon site and were joined there by A/2-22 Inf (M). The mechanized company had taken sniper fire which wounded two men in its effort to join B/2-27 Inf, but had seen few enemy. Resupply was brought in to the consolidated NDP, but no further activity occurred that night. It was the opinion of the officers of Company B that the element they engaged was returning to its base camp and was completely unaware of the presence of any allied units in the area. It is possible that this unit was part of the force which attacked FSB Jay (XT0375) on 30 March.
On 5 April, Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, and Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, were ordered to continue their ground reconnaissance of the contact area, concentrating on the vicinity of the previous night's encounter. Company A, 2-27 Inf, would go to Cu Chi Base Camp for a 24-hour maintenance standdown and be relieved in place at noon by Company C.
At 0925 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav located two enemy KIA (XT292299) which were credited to A/2-22 Inf (M) from the previous evening's action. At 0940 hours B/2-27 Inf located one enemy KIA from the night before and received one Hoi Chanh, badly burned by napalm (XT275307). They also captured two AK-47 rifles and one pistol belt. Four bodies of enemy soldiers killed by air strikes were located between 1100 and 1200 hours. Company B discovered two at XT281306, and Company A found one at XT280304 and another at XT282306.
Two air strikes were delivered at split locations (see Overlay 13) during the morning. CPT Hawkins directed one at 1160 hours which destroyed a large supply bunker and produced a large secondary explosion. 1LT Parsons directed the second at 1200 hours.
After the noon meal, the ground forces continued to sweep west towards their evening NDP (XT270320). At 1500 hours LTC Custer's Command and Control ship engaged and killed one enemy with three flame baths at XT296301. There was no return fire. One half-hour later A/2-22 Inf (M) located five enemy KIA from their engagement on 4 April (XT276303). They also captured ten rucksacks and destroyed 35 RPG boosters. At 1545 hours, a UH-1H from the 25th Aviation Battalion flying over XT289301 at an altitude of 500 feet and a speed of 50 knots received small arms fire from an unknown location. No damage occurred and there was no return fire. The final action of the day occurred when Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery engaged a suspected enemy location (XT296308), killing two at 1745 hours.
Plans for the final day of the action, 6 April, called for Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, to return to Cu Chi for a 24-hour maintenance standdown. The remaining companies (C/2-27 Inf and A/B/2-22 Inf (M)) were to make a sweep through the area and move west to NDPs.
At 0730 hours A/B/2-22 Inf (M) received one Hoi Chanh in their NDP (XT295283). He was evacuated to Cu Chi for interrogation. Exploiting information obtained from him, Company B evacuated one RPD light machine gun at 1500 hours (XT301286). The other incident during the day oc¬curred at 1341 hours when Company B detonated a tripwired hand grenade and had two men wounded (XT282302). Three air strikes were flown (see Overlay 14) at 0900, 0930 and 1300 hours, the last of which produced a large secondary explosion.
13. RESULTS: This action was a successful ground reconnaissance operation carried out by 3rd Brigade elements. Enemy personnel losses during the five-day operation were 101 KIA (BC), one prisoner-of-war captured, and two Hoi Chanh received by US forces. Large amounts of enemy equipment were also captured or destroyed. US forces suffered 11 men killed and 35 wounded, of whom 18 were treated and returned to duty immediately, but one of whom subsequently died of wounds.
The 271 VC/NVA Regiment was hurt by this operation which inflicted heavy personnel and material losses and destroyed the base area of the 2 and 3 Battalions. This operation has impaired the enemy's offensive capability in the Hieu Thien District of Tay Ninh Province.
14. ANALYSIS: This operation succeeded because the morale, initiative, esprit-decorps and fighting qualities of the individual soldier proved equal to the test, and because of outstanding support from air assets and artillery. The enemy force was aggressive, well-equipped, highly trained, and well-entrenched. The massive, concentrated firepower which was utilized by the ground troops enabled them to batter the enemy while minimizing casualties.
The initial contacts of both the Rangers and Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, resulted in heavy expenditures of ammunition, particularly M-60 and M-79 rounds. The enemy apparently was inadequately supplied with mortars and M-79s, since he made little use of them, especially in the Ranger contact when they would have been decisive. Both the Ranger team and B/C/2-27 Inf experienced sniper fire which was highly effective, and had enemy ground elements trying to maneuver around their flanks. Air assets proved invaluable in providing flank security. The team from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry, felt that their early insertion caught the enemy by surprise, since the extensive positions around the clearing were only partly manned. By contrast B/C/2-27 Inf found the positions they assaulted prepared and fully manned.
The Forward Air Controllers encountered unusual problems with air congestion during the operation. There were numerous helicopters overflying the contact area, and an ARVN contact four kilometers southwest which was also utilizing air support required coordination. Eighteen tactical air strikes were flown in the area, despite heavy cloud cover which often provided the supporting fighters with special problems involved in low altitude bombing.
[Signature Block]
s/ Ralph J. Ballway
RALPH J. BALLWAY
MAJ, INF
Division Historian
COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. Capt Seid Waddell CW5 (Join to see) CW5 Charlie Poulton CSM Charles Hayden SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT SSgt Robert Marx SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP4" SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SGT John " Mac " McConnell SP5 Mark Kuzinski SGT Forrest Stewart SGT Robert Hawks SPC (Join to see) SrA Christopher Wright
MISSION: "Initially, the teams from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry were inserted into the contact area to exploit intelligence information. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which was preparing to begin normal operations in the same general area, was committed as a reaction force when the Rangers developed the large contact. Two companies from the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, were committee to the action as it expanded. The mission of the reacting forces was to conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area, and to extract the bodies of the two Rangers who had been killed."
This was a successful ground reconnaissance operation carried out by 3rd Brigade , 25th ID elements. "Enemy personnel losses during the five-day operation were 101 KIA (BC), one prisoner-of-war captured, and two Hoi Chanh received by US forces. Large amounts of enemy equipment were also captured or destroyed. US forces suffered 11 men killed and 35 wounded, of whom 18 were treated and returned to duty immediately, but one of whom subsequently died of wounds."
I found an after action report by the Division historian at: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/vietnam/reneg/rtxt.htm
Here are the details for that report:
1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Unnamed; Ground Reconnaissance.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 02 April - 06 April 1970.
3. LOCATION: Renegade Woods (XT2930); Sheet Number 6231 III N, Map Series L8020, 1:25,000; Hieu Thien District, Tay Ninh Province.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED:
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian.
7. TASK ORGANIZATION:
a. Teams 38 and 39, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry.
b. Companies A, B, C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry.
c. Companies A, B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry.
8. SUPPORTING FORCES:
a. Artillery.
(1) Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm howitzer).
(2) Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (8" howitzer).
(3) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, IIFFV (155mm howitzer).
(4) Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery, IIFFV (8" howitzer).
b. Army Aviation.
(1) Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Centaur).
(2) Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion (Little Bear).
(3) Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion (Diamondhead).
(4) 116th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion (Hornet).
(5) 187th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion (Crusaders).
(6) 118th Assault Helicopter Company, 145th Aviation Battalion (Thunderbird).
(7) 159th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) (Dustoff) - MEDEVAC.
(8) 3rd Brigade Aviation Element (Snoopy).
c. United States Air Force.
(1) Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FAC), 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (OV-10).
(2) 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100; A-37).
(3) 31st Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100).
(4) 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100).
(5) 8th Attack Squadron (A-37).
(6) 3rd Direct Air Support Center (AC-119 Show).
9. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The primary mission of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division is to destroy VC/NVA forces and their bases of operation; assist the Republic of Vietnam in rural development, pacification and civic action programs; assist in training and provide support to RVNAF; and to be prepared to reinforce US and ARVN forces within the TAOI as directed. This Brigade is continuing Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang.
10. INTELLIGENCE: a. Enemy: Intelligence indicated that enemy main force units might be moving into the Renegade Woods to establish a base area from which to conduct offensive operations. On 30 March elements of the 271 Regiment and elements of the 272 Regiment conducted an attack on Fire Support Base Jay (XT0375) of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), but were repulsed with a loss of 70 KIA (BC). After the attack these units were reported moving to base areas to refit. Subsequent moves of these regiments was not indicated, however, a move to the south along the border was suspected and watched for. The first indication of a sizeable enemy force in the Renegade Woods came when Teams 38 and 39, Co F (Ranger), 75th Inf made contact on 2 April 1970. Interrogation of prisoners-of-war and Hoi Chanh, plus readouts from captured documents, later identified the 271 Regiment, 9 VC/NVA Division as the enemy force contacted during this operation.
Interrogation of Nguyen Huong Mai, a prisoner-of-war captured on 3 April in the vicinity of XT264274 revealed that the 2 and 3 Battalions of the 271 Regiment were moving into newly established positions in the Renegade Woods to prepare for future operations. He further stated that the battalions were 80% NVA and that his battalion (2 Battalion) had a strength of 200-300 men. Documents captured on 3 April ln the vicinity of XT292312 identified the Executive Officer, C13 Company, 3 Battalion, 271 Regiment, and the same battalion was identified by further documents found the next day at XT289312.
The ground units involved in the action found numerous indications that the enemy was highly trained and well-equipped. They identified NVA equipment in large quantities, and believed the enemy to be highly aggressive NVA regulars.
For additional information, see Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 372nd Radio Research Company, 303rd Radio Research Battalion, dated 1 April 1970.
b. Terrain: The Renegade Woods is a flat area with thick double canopy jungle heavily undergrown with vines. The few open areas consist of elephant grass bisected by hedgerows and have isolated clumps of brush and a few dead trees, but are basically without cover or concealment. An exception was the landing zone of the Ranger team which had two bomb craters that provided the only cover. The hedgerows and jungle areas had been heavily bunkered and provided excellent defensive positions which were very difficult to locate. (See Overlay 1.)
c. Weather: Weather remained variable during the contact period and caused some difficulties during the early morning hours and again in the later afternoon when rainstorms forced air assets to operate at low level. Those periods, notably the mornings of 2, 3, and 4 April and the afternoon of 4 April, were the only exceptions to generally excellent visibility during the contact period. High temperatures in the 90s were typically seasonal for this area of Vietnam and caused only minor difficulties as most of the troops were acclimated. Heavy residual ground moisture on the morning of 2 April caused an unusually high number of weapons to malfunction among the Ranger team. It also served to lessen casualties among the elements engaged that day by absorbing much of the ricochet.
11. MISSION: Initially, the teams from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry were inserted into the contact area to exploit intelligence information. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which was preparing to begin normal operations in the same general area, was committed as a reaction force when the Rangers developed the large contact. Two companies from the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, were committee to the action as it expanded. The mission of the reacting forces was to conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area, and to extract the bodies of the two Rangers who had been killed.
12. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION:
At 0700 hours on 2 April the Commanding Officer, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry, CPT Paul Schierholz, was alerted by 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, to provide an element to exploit intelligence information in the Renegade Woods (XT3O32). From 0700 to 0800 hours a Light Scout Team (LST) from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry flew a visual reconnaissance of the area and noted no activity in the proposed landing zone (LZ), but saw signs of recent activity in a large clearing approximately 1000 meters to the west and 500 meters to the south. The AH-1G Cobra (Centaur 47) and OH-6A Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) (Centaur 13) saw a camouflaged structure just west of this clearing and made rocket and grenade passes at it, uncovering eight to ten buildings. They then returned to Cu Chi to refuel.
The 13-man Ranger element, composed of teams 38 and 39 (see Inclosure 4), boarded two UH-1H helicopters provided by D/3-4 Cav at 0800 hours and proceeded to the Renegade Woods, escorted by the LST. (See Inclosure 5). Upon arriving in the area they still found no signs of enemy activity near the proposed LZ, but discovered additional footprints in the other clearing (XT291316) along with a lister bag lying in the open near a well. At this time WO1 Kenneth Strand, Aircraft Commander in the Cobra,advised 1LT Philip Norton, the Ranger Team Leader who was riding in the lead UH-1H (Centaur 23) to supervise the insertion, of these findings. 1LT Norton decided to insert the team at the new location, which was accomplished at 0835 hours (see Overlay 2). Following standard operating procedures for Ranger insertions there was no preparation of the landing zone.
The Rangers deployed from the helicopters, immediately found signs of recent activity, and began moving west toward where the structures had been uncovered. At approximately 0840 hours a light machine gun (LMG) opened fire on the lead man, 1LT Norton, SGT Fred Stuckey and SP4 Donald Purdy, at a range of ten to 15 meters (see Overlay 3). In this initial burst of fire SGT Stuckey was wounded, 1LT Norton's AN/PRC-25 radio was rendered inoperable when the cord to its microphone was severed, and SP4 Purdy's extractor mechanism on his M-16 was shattered. SGT Stuckey and SP4 Purdy destroyed the LMG with hand grenades, killing its crew, but the team began taking fire from all directions. Since a LMG is usually found with at least a reinforced platoon, too large a force for the team to fight, it was decided that they should withdrew to the east and attempt to maneuver around the enemy. SFC Alvin Floyd, the Assistant Team Leader, contacted the Cobra with the remaining radio and requested that suppressive fire be placed on the western treeline, and that a reaction force be sent into the area.
The team split into its two elements, Team 39 under 1LT Norton moving eastward while Team 38 under SFC Floyd provided covering fire (see Overlay 4). The initial firefight lasted three to five minutes and died down to isolated sniping by the time Team 39 reached the eastern end of the clearing (100 meters away) and began deploying into the woods. During this withdrawal the Cobra made minigun and rocket passes on the western treeline to provide cover. At this time its 40mm automatic grenade launcher jammed after firing only one of the 250 rounds it carried. The LOH also made firing passes with its M-60 machine guns. The two UH-1H helicopters (Centaur 23 and 24) were dispatched to Cu Chi to bring out a reaction force. Centaur 23 had intended to land to MEDEVAC SGT Stuckey, but WO1 Strand refused it permission because no assistance had been requested and ground fire was too intense.
As Team 39 entered the eastern treeline they began to receive a heavy volume of fire from small arms and two or possibly three LMGs. Team 38 had just reached the vicinity of a large bomb crater, approximately 15 feet deep and 30 feet wide, when a combination of small arms and a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fired from the north killed SFC Floyd and SGT Michael Thomas and wounded SP4 Donald Tinney. SFC Floyd's radio was destroyed by the explosion, leaving the team without radio contact. Suppressive fire was placed by the Rangers in all directions to enable all of them to withdraw to the crater which provided the only cover in the area. At this time SFC Colin Hall silenced the western LMG and killed its crew with hand grenades and M-16 fire, and SGT Charles Avery silenced the RPG-7 and M-79 firing from the northern LMG site.
Once inside the lip of the crater 1LT Norton dragged SP4 Tinney to safety and obtained the microphone from SFC Floyd's radio, enabling him to regain communications. He repeated his request for a reaction force and gunship support, and additionally requested MEDEVAC for the three men struck by the RPG. The Cobra expended the rest of its rockets and minigun ammunition (4000 rounds) in laying suppressive fire. Tho LOH made passes with its M-60s expending 600 rounds. It also began jettisoning extra ammunition in preparation for an attempt to accomplish the MEDEVAC by leaving one of its gunners on the ground to make space for the wounded. The UH-1H helicopters heard the call and returned on station, having gotten as far towards Cu Chi as the French Factory (XT3532).
The Rangers inside the crater were taking small arms fire from all directions and hand grenade fire from a finger of the woods to the southwest. However, their suppressive fire succeeded in silencing the crew-served weapons. A NVA soldier emerged from the southern treeline to throw a hand grenade, but was wounded and then killed by two hand grenades thrown by SGT Stuckey. PFC Raymond Allmon expended the 700 rounds of M-60 ammunition he carried and a 50-round belt he removed from SGT Thomas' body, and was reduced to using his .45 caliber pistol. PFC Steven Perez expended all his M-79 ammunition and PFC Kenneth Langland fired 860 rounds before his M-60 malfunctioned. By about 0920 hours the team had expended most of their ammunition and were having many weapons failures. The LST had expended their ammunition and were making dry gun runs in an attempt to suppress the enemy fire.
At 0922 hours Centaur 23's Commander, WO1 James Tonelli, and its Pilot, CPT Philip Tocco, landed after a low-level approach to pick up the wounded. (See Overlay 5.) The helicopter received four hits from ground fire during the extraction (see Diagram 1), and was later examined by experts from Bell Aircraft who expressed amazement that it was still able to fly. The ship landed ten to 15 feet from the lip of the crater, and 1LT Norton gave his men the order to board, since they were in an untenable position. SP5 Charles Lowe, the Grew Chief, maintained fire with his M-60 on the treeline ten meters away while the doorgunner, PFC Richard Adams, a former member of Team 38, jumped off the ship to assist in getting SP4 Tinney aboard. After spending 30 seconds on the ground the overloaded UH-1H lifted off with maximum torque and severe vertical vibration and cleared the treeline with 11 Rangers and its crew of four aboard. One of its M-60 machine guns jammed as it was lifting off, but the Rangers continued firing their individual weapons. The two dead man were left on the ground along with some of the destroyed or damaged weapons and equipment. All the helicopters were running low on fuel and departed for Cu Chi, arriving there about 1000 hours. Centaur 23 had to stop near Trang Bang (XT4919) to administer initial first aid to SP4 Tinney and to redistribute the passengers, some of whom were literally hanging on, before landing at the 12th Evacuation Hospital.
At 0900 hours 1LT David Parsons, a Forward Air Controller (FAC), arrived on station over the contact area in an OV-10 and expended 1500 rounds of minigun ammunition strafing after the extraction. He received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the ground. Also at 0900 hours, Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, were alerted that they were to be inserted into the area as the reaction force. Company B had conducted Ambush Patrols (APs) in an area nine kilometers south of the contact area and were alerted to move to a pick-up point for airlift. Company C had been serving as a blocking force for an ARVN contact four kilometers to the southwest. Additionally, Company A which had just come into Cu Chi on standdown was placed on alert. The Battalion had been preparing to conduct operations in the same general area on that day. At 0925 hours LTC George Custer III, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, flying in a Command and Control helicopter from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, took off to supervise the action, and he remained on station for the majority of the five-day encounter.
Company C, utilizing three UH-1H ships, began helilifting to a LZ located in the vicinity of XT298313 (see Overlay 6). Artillery fire from Fire Support Bases (FSBs) Hull and Hampton provided a blocking fire into which the enemy was to be driven. By 1100 hours the 1st and 3rd Platoons, Company C, had assembled and began moving west towards the area of the Ranger contact, while part of the 2nd Platoon moved along a parallel course 300 meters north. At 1140 hours both elements became engaged. The heavier contact involved the southern group, which had been moving forward in a two-column formation through a series of open areas bordered by hedgerows (XT297313). The lead platoon, the 1st, was immediately pinned down by a LMG firing from the right front. The initial burst of fire killed the point man of the right column and wounded the other point man. The Platoon Leader, 1LT Ronnie Clark, was also wounded in the stomach by this burst which initiated a 20-minute firefight. At 1217 hours urgent MEDEVAC was requested by the Company Commander.
When this action began, 2/C/2-27 Inf began receiving small arms fire from the west (to their front), but most fell short. The Platoon Leader, 2LT Monte Hack, requested gunship cover to enable him to pull back and link up with the rest of the Company. He withdrew but was unable to rejoin the rest of the Company until about 1400 hours when Company B was lifted into the action. At that time his wounded man and five heat casualties were evacuated. The 3rd Platoon which had been on the right flank of the 1st pulled back and maneuvered in again on its left. 2LT Ronald Kolb, with 3/C/2-27 Inf was killed during this maneuver, and SSG Melvin Kalili, Platoon Sergeant of the 1st Platoon, was killed when he went to aid the wounded point man. The intense enemy fire was very accurate and well-directed. The men of Company C were effectively pinned down and had difficulty locating the source of the enemy fire. They remained pinned down by the sniper fire following the firefight for over six hours and had extreme difficulty extracting their casualties. The dead point was left overnight because it was impossible to reach his body.
At 1145 hours a Light Fire Team (LFT) composed of two UH-1C gunships from the 118th Assault Helicopter Company were orbiting the contact area trying to locate ground fire with other aviation elements and CPT William Wilson, a FAC. One of the gunships was shot down by small arms fire, but the pilot was able to set it down in a clearing about 800 meters west of the contact site (XT287314), and the crew safely evaded one hedgerow westward where the other gunship rescued them. The UH-1C's left side rocket pod was on fire and the rockets "cooked off" after the crew had left. The FAC and other gunships expended in support of the rescue.
At 1200 hours CPT Wendell Brown (FAC) was on station over the contact area and inquired if the ground commander wanted tactical air strikes in addition to the LFT from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion, then on station. He requested two immediate air strikes in addition to the one already scheduled. Those he directed on target at 1315, 1330, and 1345 hours in an area west of the contact (see Overlay 7 and Inclosure 3). At 1337, 1357 and 1421 hours resupply ships from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, brought in extra ammunition and evacuated seven wounded men and five heat casualties to Tay Ninh.
Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which had been waiting at its pick-up zone since 0900 hours was finally airlifted into a LZ (XT298315) to assist Company C. The seven UH-1H helicopters took the Commanding Officer, CPT Charles Creswell, and his command element with the 1st and part of the 2nd Platoons on the first lift. After an hour-long flight, it inserted at 1423 hours. The second lift brought in the remainder of the company and 1SG Domingo Rodriguez-Colon at 1820 hours. The element from the initial lift formed on line with 2/B/2-27 Inf on the right and moved forward 300 meters until they reached Company C (see Overlay 6).
At approximately 1445 hours they began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire, and assaulted forward, bypassing the strongpoint which was keeping Company C pinned down. The 1st Platoon worked through the open area to its front by fire and maneuver, but was forced to halt when the 2nd Platoon became pinned down temporarily, causing its fire to impact close to the front of the 1st Platoon's positions. While they were temporarily halted, the enemy attempted to maneuver around their right flank. Two men who emerged from the hedgerow were killed by the fire of 1/B/2-27 Inf, one of whom appeared to be either a junior officer or NCO who was attempting to lead his men. Other enemy soldiers were chased out of the hedgerow and two more were killed by gunship fire then they attempted to flee west. This firefight cost the 1st Platoon one machine gunner wounded.
The 2nd Platoon was finally able to move up on line, but highly accurate sniper fire immediately pinned them down, killing SP4 John Lyons, the RTO (radioman), and 2LT Orvil Kitchens the Forward Observer (FO) from Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, in rapid succession. The bypassed "hot corner", where the initial LMG fire had come from, had been quiet for some time, so SGT Stephen Adams, a squad leader from the 1st Platoon, Company B, and SP4 Richard Nast, a medic from HHC attached to his platoon, attempted to retrieve the body of the dead point man. The LMG opened fire on them and kept them pinned down until SP4 Orlando Noriega, a machine gunner from 1/B/2-27 Inf fired to his rear with his M-60 and an M-16 which he took from his assistant gunner and silenced it. This action also enabled the forward elements to commence a fighting withdrawal as they began to run out of ammunition. They were forced to leave two bodies at the limit of the farthest advance, as well as the dead point man, and abandon some equipment. MEDEVAC of casualties took place at 1533, 1545 and 1631 hours as the wounded and the bodies of the KIAs were brought back to the LZ.
At 1525 hours Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was alerted to move to a pick-up zone at Cu Chi and began lifting on two UH-1H helicopters at 1600 hours. By 1815 hours the last of the company had inserted into a LZ approximately one kilometer southwest of Companies B and C. The withdrawal of these two Companies to a night defensive position (NDP) in the vicinity of their LZ was covered by artillery fire from FSB Hull and FSB Hampton, and air strikes placed on enemy positions 400©600 meters west by 1LT Hamby Fagg at 1700 hours and again at 1805 hours. This second strike which was made by four F-100s struck positions marked by a Cobra in the area of the camouflaged structures. During this last strike 1LT Fagg expended 1000 rounds covering Company B's right flank with a Cobra. They spotted a group of enemy maneuvering to attack, and broke it up after the ground troops had marked their positions with smoke.
At 1820 hours the second lift of Company B arrived at the LZ and was directed by MAJ Howard McAllister, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, S-3 who had assumed command on the ground, to begin securing a NDP for the engaged troops to withdraw to. LTC Custer reported that the contact was broken off at 1840 hours, and a four-ship resupply mission brought ammunition, food and water into the NDP. Reinforcements were brought in for Company C from the Battalion rear, and 1LT Cy Weisner, Company C Executive Officer (XO), replaced the wounded 1LT Clark in command of 1/C/2-27 Inf. Helicopter gunships and flareships remained on station during the night but there was no contact. CPT John MacLeod directed the final airstrike of the day at 1900 hours and made rocket and machine gun runs when the fighters received ground fire.
The mission of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was to conduct a ground reconnaissance on 3 April of the previous day's contact area, and to retrieve the five bodies left overnight. The task force was composed of Companies A, B, C, and Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, which was made OPCON. Plans called for B/C/2-27 Inf to sweep west from their position through the area of their firefight to the area of the Ranger contact. There they would link up with Company A and B/2-22 Inf (M) moving up from the south (see Overlay 8).
At 0745 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged three enemy in the vicinity of XT292320. They received ineffective small arms fire from the enemy and killed all three. CPT Bobby Hawkins, FAC, arrived on station at 0945 hours as the ground troops began moving forward, and shut off artillery fire to clear the air for friendly aircraft. At 1000 hours he sent the day's first air strike (see Overlay 9) into the area, resulting in two enemy KIA (BC). His rocket and machine gun passes which were required to suppress ground fire directed at the aircraft resulted in another possible enemy KIA. Companies B and C had meanwhile moved up to the contact area and paused while the air strikes were bright in, and then moved forward to evacuate the three bodies left in the area the previous afternoon. They paused again at 1100 hours to let additional air assets be brought in.
CPT MacLeod brought in an air strike at 1100 hours on positions marked with smoke by a LST from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and in response to ground requests for additional napalm had two more air strikes brought into the area by 1300 hours. At 1100 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged two enemy near an oxcart in the vicinity of XT275308, killing both. The NVA were attempting to fire an RPG at the LOH when they were killed by rockets and minigun fire from the Cobra. A .51 caliber machine gun mount, six RPG rounds and 1/4 pound of documents were evacuated to Cu Chi from this encounter. CPT MacLeod engaged two enemy in a bunker (XT283318) at 1146 hours, killing both of them. The weather had cleared by this time, enabling the follow-up missions to avoid the necessity of making low-level approaches which had plagued pilots earlier in the day. The first element of fighters at 1300 hours produced multiple secondary explosions.
During their pause to allow the air assets to be brought in, Companies B and C policed the contact area and gathered up abandoned equipment for evacuation. They also ate a hot meal at noon which was brought forward from the LZ by their respective security elements. Company C utilized its 1st Platoon for this task, with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons remaining on line. Company B kept three platoons as a striking force and had its Weapons Platoon (without heavy weapons) acting as a rear security element. The equipment was evacuated between 1400 and 1430 hours, with the two companies (minus security elements) sweeping forward to the area of the Ranger contact where they linked up with A/2-27 Inf and B/2-22 Inf (M) which had swept up from the south across their front. Two armored personnel carriers (APCs) broke down during the sweep and 2/B/2-27 Inf provided security for them until them were repaired.
At approximately 1400 hours CPT Brown and 1LT Parsons received permission to engage a bunker complex (XT290314) which 1LT Parsons had seen one NVA run into earlier. After having B/2-27 Inf mark its positions with smoke, CPT Brown made an initial rocket pass which flushed four or five enemy into the open. The two FACs made ten passes apiece on the target, chasing several more enemy into the open, and receiving fire from small arms, LMGs, and RPGs. Initially, the enemy ran towards Company B, which engaged them with organic weapons at 1415 hours. Six enemy were killed by the ground troops before they fled. Several weapons were found in the bunkers, indicating that the enemy was attempting to strike Company B on the northern flank.
After the bodies of the two dead Rangers were recovered by Company A, the ground troops swept west to the downed UH-1C. They provided security while it was disarmed and recovered by a CH-47. Recovery took place at 1815 hours with 1LT Parsons flying cover. At this time all four companies returned to the clearing where the Ranger contact had occurred and established a NDP with APCs positioned around the perimeter.
During the afternoon's sweep of the area, there were several isolated contacts. Company A engaged three enemy in a bunker (XT292312) located a LST from D/3-4 Cav. Using small arms fire at 1517 hours, they killed three enemy without taking any casualties. A ChiCom claymore mine and documents identifying the XO, C13 Company, 3 Battalion, 271 Regiment, were evacuated and three RPG rounds destroyed. At 1528 hours Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, engaged four enemy (XT294313) with organic weapons, killing all four. The enemy small arms fire produced negative casualties, and a cache containing 49 RPG rounds, 70 82mm mortar rounds, and 100 60mm mortar rounds was uncovered and evacuated. At 1529 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav located eight enemy killed by artillery at XT289316. The force sweeping from the south engaged another group of four enemy at 1535 hours at XT293314. Company A killed three of the enemy and captured one CKC rifle without receiving any return fire. Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, captured the fourth, who was taken to Tay Ninh for interrogation.
Two pounds of documents, two RPG launchers, five AK-47 rifles, two SKS rifles, three ChiCom claymores, 19 ChiCom hand grenades, one ChiCom field radio with S.O.I., 1500 rounds of small arms ammunition, 400 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition, one loaded RPD magazine, 23 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, four pounds of medical supplies, a bag of miscellaneous machine gunÔds of polished rice, two NVA backpacks, four NVA canteens, five NVA ponchos, three NVA shovels, two flashlights, and six pounds of clothing and miscellaneous web gear were gathered during the sweep of the battlefield and evacuated to Cu Chi. One enemy body was also discovered at XT291315.
After spending an uneventful night, all companies moved out from the NDP to continue their ground reconnaissance of the immediate area on the morning of 4 April. Company C prepared to move to Cu Chi Base Camp to conduct a 24-hour maintenance standdown, and Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry moved from Patrol Base (PB), Blue (XT258290) to replace them. At 0830 hours A/2-27 Inf located one enemy KIA in blue shorts and a blue shirt which baa credited to their contact at 1517 hours the previous day. At the same time B/2©27 Inf located another body at XT289314 which was credited to artillery fired at 1548 hours on 3 April. At 0915 hours one field telephone switchboard with batteries, two terminal boxes, one 82mm mortar sight, five pounds of documents, and one unknown type of booster which had been found during the morning by the two companies were evacuated to Cu Chi. Another cache (XT287317) containing 43 rounds of 82mm, 30 rounds of 60mm and three rounds of 75mm ammunition plus an 82mm mortar sight and one ton of unbagged rice was discovered by the two companies at 1136 hours and destroyed. At noon the companies returned to their NDP for a hot meal brought in by helicopter.
The two air strikes of the day were flown at 1100 hours and 1300 hours before weather conditions became too poor (see Overlay 10). CPT Brown directed the first on targets marked by helicopters from D/3-4 Cav. CPT MacLeod directed the second, which produced one large secondary explosion and several smaller ones. He had the Fª100s make strafing runs with their 20mm cannon, but they were unable to cause any more explosions. An artillery spotter in a LOH made a visual reconnaissance of the area and saw numerous boxes scattered on the ground, leading to the assumption that a supply bunker had been destroyed.
In the afternoon sweep (see Overlay 11) Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, moved northwest to establish a line, and then began sweeping southwest towards two large clearings. Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry provided security for them and then continued towards PB Blue for the night. During the sweep B/2-27 Inf located several bodies and miscellaneous equipment. At 1220 hours they located ten KIA (BC) at XT287317, of which six were credited to their small arms fire, two to the artillery, and two to air strikes. At 1230 hours two bodies were located (XT279313) which had been killed by D/3-4 Cav, and one RPG-2 launcher was evacuated. Fifteen minutes later at XT289315 one pound of documents, 660 small arms rounds, nine 82mm mortar rounds, and one RPG round were evacuated to Cu Chi. A/B/2-27 Inf halted at 1600 hours in the large clearings to eat their evening meal which was brought in on resupply helicopters. At this time the evening rainstorms set in.
During this meal, A/B/2-27 Inf used binoculars to select sites for platoon-sized ambush patrols which would be set out that night in the clearings. At 1930 hours the patrols moved out. Company B selected locations for its platoons along the northwest edge of their clearing (see Overlay 12). The 1st Platoon set up an Lªshaped ambush at the clearing entrance (XT275301), the 2nd Platoon chose an area to their northeast (XT278314), and the 3rd Platoon with the command element remained between them (XT277312). By 2000 hours, the 1st and 2nd Platoons had become established in their locations, but the 3rd still had not found a suitable site.
Just after dark (approximately 2010 hours), 1/B/2-27 Inf saw an unidentified element moving towards their positions from the southwest. The Platoon Leader, 2LT Dennis Heitner, wanted clearance before engaging the estimated 20 men because there were indications that they might be allied troops. Before he could contact the Company Commander, his men informed him that the force was composed of 200-250 heavily equipped NVA. 2LT Heitner ordered his men to lay down and let the enemy pass. The column, which had no forward or flank security and was observing lax route discipline, passed in such close proximity to the platoon's position that they walked over the wires strung out to the platoon's claymore mines. The enemy force paused for approximately 45 seconds near the platoon's posi¬tion to allow stragglers to close up, and the AP saw that they were heavily laden with LMGs, mortars, and large quantities of ammunition being transported on stretchers. As the two-man rear security element of the 300 meter long column came abreast of his position (about 2035 hours), 2LT Heitner told his men to get on the other side of their berm and open fire on the enemy who were disappearing into a large wooded area to the east. He initiated fire with his M-60 machine guns and M-79s, followed by a general engagement with small arms. The enemy replied with small arms and RPG fire.
The other two platoons, concentrated at the 3rd Platoon location, set up a cross fire. Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, was recalled to the scene and helicopter gunships, flareships and artillery were brought in. A/2-27 Inf never saw the enemy, most of whom had evaded into the woods when the contact was initiated. B/2-27 Inf gathered at the 3rd Platoon site and were joined there by A/2-22 Inf (M). The mechanized company had taken sniper fire which wounded two men in its effort to join B/2-27 Inf, but had seen few enemy. Resupply was brought in to the consolidated NDP, but no further activity occurred that night. It was the opinion of the officers of Company B that the element they engaged was returning to its base camp and was completely unaware of the presence of any allied units in the area. It is possible that this unit was part of the force which attacked FSB Jay (XT0375) on 30 March.
On 5 April, Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, and Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, were ordered to continue their ground reconnaissance of the contact area, concentrating on the vicinity of the previous night's encounter. Company A, 2-27 Inf, would go to Cu Chi Base Camp for a 24-hour maintenance standdown and be relieved in place at noon by Company C.
At 0925 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav located two enemy KIA (XT292299) which were credited to A/2-22 Inf (M) from the previous evening's action. At 0940 hours B/2-27 Inf located one enemy KIA from the night before and received one Hoi Chanh, badly burned by napalm (XT275307). They also captured two AK-47 rifles and one pistol belt. Four bodies of enemy soldiers killed by air strikes were located between 1100 and 1200 hours. Company B discovered two at XT281306, and Company A found one at XT280304 and another at XT282306.
Two air strikes were delivered at split locations (see Overlay 13) during the morning. CPT Hawkins directed one at 1160 hours which destroyed a large supply bunker and produced a large secondary explosion. 1LT Parsons directed the second at 1200 hours.
After the noon meal, the ground forces continued to sweep west towards their evening NDP (XT270320). At 1500 hours LTC Custer's Command and Control ship engaged and killed one enemy with three flame baths at XT296301. There was no return fire. One half-hour later A/2-22 Inf (M) located five enemy KIA from their engagement on 4 April (XT276303). They also captured ten rucksacks and destroyed 35 RPG boosters. At 1545 hours, a UH-1H from the 25th Aviation Battalion flying over XT289301 at an altitude of 500 feet and a speed of 50 knots received small arms fire from an unknown location. No damage occurred and there was no return fire. The final action of the day occurred when Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery engaged a suspected enemy location (XT296308), killing two at 1745 hours.
Plans for the final day of the action, 6 April, called for Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, to return to Cu Chi for a 24-hour maintenance standdown. The remaining companies (C/2-27 Inf and A/B/2-22 Inf (M)) were to make a sweep through the area and move west to NDPs.
At 0730 hours A/B/2-22 Inf (M) received one Hoi Chanh in their NDP (XT295283). He was evacuated to Cu Chi for interrogation. Exploiting information obtained from him, Company B evacuated one RPD light machine gun at 1500 hours (XT301286). The other incident during the day oc¬curred at 1341 hours when Company B detonated a tripwired hand grenade and had two men wounded (XT282302). Three air strikes were flown (see Overlay 14) at 0900, 0930 and 1300 hours, the last of which produced a large secondary explosion.
13. RESULTS: This action was a successful ground reconnaissance operation carried out by 3rd Brigade elements. Enemy personnel losses during the five-day operation were 101 KIA (BC), one prisoner-of-war captured, and two Hoi Chanh received by US forces. Large amounts of enemy equipment were also captured or destroyed. US forces suffered 11 men killed and 35 wounded, of whom 18 were treated and returned to duty immediately, but one of whom subsequently died of wounds.
The 271 VC/NVA Regiment was hurt by this operation which inflicted heavy personnel and material losses and destroyed the base area of the 2 and 3 Battalions. This operation has impaired the enemy's offensive capability in the Hieu Thien District of Tay Ninh Province.
14. ANALYSIS: This operation succeeded because the morale, initiative, esprit-decorps and fighting qualities of the individual soldier proved equal to the test, and because of outstanding support from air assets and artillery. The enemy force was aggressive, well-equipped, highly trained, and well-entrenched. The massive, concentrated firepower which was utilized by the ground troops enabled them to batter the enemy while minimizing casualties.
The initial contacts of both the Rangers and Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, resulted in heavy expenditures of ammunition, particularly M-60 and M-79 rounds. The enemy apparently was inadequately supplied with mortars and M-79s, since he made little use of them, especially in the Ranger contact when they would have been decisive. Both the Ranger team and B/C/2-27 Inf experienced sniper fire which was highly effective, and had enemy ground elements trying to maneuver around their flanks. Air assets proved invaluable in providing flank security. The team from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry, felt that their early insertion caught the enemy by surprise, since the extensive positions around the clearing were only partly manned. By contrast B/C/2-27 Inf found the positions they assaulted prepared and fully manned.
The Forward Air Controllers encountered unusual problems with air congestion during the operation. There were numerous helicopters overflying the contact area, and an ARVN contact four kilometers southwest which was also utilizing air support required coordination. Eighteen tactical air strikes were flown in the area, despite heavy cloud cover which often provided the supporting fighters with special problems involved in low altitude bombing.
[Signature Block]
s/ Ralph J. Ballway
RALPH J. BALLWAY
MAJ, INF
Division Historian
COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. Capt Seid Waddell CW5 (Join to see) CW5 Charlie Poulton CSM Charles Hayden SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT SSgt Robert Marx SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP4" SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SGT John " Mac " McConnell SP5 Mark Kuzinski SGT Forrest Stewart SGT Robert Hawks SPC (Join to see) SrA Christopher Wright
a. Teams 38 and 39, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry. b. Companies A, B, C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry. c. Companies A, B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry.
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